

Russian War Crimes Against Ukraine:

The Breach of International Humanitarian Law by the Russian Federation



The Global Accountability Network

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RUSSIAN WAR CRIMES AGAINST UKRAINE:

The Breach Of International Humanitarian Law By The Russian Federation Fourth Edition
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The UAP creates documentation products in a narrative and graphical format, as well as a quarterly and annual trend analysis of ongoing crimes. Furthermore, the UAP publishes issue-specific white papers.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Executive Summary	1
I. Introductory Remarks by Professor David M.Crane*	2
II. Introduction by the Authors	4
III. The Russian Federation's Invasion of Ukraine	5
IV. Historical Background Preceding the Russian Federation's Invasion of Ukraine	7
A. Brief Description	7
B. Eurasian Chernozem Belt	8
C. Soviet-Era Ukraine	12
1. Holodomor	12
2. Chernobyl	15
3. Ukraine Declaration of Independence	18
4. The Denuclearization of Ukraine	19
D. Russia-Ukraine War	21
1. Revolution of Dignity/Maidan Revolution/Euromaidan	24
2. Crimea	31
3. The Donbas	35
V. International Legal Framework of Accountability	38
E. History of the Geneva Conventions	38
F. The Conventions	39
G. Overview and Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court	42
H. Crimes Against Humanity	42
I. War Crimes	44
J. The Crime of Aggression and Ukraine	45
VI. Violations of International Law by Russia	47
A. Unlawful Targeting of Medical Facilities	47
B. Use of Indiscriminate Cluster Munitions Against Civilians	50
C. Willfully Causing Great Suffering and Murder of Civilians	52
D. Targeting of Journalists and Members of the Press	53
E. Bombing of Evacuation and Humanitarian Routes	55
F. Forced Deportation of Ukrainian Civilians	58
G. Sexual Violence	62
I. Torture	64
J. Pillaging	68
K. Employing Poison or Poisoned Weapons	70
L. Chemical Warfare	71
M. Unlawful use of Enemy Uniforms	73
VII. Conclusion	75

A. Most Egregious Incidents Appendix	77
MOST EGREGIOUS INCIDENTS	78
Incident: MAR 2022 Invasion of Bucha	79
Incident: 16 MAR 2022, Mariupol Drama Theater Bombing	92
Incident: 8 APR 2022, Kramatorsk Railway Station Bombing	100
Incident: The Destruction of Dzarylhach National Park	108
Incident: The Destruction of Ukrainian Grain Infrastructure	112
Incident: The Use of Banned Chemical Weapons Against Ukrainian Forces	118
Incident: 6 JUN 2023 The Destruction of the Nova Kakhova Dam	122
Incident: The Detention, Torture, and Killing of Victoria Roshchyna	128
Incident: 8 JUL 2024 Missile Attack on Okhmatdyt Children’s Hospital in Kyiv	134
Incident: 1 FEB 2025 Poltava Apartment Strike	142
Incident: 2 APR 2025 The Destruction of a Dam in the Village of Popovka of the Belgorod Region	150
Incident: 4 APR 2025 Kryvyi Rih Playground Strike	154
Incident: 13 APR 2025 Missile Strike on Sumy	163
Incident: “The Human Safari” - Targeting of Civilians With Quadcopter Drones in Kherson	172
Incident: 28 AUG 2025 Kyiv Missile and Drone Strike	184
B. Most Responsible Parties	190
I. Introduction and Scope	191
II. Key Areas	191
Key Political Areas	191
Key Military Areas	192
Relevant Areas of Operations	193
III. Key Structures and Infrastructure	193
Importance of Belarusian Infrastructural Support in the Ukrainian Invasion	193
Russia’s Access to Chernobyl	195
Conscription Situation	195
Military Hardware and Apparatuses Used in Ukraine Invasion	196
Planes	197
Helicopters	197
IV. Key Capabilities: Military Capabilities	197
Land Forces	197
Air Forces	198
Naval Forces	199
Special Operations Forces	199
Paramilitary Forces	200

<u>Political Capabilities</u>	201
<u>Economic Capabilities</u>	203
<u>Media/Information Capabilities</u>	204
<u>United Russia</u>	206
<u>Military Organizations: Armed Forces of the Russian Federation</u>	207
<u>Economic Organizations</u>	207
<u>Bank of Russia</u>	207
<u>Gazprom</u>	207
<u>Most Responsible Parties</u>	209
<u>I. VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVICH PUTIN</u>	214
<u>II. VALERY VASILYEVICH GERASIMOV</u>	223
<u>III. NIKOLAY VASILYEVICH/VASELYEVICH BOGDANOVSKY/BOGDANOVSKIY</u>	226
<u>IV. IGOR OLEGOVICH KOSTYUKOV</u>	228
<u>V. OLEG LEONIDOVICH/LEONYDOVYCH SALYUKOV</u>	230
<u>VI. ALEKSANDR PAVLOVICH LAPIN</u>	233
<u>VII. VASILY/VASILII PETROVICH TONKOSHKUROV</u>	236
<u>VIII. ALEKSANDR/ALEXANDER ANATOLYEVICH MATOVNIKOV</u>	238
<u>IX. SERGEY/SERGEI VLADIMIROVICH SUROVIKIN</u>	240
<u>X. VIKTOR MUSAVIROVICH AFZALOV</u>	243
<u>XI. SERGEY/SERGEI VLADIMIROVICH DRONOV</u>	245
<u>XII. NIKOLAI/NIKOLAY ANATOLYEVICH YEVMENOV</u>	247
<u>XIII. ALEKSANDR MIKHAILOVICH NOSATOV</u>	249
<u>XIV. VLADIMIR LVOVICH KASATONOV</u>	251
<u>XV. IGOR VLADIMIROVICH OSIPOV</u>	253
<u>XVI. VIKTOR VASILYEVICH ZOLOTOV</u>	256
<u>XVII. VALENTINA MATVIYENKO</u>	260
<u>XVIII. SERGEY/SERGEI KUZHUGETOVICH SHOIGU</u>	263
<u>XIX. RUSLAN KHADZHISMELOVICH TSALIKOV</u>	267
<u>XX. DMITRY VITALYEVICH BULGAKOV</u>	269
<u>XXI. PAVEL ANATOLYEVICH/ANATOLEVICH POPOV</u>	271
<u>XXII. TATIANA/TATYANA VIKTOROVNA SHEVTSOVA</u>	273
<u>XXIII. YURI/YURIY EDUARDOVICH SADOVENKO</u>	275
<u>XXIV. ALEXANDER/ALEKSANDR VASILYEVICH FOMIN</u>	277
<u>XXV. TIMUR VADIMOVICH IVANOV</u>	280
<u>XXVI. YUNUS-BEK BAMATGIREYEVICH YEVKUROV/EVKUROV</u>	282
<u>XXVII. NIKOLAY ALEKSANDROVICH PANKOV</u>	286
<u>XXVIII. ALEKSEY/ALEXEY/ALEXEI YURIEVICH KRIVORUCHKO</u>	290

XXIX. DMITRY EVGENYEVICH SHUGAEV/SCHUGAEV	293
XXX. ALEKSANDR/ALEXANDER ALEKSANDROVICH MIKHEEV	296
XXXI. VLADIMIR ALEXANDROVICH KOLOKOLTSEV	299
XXXII. SERGEY VIKTOROVICH LAVROV	304
XXXIII. MARIA VLADIMIROVNA ZAKHAROVA	307
XXXIV. MIKHAIL VLADIMIROVICH MISHUSTIN	310
XXXV. ANDREI/ANDREY REMOVICH BELOUSOV	313
XXXVI. DMITRY YURYEVICH GRIGORENKO	316
XXXVII. YURY PETROVICH TRUTNEV	319
XXXVIII. VIKTORIA/VICTORIA VALERIEVNA ABRAMCHENKO	322
XXXIX. YURY IVANOVICH BORISOV	324
XL. DMITRY NIKOLAEVICH CHERNYSHENKO	327
XLI. TATYANA ALEKSEEVNA GOLIKOVA	330
XLII. MARAT SHAKIRZYANOVICH KHUSNULLIN	333
XLIII. ALEXANDER VALENTINOVICH NOVAK	337
XLIV. ALEXEI/ALEXEY LOGVINOVICH OVERCHUK	341
XLV. DMITRY ANATOLYEVICH MEDVEDEV	344
XLVI. SERGEI/SERGEY BORISOVICH IVANOV	349
XLVII. VYACHESLAV VIKTOROVICH VOLODIN	352
XLVIII. DMITRY VIKTOROVICH KOCHNEV	356
XLIX. ALEKSANDR/ALEXANDER VASILYEVICH BORTNIKOV	358
L. SERGEI BORISOVICH KOROLEV/KOROLYOV	361
LI. VLADIMIR GRIGORIEVICH KULISHOV	363
LII. NIKOLAI PLATONOVICH PATRUSHEV	366
LIII. RASHID GUMAROVICH NURGALIYEV/NURGALIEV	370
LIV. SERGEY YEVGENYEVICH NARYSHKIN	372
LV. ANTON EDUARDOVICH VAINO	376
LVI. ALEKSANDR PETROVICH CHUPRIYAN	379
LVII. MAXIM GENNADYEVICH RESHETNIKOV	381
LVIII. IGOR SHCHEGOLEV	384
LIX. VLADIMIR VASILYEVICH USTINOV	386
LX. ALEKSANDR VLADIMIROVICH GUTSAN	388
LXI. ANATOLY ANATOLYEVICH SERYSHEV	390
LXII. NIKOLAY NIKOLAYEVICH TSUKANOV	392
LXIII. IGOR ANATOLYEVICH KOMAROV	394
LXIV. YURY/YURIY YAKOVLEVICH CHAIKA/CHAYKA	396
LXV. IGOR VIKTOROVICH KRASNOV	398
LXVI. DENIS VALENTINOVICH MANTUROV	402

<u>LXVII. ALEKSANDR/ALEKSANDER VYACHESLAVOVICH KURENKOV</u>	<u>405</u>
<u>LXVIII. MIKHAIL YEVGENYEVICH/EVGENIEVICH MIZINTSEV</u>	<u>408</u>
<u>LXIX. AZATBEK ASANBEKOVICH OMURBEKOV</u>	<u>410</u>
<u>LXX. ALEKSANDR VLADIMIROVICH DVORNIKOV</u>	<u>413</u>
<u>LXXI. VIKTOR NIKOLAYEVICH SOKOLOV</u>	<u>415</u>
<u>LXXII. ALEKSANDR ALEKSEYEVICH MOISEYEV/MOISEEV</u>	<u>418</u>
<u>LXXIII. ALEKSANDR CHAIKO</u>	<u>420</u>
<u>LXXIV. RUSTAM USMANOVICH MURADOV</u>	<u>422</u>
<u>LXXV. ALEKSANDER LINKOV</u>	<u>424</u>
<u>LXXVI. ALEXANDER ALEXANDROVICH ZHURAVLYOV</u>	<u>425</u>
<u>LXXVII. ANDREI/ANDREY IYANOVICH SYCHEVOI</u>	<u>427</u>
<u>LXXVIII. ROMAN BORISOVICH BERDNIKOV</u>	<u>429</u>
<u>LXXIX. VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVICH YAKUSHEV</u>	<u>431</u>
<u>LXXX. MARIA ALEKSEEVNA LVOVA-BELOVA</u>	<u>434</u>
<u>C. Statute of the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine</u>	<u>441</u>

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This document will primarily cover the commission of war crimes by the Russian Federation since 24 February 2022. The basis of this report is founded upon open-source research and evidence collection by an inter-collegiate investigative team from across the US, collecting reports, photographic, and video evidence of crimes perpetrated in Ukraine. The contents of this document will provide the reader with a brief, but important, historical overview of Ukraine and its relationship with the Russian Federation. In addition, it will articulate the international legal mechanisms of accountability, identify individuals most responsible for the commission of crimes in Ukraine, and provide a series of representative charges to be used in an international criminal tribunal. In its conclusion, this paper calls upon the international community to not remain silent or idle, but to respond to the call for justice and accountability by utilizing the available international accountability mechanisms, as the Russian Federation is openly committing crimes of aggression, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.

In addition, this document contains appendices that provide the reader more detailed information regarding the Russian Federation's criminal activity in Ukraine.

Notably, there are omissions from this document that are deserving of discussion and further analysis. The efforts of the Global Accountability Network's Ukraine Accountability Project do not end here. This is only the Fourth Edition, and the Ukraine Accountability Project will continue its investigations and analyses of crimes committed in Ukraine.

I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS BY PROFESSOR DAVID M. CRANE^{1*}

Only the dead have seen the end of the war. George Santayana

The Ukraine Accountability Project of the Global Accountability Project is proud to present the fourth edition of "Russian War Crimes," a critical examination of the grave violations of international law following the unprovoked invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation. Initially published in April 2022, just five weeks after the onset of hostilities, the first edition set the stage for a comprehensive documentation of war crimes and atrocities committed against the Ukrainian people. This fourth edition serves as an updated and enhanced compilation, reflecting the evolving narrative of accountability for those most responsible for these heinous acts.

From the onset of the invasion, it has been evident that the actions of the Russian Federation, under the leadership of President Vladimir Putin, represent a flagrant disregard for international law and the very principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter. As a founding and permanent member of the UN Security Council, the Russian Federation is expected to uphold the rule of law, committing to the peaceful resolution of disputes and wielding force only as a last resort. Instead, we have witnessed a grim departure from these obligations, as the Kremlin has engaged in a systematic campaign to seize territory from a sovereign nation, inflicting enormous suffering and displacement upon innocents. Russian illegal actions rise to a new crime against humanity called *mass destruction*, a concept advocated by the Global Accountability Network.

This edition underscores the imperative for accountability—both for the state and for individuals who have perpetrated or enabled these war crimes and crimes against humanity. President Putin, now facing an arrest warrant from the International Criminal Court, exemplifies the urgent need for the global community to reject his aggressive actions and label the Russian Federation a pariah state. We must rally together, as advocates for justice, to ensure that those accountable for these transgressions face the full weight of international justice. This updated report aims to serve as a testament to the resilience of the Ukrainian people and a clarion call for a unified response against the alarming resurgence of aggression and impunity in modern geopolitics. It must be noted that the Council of Europe and Ukraine have joined together to account for Russian Aggression by creating the innovative Special Tribunal on the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine. For this they are to be commended.

As we delve into the findings of this fourth edition, let us reaffirm our commitment to upholding

¹ * Professor David M. Crane, author of *Every Living Thing: Facing Down Terrorists, Warlords, and Thugs in West Africa--A Story of Justice*, was the founding Chief Prosecutor of the Special Court for Sierra Leone from 2002 to 2005 after being appointed by Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan. He served with the rank of Under-Secretary General and indicted the President of Liberia, Charles Taylor, the first sitting African head of state in history to be held accountable. Prior to this position, he served over 30 years in the US government. He holds a J.D. from Syracuse University, a M.A. in African Studies and a B.G.S. in History from Ohio University.

the principles of justice and accountability, ensuring that the grave violations of the past are neither forgotten nor tolerated. The world stands at a crossroads, and the choices we make today will shape the future of international law and human rights for generations to come. The rule of law must be shown to be more powerful than the gun. This white paper serves as a warning to President Putin and strongmen around the world that his aggression and subsequent acts are wrong and he will be held accountable. His time is coming.

II. INTRODUCTION BY THE AUTHORS

In April 2022, in response to Russia's unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, the Global Accountability Network published *Russian War Crimes Against Ukraine: The Breach of International Humanitarian Law by the Russian Federation*. The publication of this document, the 4th Edition of *Russian War Crimes Against Ukraine* marks the fourth year of the conflict. Work on this edition began in February of 2025 and since then the European Council has created the Statute of the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine. This marks an incredible development not only in the conflict, but also in international law, as this is the first special tribunal to be established while the conflict is still ongoing. This statute, combined with the ICC's earlier arrest warrants for Vladimir Putin, Maria Lvova-Belova, Viktor Sokolov, Sergey Kobylash, Sergei Shoigu, and Valery Gerasimov, represent the international community's condemnation for Russia's actions in Ukraine. While these are promising developments, they are only the beginning of accountability for Ukraine.

The purpose of this paper is to assist legal experts, tribunals, and other enforcement mechanisms in holding the Russian Federation accountable for its actions in Ukraine by informing them of the scope of the war crimes that have been committed since Russia invaded. Since the Third Edition of this publication, updates have been made to every section, events and analysis have been added, and the appendices have been heavily edited and updated to reflect current developments.

The Ukraine Accountability Project continues its work and commitment to identifying atrocities in Ukraine and persistently demand that the international community continue to fight for accountability and reparations for the victims of the conflict.

III. THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION'S INVASION OF UKRAINE

The Russian Federation invaded Ukraine on 24 February 2022, with the stated goal to “demilitarise and denazify the nation.”² On the day of the attack, President Vladimir Putin called the invasion a “special military operation,”³ and these words were circulated as propaganda domestically in Russia.⁴ Grounded in these baseless claims and state-sponsored lies, Russia invaded Ukraine seeking a quick surrender.⁵ However, they were met by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy leading the defense of the nation with a call on Ukrainians to take up arms.⁶

The Russian government invaded Ukraine on three fronts: through Belarus, the east of Ukraine, and the south of Ukraine.⁷ Since the first day of invasion, Russia has continued its attacks not just on the Ukrainian military, but its civilian population as well. There have been reports of war crimes committed by the Russian government, including the shelling of an orphanage,⁸ a maternity hospital,⁹ and a children's hospital.¹⁰ Consequently, the international response has become increasingly harsh towards Russia since the initial invasion. Economic sanctions against the Russian government and the Russian oligarchs have weakened – sadly, have not crippled – the Russian war-fighting effort.¹¹ For example, Russian banks have been blocked from engaging in global transactions, causing its economy to take a hit.¹² As a result, Russian forces seem to be experiencing a shortage of small arms and munitions, even with their recent purchase of these supplies from North Korea.¹³ In contrast, the US and European nations are providing

² Paul Kirby, *Why has Russia invaded Ukraine and what does Putin want?*, BBC NEWS <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-56720589> (last visited 29 Mar. 2022).

³ Paul Kirby, *Why has Russia invaded Ukraine and what does Putin want?*, BBC NEWS <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-56720589> (last visited 29 Mar. 2022).

⁴ Paul Kirby, *Why has Russia invaded Ukraine and what does Putin want?*, BBC NEWS <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-56720589> (last visited 29 Mar. 2022).

⁵ Paul Kirby, *Why has Russia invaded Ukraine and what does Putin want?*, BBC NEWS <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-56720589> (last visited 29 Mar. 2022).

⁶ Alexander Marrow, *Ukraine's Zelenskiy calls on citizens to fight, promises weapons*, REUTERS (24 Feb. 2022), <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraines-zelenskiy-calls-citizens-fight-promises-weapons-2022-02-24/>.

⁷ James Hookway & Yaroslav Trofimov, *What is Happening in Ukraine and Why Russia is invading*, WSJ (17 May 2022), <https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraine-russia-war-invasion-whats-happening-11646157211>.

⁸ Jen Kirby & Jonathan Guyer, *Russia's war in Ukraine, explained*, VOX (6 Mar. 2022), <https://www.vox.com/2022/2/23/22948534/russia-ukraine-war-putin-explosions-invasion-explained>.

⁹ *Ukraine war: Three dead as maternity hospital hit by Russian air strike*, BBC NEWS (10 Mar. 2022), <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60675599>.

¹⁰ Tim Lister et al., *Mariupol children's hospital bombing one of many attacks on medical facilities since Russian invasion, WHO says*, CNN (10 Mar. 2022), <https://www.cnn.com/2022/03/10/europe/russia-invasion-ukraine-03-10-intl/index.html>.

¹¹ James Hookway & Yaroslav Trofimov, *What is Happening in Ukraine and Why Russia is invading*, WSJ (17 May 2022), <https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraine-russia-war-invasion-whats-happening-11646157211>.

¹² Jen Kirby & Jonathan Guyer, *Russia's war in Ukraine, explained*, VOX (6 Mar. 2022), <https://www.vox.com/2022/2/23/22948534/russia-ukraine-war-putin-explosions-invasion-explained>.

¹³ Julian E. Barnes, *Russia Is Buying North Korean Artillery, According to US Intelligence*, THE NEW YORK TIMES (5 September, 2022) <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/05/us/politics/russia-north-korea-artillery.html>.

international support in the form of military equipment to the Ukrainian government.¹⁴

As a result, the ‘quick and easy’ takeover of Ukraine has become an intense grind akin to the trench warfare of the First World War.¹⁵ In response, Russia has resorted to human wave tactics and indiscriminate bombardment of military and civilian positions with little success.¹⁶ Meanwhile, the Ukrainian armed forces have managed to expel Russian forces from the Kyiv Oblast and regain key, previously lost territory through irregular war and shipments of western arms.¹⁷

Throughout most of its modern history, Ukraine’s nationhood has repeatedly been in peril.¹⁸ From Stalin’s starvation of 3 million Ukrainians to Putin’s invasion of the Donbas territories (2014), Ukraine is no stranger to attacks on its nationhood.¹⁹ Ukrainians are fighting back with the memory of previous Russian atrocities and oppression still festering as open wounds.²⁰ Yet, these efforts will not be enough to fully resolve this ongoing conflict. The international system of justice must step up and fulfill its role as a mechanism of accountability. Without it, the painful and brutal history of the Ukrainian occupation will continue unabated, leaving democracy and justice around the world in peril.

¹⁴ James Hookway & Yaroslav Trofimov, *What is Happening in Ukraine and Why Russia is invading*, WSJ (17 May 2022), <https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraine-russia-war-invasion-whats-happening-11646157211>.

¹⁵ *Echoes Of World War I Highlighted In Mud, Shattered Trees Of Ukraine*, RADIO FREE EUROPE RADIO LIBERTY (2 Dec. 2022) <https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-mud-world-war-1-russia-invasion/32157465.html>.

¹⁶ Andreas Kluth, *Russia's 'Human Wave Attacks' Are Another Step Into Hell*, The Washington Post (14 Feb. 2023) https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/russias-human-wave-attacks-are-another-stepinto-hell/2023/02/14/574e7202-ac27-11ed-b0ba-9f4244c6e5da_story.html.

¹⁷ Jim Garamore, *Ukraine's Success Was a Surprise Only to the Russians*, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE NEWS (13 September 2022) <https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3157239/ukraines-success-was-a-surprise-only-to-the-russians/>.

¹⁸ Olga Tokariuk, *Ukraine Won't Surrender (Apologies to Certain Europeans)*, CEPA (16 Mar. 2022), <https://cepa.org/ukraine-wont-surrender-apologies-to-certain-europeans/>.

¹⁹ Olga Tokariuk, *Ukraine Won't Surrender (Apologies to Certain Europeans)*, CEPA (16 Mar. 2022), <https://cepa.org/ukraine-wont-surrender-apologies-to-certain-europeans/>.

²⁰ Olga Tokariuk, *Ukraine Won't Surrender (Apologies to Certain Europeans)*, CEPA (16 Mar. 2022), <https://cepa.org/ukraine-wont-surrender-apologies-to-certain-europeans/>.

IV. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND PRECEDING THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION'S INVASION OF UKRAINE

A. Brief Description

Ukraine is a country in Eastern Europe that regained its independence in 1991 following the dissolution of the Soviet Union.²¹ The use of “the” before “Ukraine” is a rejected usage by the Ukrainian government in its Declaration of Independence and Constitution and in western media.²² The capital of Ukraine is Kyiv (the Russian “Kiev” pronunciation and spelling are also rejected).²³ The word “Ukraine” means “borderland”.²⁴ Ukraine borders Russia to the east and northeast; Belarus to the north; and Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary to the northwest. To the southwest, it borders Romania and Moldova, and its coastline stretches along the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea (See Figure 1). The Dnieper River flows through the center of Ukraine (See Figure 1).

²¹ Chrystyna Lapchak, *Independence: Over 90% Vote Yes in Referendum; Kravchuk Elected President of Ukraine*, UKRAINIAN WEEKLY (8 Dec. 1991),

https://www.ukrweekly.com/archive/1991/The_Ukrainian_Weekly_1991-49.pdf.

²² *Resolution On Declaration of Independence of Ukraine*, VERKHOVNA RADA OF UKR., http://static.rada.gov.ua/site/postanova_eng/Rres_Declaration_Independence_rev12.htm (last visited 19 Mar. 2022); *The Constitution of Ukraine*, VERKHOVNA RADA OF UKR., <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/en/254k/96-bp#Text> (last visited Mar. 19, 2022); Tom Geoghegan, *Ukraine or the Ukraine: Why do some country names have ‘the’?*, BBC NEWS MAG. (7 Jun. 2012), <https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-18233844>; Adam Taylor, *Why Ukraine Isn’t ‘The Ukraine,’ And Why That Matters Now*, BUS. INSIDER (9 Dec. 2013), <https://www.businessinsider.com/why-ukraine-isnt-the-ukraine-and-why-that-matters-now-2013-12>; Katy Steinmetz, *Ukraine, Not the Ukraine: The Significance of Three Little Letters*, TIME (5 Mar. 2014), <https://time.com/12597/the-ukraine-or-ukraine/>; Franklin Foer, *It’s Not ‘The’ Ukraine*, ATLANTIC (17 Feb. 2022),

<https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/02/defending-ukraine/622063/>.

²³ Steinmetz, *Ukraine, Not the Ukraine: The Significance of Three Little Letters*, TIME (5 Mar. 2014), <https://time.com/12597/the-ukraine-or-ukraine/>; Franklin Foer, *It’s Not ‘The’ Ukraine*, ATLANTIC (17 Feb. 2022), <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/02/defending-ukraine/622063/>; Jerome Socolovsky, *Kyiv or Kiev? Why people disagree about how to pronounce the Ukrainian capital’s name*, NPR (25 Jan. 2022), <https://www.npr.org/2022/01/25/1075357281/how-do-you-pronounce-kyiv>; Mark Rice-Oxley, *How to pronounce and spell ‘Kyiv’, and why it matters*, THE GUARDIAN (25 Feb. 2022), <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/25/how-to-pronounce-and-spell-kyiv-kiev-ukraine-and-why-it-matter>; Ruby Mellen, *It’s Ukraine, not ‘the’ Ukraine. And Ukrainians want you to get it right*, WASH. POST (1 Oct. 2019), <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/10/01/its-ukraine-not-ukraine-ukrainians-want-you-get-it-right/>.

²⁴ *Ukraine*, ONLINE ETYMOLOGY DICTIONARY, <https://www.etymonline.com/word/ukraine> (last visited 19 Mar. 2022) (explaining “from Russian or Polish *Ukraina*, literally “border, frontier,” from *u-* “at” + *krai* “edge.” So Ukraine is regarded as the southern frontier of Poland or Russia.”); Steinmetz, *supra* note 22 (explaining “Ukraine’s name is thought to come from the Slavic word for borderland”).



Figure 1, Image Credit: Encyclopædia Britannica

B. Eurasian Chernozem Belt

The Eurasian Chernozem Belt—a rich, fertile soil high in humus, phosphorus, and phosphoric acids—runs across two-thirds of Ukraine.²⁵ In addition to Ukraine, the Eurasian Chernozem Belt also cuts across parts of Croatia, Serbia, Bulgaria, Romania, Russia, and Siberia.²⁶ USAID notes that “[w]ith over 41 million hectares of agricultural land covering 70 percent of the country, agriculture is Ukraine’s largest export industry.”²⁷ Ukraine is the ninth-largest wheat exporter in the world, the fifth-largest barley exporter, and the largest sunflower seed exporter.²⁸ The flag of

²⁵ Stepan Pozniak, *Chernozems of Ukraine: past, present and future perspectives*, 70 SCIENDO 193,193 (2019) (explaining “‘Chernozem’ is a Ukrainian word and has a national meaning. It is often used in everyday life, folklore and even in poems. In the soil nomenclature of various countries and international World Reference Base for Soil Resources (IUSS Working Group WRB 2015), the term is used without a translation.”); *Soils of Ukraine*, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (last visited 19 Mar. 2022), <https://www.britannica.com/place/Ukraine/Soils>; Marques Hayes, *What Is The Central Black Earth Region Famous For?*, WORLDATLAS (18 Sept. 2017), <https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/what-is-the-central-black-earth-region-famous-for.html>.

²⁶ *Earth from Space: Chernozem cropland*, EUR. SPACE AGENCY (7 Sept. 2012), https://www.esa.int/Applications/Observing_the_Earth/Earth_from_Space_Chernozem_cropland; Marques Hayes, *What Is The Central Black Earth Region Famous For?*, WORLDATLAS (18 Sept. 2017), <https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/what-is-the-central-black-earth-region-famous-for.html>.

²⁷ Will Horner, *Russia’s Ukraine Invasion Chokes Food Exports From Global Breadbasket*, WSJ (25 Feb. 2022), <https://www.wsj.com/articles/russias-ukraine-invasion-chokes-food-exports-from-global-breadbasket-11645798059>.

²⁸ *Wheat Exports by Country in 1000 MT*, INDEX MUNDI, <https://www.indexmundi.com/agriculture/?commodity=wheat&graph=production> (last visited 23 Mar. 2025); *Corn Exports by Country in 1000 MT*, INDEX MUNDI, <https://www.indexmundi.com/agriculture/?commodity=corn&graph=exports> (last visited 23 Mar. 2025); *Barley*

Ukraine, consisting of equal horizontal stripes of blue over yellow, is a nod to its fertile soil because it represents “blue skies over golden wheat fields.” (See figure 2).²⁹



Figure 2, Image Credit: WorldAtlas

Foreign investment has often targeted Ukraine for its fertile soils.³⁰ However, since 2001, there has been a Ukrainian moratorium “prohibiting transfers of a major part of agricultural land.”³¹ Therefore, most agricultural companies, regardless of their shareholders’ residency (Ukrainian or foreign), do not own agricultural land and must lease from individual landowners. On 31 March 2020, the Ukrainian Parliament passed a law, starting 1 July 2021, allowing Ukrainian citizens to purchase agricultural land and, starting 1 January 2024, allowing Ukrainian companies owned by

Exports by Country in 1000 MT, INDEX MUNDI, <https://www.indexmundi.com/agriculture/?commodity=barley&graph=exports> (last visited 23 Mar. 2025); *Sunflowerseed Oil Exports by Country in 1000 MT*, INDEX MUNDI, <https://www.indexmundi.com/agriculture/?commodity=sunflowerseed-oil&graph=exports> (last visited 23 Mar. 2025).

²⁹ *Flag of Ukraine*, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/flag-of-Ukraine> (last visited 19 Mar. 2022); *WHAT IS THE HISTORY AND MEANING BEHIND THE UKRAINIAN FLAG*, OFF. WEBSITE OF UKR., <https://ukraine.ua/stories/ukrainian-flag-day/> (last visited Mar. 19, 2022); Amanda Holpuch, *US flag makers are rushing to fill orders for Ukrainian flags*, N. Y. TIMES (3 Mar. 2022), <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/03/us/ukraine-flag-sales.html>.

³⁰ John Vidal, *Fears for the world’s poor countries as the rich grab land to grow food*, THE GUARDIAN (3 Jul. 2009), <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2009/jul/03/land-grabbing-food-environment>; Laetitia Van Eeckhout, *Ukraine: forgotten granary of Europe*, GUARDIAN (20 July 2010), <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jul/20/ukraine-grain-farming-exports>. See also Oane Visser, *Persistent farmland imaginaries: celebration of fertile soil and the recurrent ignorance of climate*, 38 AGRIC. AND HUM. VALUES 313, 313 (2021).

³¹ *Doing Agribusiness in Ukraine: Legal Guidance for Foreign Investors*, MINISTRY OF AGRARIAN POL’Y & FOOD OF UKR. 19 (July 2021); Bate Toms, *Ban on farmland sales to foreigners risks starving Ukraine of investment*, ATL. COUNCIL (21 Apr. 2020), <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/ban-on-farmland-sales-to-foreigners-risks-starving-ukraine-of-investment/>.

Ukrainian shareholders to purchase agricultural land.³² Under the law, “[f]oreigners and companies with foreign shareholders or beneficiaries cannot purchase agricultural land (whether directly or through a Ukrainian company) and will get this right only if a national referendum decides so.”³³ However, a substantial part of Ukraine’s most productive agricultural land is located in its eastern regions, which is currently under Russian attack. (See Figure 3).³⁴

³² *Doing Agribusiness in Ukraine: Legal Guidance for Foreign Investors*, MINISTRY OF AGRARIAN POL’Y & FOOD OF UKR. 19 (July 2021); Bate Toms, *Ban on farmland sales to foreigners risks starving Ukraine of investment*, ATL. COUNCIL (21 Apr. 2020), <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/ban-on-farmland-sales-to-foreigners-risks-starving-ukraine-of-investment/>.

³³ *Doing Agribusiness in Ukraine: Legal Guidance for Foreign Investors*, MINISTRY OF AGRARIAN POL’Y & FOOD OF UKR. 19 (July 2021).

³⁴ Alex Smith, *A Russia-Ukraine War Could Ripple Across Africa and Asia*, FOREIGN POL’Y (22 Jan. 2022), <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/01/22/russia-ukraine-war-grain-exports-africa-asia/>.

C. Soviet-Era Ukraine

1. Holodomor

It is one of the unique tragedies of Ukrainian history that, despite being blessed with some of the most fertile soils in the world, Ukraine also endured one of the worst famines in modern history. Between 1931 and 1934 Ukraine suffered an excess mortality of 3.9 million people: deaths caused by starvation, malnutrition, exhaustion, disease, and execution.³⁵ This event which would subsequently be called the *Holodomor*, “a term derived from the Ukrainian words for hunger—*holod*—and extermination—*mor*.” The earliest deaths were a direct result of the Soviet Union’s efforts to collectivize its agricultural system during the First Five Year Plan, 1928-1932.³⁶ The rapid industrialization of the Soviet Union required a reliable source of food which Stalin and his advisers believed could only be guaranteed by collectivizing the countryside into state-run farms. This collectivization would also have the benefit of bringing the somewhat more autonomous rural areas under more direct physical and ideological control of the state and, in Ukraine and Belarus, to secure the Soviet Union’s western border.

Many rural Ukrainians actively resisted these efforts, seeing no benefit in giving up their culture, independence, and meager property for the promise of a nebulous Soviet ideal. Peasants were pitted against peasants: those who spoke against collectivization, who refused to voluntarily join the collectivization movement, or who had a little more material wealth than their neighbors – a cow and calf, perhaps, or a horse – were branded *Kulaks* (in Ukrainian: “куркуль” “*Kurkul*’”)³⁷ and persecuted. Eventually, the term would be expanded to fit almost anyone viewed as a threat to the state or its agents. By 1930, parts of Ukraine were in active revolt.³⁸ Some of this resistance was described in state police reports as being explicitly Ukrainian nationalist and counter-revolutionary, although it is difficult to know whether these reports were accurate or instead a regurgitation of what leaders in Moscow wanted to hear.³⁹ Certainly, there was a growing conviction among Stalin and his lieutenants that the Ukrainian identity was a threat. The Soviets responded to this by mass deportations of so-called *Kurkul*’ and their families. At least

³⁵ Anne Applebaum, *Red Famine: Stalin’s War on Ukraine* xxvi (2017); *Demographic Research: Holodomor: The Real Number of Its Victims and Evidence of Its Man-Made Nature*, Harv. Univ., <https://gis.huri.harvard.edu/demographic-research> (last visited 24 Mar. 2023) (noting that in 1933, Ukraine had a total mid-year population of 29.6 million).

³⁶ Timothy Snyder, *Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin*, at 24-25, (2010).

³⁷ Serhii Plokhy, *The Gates of Europe, A History of Ukr.*, at 249, (2021).

³⁸ Serhii Plokhy, *The Gates of Europe, A History of Ukr.*, at 249, (2021); Plokhy notes that in March 1930 there were “more than 1,700 peasant revolts and protests” and “In regions...bordering Poland, whole villages rose up and marched towards the border.” For further detail see Anne Applebaum, *Red Famine: Stalin’s War on Ukraine* xxvi (2017); *Demographic Research: Holodomor: The Real Number of Its Victims and Evidence of Its Man-Made Nature*, Harv. Univ., <https://gis.huri.harvard.edu/demographic-research> (last visited 24 Mar. 2023); Timothy Snyder, *Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin*, at 24-25, (2010).

³⁹ Anne Applebaum, *Red Famine: Stalin’s War on Ukraine* xxvi (2017); *Demographic Research: Holodomor: The Real Number of Its Victims and Evidence of Its Man-Made Nature*, Harv. Univ., at 152-153, <https://gis.huri.harvard.edu/demographic-research> (last visited 24 Mar. 2023).

75,000 were deported from Ukraine that year to remote parts of the Soviet empire⁴⁰ with the total number deported during the Five-Year Plan estimated to be 300,000.⁴¹ Under this pressure, resistance shifted to more passive methods. Peasants slaughtered their livestock rather than hand them over to the collective. They produced enough food for themselves and their communities, but no more, and some left their villages permanently for what they hoped would be a more secure life in the city.⁴²

In response, Moscow increased the pressure. 1931 saw the first “collectivized” harvest in Ukraine. It was not a success; natural and man-made factors combined to produce grain yields that could not meet Moscow-set quotas which led to food shortages across the Soviet Union.⁴³ But rather than acknowledging the disruption caused by collectivization⁴⁴ and adjusting internal agricultural policies, export policies, or quotas, the Soviet leadership instead decided that the shortfall was a deliberate effort by *Kurkul's*, Ukrainian nationalists, and other counter-revolutionaries to steal food from the Soviet people.⁴⁵ Moscow ensured that grain quotas would be met by any means necessary including confiscation of household stores and, most ominously, of seed grain held in reserve for the next season’s sowing. Hungry peasants, already struggling, began to starve, and, with no means to plant a crop, their misery only deepened. They could neither feed themselves nor grow the grain to meet the state’s quotas.

By early 1932, many regions of Ukraine were in active famine. Stalin’s response to this crisis was to intensify the search for “thieves” and “saboteurs” and, ultimately, to re-cast the desperate search for food by hungry people into a direct assault on the state. In discussions with his Minister of Agriculture, Lazar Kaganovich, Stalin developed the theory that socialism required the absolute protection of “state property”, which included agricultural commodities.⁴⁶ Therefore, withholding any commodity, even if but a handful of grain to keep oneself or one’s children alive, was tantamount to an attack on the entire nation, an act of treason which merited death. This theory aligned with Stalin’s festering concern that Ukraine was the Soviet state’s most vulnerable point, and yet the keystone to the USSR’s survival. Ukraine had to be permanently secured and made, in Stalin’s words, “a real fortress of the USSR, a truly model republic.”⁴⁷

⁴⁰ Serhii Plokhy, *The Gates of Europe, A History of Ukr.*, at 250, (2021).

⁴¹ Timothy Snyder, *Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin*, at 27, (2010).

⁴² Serhii Plokhy, *The Gates of Europe, A History of Ukr.*, at 250, (2021).

⁴³ Anne Applebaum, *Red Famine: Stalin’s War on Ukraine* xxvi (2017); *Demographic Research: Holodomor: The Real Number of Its Victims and Evidence of Its Man-Made Nature*, Harv. Univ., at 164-165, <https://gis.huri.harvard.edu/demographic-research> (last visited 24 Mar. 2023).

⁴⁴ Which included a lack of draft animals, or tractors to replace them, derangement of the agricultural calendar by the collectivization process and unrealistic orders from Moscow, the loss of many of the best and most skilled farmers to deportation, and a lack of motivation to work on the part of those who remained. Snyder, Timothy Snyder, *Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin*, at 33, (2010).

⁴⁵ Snyder, Timothy Snyder, *Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin*, at 37, (2010); Anne Applebaum, *Red Famine: Stalin’s War on Ukraine* xxvi (2017); *Demographic Research: Holodomor: The Real Number of Its Victims and Evidence of Its Man-Made Nature*, Harv. Univ., at 163-166, <https://gis.huri.harvard.edu/demographic-research> (last visited 24 Mar. 2023).

⁴⁶ Serhii Plokhy, *The Gates of Europe, A History of Ukr.*, at 252, (2021).

⁴⁷ Serhii Plokhy, *The Gates of Europe, A History of Ukr.*, at 252, (2021).

Therefore, on 7 August 1932, an edict codifying the absolute protection of state property was passed, and its enforcement began almost immediately.⁴⁸ Cadres were sent into the countryside to search for hidden grain and to execute or exile for a minimum of 10 years, anyone presumed to have taken it.

In December 1932, at a politburo meeting on grain procurement Stalin placed the blame for the continuing quota shortfalls on the Ukrainian party leadership and their failure to prevent the “bourgeois nationalist elements”⁴⁹ from disrupting production and enforcing the party’s demands. In his eyes, Ukrainians could not be trusted to run Ukraine.

Consequently, beginning in November and December 1932, Ukrainian party cadres were purged, the Ukrainian People’s Commissar for Education, Mykola Skrypnyk, was driven to suicide,⁵⁰ and Ukrainian artists, intellectuals, teachers, and scholars were targeted. The use of the Ukrainian language was equated as a matter of policy with Ukrainian nationalism and thereby with efforts to wreck the state.⁵¹ Even the standard Soviet Ukrainian dictionary, developed by Skrypnyk, was banned, and a letter of the alphabet was purged from use to align the language more closely with Russian.

Many of those who managed to survive 1932 died in 1933-34. Already weakened by the hunger and terror they had suffered over the previous years; the survivors could not endure the new punitive regime enforced on them by Kaganovich and the Soviet Minister for the Interior, Vyacheslav Molotov.⁵² Under this system, the survivors could either hand over all their agricultural commodities and starve or hold back enough grain to keep themselves and their families alive or to plant the next season and be subject to execution. Villages and collective farms which could not meet their quotas were blacklisted, denied not only the means to plant future crops and the right to engage in trade, but also the necessities of life such as cloth, heating fuel and salt.⁵³ Internal border controls and passports were also instituted which prevented Ukrainians, first, from leaving the Republic, and, then, from moving from their villages or collective farms to the relatively better conditions in Ukrainian cities.⁵⁴ While other parts of the Soviet Union suffered famine, Ukrainians were deliberately imprisoned within their famine state. By the end of 1934, one in every eight Ukrainians had died of hunger⁵⁵ while their cultural,

⁴⁸ Serhii Plokhy, *The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine*, 252 (Basic Books 2021).

⁴⁹ Serhii Plokhy, *The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine*, 252 (Basic Books 2021).

⁵⁰ Serhii Plokhy, *The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine*, 252 (Basic Books 2021).

⁵¹ Anne Applebaum, *Red Famine: Stalin’s War on Ukraine* xxvi (2017); *Demographic Research: Holodomor: The Real Number of Its Victims and Evidence of Its Man-Made Nature*, Harv. Univ., at 213-218, <https://gis.huri.harvard.edu/demographic-research> (last visited 24 Mar. 2023).

⁵² Serhii Plokhy, *The Gates of Europe, A History of Ukr.*, at 253, (2021).

⁵³ Anne Applebaum, *Red Famine: Stalin’s War on Ukraine* xxvi (2017); *Demographic Research: Holodomor: The Real Number of Its Victims and Evidence of Its Man-Made Nature*, Harv. Univ., at 194-195, <https://gis.huri.harvard.edu/demographic-research> (last visited 24 Mar. 2023).

⁵⁴ Anne Applebaum, *Red Famine: Stalin’s War on Ukraine* xxvi (2017); *Demographic Research: Holodomor: The Real Number of Its Victims and Evidence of Its Man-Made Nature*, Harv. Univ., at 202-204, <https://gis.huri.harvard.edu/demographic-research> (last visited 24 Mar. 2023).

⁵⁵ Serhii Plokhy, *The Gates of Europe, A History of Ukraine.*, 253, (Basic Books 2021).

educational, spiritual, and linguistic institutions were systematically dismantled and criminalized. This “destruction, not of individuals only, but of a culture and a nation,” was cited explicitly by Raphael Lemkin as the “classic example” of the term he coined – genocide.⁵⁶ From 1933 until its collapse in 1991, the Soviet Union refused to recognize that a famine even took place in Ukraine.⁵⁷ However, thirty-two United Nations member countries and the Vatican City now recognize the Holodomor as genocide, including the US, Australia, Canada, and Poland.⁵⁸

2. Chernobyl

The Chernobyl Nuclear Disaster was the worst nuclear power plant disaster in history.⁵⁹ On 26 April 1986, the Chernobyl nuclear plant in northern Ukraine (about 80 miles north of Kyiv) exploded, releasing 400 times more radiation than the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima. (See Figure 4).⁶⁰ On 27 April, 45,000 residents of the nearby town of Pripyat were evacuated.⁶¹ While the Soviet government tried to keep the nuclear disaster a secret, the radioactive fallout was devastatingly conspicuous to the international community.⁶²

⁵⁶ Anne Applebaum, *Red Famine: Stalin's War on Ukraine* xxvi (2017); *Demographic Research: Holodomor: The Real Number of Its Victims and Evidence of Its Man-Made Nature*, Harv. Univ., at xxvii, <https://gis.huri.harvard.edu/demographic-research> (last visited 24 Mar. 2023).

⁵⁷ Nicole Loroff, et al., *Holodomor - Denial and Silences*, HREC Education, (Last Visited Mar. 23, 2025), <https://education.holodomor.ca/teaching-materials/holodomor-denial-silences/>.

⁵⁸ Anne Applebaum, *Red Famine: Stalin's War on Ukraine* xxvi (2017); *Demographic Research: Holodomor: The Real Number of Its Victims and Evidence of Its Man-Made Nature*, Harv. Univ., at xxviii, <https://gis.huri.harvard.edu/demographic-research> (last visited 24 Mar. 2023); Holodomor Museum, *Worldwide Recognition of the Holodomor as Genocide*, HOLODOMOR MUSEUM (04 Mar., 2025), <https://holodomormuseum.org.ua/en/recognition-of-holodomor-as-genocide-in-the-world/> (also including Bulgaria, Belgium, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Ecuador, Estonia, France, Georgia, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico, Moldova, the Netherlands, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Slovakia, Switzerland and Ukraine).

⁵⁹ ADAM HIGGINBOTHAM, *MIDNIGHT IN CHERNOBYL: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE WORLD'S GREATEST NUCLEAR DISASTER* (2019); SERHII PLOKHY, *CHERNOBYL: THE HISTORY OF A NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE* (2018). See *Chernobyl*, HIST. (24 Apr. 2018), <https://www.history.com/topics/1980s/chernobyl>.

⁶⁰ ADAM HIGGINBOTHAM, *MIDNIGHT IN CHERNOBYL: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE WORLD'S GREATEST NUCLEAR DISASTER* (2019); SERHII PLOKHY, *CHERNOBYL: THE HISTORY OF A NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE* (2018). See *Chernobyl*, HIST. (24 Apr. 2018), <https://www.history.com/topics/1980s/chernobyl>.

⁶¹ SVETLANA ALEXIEVICH, *VOICES FROM CHERNOBYL* (2006); KATE BROWN, *MANUAL FOR SURVIVAL: A CHERNOBYL GUIDE TO THE FUTURE* (2020); *Chernobyl*, ADAM HIGGINBOTHAM, *MIDNIGHT IN CHERNOBYL: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE WORLD'S GREATEST NUCLEAR DISASTER* (2019); SERHII PLOKHY, *CHERNOBYL: THE HISTORY OF A NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE* (2018); See *Chernobyl*, HIST. (24 Apr. 2018), <https://www.history.com/topics/1980s/chernobyl>; *Chernobyl Accident 1986*, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS'N, <https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/safety-and-security/safety-of-plants/chernobyl-accident.aspx> (last updated Apr. 2022).

⁶² ADAM HIGGINBOTHAM, *MIDNIGHT IN CHERNOBYL: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE WORLD'S GREATEST NUCLEAR DISASTER* (2019); SERHII PLOKHY, *CHERNOBYL: THE HISTORY OF A NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE* (2018). See *Chernobyl*, HIST. (24 Apr. 2018), <https://www.history.com/topics/1980s/chernobyl>.



Figure 4, Image Credit: UKTF Team

After 206 days, an initial Sarcophagus was erected above the disaster site to contain further radiation.⁶³ In 2017, this Sarcophagus was replaced by a new “tomb” that took two decades to make.⁶⁴ The new tomb is the biggest object humans have ever moved — bigger than Wembley Stadium and taller than the Statue of Liberty—and it will entomb the disaster site for 100 years. (See Figure 5).⁶⁵

⁶³ Christian Borys, *A vast new tomb for the most dangerous waste in the world*, BBC (3 Jan. 2017), <https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20170101-a-new-tomb-for-the-most-dangerous-disaster-site-in-the-world>; ADAM HIGGINBOTHAM, *MIDNIGHT IN CHERNOBYL: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE WORLD’S GREATEST NUCLEAR DISASTER* (2019); SERHII PLOKHY, *CHERNOBYL: THE HISTORY OF A NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE* (2018). See *Chernobyl*, HIST. (24 Apr. 2018), <https://www.history.com/topics/1980s/chernobyl>.

⁶⁴ Christian Borys, *A vast new tomb for the most dangerous waste in the world*, BBC (3 Jan. 2017), <https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20170101-a-new-tomb-for-the-most-dangerous-disaster-site-in-the-world>.

⁶⁵ Christian Borys, *A vast new tomb for the most dangerous waste in the world*, BBC (3 Jan. 2017), <https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20170101-a-new-tomb-for-the-most-dangerous-disaster-site-in-the-world>.



Figure 5, Image Credit: BBC

On 24 February 2022, Russian forces took control of all the facilities of the Chernobyl nuclear plant.⁶⁶ The control levels of the gamma radiation dose rates in the Chernobyl exclusion zone were exceeded—likely due to “disturbance of the top layer of soil from the movement of a large number of heavy military machinery through the exclusion zone and an increase of air pollution.”⁶⁷ On 9 March 2022, the Chernobyl nuclear plant lost connection to the grid.⁶⁸ On 14 March external power was restored and the plant was reconnected to Ukraine’s electricity grid.⁶⁹

⁶⁶ *Ukraine: Russia-Ukraine War and Nuclear Energy*, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N, (1 Mar. 2023), <https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-t-z/russian-military-operation-and-ukraine-s-nuclear-p.aspx>; *Chernobyl Accident 1986*, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N, <https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/safety-and-security/safety-of-plants/chernobyl-accident.aspx> (last updated Apr. 2022).

⁶⁷ *Ukraine: Russia-Ukraine War and Nuclear Energy*, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N, (1 Mar. 2023), <https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-t-z/russian-military-operation-and-ukraine-s-nuclear-p.aspx>; *Chernobyl Accident 1986*, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N, <https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/safety-and-security/safety-of-plants/chernobyl-accident.aspx> (last updated Apr. 2022); *Unprotected Russian soldiers disturbed radioactive dust in Chernobyl’s ‘Red Forest’, workers say*, REUTERS (29 Mar. 2022), <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/unprotected-russian-soldiers-disturbed-radioactive-dust-chernobyls-red-forest-2022-03-28/>; @visegrad24, TWITTER (30 Mar. 2022, 5:53 PM), <https://twitter.com/visegrad24/status/1509287796065845250?s=20&t=75AqZ6G9wTNulxQILew2Yw>.

⁶⁸ Geoff Brumfiel & Deepa Shivaram, *Ukraine Says the Chernobyl Nuclear Site has Lost Power*, NPR (March 9, 2022, 9:13 AM), <https://www.npr.org/2022/03/09/1085380694/ukraine-russia-chernobyl-nuclear-site-lost-power>.

⁶⁹ *Ukraine: Russia-Ukraine War and Nuclear Energy*, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N, (1 Mar. 2023), <https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-t-z/russian-military-operation-and-ukraine-s-nuclear-p.aspx>; *Chernobyl Accident 1986*, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N, <https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/safety-and-security/safety-of-plants/chernobyl-accident.aspx> (last updated Apr. 2022).

By 31 March, all Russian soldiers had left the Chernobyl nuclear plant.⁷⁰ On 3 April 2022, the Ukrainian military entered Chernobyl nuclear plant, and the Deputy Director of the Chernobyl Management Company returned on 5 April. It is estimated that replacing the equipment destroyed by the Russian forces will cost \$135 million USD.⁷¹

3. Ukraine Declaration of Independence

Ukraine declared its independence from the Soviet Union on 24 August 1991.⁷² From the end of August through December, the Communist Party of Ukraine was dissolved, its property was nationalized, and the KGB was banned.⁷³ Party and ideological pluralism was established, and “all individuals living on the soil of the Ukrainian socialist republic were granted citizenship in the emerging independent state.”⁷⁴ The Constitution of Ukraine was adopted on 28 June 1996.⁷⁵ Following the post-Soviet democratization of Ukraine, the country has existed as an independent and sovereign state.⁷⁶ However, Russia’s recent aggressive actions in Ukraine are threatening its independence and sovereignty.⁷⁷ The annexation of Crimea (2014), the war in the Donbas that

⁷⁰ *Ukraine Nuclear Power Operator Says All Russian Forces Have Left Chernobyl*, RADIOOFFREEEUROPE RADIOFREELIBERTY (1 Apr. 2022) <https://www.rferl.org/a/chernobyl-russian-forces-leave/31780044.html>.

⁷¹ Maxim Kamenev, *How Russia took over Chernobyl*, OpenDemocracy (June 22, 2022, 12:01 AM), <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/chernobyl-russian-occupation-nuclear-radiation-effects/>; Joe Middleton, *Inside Chernobyl nuclear plant devastated by Russian troops as \$135m of equipment destroyed*, Independent (June 3, 2022, 19:49 BST), <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/chernobyl-nuclear-russian-invasion-b2093272.html>.

⁷² *Resolution On Declaration of Independence of Ukraine*, VERKHOVNA RADA OF UKR., http://static.rada.gov.ua/site/postanova_eng/Rres_Declaration_Independence_rev12.htm (last visited 19 Mar. 2022); Mykhailo Minakov, *Three Decades of Ukraine’s Independence*, WILSON CTR. (13 Sept. 2021), <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/three-decades-ukraines-independence>; Nikola Antonov, *Ukraine Declares Independence, Sets Referendum*, WASH. POST (25 Aug. 1991), <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1991/08/25/ukraine-declares-independence-sets-referendum/ee9266e3-dd83-4568-b7e5-40715ca0c77a/>.

⁷³ Mykhailo Minakov, *Three Decades of Ukraine’s Independence*, WILSON CTR. (13 Sept. 2021), <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/three-decades-ukraines-independence>.

⁷⁴ Mykhailo Minakov, *Three Decades of Ukraine’s Independence*, WILSON CTR. (13 Sept. 2021), <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/three-decades-ukraines-independence>.

⁷⁵ *The Constitution of Ukraine*, VERKHOVNA RADA OF UKR., <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/en/254к/96-вп#Text> (last visited Mar. 19, 2022).

⁷⁶ Mykhailo Minakov, *Three Decades of Ukraine’s Independence*, WILSON CTR. (13 Sept. 2021), <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/three-decades-ukraines-independence>; Alexander J. Motyl, *Ukraine’s Democracy Is (Almost) All Grown Up*, FOREIGN POL’Y (28 Aug. 2019), <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/28/ukraines-democracy-is-almost-all-grown-up/>; Brian Mefford, *Ukraine at 30; Europe’s frontline democracy*, ATL. COUNCIL (6 July 2021), <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/ukraine-at-30-europes-frontline-democracy/>. Oksana Huss & Oleksandra Keudel, *Ukraine: Executive Summary*, FREEDOM HOUSE, <https://freedomhouse.org/country/ukraine/nations-transit/2021> (last visited 19 Mar. 2022).

⁷⁷ Mykhailo Minakov, *Three Decades of Ukraine’s Independence*, WILSON CTR. (13 Sept. 2021), <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/three-decades-ukraines-independence>; Alexander J. Motyl, *Ukraine’s Democracy Is (Almost) All Grown Up*, FOREIGN POL’Y (28 Aug. 2019), <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/28/ukraines-democracy-is-almost-all-grown-up/>; Brian Mefford, *Ukraine at 30; Europe’s frontline democracy*, ATL. COUNCIL (6 July 2021), <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/ukraine-at-30-europes-frontline-democracy/>. Oksana Huss & Oleksandra Keudel, *Ukraine: Executive Summary*, FREEDOM HOUSE,

left portions of Luhansk and Donetsk in the hands of Russian-backed separatists, and the current Russian invasion of Ukraine are just a few examples.⁷⁸

4. The Denuclearization of Ukraine

In the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, four of the former Soviet republics inherited nuclear missiles from their predecessor: Kazakhstan, Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine.⁷⁹ Diplomatically, Russia had declared itself the true successor of the Soviet Union, and it took over the Soviet Union's seat on the UN Security Council and assumed all diplomatic obligations of its predecessor state.⁸⁰ As a result, Kazakhstan and Belarus were quick to turn over their nuclear arms, but Ukraine refused to do so for some time.⁸¹ Unlike Kazakhstan and Belarus, Ukraine feared its new neighbor: Russia.⁸²

For the newly independent Ukraine, the greatest danger to Ukrainian sovereignty was Russia. Russian nationalists had long declared Ukraine as rightful Russian land, and they saw Ukrainians to be Russians in all but name.⁸³ Furthermore, the "transfer" of Crimea during the Soviet period to Ukraine created friction between the newly independent states.⁸⁴ In essence, upon its birth, Ukraine had to contend with the possibility that its existence might be quite short-lived. In this environment, Ukrainians had ample reason to hold onto their inherited nuclear arms as a deterrent, but this, in turn, posed several additional problems.

The most immediate problems were financial: the cost of maintenance and the lack of launch codes. Like most of the former Soviet republics, Ukraine's first few years of existence were marked by economic turmoil and instability, and lack of funds presented a pressing problem for the Ukrainian government. First, nuclear arms require considerable financial investments for maintenance, safety, and use.⁸⁵ Failure to adequately meet the needs of these arms can, at best,

<https://freedomhouse.org/country/ukraine/nations-transit/2021> (last visited 19 Mar. 2022).

⁷⁸ Mykhailo Minakov, *Three Decades of Ukraine's Independence*, WILSON CTR. (13 Sept. 2021), <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/three-decades-ukraines-independence>; Tamara Qibawli et al., *Why Donbas is at the heart of the Ukraine crisis*, CNN NEWS (21 Feb. 2022), <https://www.cnn.com/2022/02/19/europe/donbas-ukraine-russia-intl-cmd/index.html>.

⁷⁹ John-Thor Dahlburg, *Ukraine Votes to Quit Soviet Union: Independence: More than 90% of voters approve historic break with Kremlin. The president-elect calls for collective command of the country's nuclear arsenal*, LA TIMES (3 Dec. 1991) <https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1991-12-03-mn-504-story.html>.

⁸⁰ Yehuda Z. Blum, *Russia Takes Over the Soviet Union's Seat at the United Nations*, European Journal of International Law (Last Visited March 23, 2025), <http://www.ejil.org/pdfs/3/2/2045.pdf>.

⁸¹ Thomas Graham Jr., *In a Historic Moment, the West Cannot look away from Ukraine*, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (February 23, 2022), <https://thebulletin.org/2022/02/in-a-historic-moment-the-west-cannot-look-away-from-ukraine/>.

⁸² Thomas Graham Jr., *In a Historic Moment, the West Cannot look away from Ukraine*, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (February 23, 2022), <https://thebulletin.org/2022/02/in-a-historic-moment-the-west-cannot-look-away-from-ukraine/>.

⁸³ Vladimir Putin, *On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians*, President of Russia (July 12, 2021), <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181>.

⁸⁴ Serhii Plokhyy, *The Russo-Ukrainian War: The Return of History*, 70 (2023).

⁸⁵ Mariana Budjeryn, *Was Ukraine's Nuclear Disarmament a Blunder?*, 179 WORLD AFFS. 2, 9-20 (2016).

result in non-functioning weapons or, at worst, cause a nuclear catastrophe. In the United States, for example, there was the 1980 Damascus Titan missile incident where a nuclear missile was inadvertently set off by a maintenance worker when he accidentally dropped a socket wrench into a fixture of the missile.⁸⁶ This triggered a series of events in which the missile was launched, but the warhead miraculously did not detonate.⁸⁷ If even the United States, which has always devoted a considerable amount of its budget to defense spending, could have that close of a call, then the prospects did not look great for Ukraine when it came to retaining control of these nuclear arms. The last thing Ukraine needed was another Chernobyl. The second financial aspect dealt with the missiles' launch codes: the Ukrainian government did not have them. Russia had inherited all of the Soviet Union's archives and secrets, which included those codes, and Russia was not inclined to hand them over to Ukraine.⁸⁸ Now, the Ukrainian government could have eventually reverse-engineered the codes, but, like with maintenance, that process would require considerable financial investment.⁸⁹ Once again, the Ukrainian government would have struggled both to make these ends meet and to explain to their citizenry what public funding was being diverted towards the nuclear arsenal. In essence, Ukraine inherited a powerful nuclear deterrent that could also likely cause harm to the country itself.

On the diplomatic front, Ukraine's nuclear weapons did not endear it to the major powers of the international community. The danger and destruction of a nuclear war means that the international community often does not look favorably upon states which attempt to acquire nuclear arms, and this rings especially true for countries that already possess nuclear arms. For the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom, the potential for another nuclear armed nation did not sit well. Whatever they may have thought of Ukraine, none of these powers enjoyed the prospect of the potential competition that a nuclear Ukraine could present as (except for the United Kingdom and the United States) no nuclear power has ever viewed another nuclear power as anything but a rival. This problem was further compounded by the fact that the Soviet Union had stationed so many nuclear arms in Ukraine, that Ukraine had suddenly become the state with the third largest arsenal in the world.⁹⁰ For most of these nations, the list of nuclear

⁸⁶ *Titan II Missile Explosion (1980)*, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ARKANSAS (last updated 18 Jul. 2023) <https://encyclopediaofarkansas.net/entries/titan-ii-missile-explosion-2543/>; This American Life: Human Error in Volatile Situations, CHI PUB. RADIO (20 Dec. 2017) <https://www.thisamericanlife.org/634/human-error-in-volatile-situations>.

⁸⁷ *Titan II Missile Explosion (1980)*, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ARKANSAS (last updated 18 Jul. 2023) <https://encyclopediaofarkansas.net/entries/titan-ii-missile-explosion-2543/>; This American Life: Human Error in Volatile Situations, CHI PUB. RADIO (20 Dec. 2017) <https://www.thisamericanlife.org/634/human-error-in-volatile-situations>.

⁸⁸ Alexander A. Pikayev, *Post-Soviet Russia and Ukraine: Who can push the Button?*, THE NONPROLIFERATION REV. (1994) <https://web.archive.org/web/20140808054400/http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/pikaye13.pdf>.

⁸⁹ Alexander A. Pikayev, *Post-Soviet Russia and Ukraine: Who can push the Button?*, THE NONPROLIFERATION REV. (1994) <https://web.archive.org/web/20140808054400/http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/pikaye13.pdf>.

⁹⁰ John-Thor Dahlburg, *Ukraine Votes to Quit Soviet Union: Independence: More than 90% of voters approve historic break with Kremlin. The president-elect calls for collective command of the country's nuclear arsenal*, LA

powers was (and is) big enough as it was (and is). Consequently, compared to other former Soviet bloc nations, Ukraine faced greater difficulties in diplomatic negotiations due to its inherited arms.⁹¹

The situation presented a perfect Catch-22: the nuclear weapons were necessary to preserve Ukrainian sovereignty, but they could destroy Ukraine economically or even quite literally. The arms may not have been operational, but, regardless, many in the international community were unwilling to deal with another nuclear armed state. From this standpoint, there was no right path for Ukraine, but the international community came forward with a solution.

Assessing the situation, the international community came to the realization that the only reason for Ukraine to retain these arms was to maintain its sovereignty in the event of a Russian invasion. To that end, the solution was simple: if Russia could guarantee the sovereignty and integrity of Ukraine, then Ukraine should surrender its nuclear arms. The solution was put forward to both parties, and they agreed to the proposal: regardless of any Russian claims or ideals, Russia would forever respect the sovereignty and integrity of Ukraine. Hence, on 5 December 1994, Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom signed an agreement in which each state pledged to preserve Ukrainian sovereignty.⁹² Ukraine handed over the nuclear weapons, and Russia abided by this agreement until 2014.

D. Russia-Ukraine War

Following Ukraine's declaration of independence on 24 August 1991, tensions with Russia quickly arose.⁹³ On 26 August 1991, P. Voschanov, the press secretary for Russian President Boris Yeltsin, publicly stated that Russia reserved the right to reconsider its borders with former Soviet republics.⁹⁴ Shortly after, on 28 August 1991, a Russian delegation led by Vice President O. Rutskoy visited Kyiv, seeking to pressure Ukraine into renouncing its independence while threatening potential border revisions if Ukraine proceeded with separation.⁹⁵

Disputes between Ukraine and Russia intensified regarding the status of Sevastopol and the Black Sea Fleet. In December 1992, the Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation authorized its Parliament to discuss Sevastopol's legal standing. By 9 July 1993, the Russian Parliament unilaterally declared Sevastopol a city under Russian federal jurisdiction through the

TIMES (3 Dec. 1991) <https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1991-12-03-mn-504-story.html>.

⁹¹ Serhii Plokhyy, *The Russo-Ukrainian War: The Return of History*, 64-70 (2023).

⁹² Mary Louise Kelly & Kat Lonsdorf, *Why Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons — and what that means in an invasion by Russia*, NPR (21 Feb. 2022) <https://www.npr.org/2022/02/21/1082124528/ukraine-russia-putin-invasion>.

⁹³ *Government and Society: Ukraine*, Encyclopedia Britannica (Last Visited March 23, 2025), <https://www.britannica.com/place/Ukraine/Government-and-society>.

⁹⁴ Gorbulin, V., *Ukrainian crisis: Global perspectives* (Ukrainian Crisis Media Center, Mar. 23, 2025), <https://uacrisis.org/en/40347-gorbulin-tezy>.

⁹⁵ Gorbulin, V., *Ukrainian crisis: Global perspectives* (Ukrainian Crisis Media Center, Mar. 23, 2025), <https://uacrisis.org/en/40347-gorbulin-tezy>.

“Decree on the Status of Sevastopol.”⁹⁶

The Black Sea Fleet proved contentious. Although some elements of the fleet began swearing allegiance to Ukraine in January 1992, the fleet's commander, Admiral Igor Kasatonov, resisted by ordering personnel to take their ships to sea, sparking the first significant crisis between Ukraine and Russia in May 1992.⁹⁷

A preliminary agreement was reached whereby Ukraine would retain 18.3% of the fleet, while Russia would assume 81.7%, compensating Ukraine through energy supplies and debt relief.⁹⁸ Additionally, Russia would continue to lease facilities in Sevastopol, while Ukraine retained rights to establish its own naval base at a location to be determined later.⁹⁹

Ukraine's integration with the West began in 1994, marked by two significant milestones. In January 1994, Ukraine agreed to relinquish the nuclear arsenal it had inherited from the Soviet Union, facilitated by the U.S.-brokered agreement.¹⁰⁰ This decision was formalized through the Budapest Memorandum in December 1994, where the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom pledged to respect Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity as part of Ukraine's accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear state.¹⁰¹

Furthermore, Ukraine strengthened its ties with Europe by signing a cooperation agreement with the European Union in June 1994, becoming the first post-Soviet country to do so.¹⁰²

Border disputes persisted despite formal agreements. In 2002, the demarcation of the land border between Ukraine and Russia was completed and formalized through an agreement signed on 23 January 2003. However, the agreement did not resolve disputes over the Azov and Black Seas, as Russia refused to follow international norms on maritime boundaries. Tensions escalated on 29 September 2003, when Russia began constructing a dam to connect its territory on the Taman Peninsula with Ukraine's Kosa Tuzla Island, raising further concerns over territorial sovereignty.¹⁰³

⁹⁶ Gorbulin, V., *Ukrainian crisis: Global perspectives* (Ukrainian Crisis Media Center, Mar. 23, 2025), <https://uacrisis.org/en/40347-gorbulin-tezy>.

⁹⁷ Plokhly S. *The Gates of Europe: a History of Ukraine* / Serhii Plokhly. - New York: Basic Books, A Member of the Perseus Books Group, 2015. - note 228 at 264 p.

<https://readerslibrary.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/The-Gates-of-Europe.pdf>.

⁹⁸ Tyler Felgenhauer, *Ukraine, Russia, and the Black Sea Fleet Accords*, WWS Case Study 2/99 (1999), <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA360381.pdf>.

⁹⁹ Tyler Felgenhauer, *Ukraine, Russia, and the Black Sea Fleet Accords*, WWS Case Study 2/99 (1999), <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA360381.pdf>.

¹⁰⁰ Plokhly S. *The Gates of Europe: a History of Ukraine* / Serhii Plokhly. - New York: Basic Books, A Member of the Perseus Books Group, 2015. - note 228 at 264 p.

<https://readerslibrary.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/The-Gates-of-Europe.pdf>.

¹⁰¹ Serhii Plokhly, *The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine*, 264 (Basic Books 2021).

¹⁰² Plokhly S. *The Gates of Europe: a History of Ukraine* / Serhii Plokhly. - New York: Basic Books, A Member of the Perseus Books Group, 2015. - note 228 at 264 p.

<https://readerslibrary.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/The-Gates-of-Europe.pdf>.

¹⁰³ Lyudmyla D. Chekalenko, *Foreign Policy of Ukraine*, ed. by Vyacheslav G. Tsivaty (LAT&K 2016), <https://elibrary.ivinas.gov.ua/4235/1/ChekalenkoZL.D.ZForeignZpolicyZofZUkraine.pdf>.

In 2004, Viktor Yushchenko became president of Ukraine.¹⁰⁴ He was a member of the Our Ukraine–People’s Self-Defense Bloc party that ran on an anti-corruption platform.⁹⁴ His opponent, Viktor Yanukovich, was backed by the Kremlin.¹⁰⁵ During Yushchenko’s presidential campaign, he suffered an assassination attempt via dioxin poisoning that ultimately disfigured his face.¹⁰⁶ Although an investigation did not uncover the culprit, many (including Yushchenko) suspected the Kremlin, due to Yushchenko’s anti-Kremlin position, the fact that dioxin used was only manufactured in the US, Russia, and the UK, and the other common poisonings of opponents of the Kremlin.¹⁰⁷ Despite this attempt, Yushchenko continued campaigning.¹⁰⁸

However, on 31 October 2004, the election results declared Yanukovich the winner.¹⁰⁹ The clearly rigged election enraged the Ukrainian public.¹¹⁰ Citizens took to the streets to protest the election results wearing orange—Yushchenko’s campaign color—in what came to be known as the Orange Revolution.¹¹¹ On 23 November 2004, the Orange Revolution signaled an end to speech suppression in Ukraine and an increase in its alignment with a European identity, separating it further from Russia.¹¹²

The Orange Revolution consisted of approximately 500,000 people, including Ukrainian youths, marching in Kyiv’s Independence Square.¹¹³ Through the movement of the Orange Revolution, the Ukrainian people slowly began to take back their long-lost political power for the first time in

¹⁰⁴ Peter Dickinson, *How Ukraine’s Orange Revolution shaped twenty-first century geopolitics*, ATL. COUNCIL (22 Nov. 2020), <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/how-ukraines-orange-revolution-shaped-twenty-first-century-geopolitics/>.

¹⁰⁵ *The Orange Revolution and the Yushchenko presidency*, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Ukraine/The-Orange-Revolution-and-the-Yushchenko-presidency> (last visited 28 Mar. 2022).

¹⁰⁶ *The Orange Revolution and the Yushchenko presidency*, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Ukraine/The-Orange-Revolution-and-the-Yushchenko-presidency> (last visited 28 Mar. 2022).

¹⁰⁷ Roman Kupchinsky, *Ukraine: Mystery Behind Yushchenko’s Poisoning Continues*, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, (18 Sep. 2006), <https://www.rferl.org/a/1071434.html>.

¹⁰⁸ *The Orange Revolution and the Yushchenko presidency*, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Ukraine/The-Orange-Revolution-and-the-Yushchenko-presidency> (last visited 28 Mar. 2022).

¹⁰⁹ *The Orange Revolution and the Yushchenko presidency*, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Ukraine/The-Orange-Revolution-and-the-Yushchenko-presidency> (last visited 28 Mar. 2022).

¹¹⁰ *The Orange Revolution and the Yushchenko presidency*, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Ukraine/The-Orange-Revolution-and-the-Yushchenko-presidency> (last visited 28 Mar. 2022).

¹¹¹ *The Orange Revolution and the Yushchenko presidency*, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Ukraine/The-Orange-Revolution-and-the-Yushchenko-presidency> (last visited 28 Mar. 2022).

¹¹² Liliane Bivings, *Explaining Ukraine Ukraine’s Orange Revolution*, Kyiv Independent, (24 Aug. 2022), <https://kyivindependent.com/ukraines-orange-revolution/>.

¹¹³ Liliane Bivings, *Explaining Ukraine Ukraine’s Orange Revolution*, Kyiv Independent, (24 Aug. 2022), <https://kyivindependent.com/ukraines-orange-revolution/>.

modern history.¹¹⁴

This influence became most apparent in the Ukrainian public's response to the Kremlin's support of its chosen candidate, Yanukovich.¹¹⁵ President Vladimir Putin traveled to Kyiv on the day before the election to advise Ukrainians on the importance of voting for Yanukovich.¹¹⁶ However, these efforts only served to further exacerbate the Ukrainian citizens' negative sentiments towards the Kremlin.¹¹⁷ Consequently, shortly after the Orange Revolution ended, the Supreme Court of Ukraine (the Ukrainian Parliament) ordered a recount of the votes, despite the wishes of Yanukovich supporters.¹¹⁸ After the recount, Yushchenko was officially declared the winner.¹¹⁹

For these reasons, the Orange Revolution can be said to have helped liberate Ukraine, especially from the influence of the Kremlin. Consequently, the Revolution also indirectly contributed to the Kremlin tightening its hold over its own Russian population and reasserting its influence over the Russian-speaking regions of Ukraine.¹²⁰ This culminated in the establishment of various Pro-Kremlin movements and organizations such as Nashi, a youth movement that has drawn comparisons to the Hitler Youth. In contrast to the Orange Revolution, Nashi's intent was to establish an unbreakable relationship between the younger generation and the Russian government.¹²¹ The success of the Kremlin's renewed efforts would ultimately set the stage for Euromaidan.

1. Revolution of Dignity/Maidan Revolution/Euromaidan

The election of Viktor Yushchenko on 26 December 2004 brought with it the hope that Ukraine was finally turning away from the corruption and authoritarianism of the post-Soviet world and moving towards a closer relationship with the West.¹²² Unfortunately, those hopes were soon shattered due to factionalism, a challenging economic environment, and changes to the Ukrainian

¹¹⁴ Liliane Bivings, *Explaining Ukraine Ukraine's Orange Revolution*, Kyiv Independent, (24 Aug. 2022), <https://kyivindependent.com/ukraines-orange-revolution/>.

¹¹⁵ Liliane Bivings, *Explaining Ukraine Ukraine's Orange Revolution*, Kyiv Independent, (24 Aug. 2022), <https://kyivindependent.com/ukraines-orange-revolution/>.

¹¹⁶ Peter Dickinson, *Putin's Ukraine Obsession Began 20 years Ago with the Orange Revolution*, (26 Nov. 2024), <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/putins-ukraine-obsession-began-20-years-ago-with-the-orange-revolution/>.

¹¹⁷ Peter Dickinson, *Putin's Ukraine Obsession Began 20 years Ago with the Orange Revolution*, (26 Nov. 2024), <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/putins-ukraine-obsession-began-20-years-ago-with-the-orange-revolution/>.

¹¹⁸ *Viktor Yushchenko*, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Viktor-Yushchenko> (last updated 19 Feb. 2022).

¹¹⁹ *Viktor Yushchenko*, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Viktor-Yushchenko> (last updated 19 Feb. 2022).

¹²⁰ *Viktor Yushchenko*, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Viktor-Yushchenko> (last updated 19 Feb. 2022).

¹²¹ Peter Dickinson, *How Ukraine's Orange Revolution shaped twenty-first century geopolitics*, ATL. COUNCIL (22 Nov. 2020), <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/how-ukraines-orange-revolution-shaped-twenty-first-century-geopolitics/>.

¹²² Serhii Plokhyy, *The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine*, 454 (Basic Books 2021).

constitution demanded by supporters of Yushchenko's predecessor, Viktor Yanukovich. These changes sharply limited the powers of the President and heightened political rivalries at the expense of effective reform.¹²³

After his re-election in 2010, Yanukovich quickly undid all of the constitutional changes that his supporters had used to hamstring his political rival Yushchenko. Moreover, he added new powers for his own benefit—both politically and personally.¹²⁴ He took control of the courts and the Supreme Council and turned the police and the state security service (the SBU) into agents of his regime rather than servants of the State.¹²⁵ In 2011, he had his most prominent opponent, former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, tried, convicted, and imprisoned on corruption charges related to an unfavorable gas deal with Russia.¹²⁶ He also manipulated election laws and elections to ensure that his defeat in 2004 could not be repeated.¹²⁷

At the same time, Yanukovich continued making economic overtures toward the EU even as he personally enriched himself and his family at the expense of the country.¹²⁸ By late 2013, Ukraine was on the verge of economic default due in part to the transfer of over \$70 billion into foreign accounts controlled by Yanukovich, his family, and his allies.¹²⁹ As economic default loomed and the national mood turned sour, Ukrainians turned toward the EU for relief.¹³⁰

On 21 November 2013, the Ukrainian government decided to halt Ukraine's European Union integration and suspend the pursuit of an association agreement.¹³¹ This decision sparked rallies that began on Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) in Kyiv on the night of November 21, with protests continuing in Kyiv and other cities in the lead-up to the 28-29 November 2013 summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, where Ukraine and the EU were expected to sign a political and free trade agreement.¹³² On 24 November 2013, hundreds of Ukrainian, Polish, and Belarusian students, along with civic activists, held a rally outside the Ukrainian Embassy in Warsaw, Poland, aiming to gather support for the association agreement with the European Union.¹³³

¹²³ Serhii Plokhy, *The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine*, 460 (Basic Books 2021).

¹²⁴ Serhii Plokhy, *The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine*, 460 (Basic Books 2021).

¹²⁵ Serhii Plokhy, *The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine*, 460 (Basic Books 2021).

¹²⁶ Serhii Plokhy, *The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine*, 460 (Basic Books 2021).

¹²⁷ Bohdan Harasymiw, *Euromaidan Revolution*, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UKR., [http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CE%5CU%5CEuromaidanRevoluti on.htm](http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CE%5CU%5CEuromaidanRevoluti%20on.htm) (last visited 20 Mar. 2022).

¹²⁸ Bohdan Harasymiw, *Euromaidan Revolution*, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UKR., [http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CE%5CU%5CEuromaidanRevoluti on.htm](http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CE%5CU%5CEuromaidanRevoluti%20on.htm) (last visited 20 Mar. 2022).

¹²⁹ Serhii Plokhy, *The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine*, 460 (Basic Books 2021).

¹³⁰ Serhii Plokhy, *The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine*, 460 (Basic Books 2021).

¹³¹ Euromaidan Rallies in Ukraine, Nov. 24 Coverage, Kyiv Post (Nov. 24, 2013), <https://archive.kyivpost.com/article/content/euromaidan/euromaidan-rallies-in-ukraine-nov-24-coverage-332457.html>.

¹³² Euromaidan Rallies in Ukraine, Nov. 24 Coverage, Kyiv Post (Nov. 24, 2013), <https://archive.kyivpost.com/article/content/euromaidan/euromaidan-rallies-in-ukraine-nov-24-coverage-332457.html>.

¹³³ Euromaidan Rallies in Ukraine, Nov. 24 Coverage, Kyiv Post (Nov. 24, 2013),

On 28 November 2013, two long-negotiated agreements signifying political association and economic integration, the Association Agreement and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement, were to be signed in Vilnius, Lithuania.¹³⁴ These agreements would open the country to badly needed foreign investment and allow for free trade of Ukrainian goods across the EU. They would also serve as a bulwark against Russian efforts to turn Ukraine back to its sphere of influence.¹³⁵ Many Ukrainians—particularly students, professionals, and city-dwellers—believed that their future lay with Europe and the West, not in a return to the lesser status of a Russian vassal state – Malorossia “Little Russia.”¹³⁶ When Yanukovich announced a suspension of the agreements a week before the signing, Ukrainians were enraged and some took to the streets.¹³⁷

The protests began with a Facebook post by Mustafa Nayyem on 21 November 2013, calling for students to assemble in Kyiv’s Independence Square – the Maidan.¹³⁸ The students and their supporters demanded that the agreements continue. However, while Yanukovich attended the EU summit, he refused to sign the agreements.¹³⁹ Protests grew and clashes with the police intensified on the outskirts of the Maidan.¹⁴⁰ On 30 November, the Berkut, a special operations unit of the Ukrainian Ministry of the Interior, attempted to clear the protesters from the square. However, the operation was so violent that it incensed the entire nation.¹⁴¹

What had once been a limited protest became a national movement.¹⁴² Over 700,000 people attended a rally in the Maidan on the next day. The protest area was turned into an encampment with barricades, a mechanism of self-government, logistical support, and militia modeled on the Cossacks of Ukrainian history.¹⁴³ The Maidan protesters were unaligned and comprised a broad

<https://archive.kyivpost.com/article/content/euromaidan/euromaidan-rallies-in-ukraine-nov-24-coverage-332457.html>.

¹³⁴ Serhii Plokhyy, *The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine*, 460 (Basic Books 2021).

¹³⁵ Serhii Plokhyy, *The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine*, 460 (Basic Books 2021).

¹³⁶ Serhii Plokhyy, *The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine*, 460 (Basic Books 2021).

¹³⁷ Serhii Plokhyy, *The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine*, 460 (Basic Books 2021).

¹³⁸ Bohdan Harasymiw, *Euromaidan Revolution*, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UKR.,

<http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CE%5CU%5CEuromaidanRevoluti%20on.htm> (last visited 20 Mar. 2022).

¹³⁹ Bohdan Harasymiw, *Euromaidan Revolution*, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UKR.,

<http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CE%5CU%5CEuromaidanRevoluti%20on.htm> (last visited 20 Mar. 2022).

¹⁴⁰ Bohdan Harasymiw, *Euromaidan Revolution*, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UKR.,

<http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CE%5CU%5CEuromaidanRevoluti%20on.htm> (last visited 20 Mar. 2022).

¹⁴¹ Eric Sof, *Once Upon a Time Was BERKUT*, <https://special-ops.org/berkut-ukraine> (last viewed 20 Mar. 2023). (It is noteworthy that the Berkut in Crimea appear to have acted en masse as Russian agents when the Russian Army invaded Crimea in Feb. 2014.)

¹⁴² Bohdan Harasymiw, *Euromaidan Revolution*, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UKR.,

<http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CE%5CU%5CEuromaidanRevoluti%20on.htm> (last visited 20 Mar. 2022).

¹⁴³ Bohdan Harasymiw, *Euromaidan Revolution*, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UKR.,

<http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CE%5CU%5CEuromaidanRevoluti%20on.htm> (last visited 20 Mar. 2022).

coalition of political, economic, and cultural views and perspectives.¹⁴⁴ This ranged from pro-democracy groups to nationalists connected with far- right political movements. Ukrainians from all walks of life came out to protest.

The Berkut made another effort to clear the square on 11 December but were successfully rebuffed. Two days later, Yanukovich made overtures to the leaders of the movement. He offered amnesty for detained Maidan participants in exchange for the identification of the government security officers who took part in the worst of the violence.¹⁴⁵ At the same time, he also concluded a deal with Russia for \$15 billion in economic aid, a renegotiation of gas prices, and the lifting of an existing blockade on Ukrainian imports.¹⁴⁶ These two decisions had the potential to resolve the political crisis in Yanukovich's favor. However, a video of journalist and activist Tetiana Chornovol's brutal beating outside of Kyiv inflamed the nation once more. On 29 December, the protesters presented the Manifesto of the Maidan, which called for international sanctions against Yanukovich, his family, and his allies.¹⁴⁷ Mass demonstrations closed out the year as over half a million people filled the Square on New Year's Day.¹⁴⁸



Figure 6, Image Credit: Atlantic Council

¹⁴⁴ Serhii Plokhy, *The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine*, 461 (Basic Books 2021).

¹⁴⁵ Bohdan Harasymiw, *Euromaidan Revolution*, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UKR., [http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CE%5CU%5CEuromaidanRevoluti on.htm](http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CE%5CU%5CEuromaidanRevoluti%20on.htm) (last visited 20 Mar. 2022).

¹⁴⁶ Bohdan Harasymiw, *Euromaidan Revolution*, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UKR., [http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CE%5CU%5CEuromaidanRevoluti on.htm](http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CE%5CU%5CEuromaidanRevoluti%20on.htm) (last visited 20 Mar. 2022).

¹⁴⁷ Bohdan Harasymiw, *Euromaidan Revolution*, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UKR., [http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CE%5CU%5CEuromaidanRevoluti on.htm](http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CE%5CU%5CEuromaidanRevoluti%20on.htm) (last visited 20 Mar. 2022).

¹⁴⁸ Bohdan Harasymiw, *Euromaidan Revolution*, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UKR., [http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CE%5CU%5CEuromaidanRevoluti on.htm](http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CE%5CU%5CEuromaidanRevoluti%20on.htm) (last visited 20 Mar. 2022).

All government efforts to discredit, disrupt, and disperse the protests failed. In response, Yanukovich directed the Supreme Council to pass a sweeping package of laws that criminalized anything connected to the Maidan protests on 16 January 2014. The new laws limited free speech, privacy, and due process to such a degree that even his Chief of Staff resigned in protest.

128

The “16 January laws” were designed to suppress the Euromaidan protests and prevent any future demonstrations.¹⁴⁹ However, they had the opposite effect. It was after the implementation of these laws that protests spread beyond the major cities, reaching much of Ukraine.¹⁵⁰ The Verkhovna Rada repealed these laws on 28 January 2014.¹⁵¹

This development marked a new phase of the Maidan movement and pushed the protests quickly toward revolution.¹⁵² With covert Russian backing, the Ukrainian government forces became increasingly violent: beating and shooting protesters indiscriminately.¹⁵³ They abducted the wounded from hospitals for detention, torture, and execution. Yanukovich continued offering small concessions, including the installation of two opposition politicians in the government. Nevertheless, the aggressive actions of his security forces belied any promises that he made.¹⁵⁴

¹⁴⁹ “Little Russia”: What Ukraine Would Look Like if the “January 16 Laws” had been Implemented, *UkraineWorld* (Jan. 28, 2014), <https://ukraineworld.org/en/articles/reforms/diktatura-v-zakoni-shcho-bulo-bi-yakbi-zakoni-16-sichnya-diyali-sogodni>.

¹⁵⁰ “Little Russia”: What Ukraine Would Look Like if the “January 16 Laws” had been Implemented, *UkraineWorld* (Jan. 28, 2014), <https://ukraineworld.org/en/articles/reforms/diktatura-v-zakoni-shcho-bulo-bi-yakbi-zakoni-16-sichnya-diyali-sogodni>.

¹⁵¹ “Little Russia”: What Ukraine Would Look Like if the “January 16 Laws” had been Implemented, *UkraineWorld* (Jan. 28, 2014), <https://ukraineworld.org/en/articles/reforms/diktatura-v-zakoni-shcho-bulo-bi-yakbi-zakoni-16-sichnya-diyali-sogodni>.

¹⁵² Bohdan Harasymiw, *Euromaidan Revolution*, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UKR., <http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CE%5CU%5CEuromaidanRevolution.htm> (last visited 20 Mar. 2022).

¹⁵³ Bohdan Harasymiw, *Euromaidan Revolution*, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UKR., <http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CE%5CU%5CEuromaidanRevolution.htm> (last visited 20 Mar. 2022).

¹⁵⁴ Bohdan Harasymiw, *Euromaidan Revolution*, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UKR., <http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CE%5CU%5CEuromaidanRevolution.htm> (last visited 20 Mar. 2022).



Figure 7, Image Credit: Ihor Zakharenko - Maidan activist, volunteer, photographer and war correspondent



Figure 8, Image Credit: Mstyslav Chernov - <https://www.mstyslav.com/ukrainian-revolution>

The conflict culminated in a battle on the Maidan and in nearby government buildings from 18 - 20 February. At Yanukovych's direction, government security forces and police, including the SBU and the Berkut, backed by snipers, killed 60 people.¹⁵⁵

This mass shooting and the threat of additional international sanctions was too much for the Supreme Council. With mediation from representatives from Poland, Germany, France, and a special envoy from Russia, both sides reached an agreement on 21 February. The Ukrainian government would reinstate the 2004 Constitution, suspend the Interior Minister who controlled the SBU and the Berkut, and free former Prime Minister Yuliia Tymoshenko.¹⁵⁶ By the time the agreement concluded, Viktor Yanukovych was on the run. He moved first to Kharkiv and then to Crimea before turning up in Russia to announce that he was still the President of Ukraine.¹⁵⁷ The Supreme Council disagreed and declared that he had abandoned his office.¹⁵⁸ They scheduled new elections for May 2014.

The exact numbers are uncertain but over 100 protesters and at least 13 police and security

¹⁵⁵ Serhii Plokhyy, *The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine*, 461 (Basic Books 2021).

¹⁵⁶ Bohdan Harasymiw, *Euromaidan Revolution*, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UKR., [http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CE%5CU%5CEuromaidanRevoluti on.htm](http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CE%5CU%5CEuromaidanRevoluti%20on.htm) (last visited 20 Mar. 2022).

¹⁵⁷ Bohdan Harasymiw, *Euromaidan Revolution*, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UKR., [http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CE%5CU%5CEuromaidanRevoluti on.htm](http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CE%5CU%5CEuromaidanRevoluti%20on.htm) (last visited 20 Mar. 2022).

¹⁵⁸ Bohdan Harasymiw, *Euromaidan Revolution*, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UKR., [http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CE%5CU%5CEuromaidanRevoluti on.htm](http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CE%5CU%5CEuromaidanRevoluti%20on.htm) (last visited 20 Mar. 2022).

officers were killed during the Euromaidan or Revolution of Dignity.¹⁵⁹ They were all subsequently enshrined in the national memory as the “Heavenly Hundred.” The Revolution stands as a statement of Ukrainian independence and identity and a belief in the rule of law. Consequently, it is likely not a coincidence that Russia seized Crimea outright and instigated Russophone separatist movements in Luhansk and Donetsk shortly after Yanukovych’s departure.¹⁶⁰ Indeed, President Putin himself claimed that he made the decision to “return” Crimea to Russia on 22 February when Yanukovych was still in transit to Moscow.¹⁶¹ Without a compliant Ukrainian government to facilitate his ends, President Putin would have to turn to more aggressive options.¹⁶²

2. Crimea

Just as Ukraine has been a borderland for more than a millennium, the Crimean Peninsula has also seen successive waves of invasion and settlement. Ukraine’s geographical domination of the Black Sea and the mouths of several large rivers (the Dnipro, Dniester, Don, Danube, and Kuban) made it an attractive target for regional powers hoping to control trade. Its mountains offered a refuge for remnants of earlier cultures seeking safety. Moreover, the Mediterranean climate on its coast drew colonists hoping to take advantage of its agricultural and economic opportunities.¹⁶³ Mongols and Turkic Tatars were the final major wave of settlers prior to the modern era. By the mid-15th Century, they dominated the peninsula as the Khanate of the Crimean Tatars.¹⁶⁴ They sacked Kyiv in 1482, and¹⁶⁵ for the next 300 years, they would shift their allegiance between the Ottoman Empire, the Hetmanate (representing Ukrainian Cossacks), Muscovy, and Muscovy’s successor, Russia, which annexed Crimea in 1783.¹⁶⁶ The Russians hoped to cement control of their new territory and encouraged colonization. By 1917, Crimea was a multi-ethnic region of Tatars, Ukrainians, Russians, Greeks, Germans, Jews, Armenians,

¹⁵⁹ *Five Years After Euromaidan: Justice for The Victims ‘Still Not Even In Sight’*, RFE/RNL (19 Feb. 2019, 18:25 GMT), <https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-maidan-justice-victims-amnesty-fifth-anniversary/29779358.html> (last visited 20 Mar. 2023).

¹⁶⁰ Serhii Plokhy, *The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine*, 462-64 (Basic Books 2021).

¹⁶¹ Serhii Plokhy, *The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine*, 462-64 (Basic Books 2021).

¹⁶² Serhii Plokhy, *The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine*, 462 (Basic Books 2021).

¹⁶³ Volodymyr Kubijovyč et al., *Crimea*, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UKR., <http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CC%5CR%5CCrimea.htm> (last visited 20 Mar. 2023). (As early as the 6th century BCE, the Greeks were building city-states on the Crimean coast. In the ensuing eight centuries, Scythians, Romans, Goths, Huns, Byzantines, Khazars, Venetians, Genoese, Armenians, Jews, and Slavs (under the Kyivan Rus) would all claim or settle parts of Crimea.)

¹⁶⁴ Volodymyr Kubijovyč et al., *Crimea*, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UKR., <http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CC%5CR%5CCrimea.htm> (last visited 20 Mar. 2023).

¹⁶⁵ Volodymyr Kubijovyč et al., *Crimea*, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UKR., <http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CC%5CR%5CCrimea.htm> (last visited 20 Mar. 2023).

¹⁶⁶ Volodymyr Kubijovyč et al., *Crimea*, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UKR., <http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CC%5CR%5CCrimea.htm> (last visited 20 Mar. 2023).

and Bulgarians. The first three groups made up the largest percentages of the population.¹⁶⁷ Following the 1917 Russian Revolution, Ukraine declared its independence from Russia and attempted to claim Crimea as Ukrainian territory.¹⁶⁸ The Crimeans signed an agreement with the provisional Ukrainian government that would give Crimea status as an autonomous region within the Ukrainian National Republic.¹⁶⁹

However, when the Bolsheviks took over Ukraine in 1919, they designated Crimea as an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (“ASSR”) under the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic.¹⁷⁰ This status as an ASSR was initially beneficial to the Tatar population in the 1920’s. The Tatar language and culture were promoted and given special status in the region similar to the promotion of the Ukrainian language and culture in the Ukrainian SSR.¹⁷¹ However, the Soviet Union’s cultural policies in Ukraine and Crimea reversed dramatically in the 1930’s with the rise of Stalin.¹⁷² Under his rule, the Soviets aggressively pursued Russification. In Crimea, the new policy meant that Russian became the language of advanced schooling and government. This policy was detrimental to Ukrainian and Tatar speakers, ultimately leading to the persecution of the Tatar people.¹⁷³ This persecution led some Tatars and Ukrainians in Crimea to welcome German occupation during WWII. Some individuals even actively collaborated with the Germans, assisting not just with the occupation but also the extermination of Crimea’s Jewish population.¹⁷⁴

When the Soviets took Crimea, the Tatars were collectively declared a traitor population and forcibly removed from their homeland to controlled settlements in Siberia and Uzbekistan.¹⁷⁵ Of the roughly 240,000 people removed from Crimea, substantial numbers died. The estimates

¹⁶⁷ Volodymyr Kubijovyč et al., *Crimea*, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UKR., <http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CC%5CR%5CCrimea.htm> (last visited 20 Mar. 2023).

¹⁶⁸ Volodymyr Kubijovyč et al., *Crimea*, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UKR., <http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CC%5CR%5CCrimea.htm> (last visited 20 Mar. 2023).

¹⁶⁹ Volodymyr Kubijovyč et al., *Crimea*, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UKR., <http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CC%5CR%5CCrimea.htm> (last visited 20 Mar. 2023).

¹⁷⁰ Volodymyr Kubijovyč et al., *Crimea*, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UKR., <http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CC%5CR%5CCrimea.htm> (last visited 20 Mar. 2023).

¹⁷¹ Bohdan Kravtsiv & Volodymyr Kubijovyč, *Russification*, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UKR. (1993), <http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CR%5CU%5CRussification.htm>.

¹⁷² Bohdan Kravtsiv & Volodymyr Kubijovyč, *Russification*, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UKR. (1993), <http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CR%5CU%5CRussification.htm>.

¹⁷³ J. Otto Pohl, *The Deportation and Fate of the Crimean Tatars*, INT’L COMM. FOR CRIMEA, <https://iccrimea.org/scholarly/jopohl.html> (last visited 20 Mar. 2023).

¹⁷⁴ Volodymyr Kubijovyč et al., *Crimea*, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UKR., <http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CC%5CR%5CCrimea.htm> (last visited 20 Mar. 2023).

¹⁷⁵ Volodymyr Kubijovyč et al., *Crimea*, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UKR., <http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CC%5CR%5CCrimea.htm> (last visited 20 Mar. 2023).

range from as low as 20% to as high as 50% within 5 years.¹⁷⁶ This number also includes Germans, Bulgarians, Armenians, Greeks, and the Jewish Krymchak people who survived the Nazi death squads. The survivors and their descendants were subsequently barred from returning to Crimea. Although the Tatar were officially exonerated as a group in 1960, the USSR refused to recognize them as a unique ethnicity. Instead, they were seen only as former inhabitants of Crimea, and the USSR left in place the 1956 decree forbidding their return home.¹⁷⁷ Prior to the Soviet Union's fall and after Mikhail Gorbachev's Perestroika reforms allowed for Tatar return, only 1.5% of the Crimean population was Tatar.¹⁷⁸

In the late 1940s, the Soviets began resettling Crimea with a mixture of Russians and Polish Ukrainians.¹⁷⁹ In 1954, Crimea was transferred from the RSFSR to the Ukrainian SSR.¹⁸⁰ Shortly after the transfer, work began on the North Crimean Canal to bring much needed water from the Dnipro River to the peninsula.¹⁸¹ The resulting network of canals, reservoirs, locks, and pumps supported multiple cities, particularly those on the drier south coast of Crimea, and extensive agriculture operations.¹⁸² Notably, the canal begins in the Kherson Oblast, not in Crimea. Thus, control of the water flow remained in Ukrainian hands after the 2014 invasion of Crimea.¹⁸³ Ukraine subsequently dammed the canal after Russia refused to pay for the use of the water.¹⁸⁴ Russification efforts continued in Ukraine and Crimea after Stalin's death with some degree of success.¹⁸⁵ In 1989, the majority of people in Crimea identified themselves as Russians and Russian speakers.¹⁸⁶ Despite this, however, the vote for Ukrainian independence on 1 December

¹⁷⁶ J. Otto Pohl, *The Deportation and Fate of the Crimean Tatars*, INT'L COMM. FOR CRIMEA, <https://iccrimea.org/scholarly/jopohl.html> (last visited 20 Mar. 2023).

¹⁷⁷ J. Otto Pohl, *The Deportation and Fate of the Crimean Tatars*, INT'L COMM. FOR CRIMEA, <https://iccrimea.org/scholarly/jopohl.html> (last visited 20 Mar. 2023).

¹⁷⁸ *Ethnic Composition of the Crimea, 1979 and 1989*, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UKR., http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/picturedisplay.asp?linkpath=pic\C\R\Crimea_Table4.jpg (last visited 20 Mar. 2023).

¹⁷⁹ Volodymyr Kubijovyč et al., *Crimea*, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UKR., <http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CC%5CR%5CCrimea.htm> (last visited 20 Mar. 2023).

¹⁸⁰ Volodymyr Kubijovyč et al., *Crimea*, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UKR., <http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CC%5CR%5CCrimea.htm> (last visited 20 Mar. 2023).

¹⁸¹ Ihor Stebelsky, *North Crimean Canal*, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UKR., <http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CN%5CO%5CNorthCrimeanCanal.htm> (last visited 20 Mar. 2023).

¹⁸² Ihor Stebelsky, *North Crimean Canal*, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UKR., <http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CN%5CO%5CNorthCrimeanCanal.htm> (last visited 20 Mar. 2023).

¹⁸³ Ihor Stebelsky, *North Crimean Canal*, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UKR., <http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CN%5CO%5CNorthCrimeanCanal.htm> (last visited 20 Mar. 2023).

¹⁸⁴ Ihor Stebelsky, *North Crimean Canal*, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UKR., <http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CN%5CO%5CNorthCrimeanCanal.htm> (last visited 20 Mar. 2023). (On 26 Feb. 2022, after securing control of the region, the Russian military blew up the dam, reopening the flow of water from the canal.)

¹⁸⁵ Bohdan Kravtsiv & Volodymyr Kubijovyč, *Russification*, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UKR. (1993), <http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CR%5CU%5CRussification.htm>.

¹⁸⁶ *Ethnic Composition of the Crimea, 1979 and 1989*, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UKR.,

1991 passed in the region by 54%.¹⁸⁷ With independence, larger numbers of Tatars also began to return. By the mid-1990s, it is estimated that close to 250,000 Tatars had made it back to Crimea where they began to rebuild their culture.¹⁸⁸

However, these efforts were disrupted by the 26 February 2014 Russian invasion.¹⁸⁹ After the initial seizure of the Crimean Parliament, Russia moved quickly. With the aid of a small pro-Russian separatist party that previously had only 4% of the vote and turncoat police and security forces, they engineered a Russian annexation referendum in mid-March 2014.¹⁹⁰ The groups favoring annexation claimed that 97% of voters supported their efforts.¹⁹¹ In the district of Sevastopol, they even reported a pro-Russian vote of 123% of registered voters. Following the referendum, Vladimir Putin asked the Duma (the Russian legislature) to formalize Russia's annexation of Crimea on 18 March 2014.¹⁹² Since the annexation, Russian state security forces have arrested leaders of the Crimean Tatar community and banned them from returning to their homeland.¹⁹³



Figure 9, Image Credit: Encyclopedia Britannica

http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/picturedisplay.asp?linkpath=pic\C\R\Crimea_Table4.jpg (last visited 20 Mar. 2023).

¹⁸⁷ Volodymyr Kubijovyč et al., *Crimea*, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UKR., <http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CC%5CR%5CCrimea.htm> (last visited 20 Mar. 2023).

¹⁸⁸ J. Otto Pohl, *The Deportation and Fate of the Crimean Tatars*, INT'L COMM. FOR CRIMEA, <https://iccrimea.org/scholarly/jopohl.html> (last visited 20 Mar. 2023).

¹⁸⁹ Serhii Plokyh, *The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine*, 461 (Basic Books 2021).

¹⁹⁰ Serhii Plokyh, *The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine*, 461 (Basic Books 2021).

¹⁹¹ Serhii Plokyh, *The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine*, 461 (Basic Books 2021).

¹⁹² Serhii Plokyh, *The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine*, 461 (Basic Books 2021).

¹⁹³ Press release, Institute for Democracy in Eastern Europe, IDEE Condemns Forced Exile of Crimean Tatar Leaders (25 Oct. 2017), <https://idee-us.org/idee-condemns-forcible-expulsion-of-crimean-tatar-leaders/>; Serhii Plokyh, *The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine*, 461 (Basic Books 2021).

3. The Donbas

The other region through which the Russian state has exercised its aggressive influence is the Donbas. Utilizing the cultural ties of the Donbas's significant Russian-speaking minority and the recent turmoil from the Revolution of Dignity, Russia has used the Donbas as an entryway for destabilizing Ukraine. To that end, an overview of the region is merited.

The word Donbas comes from the words Donets Basin. It is a region located in south-eastern Ukraine that carries its own historical, cultural, and economic value.¹⁹⁴ The region borders both Ukraine and Russia.¹⁹⁵ It contains two provinces called Donetsk and Luhansk.¹⁹⁶ The region also includes the common day cities of Mariupol, Donetsk, and Luhansk. The region was predominantly used for a coal-steel industry in the early 1900s.¹⁹⁷ Notably, over the span of 60 years, the population grew rapidly from 700,000 to approximately 7 million people.¹⁹⁸



Figure 10, Image Credit: The Interpreter

Unlike other parts of Ukraine, the Donbas is not known for its agricultural output, but for its coal

¹⁹⁴ *Donets Basin*, LEXICO, <https://www.dictionary.com/browse/donets> (last visited 28 Mar. 2022).

¹⁹⁵ Bill Hutchinson & Patrick Reeve, *What are the Ukraine 'separatist' regions at the crux of the Russian Invasion*, ABC NEWS (4 Mar. 2022, 5:08 AM), [https://abcnews.go.com/International/ukraine-separatist-regions-crux-russian-invasion/story?id=83084803#:~:text=The%20Donbas%20contains%20two%20provinces,Moscow%20armed%20and%20helped%20establish.\(last%20visited%20Mar.2023\).](https://abcnews.go.com/International/ukraine-separatist-regions-crux-russian-invasion/story?id=83084803#:~:text=The%20Donbas%20contains%20two%20provinces,Moscow%20armed%20and%20helped%20establish.(last%20visited%20Mar.2023).)

¹⁹⁶ Bill Hutchinson & Patrick Reeve, *What are the Ukraine 'separatist' regions at the crux of the Russian Invasion*, ABC NEWS (4 Mar. 2022, 5:08 AM), [https://abcnews.go.com/International/ukraine-separatist-regions-crux-russian-invasion/story?id=83084803#:~:text=The%20Donbas%20contains%20two%20provinces,Moscow%20armed%20and%20helped%20establish.\(last%20visited%20Mar.2023\).](https://abcnews.go.com/International/ukraine-separatist-regions-crux-russian-invasion/story?id=83084803#:~:text=The%20Donbas%20contains%20two%20provinces,Moscow%20armed%20and%20helped%20establish.(last%20visited%20Mar.2023).)

¹⁹⁷ HIROAKI KUROMIYA, *FREEDOM AND TERROR IN THE DONBAS: A UKRAINIAN-RUSSIAN BORDERLAND, 1870S - 1990S* 14 (2002).

¹⁹⁸ HIROAKI KUROMIYA, *FREEDOM AND TERROR IN THE DONBAS: A UKRAINIAN-RUSSIAN BORDERLAND, 1870S - 1990S* 17 (2002).

and related industrial output. Consequently, over the centuries, the Russian Empire and its successor, the Soviet Union, imported many Russian workers into Donbas to develop and work in the burgeoning coal mines there. These factors, along with the Donbas' close proximity to Russia developed the region in several unique ways.

First, the region became one of the few industrial heartlands of Ukraine. As a result, historically the wage pay in the Donbas was significantly better than the surrounding regions.¹⁹⁹ Furthermore, during Holodomor, the region did not suffer as much from deprivations of the famine as other parts of Ukraine did due to a lower reliance upon the local agricultural industry.²⁰⁰

Second, the Donbas became a representation of the ways that the Russian state (whether its modern form or as the Soviet Union) has tried to destroy the Ukrainian identity. During the time of the Soviet Union, a central figure in this process was Stalin's successor, Nikita Khrushchev. Khrushchev grew up in Donbas and identified himself as a proletarian instead of a Ukrainian because of the ethnicity's peasant and agricultural connotations.²⁰¹ As a result, during the Great Terrors, from the years 1937 – 1938, Stalin and Khrushchev planned to purge the Ukrainian Communist Party and kill the idea of Ukrainian nationalism and the identity entwined with it.²⁰² Consequently, after the purge ended in 1940, the region was devastated, and the people had to rebuild from scratch. The region was revitalized in the 1960s. Most of the population chose to speak Russian in order to pursue more opportunities, and the Ukrainian language became known as a “backward language.”²⁰³ By the 1980s, the idea of the Ukrainian national movement was almost obsolete with only some activists still advocating within the cities.²⁰⁴ The majority of Russians and Donbas Ukrainians thought of Ukraine as a Russian province by that point.²⁰⁵ It was only with the revitalization of Ukrainian nationalism in the late 80s and early 90s that this changed.

Third, and perhaps most importantly, the Donbas developed a sizable Russian population which tied it more to its neighbor than other parts of Ukraine. Ukrainian was (and still is) spoken in the Donbas, but, proportionally, there are more Russian speakers in the Donbas than the average Ukrainian province. For example, in 2001, Russian was the primary language of 74.9% of the

¹⁹⁹ Anne Applebaum, *Red Famine: Stalin's War on Ukraine* xxvi (2017); *Demographic Research: Holodomor: The Real Number of Its Victims and Evidence of Its Man-Made Nature*, Harv. Univ., <https://gis.huri.harvard.edu/demographic-research> (last visited 24 Mar. 2023).

²⁰⁰ Anne Applebaum, *Red Famine: Stalin's War on Ukraine* xxvi (2017); *Demographic Research: Holodomor: The Real Number of Its Victims and Evidence of Its Man-Made Nature*, Harv. Univ., <https://gis.huri.harvard.edu/demographic-research> (last visited 24 Mar. 2023).

²⁰¹ Anne Applebaum, *Red Famine: Stalin's War on Ukraine* xxvi (2017); *Demographic Research: Holodomor: The Real Number of Its Victims and Evidence of Its Man-Made Nature*, Harv. Univ., <https://gis.huri.harvard.edu/demographic-research> (last visited 24 Mar. 2023).

²⁰² Anne Applebaum, *Red Famine: Stalin's War on Ukraine*, 291 (2017).

²⁰³ Anne Applebaum, *Red Famine: Stalin's War on Ukraine*, 291 (2017).

²⁰⁴ Anne Applebaum, *Red Famine: Stalin's War on Ukraine*, 291 (2017).

²⁰⁵ Anne Applebaum, *Red Famine: Stalin's War on Ukraine*, 291 (2017).

Donetsk Oblast and 68.8% in the Luhansk Oblast.²⁰⁶ Consequently, Russia (as with all of the provinces with sizable Russian speakers in former USSR republics) has maintained a special interest in the Donbas, and, through the Donbas, Ukraine would face its most open and blatant example of Russian meddling in the region. In the immediate aftermath of Euromaidan, local militias formed and rose up in the Donbas to take over the region, declare the province's independence from Ukraine, and align it with Russia.²⁰⁷ The militias had a significant part of the population's support, but they initially faced numerous setbacks in their engagements against the Ukrainian army.²⁰⁸ However, the militias received support from Russia in the form of small arms and Russian mercenaries.²⁰⁹ This stalled the sudden conflict into a stalemate and on-and-off again frozen conflict zone until the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022.²¹⁰

During the initial phases of the invasion, Russian forces were able to easily overrun and occupy the Donbas in part due to the already existing conflict and from assistance of local militias. These militias would come to fight alongside Russian forces and assist them in both their occupation of the Donbas and other regions.²¹¹ For example, during the Russian occupation of Izium, there were reports that some of the Russian soldiers present there were actually part of these militias due to their accents.²¹² If so, this could make them potentially complicit in the atrocity crimes committed by Russian forces at Izium including (but not limited to) torture, sexual violence, and mass executions.²¹³

However, the tide has turned since the initial invasion, and the Donbas is currently split between both the Ukrainian and Russian armies. One of the most brutal battles of the war raged on in the city of Bakhmut in the Donbas until the summer of 2023.²¹⁴ The city has been reported to be razed and depopulated of most of its civilians. The battle has been seen as crucial for control of the Donbas.²¹⁵

²⁰⁶ State Statistics Committee of Ukraine – English version – Results – General results of the census –& Linguistic composition of the population. <http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/general/nationality/>.

²⁰⁷ Serhii Plokhy, *The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine*, 466-67 (Basic Books 2015).

²⁰⁸ Serhii Plokhy, *The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine*, 466-67 (Basic Books 2015).

²⁰⁹ Serhii Plokhy, *The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine*, 466-67 (Basic Books 2015).

²¹⁰ Serhii Plokhy, *The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine*, 466-67 (Basic Books 2015).

²¹¹ The Kyiv Independent News Desk, *ISW: Russia formally integrates proxy militias from eastern Ukraine into Russian military*, THE KYIV INDEPENDENT (21 Feb. 2023) <https://kyivindependent.com/isw-russia-formally-integrates-proxy-militias-from-eastern-ukraine-into-russian-military/>.

²¹² *Ukraine: Russian Forces Tortured Izium Detainees*, Human Rights Watch (19 Oct. 2022) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/10/19/ukraine-russian-forces-tortured-izium-detainees>.

²¹³ *Ukraine: Russian Forces Tortured Izium Detainees*, Human Rights Watch (19 Oct. 2022) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/10/19/ukraine-russian-forces-tortured-izium-detainees>; *Ukraine: Mass graves in Izium is a macabre reminder of the cost of Russian aggression*, Amnesty International (16 Sep. 2022) <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/09/ukraine-mass-graves-in-izium-is-a-macabre-reminder-of-the-cost-of-russian-aggression/>.

²¹⁴ Andrew E. Kramer, *The Final Blocks: Inside Ukraine's Bloody Stand for Bakhmut*, THE NEW YORK TIMES (12 Apr. 2023) <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/12/world/europe/bakhmut-ukraine-russia.html>.

²¹⁵ Andrew E. Kramer, *The Final Blocks: Inside Ukraine's Bloody Stand for Bakhmut*, THE NEW YORK TIMES (12 Apr. 2023) <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/12/world/europe/bakhmut-ukraine-russia.html>.

V. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF ACCOUNTABILITY

As the world became increasingly interconnected, and the international public became more aware of the horrors and destruction caused by war and bad state actors, an international legal framework emerged in order to set standards that would hold violators accountable for their actions. The core of the current international framework of accountability is based in the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols.

E. History of the Geneva Conventions

Swiss businessman Henry Durant is widely credited as the father of modern international humanitarian law due to his work in founding the International Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”) after witnessing the brutality of war on the battlefield in Solferino, Italy, in 1859.²¹⁶ Durant’s work led to the creation of the first iteration of the Geneva Convention of the Wounded on the Field of Battle (“Geneva I”) in 1864. The first iteration of Geneva I contained ten articles providing for the protection of hospitals, and medical aid during times of armed conflict.²¹⁷ These humanitarian protections for injured combatants were first expanded in 1906, and again in 1929 in the aftermath of World War I—with changes to Geneva I and the creation of the original Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (“Geneva III”).²¹⁸

Despite these changes, the atrocities committed during World War II exposed major gaps in the international humanitarian legal framework.²¹⁹ Consequently, and with significant input from both states and the ICRC, Geneva I²²⁰ and III²²¹ were updated and two new treaties were drafted.²²² The two new conventions included the Geneva Convention on the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (“Geneva II”),²²³ and the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in the Time of War (“Geneva IV”).²²⁴ All four Geneva Conventions entered into force on 21 October 1950, and

²¹⁶ *Summary of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Their Additional Protocols*, AMERICAN RED CROSS (Apr. 2011),

https://www.redcross.org/content/dam/redcross/atg/PDF_s/International_Services/International_Humanitarian_Law/IHL_SummaryGenevaConv.pdf.

²¹⁷ *Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field. Geneva, 22 August 1864*, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS (last visited 31 Mar. 2022), <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/120>.

²¹⁸ *Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Geneva, 27 July 1929*, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS (last visited 31 Mar. 2022), <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/305>.

²¹⁹ *The Geneva Conventions of 1949: origins and current significance*, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS (last visited 31 Mar. 2022), <https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/statement/geneva-conventions-statement-120809.htm>.

²²⁰ *See* Geneva Convention I.

²²¹ *See* Geneva Convention III.

²²² *Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols*, Legal Info. Inst. (last updated 10 Jun. 2019), https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/geneva_conventions_and_their_additional_protocols.

²²³ *See* Geneva Convention III.

²²⁴ *See* Geneva Convention IV.

were widely adopted by States throughout the 20th Century.²²⁵ Two additional protocols to the Geneva Conventions were drafted and adopted in 1977, and one final protocol was drafted and adopted in 2005.²²⁶ Since all four Geneva Conventions as well as the First and Second Protocols, have been widely adopted their principles can be applied as customary international humanitarian law.²²⁷

F. The Conventions

1. Object/Purpose of the Conventions

The Geneva Conventions are intended to provide protections to medical personnel, prisoners of war, injured or surrendering members of the armed forces, and civilians or other non-combatants. These protections apply during times of international and non- international armed conflict as well as in times of peaceful occupation.²²⁸ Each Convention contains specific provisions that provide a minimum standard of treatment that governs the conduct of State parties during the course of any armed conflict or occupation. This minimum standard of treatment generally requires State parties to treat all protected persons with dignity. For example, State parties cannot subject captured protected persons to any type of mutilation, torture, or other humiliating treatment. Moreover, State parties cannot take hostages, kill surrendering opponents, perform extrajudicial killings, or interfere with humanitarian aid or civilian evacuation routes.²²⁹

2. Protected Persons Under the Conventions

Each of the Geneva Conventions provides specific protections to a different category of persons who may be at risk during an armed conflict or peaceful occupation. Geneva Convention I provides protections for sick or wounded members of armed forces and ad hoc militia groups. Geneva Convention II provides protections for members of the armed forces who are sick, injured, or shipwrecked during an armed conflict.²³⁰ Shipwrecked means a wreck or forced landing by either a sea vessel or aircraft.²³¹

Geneva Convention III provides protections for prisoners of war. Geneva Convention IV provides broad protections for any person who is not protected by Geneva Conventions I, II, or III.²³² Geneva Convention IV further states that protected persons who are “wounded and sick,”

²²⁵ *Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols*, Legal Info. Inst. (last updated 10 Jun. 2019), https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/geneva_conventions_and_their_additional_protocols.

²²⁶ *Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols*, Legal Info. Inst. (last updated 10 Jun. 2019), https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/geneva_conventions_and_their_additional_protocols.

²²⁷ See Theodor Meron, *The Geneva Conventions as Customary Law*, 81 *The American J. of Int'l L.* 348, 348-70 (1987).

²²⁸ Geneva Conventions common art. 2 & 3.

²²⁹ See generally Geneva Conventions.

²³⁰ See Geneva Convention I, art. 12; Geneva Convention II, art. 13.

²³¹ See Geneva Convention I, art. 12.

²³² See Geneva Convention III, art. 4; Geneva Convention IV, art. 4.

as well as “expectant mothers,” are granted “particular protection and respect.”²³³ In essence, the Geneva Conventions protect every individual impacted by an armed conflict or peaceful occupation except healthy, uninjured, and uncaptured individuals who are members of the armed forces or other ad hoc militias.

3. Selected Protections Within the Conventions

a) Hospital Protections

Each of the four Geneva Conventions contains multiple provisions providing specific protections to hospitals, ad hoc medical facilities, medical personnel, and medical transport equipment. Geneva Convention I provides these protections in Articles 19 – 37 which include prohibiting State Parties from targeting, bombing, destroying, or otherwise attacking established hospitals and ad hoc medical facilities, medical transport, and medical personnel that have been established to provide medical care to wounded and sick members of armed forces.²³⁴

Geneva II provides these same general protections to hospital ships, and to other medical assistance provided to sick and wounded soldiers on the high seas.²³⁵ Geneva Convention IV expands this prohibition on attacks on hospitals to civilian hospitals. Under Article 18 of Geneva Convention IV, civilian hospitals and medical facilities—including maternity hospitals—“may in no circumstances be the object of attack” and “at all times be respected and protected by the Parties to the conflict.”²³⁶ Civilian medical facilities can only be lawfully attacked if they are used to “commit, outside their humanitarian duties, acts harmful to the enemy.”²³⁷ Providing medical service and other care to troops is not considered “harmful to the enemy.” Even if a civilian hospital is engaging in qualifying harmful conduct, a State Party must first provide a warning to a civilian hospital before stripping it of its protection.²³⁸ State Parties are also required to refrain from targeting or otherwise attacking medical transport units.²³⁹

b) Humanitarian Protections

The Geneva Conventions all have provisions that require State Parties to treat all protected persons with a general standard of care. Geneva Convention I contains multiple provisions detailing the level of care that State Parties must provide to injured and sick members of armed forces, including providing a sufficient level of food, water, shelter, medical care, and refraining from any type of discrimination.²⁴⁰ Further, Geneva Convention I prohibits State Parties from engaging in medical experimentation, torture, or other degrading or humiliating treatment and

²³³ Geneva Convention IV, art. 16.

²³⁴ See Geneva Convention I, arts 19-37.

²³⁵ Geneva Convention II, arts. 22-40.

²³⁶ Geneva Convention IV, art. 18.

²³⁷ Geneva Convention IV, art. 19.

²³⁸ Geneva Convention IV, art. 19.

²³⁹ Geneva Convention IV, art. 21, 22.

²⁴⁰ Geneva Convention I, arts. 12-18.

requires State Parties to record and identify any enemy individuals who may fall under their care or control.²⁴¹

Geneva Convention II requires this same level of treatment for members of armed forces on the high seas.²⁴² Geneva Convention III requires this same level of treatment for prisoners of war.²⁴³

Geneva Convention IV requires State Parties to take reasonable measures to protect civilians from the impact of military operations and requires states to provide a heightened level of human treatment.²⁴⁴ This level of protection for internees includes access to sufficient food, water, shelter, and medical care. State Parties must permit internees to engage in religious and other important cultural practices, maintain humane working conditions for internees, and permit internees a certain level of contact with individuals outside of the internment.²⁴⁵

4. Application of the Convention by International Tribunals

The Geneva Conventions have been used in a wide array of international litigation, including contentious cases in front of the International Court of Justice and international arbitral tribunals, and in international criminal litigation. In *Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo*, the Democratic Republic of Congo (“DRC”) alleged multiple breaches of the Geneva Conventions by Uganda. The DRC allegations included killing, injuring, and despoiling DRC nationals of their property. Further, the DRC alleged Uganda failed to take adequate measures to prevent violations of human rights in the DRC by persons under its jurisdiction or control, and by failing to punish persons under its jurisdiction or control for having committed the above acts.²⁴⁶ The Court found that, among other things, the failure of the Ugandan forces to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants during the course of the armed conflict constituted a breach of the Geneva Conventions and of international humanitarian law.²⁴⁷ Similarly, the Court found that Uganda’s shelling of medical facilities, religious buildings, educational buildings, and civilian escape routes constituted a breach of the Geneva Conventions and of international humanitarian law.²⁴⁸

The Geneva Conventions were central to the *Eritrea v. Ethiopia* arbitration. The commission found that both countries to the arbitration violated the Geneva Conventions and international humanitarian law. The Commission found multiple breaches on each side of the conflict, including breaches for conduct involving both civilians and prisoners of war. The Commission found Ethiopia violated multiple articles of Geneva Convention IV—by unlawfully expelling Ethiopian nationals of Eritrean descent who did not hold dual citizenship, and for the inhuman

²⁴¹ Geneva Convention I, art. 16.

²⁴² Geneva Convention II, art. 12.

²⁴³ Geneva Convention II, art. 12-18; Geneva Convention 12-16.

²⁴⁴ Geneva Convention IV, arts. 13-26, Part III.

²⁴⁵ Geneva Convention IV, arts. 83 – 116.

²⁴⁶ *Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda*, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2005 68.

²⁴⁷ *Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda*, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2005 76.

²⁴⁸ *Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda*, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2005 76.

conditions of deportation on convoys to Eritrea.²⁴⁹ Further, the commission found Eritrea violated Article 35 of Geneva Convention IV for failing to ensure that some Ethiopian nationals who were lawfully expelled were allowed the opportunity to collect their personal property.²⁵⁰ Notably, the Commission found additional Geneva Convention IV violations by Eritrea for its unlawful detainment of Ethiopian nationals as well as the unsanitary conditions, denial of due process, and frequent abuse of Ethiopian nationals.²⁵¹

G. Overview and Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court

The International Criminal Court (“ICC”) was established in 1998 by the Rome Statute, and acts as a permanent international criminal tribunal under which individuals who commit or attempt to commit war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and crimes of aggression may be prosecuted and held accountable for their conduct.²⁵² Under the Rome Statute, the ICC can exercise jurisdiction when (1) one of these four core international crimes are committed and (2) the crimes were committed by a State party national, (3) in the territory of a State party or in a State that has accepted jurisdiction of the Court.²⁵³ Alternatively, the ICC may exercise jurisdiction where crimes are referred to the ICC Prosecutor by the UN Security Council pursuant to the resolution adopted in Chapter VII of the UN Charter.²⁵⁴

The Prosecutor may begin an investigation before issuing a warrant if the crimes were referred by the UN Security Council or if a State Party requests an investigation for crimes that appear to have been committed within the jurisdiction of the Court.²⁵⁵ Otherwise, the Prosecutor must seek authorization from a Pre-Trial Chamber to begin an investigation *proprio motu* (on its own initiative) based on information on crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.²⁵⁶ If the Pre-Trial Chamber considers that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation, and that the case appears to fall within the jurisdiction of the Court based on the criteria listed above, it shall authorize the investigation.²⁵⁷

H. Crimes Against Humanity

Article 7 of the Rome Statute details the scope of the potential crimes against humanity that may be charged by the Prosecutor. A crime against humanity is defined as any of the listed acts as part of a “widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of

²⁴⁹ *Civilian Claims, Eritrea’s Claims 15, 16, 23 & 27-32 between the State of Eritrea and the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia*, Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, 17 Dec. 2004.

²⁵⁰ *Civilian Claims, Eritrea’s Claims 15, 16, 23 & 27-32 between the State of Eritrea and the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia*, Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, 17 Dec. 2004.

²⁵¹ *Civilian Claims, Eritrea’s Claims 15, 16, 23 & 27-32 between the State of Eritrea and the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia*, Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, 17 Dec. 2004.

²⁵² Rome Statute art. 5.

²⁵³ Rome Statute art. 12.

²⁵⁴ Rome Statute art. 13.

²⁵⁵ Rome Statute art. 14.

²⁵⁶ Rome Statute art. 15.

²⁵⁷ Rome Statute art. 15.

the attack.”²⁵⁸ This statute requires proving the perpetrator had knowledge to be guilty of a crime against humanity, but this element does not require that the perpetrator had actual knowledge of the attack, details of the plan, or policy of the state organization.²⁵⁹ In order to successfully convict an individual of a crime against humanity under Article 7, the Prosecutor must establish that the conduct was committed as part of a “widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population” pursuant to a State policy, and that the perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.²⁶⁰

Crimes against humanity that fall within the jurisdiction of the ICC include murder, extermination, enslavement, forced deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape and other sex crimes, persecution, enforced disappearance, apartheid, and other inhuman acts “of a similar character.”²⁶¹ Article 7 of the Rome Statute, as well as the Rome Statute Elements of Crimes supplement, provide further clarification on what types of conduct constitute crimes against humanity. For example, a charge of enslavement under Article 7(1)(c) must include the exercise of “the right of ownership” over a person, which includes human trafficking.²⁶² Likewise, in order for the Prosecutor to successfully charge an individual with enforced disappearance under Article 7(1)(i), the Prosecutor must establish that the individual intended to remove the disappeared persons from “the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.”²⁶³

Since its establishment, the Prosecutor has charged and tried multiple individuals for violations of Article 7 of the Rome Statute. In *The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga*, the Prosecutor charged Germain Katanga, the Commander of the Force de résistance patriotique en Ituri (FRPI) and Brigadier-General of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC) with crimes against humanity arising from a February 2003 attack on Bogoro—a village in the Ituri district of the DRC.²⁶⁴ The Prosecutor alleged that Katanga and his co-perpetrators directed this attack against civilians to completely destroy Bogoro and its predominantly Hema civilian population by engaging in widespread killing and imprisonment, destroying civilian homes, raping civilian women and girls, and preventing civilians from fleeing.²⁶⁵ The FRPI also pillaged the property mainly of Hema civilians of Bogoro after the attack, and abducted women and girls from Bogoro making them “wives” of FRPI combatants.²⁶⁶ Among other things, Katanga was charged as an accessory to murder under Article 7(1)(a) and was found guilty.²⁶⁷ Katanga was

²⁵⁸ Rome Statute art. 7(1).

²⁵⁹ ICC Elements Art. 8(2).

²⁶⁰ Rome Statute art. 7(2)(a).

²⁶¹ Rome Statute arts. 7(1)(a)-(k).

²⁶² Rome Statute art. 7(2)(c) (However, this crime must also satisfy the element regarding the existence of a widespread attack on a population, and therefore a non-State organization conducting human trafficking for financial reasons would likely not fall under the scope of art. 7(1)(c)).

²⁶³ Rome Statute art. 7(2)(h).

²⁶⁴ *Prosecutor v. Katanga*, ICC-01/04-01/07- Warrant of Arrest, Judge Kuenyehia, 7 (2 July 2007).

²⁶⁵ *Prosecutor v. Katanga*, ICC-01/04-01/07-Pre-Trial Chamber I, Judge Kuenyehia, 17 (30 Sept. 2008).

²⁶⁶ *Prosecutor v. Katanga*, ICC-01/04-01/07-Pre-Trial Chamber I, Judge Kuenyehia, 348 (30 Sept. 2008).

²⁶⁷ *Prosecutor v. Katanga*, ICC-01/04-01/07-Trial Chamber II, Judge Cotte, 7 (7 Mar. 2014).

sentenced to twelve years in prison for his crimes.²⁶⁸

The Appellate Court's acquittal of Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo in *The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo* illustrates the level of direct control an individual must have in order to be liable for the conduct of those under his or her command. Jean Pierre Bemba Gombo was President and Commander-in-chief of the Mouvement de libération du Congo ("MLC") and was originally convicted by the Trial Court for the murders and rapes of all the soldiers under his direction. However, the Prosecutor did not establish that Bemba had control of the conduct of these soldiers.²⁶⁹ The Appeals Chamber found that Bemba could not be held criminally liable for the acts of all MLC troops during the CAR operation for multiple reasons.²⁷⁰ Among other issues, Appeals Court found the trial court failed to recognize the limitations Bemba faced in investigating and prosecuting these crimes given his role as a remote commander of troops in a foreign country,²⁷¹ and that MLC relied heavily on the cooperation of CAR authorities during the time in question.²⁷²

I. War Crimes

As with Article 7 and crimes against humanity, Article 8 of the Rome Statute defines the scope of what conduct constitutes a war crime under the Rome Statute. For conduct to fall under Article 8, it must be committed during a time of either international or non-international armed conflict.²⁷³ The first section of Article 8 establishes that any "grave breaches" of the Geneva Conventions constitute a war crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC. "Grave breaches" include willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, willfully causing great suffering, extensive destruction of property, depriving prisoners of war various rights, unlawful deportation or transfer of individuals, and the taking of hostages.²⁷⁴ The second section of Article 8 outlines other violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, including but not limited to, launching intentional or indiscriminate attacks against civilian populations, targeting civilian infrastructure or religious, cultural, medical, or educational institutions, subjecting individuals to unnecessary medical experimentation, and the use of various types of inhuman weapons or projectiles.²⁷⁵ In order to convict an individual of a war crime, the Prosecutor must establish that the individual directed or participated in the conduct.²⁷⁶

²⁶⁸ *Katanga Case*, INT'L CRIM. CT. PROJECT (last visited 31 Mar. 2022), <https://www.icc-cpi.int/drc/katanga>.

²⁶⁹ Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08- Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III's "Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute", 30 (8 Jun. 2018).

²⁷⁰ Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08- Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III's "Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute", 33 (8 Jun. 2018).

²⁷¹ Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08- Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III's "Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute", 25 (8 Jun. 2018).

²⁷² Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08- Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III's "Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute", 25 (8 Jun. 2018).

²⁷³ Rome Statute art. 8(2)(a-e) (This differs from Article 7 crimes against humanity, which can be committed during peacetime so long as the conduct is still part of a widespread State policy).

²⁷⁴ Rome Statute arts. 8(2)(a)(i-vii).

²⁷⁵ Rome Statute arts. 8(2)(b)(i-xxvi).

²⁷⁶ ICC Elements, art. 8.

War crimes are some of the most common charges brought by the Prosecutor. In *The Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi*, Al Mahdi was convicted under Article 8 of the Rome Statute.²⁷⁷ Al Mahdi was an alleged member of Ansar Eddine, which was a movement associated with the terrorist group Al Qaeda. The Prosecutor charged Al Mahdi under Article 8(2)(e)(iv) of the Rome Statute with intentionally directing attacks toward multiple religious and cultural institutions—including nine mausoleums and one mosque. These attacks had no military objective. The community considered the destruction of the religious and historical buildings an atrocity. In order to convict Al Mahdi, the Prosecutor needed to establish that (1) Al Mahdi directed the attack, (2) that the attack targeted one or more buildings protected under the statute, (3) that Al Mahdi intended to target protected buildings, and (4) that the attacks took place within the context of an armed conflict.

There are five elements for Article 8 (2) (e) (iv), war crime of attacking protected objects: (1) The perpetrator directed an attack; (2) The object of the attack was one or more buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals or places where the sick and wounded are collected, which were not military objectives; (3) The perpetrator intended such building or buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals or places where the sick and wounded are collected, which were not military objectives, to be the object of the attack; (4) The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an armed conflict, and that he was aware of the existence of the armed conflict.²⁷⁸ The Trial Court determined that these elements were met, and Al Mahdi was found guilty and sentenced to nine years in prison.²⁷⁹

J. The Crime of Aggression and Ukraine

The ICC did not gain jurisdiction over the crime of aggression until the fulfillment of the requirements laid out in the Amendments to the Crime of Aggression that were adopted on 11 June 2010 at the Review Conference of the Rome Statute held in Kampala, Uganda.²⁸⁰ Crimes of aggression, enumerated in Article 8 *bis* of the Rome Statute, generally prohibit State conduct that is intended to position an individual to “exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of another State.”²⁸¹ On 17 July 2018, the Assembly of State Parties to the Rome Statute, in its sixteenth session, activated the jurisdiction of the court over the Crime of Aggression, and

²⁷⁷ The Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, Judgment and Sentence, ICC-01/12-01/15-171, 27 Sep. 2016.

²⁷⁸ The Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, Judgment and Sentence, ICC-01/12-01/15-171, 27 Sep. 2016.

²⁷⁹ The Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, Judgment and Sentence, ICC-01/12-01/15-171, 27 Sep. 2016. (Al Mahdi’s sentence was reduced by the Appellate Court by two years and will be complete on 18 Sep. 2022).

²⁸⁰ *Amendments on the Crime of Aggression to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court*, UN Treaty Collection (accessed Aug. 8, 2025)

https://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?src=treaty&mtdsg_no=xviii-10-b&chapter=18&clang=_en.

²⁸¹ Rome Statute Art. 8.

the amendments came into force on 15 November 2018.²⁸²

Without UNSC referral, the ICC only has jurisdiction over the Crime of Aggression where both parties involved are state parties to the Rome Statute.²⁸³ Since Russia is not a party to the Rome Statute, the ICC does not have jurisdiction to try Russia for its invasion and subsequent aggressive military operations against Ukraine.²⁸⁴ Therefore, unless Russia, as a permanent member of the UNSC, agrees to refer itself to the ICC, the ICC cannot prosecute the case.²⁸⁵

On 1 January 2025, Ukraine officially acceded to the Rome Statute, becoming a full member.²⁸⁶ However, the Court did not have jurisdiction over the commission of the Crime of Aggression in Ukrainian territory before 01 January 2025, when Ukraine's instrument of ratification of the Rome Statute entered into force.²⁸⁷ Ukraine had on two prior occasions submitted declarations accepting the jurisdiction of the ICC to investigate crimes committed in the territory of Ukraine.²⁸⁸ These were on 9 APR 2014, for crimes committed during in the period of 21 NOV 2013 – 22 FEB 2014;²⁸⁹ and on 9 SEP 2015, for crimes committed since 20 FEB 2014 to present.²⁹⁰

To remedy this situation, the Council of Europe has announced the establishment of a Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine.²⁹¹ On 14 May 2025, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine submitted a formal request signed by the Secretary General of the

²⁸² ICC Judges amend the Regulations of the Court in connection with the activation of jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, *International Criminal Court*, (Nov. 15, 2018) <https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/icc-judges-amend-regulations-court-connection-activation-jurisdiction-over-crime-aggression>.

²⁸³ Alex Whiting, *Crime of Aggression Activated at the ICC: Does it Matter?* Just Security (Dec. 19, 2017) <https://www.justsecurity.org/49859/crime-aggression-activated-icc-matter/#:~:text=Second%2C%20the%20crime%20targets%20only,opt%20out%20in%20this%20circumstance>.

²⁸⁴ *The States Parties to the Rome Statute, Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute*, International Criminal Court, <https://asp.icc-cpi.int/states-parties> (last accessed Aug. 30, 2025).

²⁸⁵ *FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS A Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine*, Permanent Mission of the Republic of Latvia to the United Nations, (Mar., 5, 2024) <https://www2.mfa.gov.lv/en/newyork/news/69560-frequently-asked-questions-a-special-tribunal-for-the-crime-of-aggression-against-ukraine>.

²⁸⁶ *Ukraine becomes the 125th State Party to the Rome Statute*, Coalition for the International Criminal Court (Jan. 22, 2025) <https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/icc-welcomes-ukraine-new-state-party>.

²⁸⁷ *Ukraine becomes the 125th State Party to the Rome Statute*, Coalition for the International Criminal Court (Jan. 22, 2025) <https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/icc-welcomes-ukraine-new-state-party>.

²⁸⁸ *Ukraine, Situation in Ukraine*, International Criminal Court, <https://www.icc-cpi.int/situations/ukraine>, (last accessed Aug. 30, 2025).

²⁸⁹ *Declaration of Recognition of Jurisdiction by Ukraine*, Registrar of the International Criminal Court (09 Apr 2014), <https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/itemsDocuments/997/declarationRecognitionJurisdiction09-04-2014.pdf>.

²⁹⁰ *Ukraine, Situation in Ukraine*, International Criminal Court, <https://www.icc-cpi.int/situations/ukraine>, (last accessed Aug. 30, 2025).

²⁹¹ *Ukraine and the Council of Europe sign an Agreement on establishing Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine*, Secretary General of the Council of Europe (Jun. 25, 2025) <https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/-/ukraine-and-the-council-of-europe-sign-agreement-on-establishing-a-special-tribunal-for-the-crime-of-aggression-against-ukraine>.

Council of Europe for the creation of a special tribunal for the crime of aggression.²⁹² On 24 June 2025, the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers moved forward with the establishment of a special tribunal.²⁹³ On 25 June 2025, the Council of Europe and Ukraine signed the Agreement on the establishment of the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine,²⁹⁴ which included the Statute of the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine.²⁹⁵ The full text of the Statute can be found in Appendix C.

VI. VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY RUSSIA

This section will discuss crimes attributable to individuals in the Russian senior military and political leadership. Some of the incidents discussed in this section are further detailed and analyzed in the next section, the Most Egregious Incidents. The events listed in this section include those listed in previous editions as well as those that have occurred since the publication of the Third Edition.

This will not be an exhaustive list of crimes committed in Ukraine by the Russian Federation or responsible individuals. Instead, this section aims to highlight certain representative crimes that indicate an intentional pattern of aggression, destruction, and murder.

A. Unlawful Targeting of Medical Facilities

The intentional destruction of medical facilities²⁹⁶ and murder²⁹⁷ are violations of the Rome Statute. Further, the unlawful targeting of civilian medical facilities²⁹⁸ and the unlawful killing of civilians²⁹⁹ are violations of the Geneva Conventions. The Russian military, led by Vladimir Putin, targeted, and bombed multiple protected hospital units in Zhytomyr, Mariupol, Kharkiv, Vovchansk, and Dnipro.³⁰⁰ Between February 2022 and January 2025, Russia attacked Ukrainian health facilities twice per day on average.³⁰¹ Figures suggest that it will likely cost more than \$16

²⁹² Frequently Asked Questions - Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine, Council of Europe (accessed Aug. 8, 2025) <https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/frequently-asked-questions>.

²⁹³ Frequently Asked Questions - Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine, Council of Europe (accessed Aug. 8, 2025) <https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/frequently-asked-questions>.

²⁹⁴ Agreement between the Council of Europe and Ukraine on the Establishment of the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine, Council of Europe (Jun. 24, 2025) <https://search.coe.int/cm/#%7B%22CoEIdentifier%22:%5B%220900001680b678c9%22%5D,%22sort%22:%5B%22CoEValidationDate%20Descending%22%5D%7D>.

²⁹⁵ *Statute of the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine*, Council of Europe (Jun. 24, 2025) <https://search.coe.int/cm/#%7B%22CoEIdentifier%22:%5B%220900001680b678ca%22%5D,%22sort%22:%5B%22CoEValidationDate%20Descending%22%5D%7D>.

²⁹⁶ Rome Statute art. 8(2)(a)(i); 8(2)(b)(ix).

²⁹⁷ Rome Statute art. 7(1)(a).

²⁹⁸ Geneva Conventions common art. 2.

²⁹⁹ Geneva Conventions common art. 2.

³⁰⁰ *Ukraine: Civilian and medical infrastructure hit as casualties rise*, Doctors Without Borders (Oct. 28, 2024), <https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/latest/ukraine-civilian-and-medical-infrastructure-hit-casualties-rise>.

³⁰¹ *Number of attacks on health care in Ukraine from February 2022 to January 2025*, STATISTA, (Jan. 30, 2025), <https://www.statista.com/statistics/1302077/attacks-on-health-care-ukraine/#statisticContainer>.

billion to repair and rebuild Ukraine's healthcare infrastructure.³⁰² Recent figures published on 17 July 2025, using information last logged in April 2025, highlight that there have been at least 2,000 attacks on healthcare facilities in Ukraine.³⁰³

- In Kamianske, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, on 29 JUL 2025, Russia struck the maternity ward of the City Hospital 9 with two missiles, killing 3 people, and injuring at least 22 other people, including patients, nurses, midwives, and a doctor.³⁰⁴ One of the victims killed was a pregnant patient; both she and her unborn child died in the attack.³⁰⁵
- In Odesa, Odesa Oblast, on 10 JUN 2025, Russia struck a maternity ward in one of the largest Russian airstrike attacks on the city.³⁰⁶
- In Kharkiv, Kharkiv Oblast, on 30 MAR 2025, Russian drones struck targets including a military hospital, killing 2 people and injuring at least 35.³⁰⁷
- In Sumy, Sumy Oblast, on 28 SEP 2024, Russia killed 10 and injured at least 22 others when loitering munitions (suicide drones) hit the Saint Panteleimon Clinical Hospital in two attacks.³⁰⁸ The second strike, which came just 45 minutes after the first, “compounded the suffering of the wounded and incapacitated first responders,” according to a statement condemning the attack that the UN Humanitarian Coordinator in Ukraine made that day.³⁰⁹
- In Poltava, Poltava Oblast, Russia, on 3 SEP 2024, a Russian missile attack struck a medical facility and a neighboring Military Communications Institute, killing a total of

³⁰² World Bank, No. P180174 (Aug. 29, 2023), <https://web.archive.org/web/20230829122318/https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099184503212328877/pdf/P1801740d1177f03c0ab180057556615497.pdf>.

³⁰³ “Brutal Milestone”: 2000 Attacks on Ukraine's Hospitals, Clinicians, and Health Infrastructure Since Russia's Full-Scale Invasion, Physicians for Human Rights (Jul. 17, 2025), <https://phr.org/news/brutal-milestone-2000-attacks-on-ukraines-hospitals-clinicians-and-health-infrastructure-since-russias-full-scale-invasion/>.

³⁰⁴ Siobhán O'Grady and Konstantyn Khudov, *In a Ukrainian maternity ward, a Russian missile delivered death*, The Washington Post, (2 Aug. 2025).

<https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/08/02/ukrainian-maternity-ward-russian-missile-delivered-death/>; Ivana Kottosová and Darya Tarasova-Markina, *A maternity hospital was the safest place for 'ray of sunshine' expecting her first baby. Then Russia hit it with a missile*, CNN, (29 Jul, 2025)

<https://www.cnn.com/2025/07/29/world/ukraine-maternity-hospital-hit-russia-latam-intl>.

³⁰⁵ Ivana Kottosová and Darya Tarasova-Markina, *A maternity hospital was the safest place for 'ray of sunshine' expecting her first baby. Then Russia hit it with a missile*, CNN, (29 Jul, 2025)

<https://www.cnn.com/2025/07/29/world/ukraine-maternity-hospital-hit-russia-latam-intl>.

³⁰⁶ Svitlana Vlasova, Victoria Butenko, Kosta Gak, and Kathleen Magramo, *Massive Russian drone attack slams Kyiv and maternity hospital in Odesa, Ukrainian officials say*, CNN, (Jun. 10, 2025).

<https://www.cnn.com/2025/06/09/europe/russia-ukraine-kyiv-odesa-drone-attack-intl-hnk>.

³⁰⁷ Vitali Hnidy, *Russian drone attack kills two in Ukraine's Kharkiv*, Reuters, (Mar. 30, 2025),

<https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/drone-attack-kills-one-ukraines-kharkiv-officials-say-2025-03-29/>.

³⁰⁸ Pavel Polityuk, *Russian attacks on hospital in Ukraine's Sumy kill 10 Kyiv says*, Reuters, (Sep. 28, 2024),

<https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-attacks-medical-centre-kill-6-people-ukraines-sumy-minister-says-2024-09-28/>.

³⁰⁹ *Ukraine: UN Official Deplores the Deadly Double Attack on Hospital*, UN News, (Sep. 28, 2023)

<https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/09/1155096>.

58 people and injuring an additional 325.³¹⁰

- In Kyiv on 8 JUL 2024, attacks caused damage to Okhmatdyt children's hospital's infrastructure.³¹¹ This led to the destruction of many departments, the injury of 10 children and the death of a child who had to be evacuated to another facility while in critical condition.³¹²
- In Selydove, Donetsk Oblast, 20 NOV 2023, Russian forces launched a missile attack against a hospital killing three healthcare workers and wounding several more people.³¹³
- In Kherson, Kherson Oblast, on 13 NOV 2023, Russian forces shelled a hospital, shattering more than 150 windows and killing one healthcare worker.³¹⁴
- In Dnipro, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, on 26 MAY 2023, Russian forces bombarded Dnipropetrovsk City Hospital No. 14 and a veterinary clinic, killing at least two civilians and injuring dozens more.³¹⁵
- In Vovchansk, Luhansk Oblast, on 7 FEB 2023, Russian forces shelled a hospital and several apartment buildings, injuring eight civilians.³¹⁶
- In Kharkiv, Kharkiv Oblast, on 11 MAR 2022, the Russian military bombed a psychiatric hospital.³¹⁷ In addition, between 24 FEB and 21 MAR 2022, the Russian military targeted, bombed, or otherwise compromised a total of 64 protected medical facilities, unlawfully killing at least fifteen civilians and injuring an unknown number of civilians.³¹⁸
- In Mariupol, Mariupol Oblast, on 9 MAR 2022, the Russian military bombed a maternity hospital, unlawfully killing at least three civilians and injuring at least 17 civilians.³¹⁹
- In Zhytomyr, Zhytomyr Oblast, on 2 MAR 2022, the Russian military bombed a

³¹⁰ Kateryna Hodunova, *3 people injured in Russian Sept. 3 Strike on Poltava Die in Hospital*, Kyiv Independent (Sep. 8, 2024). <https://kyivindependent.com/3-people-injured-in-russian-sept-3-strike-on-poltava-die-in-hospital/>.

³¹¹ *Russia's July 8 Attack on a Children's Hospital in Ukraine*, Human Rights Watch, (Jul 11, 2024), <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/07/11/russias-july-8-attack-childrens-hospital-ukraine>.

³¹² *Russia's July 8 Attack on a Children's Hospital in Ukraine*, Human Rights Watch, (Jul 11, 2024), <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/07/11/russias-july-8-attack-childrens-hospital-ukraine>.

³¹³ "Ukraine: MSF Teams Witness Attacks on Two Hospitals," Doctors Without Borders (Nov. 27, 2023), <https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/latest/ukraine-msf-teams-witness-attacks-two-hospitals>.

³¹⁴ "Ukraine: MSF Teams Witness Attacks on Two Hospitals," Doctors Without Borders (Nov. 27, 2023), <https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/latest/ukraine-msf-teams-witness-attacks-two-hospitals>.

³¹⁵ Sana Noor Haq, Maria Kostenko, Sebastian Shukla and Joseph Ataman, *Deadly Russian strikes obliterate Dnipro medical facility in central Ukraine*, CNN (26 May 2023) <https://www.cnn.com/2023/05/26/europe/dnipro-medical-facility-attack-russia-ukraine-intl/index.html>.

³¹⁶ Susie Blann, Russian forces hit more civilian targets as Ukraine foresees a renewed assault, Los Angeles Times, (7 Feb. 2023) <https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2023-02-07/ukraine-hospital-fire-russia-attack>.

³¹⁷ Natalia Zinets & Matthias Williams, *Ukraine says Russian forces hit psychiatric hospital but no one hurt*, REUTERS (11 Mar. 2022), <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-forces-hit-psychiatric-hospital-ukraine-regional-governor-2022-03-11/>.

³¹⁸ See *Surveillance System For Attacks On Health Care (SSA)*, WORLD HEALTH ORG. [hereinafter WHO], <https://extranet.who.int/ssa/LeftMenu/PublicReportList.aspx?start=2022-02-24&end=2022-03-18&countryList=229&typeList=0> (last visited 31 Mar. 2022).

³¹⁹ *Mariupol Maternity Hospital Destroyed By Russian Air Strike, Triggering Global Horror, Outrage*, RADIOFREEEUROPE RADIOLIBERTY (hereinafter RFERL) (last updated 9 Mar. 2022), <https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-mariupol-hospital-bombed-russia/31744934.html>.

children's hospital, injuring an unknown number of civilians.³²⁰

B. Use of Indiscriminate Cluster Munitions Against Civilians

The Russian military has frequently used indiscriminate cluster munitions³²¹ that killed and injured civilians in Vuhledar, Okhtyrka, Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, and Konstyantynivka, Odesa, Kryvyi Rih, and Sumy. Willful killing³²² and extensive destruction of property carried out unlawfully and wantonly³²³ are violations of the Rome Statute. Further, attacks on civilian populations are a violation of the Geneva Convention.³²⁴ Though the Ukrainian military has recently been accused of utilizing cluster munitions, none of the alleged incidents have been attacks against civilians.³²⁵ The Ukrainian Ministry of State announced on 26 June 2025 that it had documented 5,974 instances of the use of cluster munitions by the Russian military and Russian-controlled forces in Ukraine.³²⁶ Cluster munitions have been used in attacks on civilian targets though air-bombing as well as missile attacks using missile systems Smerch, Grad, Uragan, and Tochka-U.³²⁷

- In Sumy, Sumy Oblast, on 13 APR 2025, Russia struck Petropavlivska Street in the city center with 2 missiles, killing at least 35 people, including 2 children, and injuring 117 people.³²⁸ One missile exploded on the road next to a public transport bus, reportedly outfitted with shrapnel cluster munitions, and the second hit the Sumy State University's congress center Building.³²⁹
- In Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, on 4 APR 2025, a Russian cluster ballistic missile struck a residential area where there was a playground, restaurant, and apartment

³²⁰ Laurie Churchman, *Russia bombs Ukrainian maternity hospital in Zhytomyr as mothers and children 'flee to basement'*, THE INDEPENDENT (2 Mar. 2022), <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russia-ukraine-zhytomyr-hospital-bomb-b2026632.html>.

³²¹ For further reading on the dangers of cluster munitions see *Cluster Munitions*, HUM. RTS. WATCH [hereinafter HRW] <https://www.hrw.org/topic/arms/cluster-munitions> (last visited 31 Mar. 2022). [26]

³²² Rome Statute art. 8(2)(b)(i).

³²³ Rome Statute art. 8(2)(b)(iv).

³²⁴ Geneva Conventions common art. 2.

³²⁵ Ukraine: Civilian Deaths from Cluster Munitions, Human Rights Watch, (Jul. 6, 2023) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/07/06/ukraine-civilian-deaths-cluster-munitions>.

³²⁶ Dariia Mykhailenko, *Ukraine Reports Nearly 6,000 Russian Cluster Munition Strikes Against Civilians Since 2022*, (Jul. 3, 2025) <https://united24media.com/latest-news/ukraine-reports-nearly-6000-russian-cluster-munition-strikes-against-civilian-s-since-2022-9438>.

³²⁷ Dariia Mykhailenko, *Ukraine Reports Nearly 6,000 Russian Cluster Munition Strikes Against Civilians Since 2022*, (Jul. 3, 2025) <https://united24media.com/latest-news/ukraine-reports-nearly-6000-russian-cluster-munition-strikes-against-civilian-s-since-2022-9438>.

³²⁸ Barbara Tasch and James Waterhouse, *At least 34 people killed in Russian ballistic missile attack on Sumy*, BBC, (Apr. 13, 2025). <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c4g4262x4x1o>.

³²⁹ Barbara Tasch and James Waterhouse, *At least 34 people killed in Russian ballistic missile attack on Sumy*, BBC, (Apr. 13, 2025). <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c4g4262x4x1o>.

buildings.³³⁰ This attack killed 19 civilians, including 9 children.³³¹ One point of impact, indicated by a deep crater in the ground, was located just a few yards from the playground.³³² The attack prompted a United Nations inspection team. The UN and local authorities concluded that Russia most likely launched an Iskander ballistic missile “that exploded several meters above the park, showering the area with shrapnel,” a typical feature of cluster munition use.³³³ The Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine announced on 5 APR 2025 that the missile had been “equipped with a cluster warhead for maximum damage to a larger number of people”.³³⁴

- In Odesa, Odesa Oblast, on 29 APR 2024, Russia forces fired a ballistic missile equipped with cluster munitions at the Odesa Legal Academy.³³⁵ The missile was confirmed to be an Iskander-M 9M723 series ballistic missile equipped submunitions, which is only produced by Russia.³³⁶ The attack killed 7 civilians, including a 4 year old child, and wounded 28.³³⁷
- In Konstyantinivka, Donetsk Oblast, on 18 MAR 2023, Russian forces fired cluster munition rockets near the central market of town, wounding six civilians. That same day, in the same Oblast, Russian forces used cluster munitions in an attack on the city of Kramatorsk, which killed at least two people and wounded eight.³³⁸
- In Mykolaiv, Mykolaiv Oblast, on 29 SEP 2022, a cluster munition rocket attack by Russian forces reportedly killed two civilians and wounded 12 others near a public transportation stop.³³⁹
- In Kharkiv, Kharkiv Oblast, on or around 28 FEB 2022, Russian military forces struck

³³⁰ Constant Méheut, Daria Mitiuk and Evelina Riabenko, *Where Ukrainian Children Once Played, Piles of Toys Memorialize the Dead*, The New York Times, (April 9, 2025, updated April 19, 2025) <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/09/world/europe/ukraine-kryvyi-ri-attack.html>.

³³¹ Constant Méheut, Daria Mitiuk and Evelina Riabenko, *Where Ukrainian Children Once Played, Piles of Toys Memorialize the Dead*, The New York Times, (April 9, 2025, updated April 19, 2025) <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/09/world/europe/ukraine-kryvyi-ri-attack.html>.

³³² Constant Méheut, Daria Mitiuk and Evelina Riabenko, *Where Ukrainian Children Once Played, Piles of Toys Memorialize the Dead*, The New York Times, (April 9, 2025, updated April 19, 2025) <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/09/world/europe/ukraine-kryvyi-ri-attack.html>.

³³³ Constant Méheut, Daria Mitiuk and Evelina Riabenko, *Where Ukrainian Children Once Played, Piles of Toys Memorialize the Dead*, The New York Times, (April 9, 2025, updated April 19, 2025) <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/09/world/europe/ukraine-kryvyi-ri-attack.html>.

³³⁴ *Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the murder of 17 people, including 9 children, by Russians in Kryvyi Rih 5 April 2025*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, (Apr. 5, 2025) <https://mfa.gov.ua/news/zayava-mzs-shchodo-vbivstva-rosiyanami-u-krivomu-rozi-18-lyudej-sered-yakih-9-ditej>.

³³⁵ Ukraine: Russia’s Odesa Cluster Munition Attack Harms Civilians, Human Rights Watch (May 29, 2024), <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/05/29/ukraine-russias-odesa-cluster-munition-attack-harms-civilians>.

³³⁶ Ukraine: Russia’s Odesa Cluster Munition Attack Harms Civilians, Human Rights Watch (May 29, 2024), <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/05/29/ukraine-russias-odesa-cluster-munition-attack-harms-civilians>.

³³⁷ Ukraine: Russia’s Odesa Cluster Munition Attack Harms Civilians, Human Rights Watch (May 29, 2024), <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/05/29/ukraine-russias-odesa-cluster-munition-attack-harms-civilians>.

³³⁸ Ukraine: Russia’s Odesa Cluster Munition Attack Harms Civilians, Human Rights Watch (May 29, 2024), <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/05/29/ukraine-russias-odesa-cluster-munition-attack-harms-civilians>.

³³⁹ *Cluster Munition Use in Russia-Ukraine War*, HRW (29 May 2023) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/05/29/cluster-munition-use-russia-ukraine-war#:~:text=Introduction,homes%2C%20hospitals%2C%20and%20schools>.

multiple civilian residences with indiscriminate cluster munitions, unlawfully killing an unknown number of civilians, injuring an unknown number of civilians, and unlawfully damaging civilian property.³⁴⁰ In addition, on 28 February 2022, Russian military forces struck multiple civilian residences with indiscriminate cluster munitions, unlawfully killing four civilians, burning alive a family of two adults and three children, and unlawfully damaging civilian property.³⁴¹

- In Okhtyrka, Sumy Oblast, on 25 FEB 2022, Russian military forces struck a nursery and elementary school with indiscriminate cluster munitions, unlawfully killing at least one civilian and injuring at least three civilians.³⁴²
- In Vuhledar, Donetsk Oblast, on 24 FEB 2022, Russian military forces struck a hospital with indiscriminate cluster munitions, unlawfully killing at least four civilians, injuring 10 civilians, and damaging the hospital and one ambulance.³⁴³

C. Willfully Causing Great Suffering and Murder of Civilians

Willfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or health³⁴⁴ and murder³⁴⁵ are both violations of the Rome Statute. In addition, unlawful killing of civilians³⁴⁶ and indiscriminate attacks on civilian areas³⁴⁷ are violations of the Geneva Conventions. The Russian military has repeatedly caused the death of civilians, including in Dnipro, Mariupol, Stryi Bykiv, Bilohorivka, and Izium.

- In Hroza, Kharkiv Oblast, on 5 OCT 2023, Russia fired a missile on a cafe at which a funeral reception was being held for a Ukrainian soldier, killing 59 civilians, including 36 women, 22 men and an 8-year old boy, - and injuring 7 more.³⁴⁸
- In Uman, Cherkasy Oblast, on 28 APR 2023, Russia struck an apartment building with two missiles, killing 25 people and injuring an additional 17.³⁴⁹ This was part of a larger

³⁴⁰ *Ukraine: Cluster Munitions Launched Into Kharkiv Neighborhoods*, HRW (4 Mar. 2022), <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/03/04/ukraine-cluster-munitions-launched-kharkiv-neighborhoods>.

³⁴¹ George Sargent, Eleanor Whalley, Alessandra Prentice, & Natalia Zinets, *Ukraine's Kharkiv struck by cluster bombs, experts say*, REUTERS (1 Mar. 2022), <https://www.reuters.com/world/ukraines-kharkiv-struck-by-cluster-bombs-experts-say-2022-03-01/>.

³⁴² *Ukraine: Cluster munitions kill child and two other civilians taking shelter at a preschool*, AMNESTY INT'L (27 Feb. 2022), <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/02/ukraine-cluster-munitions-kill-child-and-two-other-civilians-taking-shelter-at-a-preschool/>.

³⁴³ *Ukraine: Russian Cluster Munition Hits Hospital*, HRW (25 Feb. 2022), <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/02/25/ukraine-russian-cluster-munition-hits-hospital#>.

³⁴⁴ Rome Statute art. 8(2)(a)(iii).

³⁴⁵ Rome Statute art. 8(2)(a)(i).

³⁴⁶ Geneva Conventions common art. 2.

³⁴⁷ Geneva Conventions common art. 2.

³⁴⁸ *Attack on Funeral Reception in Hroza 5 October 2023*, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights through the UN Human Rights Monitor in Ukraine (Oct. 5, 2023), <https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/attack-funeral-reception-hroza>.

³⁴⁹ Victoria Kim and Marc Santora, Russian Missile Strikes on Civilian Buildings kill at least 25 in Ukraine, The New York Times (April 28, 2023, updated May 24, 2025).

attack on Ukraine that day, in which Russia launched twenty cruise missiles and two UAV drones.³⁵⁰

- In Dnipro, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, on 14 JAN 2023, a Russian missile was fired at a residential apartment complex which housed around 1,700 people.³⁵¹ The attack killed 45 people, including 6 children, and injured 79 people, 72 apartment units were destroyed, and another 236 were damaged beyond repair, displacing around 400 people from their homes.³⁵²
- In Bilohorivka, Luhansk Oblast, on 8 MAY 2022, 60 civilians died when the Russian military bombed a local school where almost 90 civilians were sheltering.³⁵³
- In Izium, Kharkiv Oblast, from 1 APR to 13 SEP 2022, Russian soldiers carried out the summary executions of 436 (primarily) civilians and prisoners of war. Their bodies were found in mass graves on the outskirts of the town. The bodies included men and women of all ages as well as children.³⁵⁴
- In Mariupol, Mariupol Oblast, on 16 MAR 2022, the Russian military bombed a theater being used to shelter civilians, unlawfully killing at least 300 civilians, and injuring an uncertain number more.³⁵⁵
- In Saryi Bykiv, Chernihiv Oblast, on 24 FEB 2022, Russian soldiers carried out the summary execution of six civilians.³⁵⁶

D. Targeting of Journalists and Members of the Press

The targeting and killing of civilian journalists are violations of Articles 2 Common to the Geneva Conventions and Article 71 of the Additional Protocol I.³⁵⁷ In addition, intentionally launching indiscriminate attacks against civilians is a violation of the Rome Statute.³⁵⁸ Since the start of the invasion, Russian armed forces have deliberately targeted journalists and members of

<https://www.nytimes.com/live/2023/04/28/world/russia-ukraine-news#cities-across-ukraine-targeted-by-missiles-most-of-which-were-intercepted-officials-say>.

³⁵⁰ Hanna Ahrirova, David Rising, and Andrea Rosa, *Russian missile and drone attack in Ukraine kills 23 people*, Associated Press (Apr. 28, 2023)

<https://apnews.com/article/ukraine-war-missile-attack-54c9ceec1418a0780aa0cee1427a540d>.

³⁵¹ Hanna Arhirova, *Russian strike toll: 45 dead civilians, including 6 children*, Associated Press, (Jan. 17, 2023)

<https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-apartment-strike-death-toll-1b518f84fc4e70708d56e1a1ea708929>.

³⁵² Hanna Arhirova, *Russian strike toll: 45 dead civilians, including 6 children*, Associated Press, (Jan. 17, 2023)

<https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-apartment-strike-death-toll-1b518f84fc4e70708d56e1a1ea708929>.

³⁵³ *Ukraine War: 60 People Killed after Bomb Hits School, Zelensky Says*, BBC, (9 May, 2022)

<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61369229>.

³⁵⁴ *Signs of torture, mutilation on bodies at Izium mass burial site: Ukraine officials*, CNN (24 Sep. 2022)

<https://www.cnn.com/2022/09/23/europe/ukraine-izium-mass-burial-bodies-recovered-torture-intl-hnk/index.html>.

³⁵⁵ '300 dead' in Russian Mariupol theatre attack, *Ukraine claims*, AL JAZEERA (25 Mar. 2022),

<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/25/ukraine-says-300-died-in-russian-strike-on-mariupol-theater>

³⁵⁶ *Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine - Note by the Secretary-General*, OHCHR (18 Oct. 2022) <https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/reports/a77533-independent-international-commission-inquiry-ukraine-note-secretary>.

³⁵⁷ Geneva Conventions common art. 2, Oct. 21, 1950.; Art. 71 of the Additional Protocol I.

³⁵⁸ Rome Statute art. 8(2)(b)(iv).

the press alike. Among many, these incidents have occurred in Horenka, Irpin, Yahide, Sievierodonetsk, and Kherson. Russian authorities had prepared pre-existing lists of Ukrainian journalists and systematically engaged in their detention and abduction.³⁵⁹ Since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, over 100 Ukrainian and international journalists have fallen victim to violence.³⁶⁰ These incidents range from physical assaults and injuries sustained in war zones to targeted attacks, detentions, and even deaths.³⁶¹ Such violence shows the perilous conditions under which media professionals operate and highlights the critical importance of safeguarding press freedom and ensuring the protection of journalists in conflict areas. In 2024, two media professionals were killed while reporting on Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, bringing the total number of journalists who have lost their lives in the conflict to 13, 12 of which occurred on Ukrainian soil.³⁶²

- On 19 SEP 2024, Ukrainian freelance journalist Victoria Roshchyna died while in captivity in Russia, as confirmed by a letter from the Russian Defense Ministry received by her family on October 10.³⁶³ Roshchyna was among twenty Ukrainian journalists detained by Russian authorities for their reporting on the ongoing conflict.³⁶⁴
- On 24 AUG 2024, in Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast, Ryan Evans, a member of the Reuters team reporting on the war in Ukraine, was killed during a strike on a hotel in the city.³⁶⁵ The attack also injured two other Reuters journalists, according to a statement released by the news agency.³⁶⁶ Two other members of the press were hospitalized in the same incident: American journalist Dan Peleschuk and Ukrainian cameraman Ivan Liubyshe-Kyrdey.³⁶⁷
- On 9 MAY 2023, near Bakhmut in Donetsk Oblast, Arman Soldin, a 32-year-old video

³⁵⁹ *IMI media expert: Russia deliberately targets journalists to cover up the crimes*. IMI. (Dec. 27, 2024) <https://imi.org.ua/en/news/imi-media-expert-russia-deliberately-targets-journalists-to-cover-up-the-crimes-i65763>.

³⁶⁰ *Ukraine: RSF condemns Russian attack leaving two Reuters staff injured and one killed*. (Aug. 26, 2024) <https://rsf.org/en/ukraine-rsf-condemns-russian-attack-leaving-two-reuters-staff-injured-and-one-killed>.

³⁶¹ *Ukraine: RSF condemns Russian attack leaving two Reuters staff injured and one killed*. (Aug. 26, 2024) <https://rsf.org/en/ukraine-rsf-condemns-russian-attack-leaving-two-reuters-staff-injured-and-one-killed>.

³⁶² *Three years into Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, nearly 150 journalists attacked*. Reporters Without Borders. (Feb. 19, 2025)

<https://rsf.org/en/three-years-russian-full-scale-invasion-ukraine-nearly-150-journalists-attacked>.

³⁶³ *Ukrainian journalist Victoria Roshchyna has died in a Russian jail: RSF demands an investigation into the circumstances of her death*. Reporters Without Borders. (Oct. 10, 2024)

<https://rsf.org/en/ukrainian-journalist-victoria-roshchyna-has-died-russian-jail-rsf-demands-investigation>.

³⁶⁴ *Ukrainian journalist Victoria Roshchyna has died in a Russian jail: RSF demands an investigation into the circumstances of her death*. Reporters Without Borders. (Oct. 10, 2024)

<https://rsf.org/en/ukrainian-journalist-victoria-roshchyna-has-died-russian-jail-rsf-demands-investigation>.

³⁶⁵ Rachel Armstrong, Tom Balmforth. *Reuters safety adviser killed, two journalists injured in Ukraine's Kramatorsk*. Reuters. (Aug. 26, 2024)

<https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/reuters-staff-hit-strike-hotel-ukraines-kramatorsk-2024-08-25/>.

³⁶⁶ Rachel Armstrong, Tom Balmforth. *Reuters safety adviser killed, two journalists injured in Ukraine's Kramatorsk*. Reuters. (Aug. 26, 2024)

<https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/reuters-staff-hit-strike-hotel-ukraines-kramatorsk-2024-08-25/>.

³⁶⁷ *Ukraine: RSF condemns Russian attack leaving two Reuters staff injured and one killed*. (Aug. 26, 2024) <https://rsf.org/en/ukraine-rsf-condemns-russian-attack-leaving-two-reuters-staff-injured-and-one-killed>.

coordinator for Agence France-Presse (AFP) in Ukraine, was killed in a rocket attack on the outskirts of Chasiv Yar.³⁶⁸

- In Kherson, Kherson Oblast, on 26 APR 2023, Russian snipers ambushed and killed Bogdan Bitik, a Ukrainian journalist working as a fixer for Corrado Zunino, an Italian correspondent for La Repubblica.³⁶⁹ Zunino was with Bitik and was wounded in the ambush.³⁷⁰
- In Sievierodonetsk, Luhansk Oblast, on 30 MAY 2022, Russian forces attacked evacuation vehicles, killing French journalist, Frédéric Leclerc-Imhoff.³⁷¹
- In Yahidne, Chernihiv Oblast, on 6 APR 2022, the body of Ukrainian film technician, Roman Nezhyborets, was found in a grave with his hands tied behind his back and multiple gunshot wounds.³⁷²
- On 1 APR 2022, in Huta Mezhyhirsk, Kyiv Oblast, Maksim Levin, a distinguished photographer and videographer, was killed while documenting Russia's invasion of Ukraine.³⁷³ After an extensive search, law enforcement authorities discovered the body of Maksim Levin, near the village of Huta Mezhyhirsk in the northern Kyiv region.³⁷⁴
- In the city of Horenka, Kyiv Oblast, on 14 MAR 2022, the Russian military shelled and unlawfully killed journalists Oleksandra "Sasha" Kuvshynova and Pierre Zakrzewski and seriously injured journalist Benjamin Hall.³⁷⁵
- In the town of Irpin, Kyiv Oblast, on 13 MAR 2022, Russian military forces shot at and unlawfully killed journalist Brent Renaud and injured journalist Juan Arrendondo.³⁷⁶
- On 1 MAR 2022, in Kyiv, Yevhenii Sakun, a camera operator for a Ukrainian television station that had been reporting on the invasion, was killed during a Russian military attack on the city's television tower.

³⁶⁸ Helen Regan, 'Brave and tenacious' AFP journalist Arman Soldin killed in rocket fire in eastern Ukraine, (May 10, 2023) <https://edition.cnn.com/2023/05/09/europe/afp-journalist-arman-soldin-killed-ukraine-intl-hnk/index.html>.

³⁶⁹ Lorenzo Tondo, *Ukrainian journalist killed by Russian snipers in ambush near Kherson*, THE GUARDIAN (26 Apr. 2023) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/apr/26/ukraine-journalist-killed-russian-snipers-bogdan-bitik-corrado-zunino>.

³⁷⁰ Lorenzo Tondo, *Ukrainian journalist killed by Russian snipers in ambush near Kherson*, THE GUARDIAN (26 Apr. 2023) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/apr/26/ukraine-journalist-killed-russian-snipers-bogdan-bitik-corrado-zunino>.

³⁷¹ Megan Fisher, *Frédéric Leclerc-Imhoff: French BFMTV journalist killed in Ukraine*, BBC (13 May 2022) <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61638049>.

³⁷² *After Russian withdrawal, Ukrainian journalists found killed in Bucha and Yahidne*, COMMITTEE TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS (13 Apr. 2022) <https://cpj.org/2022/04/after-russian-withdrawal-ukrainian-journalists-found-killed-in-bucha-and-yagodnoye/>.

³⁷³ *Ukrainian photographer Maksim Levin killed while covering war*, The Guardian, (Apr. 2, 2022) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/02/ukrainian-photographer-maksim-levin-killed-while-covering-war>.

³⁷⁴ *Documentalist and photographer Maks Levin found dead*, Lb.ua, (Apr. 2, 2022) https://en.lb.ua/news/2022/04/02/12419_documentalist_photographer_maks.html.

³⁷⁵ *Two journalists killed near Kyiv*, EUR. FED'N OF JOURNALISTS (15 Mar. 2022), <https://europeanjournalists.org/blog/2022/03/15/two-journalists-killed-near-kyiv/>.

³⁷⁶ Stefan Becket, *American journalist Brent Renaud shot and killed by Russian forces in Ukraine*, CBS NEWS, <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/brent-renaud-ukraine-russia-american-journalist-killed/> (last updated 14 Mar. 2022).

E. Bombing of Evacuation and Humanitarian Routes

Targeting civilian escape routes and interfering with the delivery of humanitarian aid are violations of the Geneva Convention.³⁷⁷ Further, intentionally directing attacks toward the civilian population and murder are violations of the Rome Statute.³⁷⁸ Thus far in the conflict, Zoria, Chernihiv, Mariupol, Irpin, Kherson, and Lyman have suffered numerous such violations. Ukrainian Government officials, including Oleksandr Prokudin, speculate that Russia is intentionally attacking evacuation and humanitarian centers to stop the rescue missions and cause harm, to doctors, rescuers, and police.³⁷⁹ As seen below, there have been continuous patterns of Russian forces attacking an area, and the next day performing a second attack once humanitarian aid arrives or evacuation begins.³⁸⁰

- In Zoria, on 20 APR 2025, the Russian military attacked a humanitarian mission with drones.³⁸¹ An evacuation vehicle was targeted while staff was attempting to rescue people.³⁸²
- In Kherson, on 16 APR 2025, after a bombing when rescue showed up to the scene, Russia launched an artillery barrage, damaging multiple civilian buildings and vehicles.³⁸³
- A Russian drone targeted a truck belonging to a charitable organization in Orikhiv in DEC 2024, disrupting aid distribution.³⁸⁴ While no casualties were reported, the attack

³⁷⁷ Geneva Conventions common art. 2.

³⁷⁸ Rome Statute art. 7(1)(a), 8(2)(b)(ii).

³⁷⁹ Illia Novikov, *Russian Strikes on Ukraine's Kherson Kill 1 Person and Wound 9*, ASSOCIATED PRESS (last updated Apr. 16, 2025),

<https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-kherson-glide-bombs-72f7bda22f4fb8c990a026d55f4ce66e>.

³⁸⁰ See generally ACAPS Analysis Hub, *Ukraine Quarterly Humanitarian Access Update* 1, Oct., 28, (2025), https://www.acaps.org/fileadmin/Data_Product/Main_media/20241029_ACAPS_Ukraine_Quarterly_Humanitarian_Access_update.pdf (describing the amount of attacks on humanitarian areas). See e.g., Illia Novikov, *Russian Strikes on Ukraine's Kherson Kill 1 Person and Wound 9*, ASSOCIATED PRESS (last updated Apr. 16, 2025),

<https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-kherson-glide-bombs-72f7bda22f4fb8c990a026d55f4ce66e>, Veronika Melkozerova, *Russia bombs school where flood evacuees were sheltering after Zelenskyy visits Kherson*, POLITICO (8 June 2023) <https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-strikes-school-where-evacuees-were-sheltering-after-zelenskyy-visits-flood-struck-kherson-ukraine-war/>.

³⁸¹ Yohannes Lowe & Tom Bryant, *Zelenskyy Says Russia has Intensified Shelling Despite 'Easter Truce' as Moscow also Accuses Ukraine of Breaching Ceasefire - As it Happened*, THE GUARDIAN (last updated Apr. 20, 2025, 9:26), <https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2025/apr/20/ukraine-russia-zelenskyy-putin-war-easter-truce-impression-ceasefire-live-latest-updates>.

³⁸² Yohannes Lowe & Tom Bryant, *Zelenskyy Says Russia has Intensified Shelling Despite 'Easter Truce' as Moscow also Accuses Ukraine of Breaching Ceasefire - As it Happened*, THE GUARDIAN (last updated Apr. 20, 2025, 9:26), <https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2025/apr/20/ukraine-russia-zelenskyy-putin-war-easter-truce-impression-ceasefire-live-latest-updates>.

³⁸³ Illia Novikov, *Russian Strikes on Ukraine's Kherson Kill 1 Person and Wound 9*, ASSOCIATED PRESS (last updated Apr. 16, 2025),

<https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-kherson-glide-bombs-72f7bda22f4fb8c990a026d55f4ce66e>.

³⁸⁴ ACAPS Analysis Hub, *Ukraine Quarterly Humanitarian Access Update* 15 (Feb., 6, 2025),

https://www.acaps.org/fileadmin/Data_Product/Main_media/20250206_ACAPS_Ukraine_Quarter_4_-_2024_humanitarian_access_update.pdf.

hindered humanitarian efforts in the region.³⁸⁵

- In Kutsurubsk hromada, on 25 NOV 2024, Russian forces used a drone attack on Solonchak during aid distribution, injuring five people, including humanitarian responders and residents.³⁸⁶
- On 30 SEP 2024, two humanitarian volunteers in Ivashky in the Bohodukihv district sustained injuries after a drone attack.³⁸⁷
- AUG 2024, Ukrainian authorities ordered the evacuation of women and children from Pokrovsk.³⁸⁸ Evacuation efforts were conducted under constant threat from Russian artillery and drone attacks.³⁸⁹
- Between JUL and SEP 2024, the Kherson region remained a hot spot for humanitarian operations.³⁹⁰ There were nine reports of attacks on aid workers and facilities, including strikes on ambulances and aid convoys, severely impacting relief.³⁹¹
- In Chernihiv city center, a strike on 19 AUG 2023, a strike killed 7 people (including 1 humanitarian responder, and injured over 148 others.³⁹²
- In Kherson, Kherson Oblast, on 8 JUNE 2023, Russian forces bombarded with rockets a school where evacuees from nearby flooding sought shelter. Russian forces had targeted several other evacuation routes around Kherson. Reportedly, nine civilians were injured.³⁹³

³⁸⁵ ACAPS Analysis Hub, *Ukraine Quarterly Humanitarian Access Update* 15 (Feb., 6, 2025), https://www.acaps.org/fileadmin/Data_Product/Main_media/20250206_ACAPS_Ukraine-Quarter_4_-_2024_humanitarian_access_update.pdf.

³⁸⁶ ACAPS Analysis Hub, *Ukraine Quarterly Humanitarian Access Update* 15 (Feb., 6, 2025), https://www.acaps.org/fileadmin/Data_Product/Main_media/20250206_ACAPS_Ukraine-Quarter_4_-_2024_humanitarian_access_update.pdf.

³⁸⁷ ACAPS Analysis Hub, *Ukraine Quarterly Humanitarian Access Update* 1 (Oct., 28, 2025), https://www.acaps.org/fileadmin/Data_Product/Main_media/20241029_ACAPS_Ukraine_Quarterly_Humanitarian_Access_update.pdf.

³⁸⁸ *Evacuations from Pokrovsk as Ukraine Marks 1,000 Days of Resilience*, RELIEF WEB (Nov. 19, 2024), <https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/evacuations-pokrovsk-ukraine-marks-1000-days-resilience>.

³⁸⁹ *Evacuations from Pokrovsk as Ukraine Marks 1,000 Days of Resilience*, RELIEF WEB (Nov. 19, 2024), <https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/evacuations-pokrovsk-ukraine-marks-1000-days-resilience>.

³⁹⁰ ACAPS Analysis Hub, *Ukraine Quarterly Humanitarian Access Update* 15 (Feb., 6, 2025), https://www.acaps.org/fileadmin/Data_Product/Main_media/20250206_ACAPS_Ukraine-Quarter_4_-_2024_humanitarian_access_update.pdf; ACAPS Analysis Hub, *Ukraine Quarterly Humanitarian Access Update* 1 (Oct., 28, 2025), https://www.acaps.org/fileadmin/Data_Product/Main_media/20241029_ACAPS_Ukraine_Quarterly_Humanitarian_Access_update.pdf.

³⁹¹ ACAPS Analysis Hub, *Ukraine Quarterly Humanitarian Access Update* 15 (Feb., 6, 2025), https://www.acaps.org/fileadmin/Data_Product/Main_media/20250206_ACAPS_Ukraine-Quarter_4_-_2024_humanitarian_access_update.pdf; ACAPS Analysis Hub, *Ukraine Quarterly Humanitarian Access Update* 1 (Oct., 28, 2025), https://www.acaps.org/fileadmin/Data_Product/Main_media/20241029_ACAPS_Ukraine_Quarterly_Humanitarian_Access_update.pdf.

³⁹² ACAPS Analysis Hub, *Ukraine Quarterly Humanitarian Access Update* 2 (Nov. 8, 2023), https://www.acaps.org/fileadmin/Data_Product/Main_media/20231101_ACAPS_Thematic_Report_Ukraine_Humanitarian_access_Q3.pdf.

³⁹³ Veronika Melkozerova, *Russia bombs school where flood evacuees were sheltering after Zelenskyy visits Kherson*, POLITICO (8 June 2023) <https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-strikes-school-where->

- In Kherson, Kherson Oblast, just before their withdrawal from the city on 11 NOV 2022, Russian soldiers destroyed electrical generators, cell towers, and boats; forces additionally mined the nearby Khakhovka reservoir with the intent of flooding the area if the city fell into the hands of Ukrainian forces.
- In Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast, on 9 APR 2022, Russian forces bombed a local train station where civilians were awaiting evacuation out west, killing more than 50 people.³⁹⁴
- In Lyman, Donetsk Oblast, on 13 MAR 2022, Russian military forces performed an airstrike which indiscriminately struck a civilian evacuation train, killing one civilian and injuring one civilian.³⁹⁵
- In Mariupol, Mariupol Oblast, on 7 MAR 2022, Russian military forces planted butterfly mines in a proposed civilian evacuation route in an attempt to seriously injure civilian evacuees.³⁹⁶ In addition, on 8 MAR 2022, Russian military forces shelled a civilian evacuation route from Zaporizhzhia to Mariupol, preventing humanitarian aid from reaching Mariupol and preventing civilians from evacuating Zaporizhzhia.³⁹⁷
- In Irpin, Kyiv Oblast, on 6 MAR 2022, Russian military forces fired indiscriminately at a civilian evacuation route, unlawfully killing eight civilians.³⁹⁸

F. Forced Deportation of Ukrainian Civilians

Deportation of a population,³⁹⁹ enforced disappearance of persons,⁴⁰⁰ and unlawful deportation⁴⁰¹ are each violations of the Rome Statute. In Mariupol, Donetsk, Kherson, and Luhansk, there have been frequent occurrences of open and forcible deportation of Ukrainian citizens by actors of or working on behalf of the Russian Federation. The deportation of Ukrainian civilians is a violation of The Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949's Article 49, which prohibits the transfer of civilians from occupied territories.⁴⁰² On 27 April 2023, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted Resolution 2495 (2023), stating that the definition of genocide, under Article 2 paragraph (e) of the Genocide Convention (1945) “matches with the documented

evacuees-were-sheltering-after-zelenskyy-visits-flood-struck-kherson-ukraine-war/.

³⁹⁴ Jonathan Beale, *Ukraine war: Disbelief and horror after Kramatorsk train station attack*, BBC NEWS (9 Apr. 2022) <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61055105>.

³⁹⁵ Anders Anglesey, *Russia Launches Deadly Strike on Evacuee Train, Ukraine Says*, NEWSWEEK (13 Mar. 2022), <https://www.newsweek.com/russia-deadly-strike-refugee-train-ukraine-war-kramatorsk-lviv-1687523>.

³⁹⁶ David Hambling, *Russia Accused Of Using Air-Dropped Butterfly Mines To Block Ukrainian Evacuation Route*, FORBES (10 Mar. 2022), <https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2022/03/10/russia-reportedly-blocks-ukrainian-evacuation-route-with-air-dropped-butterfly-mines/?sh=78794c141a32>.

³⁹⁷ Peter Beaumont, Luke Harding and Jon Henley, *Russia Accused of Shelling Mariupol Evacuation Route as Civilians Flee* Sumy, (8 Mar., 2022), <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/08/ukraine-war-civilians-sumy-irpin-refugees-russia>.

³⁹⁸ *Ukraine: Russian Assault Kills Fleeing Civilians*, Human Rights Watch, (Mar. 8, 2022), <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/03/08/ukraine-russian-assault-kills-fleeing-civilians>.

³⁹⁹ Rome Statute art. 7(1)(d).

⁴⁰⁰ Rome Statute art. 7(1)(i).

⁴⁰¹ Rome Statute art. 8(2)(a)(vii).

⁴⁰² The Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, art. 49.

evidence of deportation and forcible transfer of Ukrainian children to the Russian Federation or territories temporarily under Russian occupation.”⁴⁰³

Of particular note, the Russian government has developed a widespread campaign to separate and illegally deport Ukrainian children to Russia, including orphans and unaccompanied children who have been forcibly orphaned or separated from their parents as part of Russia’s actions in this conflict.⁴⁰⁴ Russia justifies its transfer of children with mainly three reasons: evacuation for security reasons;⁴⁰⁵ transfer for the purpose of adoption or foster care;⁴⁰⁶ and, temporary stays in recreation camps.⁴⁰⁷

On 19 November 2024, the UK imposed sanctions on individuals involved in Russia’s forcible deportation and indoctrination of Ukrainian children, highlighting Russia’s effort to erase Ukraine’s cultural identity. The sanctions target officials and organizations, including the All-Russian Young Army Military Patriotic Social Movement (Yunarmia) and other key perpetrators⁴⁰⁸

In April 2025, Bring Kids Back UA statistics show 19,546 reports of illegal deportations and forced displacement of children and only 1,256 children returned from places of deportation, forced displacement or from the temporarily occupied territories.⁴⁰⁹

Russia has taken numerous steps, such as simplifying the process of obtaining Russian citizenship to facilitate the adoption of Ukrainian orphans and children without parental care.⁴¹⁰ These measures strongly suggest an organized effort to absorb some members of these groups

⁴⁰³ Resolution 2495, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (Apr. 27, 2023) <https://pace.coe.int/en/files/31776/html>.

⁴⁰⁴ Veronika Bilkova, Cecilie Hellestveit and Elina Šteinerte, *Report on Violations and Abuses of International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, Related to the Forcible Transfer And/Or Deportation of Ukrainian Children to the Russian Federation*, Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (May 4, 2023) page 12-13. https://www.osce.org/files/t/documents/7/7/542751_1.pdf.

⁴⁰⁵ Bilkova, Hellestveit and Šteinerte, *Report on Violations and Abuses of International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, Related to the Forcible Transfer And/Or Deportation of Ukrainian Children to the Russian Federation*, OSCE (May 4, 2023) pages 14-16.

⁴⁰⁶ Bilkova, Hellestveit and Šteinerte, *Report on Violations and Abuses of International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, Related to the Forcible Transfer And/Or Deportation of Ukrainian Children to the Russian Federation*, OSCE (May 4, 2023) page 16.

⁴⁰⁷ Bilkova, Hellestveit and Šteinerte, *Report on Violations and Abuses of International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, Related to the Forcible Transfer And/Or Deportation of Ukrainian Children to the Russian Federation*, OSCE (May 4, 2023) pages 17-18.

⁴⁰⁸ UK sanctions perpetrators of Russia’s forced deportation and brainwashing of Ukrainian children on 1000th day of full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office of the United Kingdom (19 Nov. 2024) <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-sanctions-perpetrators-of-russias-forced-deportation-and-brainwashing-of-ukrainian-children-on-1000th-day-of-full-scale-invasion-of-ukraine>.

⁴⁰⁹ Bring Kids Back UA, *Official Website of the Ukrainian Initiative for the Repatriation of Deported Children*, <https://www.bringkidsback.org.ua/> (last visited Apr. 5, 2025).

⁴¹⁰ *Executive Order on Determining Certain Categories of Foreign Citizens and Stateless Persons Having the Right to Apply for Russian Citizenship*, President of Russia (Jan. 4, 2024) <http://en.kremlin.ru/acts/news/73222>.

into Russian society. Such actions indicate the deliberate Russian policy of deporting civilians, including children, from Ukraine to Russia. Deported Ukrainians are often coerced into signing documents alleging they witnessed war crimes by Ukrainian forces.⁴¹¹

There is also evidence that Russia and Belarus are working together and targeting children for removal from Ukraine, coordinating their transport from occupied Ukraine through Russia to Belarus, and subjecting children to re-education, sometimes including military training.⁴¹² Documented cases exist of children being physically abused, denied communication with their families in Ukraine, and given inadequate access to food and care after being taken to Russia.⁴¹³

- On 3 DEC 2024 the largest high confidence public count identified 314 individual children taken to Russia and placed in coerced adoption and fostering, 37 of whom had been naturalized with Russian citizenship.⁴¹⁴ Children from Donetsk Oblast and Luhansk Oblast were taken to “at least 21 regions throughout Russia where they were placed with citizens of Russia or placed in institutions and listed on Russia’s child placement database.”⁴¹⁵ Russian Children’s Rights Ombudsperson, Maria Lvova-Belova, stated that the so-called Donetsk-People’s Republic would be the first region to be integrated into the Russian federal child placement database, “at least 80.4% of children from Ukraine listed in Russia’s databases have been taken from Donetsk Oblast.”⁴¹⁶
- On 4 JAN 2024, President Putin signed the Executive Order on Determining Certain Categories of Foreign Citizens and Stateless Persons Having the Right to Apply for Russian Citizenship,⁴¹⁷ which indicated that children deprived of parental guardianship, which includes abducted Ukrainian children, could be fast-tracked for Russian

⁴¹¹ Amnesty International, *Index: EUR 50/6136/2022, A Bus Taking People from Mariupol Arrives in the Village of Bezimenne in Donetsk, 7 May 2022* (2022), <https://www.amnesty.org>.

⁴¹² Assessment and Analysis Working Group, *Belarus' Collaboration with Russia in the Systematic Deportation of Ukraine's Children*, ReliefWeb (Nov. 16, 2023), <https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/belarus-collaboration-russia-systematic-deportation-ukraines-children-16-november-2023-enruuk>.

⁴¹³ Tom Watling, *Kidnapped, Abused, Humiliated – the Ukrainian Children Stolen by Russia*, The Independent (June 15, 2024), <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ukraine-war-russia-children-putin-b2487474.html>.

⁴¹⁴ *Russia's Systematic program of Coerced Adoption and Fostering of Ukraine's Children*, Humanitarian Research Lab at Yale School of Public Health, (Dec. 24, 2025) page 1. <https://files-profile.medicine.yale.edu/documents/a7cf7b6a-3418-4e74-a716-3f049323d728>.

⁴¹⁵ *Russia's Systematic program of Coerced Adoption and Fostering of Ukraine's Children*, Humanitarian Research Lab at Yale School of Public Health, (Dec. 24, 2025) page 2. <https://files-profile.medicine.yale.edu/documents/a7cf7b6a-3418-4e74-a716-3f049323d728>.

⁴¹⁶ *Russia's Systematic program of Coerced Adoption and Fostering of Ukraine's Children*, Humanitarian Research Lab at Yale School of Public Health, (Dec. 24, 2025) page 2. <https://files-profile.medicine.yale.edu/documents/a7cf7b6a-3418-4e74-a716-3f049323d728>.

⁴¹⁷ *Executive Order on Determining Certain Categories of Foreign Citizens and Stateless Persons Having the Right to Apply for Russian Citizenship*, President of Russia (Jan. 4, 2024) <http://en.kremlin.ru/acts/news/73222>.

naturalization.⁴¹⁸

- On 17 MAR 2023, Pre-Trial Chamber II of the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest warrants for Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin and Maria Alekseevna Lvova-Belova (Children's Rights Ombudsperson under the President of the Russian Federation), who are accused of war crimes, including the illegal deportation and transfer of children from the occupied territories of Ukraine to Russia.⁴¹⁹
- In Kherson, Kherson Oblast, just before their withdrawal from the city on 11 NOV 2022, Russian soldiers forcibly deported an estimated 70,000 civilians to the Russian Federation.⁴²⁰ Many of these included children who were forcibly separated from their parents.⁴²¹
- In the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, beginning on 21 MAR 2022, Russian military forces forcibly deported at least 2,389 Ukrainian children to various locations within the Russian Federation.⁴²² In APR 2022, children identified by the Yale Humanitarian Research Lab were placed directly in Moscow and Moscow Oblast.⁴²³ In July 2022, this area had grown to include Kaluga Oblast, Tula Oblast, and Voronezh Oblast and by SEP 2022, the Kursk, Murmansk, Rostov, Ryazan, Nizhny-Novgorod, Astrakhan, Omsk, and Novosibirsk oblasts and Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug.⁴²⁴ Children were also placed in eight institutions (boarding schools and children centers) across the Russian oblasts of Bryansk, Orel, Pskov, and Saratov and the Republic of Bashkortostan.⁴²⁵ This report, which investigated almost exclusively children taken from Donetsk and Lukhansk Oblasts, noted in its executive findings that “Russia’s Aerospace Forces and aircraft under the direct control of President Putin’s office transported multiple groups from Ukraine on Russian Federation-flagged military transport planes for placement with

⁴¹⁸ Vladyslav Havrylov, *Putin Accused of Fast-tracking Russian Citizenship for Abducted Ukrainian Kids*, Atlantic Council (Jan. 25, 2024) <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/putin-accused-of-fast-tracking-russian-citizenship-for-abducted-ukrainian-kids/>.

⁴¹⁹ Int’l Crim. Ct., *Situation in Ukraine: ICC Judges Issue Arrest Warrants against Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin and Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova*, <https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-ukraine-icc-judges-issue-arrest-warrants-against-vladimir-vladimirovich-putin-and-maria-alekseyevna-lvova-belova> (last visited Apr. 5, 2025).

⁴²⁰ Stefan J. Bos, *Russia departs thousands from Kherson as Ukrainian army nears*, VATICAN NEWS (28 Oct. 2022) <https://www.vaticannews.va/en/world/news/2022-10/russia-deports-thousands-from-ukraine-as-ukrainian-army-nears.html>.

⁴²¹ Sam Mednick, *Ukrainians hid orphaned children from Russian deportation*, AP NEWS (5 Dec. 2022) <https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-health-europe-orphans-f283aa4d22fdab59a43a16ca0be54baf>.

⁴²² Irene Nasser & Teele Rebane, *Ukraine accuses Russia of forcibly deporting more than 2,000 children*, CNN (22 Mar. 2022), https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/ukraine-russia-putin-news-03-22-22/h_4bbe7803db45db77ceef1ab33beb6489.

⁴²³ *Russia’s Systematic program of Coerced Adoption and Fostering of Ukraine’s Children*, Humanitarian Research Lab at Yale School of Public Health, (Dec. 24, 2025) page 34.

⁴²⁴ *Russia’s Systematic program of Coerced Adoption and Fostering of Ukraine’s Children*, Humanitarian Research Lab at Yale School of Public Health, (Dec. 24, 2025) page 34.

⁴²⁵ *Russia’s Systematic program of Coerced Adoption and Fostering of Ukraine’s Children*, Humanitarian Research Lab at Yale School of Public Health, (Dec. 24, 2025) page 37.

citizens of Russia between MAY and OCT 2022.”⁴²⁶

- In Mariupol, Mariupol Oblast, beginning on 20 MAR 2022, Russian military forces forcibly deported at least 15,000 Ukrainian citizens to the Taranog region of Russia while depriving them of all official Ukrainian documentation, including passports.⁴²⁷ At least some of these Ukrainian citizens are being transferred to other locations in southwestern Russia to perform forced labor.⁴²⁸

G. Sexual Violence

Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, enforced pregnancy, and other forms of sexual violence in times of war are all violations of the Rome Statute.⁴²⁹ Such acts of sexual violence inflict profound physical and psychological harm on survivors and constitute war crimes under international law.⁴³⁰ The systematic use of sexual violence in conflict settings has long been recognized as a tactic of war, aimed at instilling fear, exerting control, and destabilizing communities. Russian forces have commonly employed sexual violence against the Ukrainian populace in detention centers and almost all of the territories they are occupying or have occupied. Some of the most egregious incidents occurred in Bucha, Kyiv Oblast, and Izium, Kharkiv Oblast. According to the 25 October 2024 Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine to the General Assembly, “in every detention facility held by Russian authorities documented so far, perpetrators have used at least one or a combination” of acts of sexual violence including “rape and attempted rape, sometimes with use of objects, as well as beatings, electric shocks, burns or other attacks on genital organs, forced nudity going beyond possible security requirements, threats of sexual mutilation and castration, and intrusive body searches.”⁴³¹

- In Izium, Kharkiv Oblast, from 1 APR to 10 SEP 2022, Russian soldiers carried out a and campaign of torture where sexual violence was employed to humiliate civilians, often in front of their partners, neighbors, and friends.⁴⁰² When Ukraine regained control of the town, Ukrainian armed forces discovered mass graves filled the bodies of civilians, some of which had been subjected to genital mutilation.⁴⁰³

⁴²⁶ *Russia's Systematic program of Coerced Adoption and Fostering of Ukraine's Children*, Humanitarian Research Lab at Yale School of Public Health, (Dec. 24, 2025) page 1.

⁴²⁷ Pavel Polityuk & Timothy Heritage, *Mariupol says 15,000 deported from besieged city to Russia*, REUTERS (24 Mar. 2022), <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/mariupol-says-15000-deported-besieged-city-russia-2022-03-24/>.

⁴²⁸ *Claims Mariupol residents taken to Russia for forced labour*, ASSOCIATED PRESS (hereinafter AP) (20 Mar. 2022), <https://www.1news.co.nz/2022/03/20/claims-mariupol-residents-taken-to-russia-for-forced-labour/>.

⁴²⁹ Rome Statute art. 8(2)(b)(xxii).

⁴³⁰ Monika Pronczuk and Ada Petriczko. ‘No One to Talk To’: The Lingering Trauma of Russian Rape in Ukraine. *The New York Times*. (Jul. 27, 2024) <https://www.nytimes.com/2024/07/27/world/europe/rape-ukraine-russia-soldiers.html>.

⁴³¹ *Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine to the General Assembly (A/79/549)*, Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, Human Rights Council, para 47 (Oct. 25, 2024) <https://docs.un.org/en/A/79/549>.

- In Berenstianka, Kyiv Oblast, in MAR 2022, upon the arrival of Russian forces, a Russian commander asked several of the local women to hang white rags outside of their homes. After doing so, the commander and his soldiers would visit these homes, brought other women with them, and sexually assault the women on a regular basis.⁴⁰⁴
- In Balakliia, Kharkiv Oblast, during MAR 2022, over 200 civilians, including 30 women, were reportedly detained and subjected to degrading treatment over a seven-month period until the city was liberated by Ukrainian armed forces.⁴³² Among those detained at least one woman reportedly raped.
- From MAR 2022 to JUL 2022, in small villages in Kherson Oblast, Russian authorities committed sexual violence in civilian homes and in detention facilities maintained by Russian authorities.⁴³³ The cases also included instances of repeated sexual violence such as gang-rape.⁴³⁴ Victims and witnesses were able to identify the perpetrators as soldiers of the Russian-backed Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics, and in some cases, upon arriving to a village, soldiers reportedly inquired first about women living alone.⁴³⁵
- In MAR 2022, in Havronshchyna, Kyiv Oblast, a woman reported being subjected to sexual violence, including being raped twice by a Russian soldier.⁴³⁶ She reported being captured while pregnant.⁴³⁷ She disclosed her condition to her captors in the hope of eliciting mercy; however, her plea was disregarded.⁴³⁸ She reported being subjected to severe physical abuse, torture, and repeated sexual violence.⁴³⁹ During her two weeks in captivity, she reported witnessing numerous acts of violence and abuse inflicted upon

⁴³² Lorenzo Tondo. Electric cables, hammers and guns: Ukrainians tell of Russian torture. *The Guardian* (Oct. 23, 2023) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/23/electric-cables-hammers-and-guns-ukrainians-tell-of-russian-torture>.

⁴³³ *Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine to the General Assembly (A/78/540)*, Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, Human Rights Council, para. 75 (Oct. 19, 2023) <https://docs.un.org/en/A/78/540>.

⁴³⁴ *Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine to the General Assembly (A/78/540)*, Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, Human Rights Council, para. 77-79 (Oct. 19, 2023) <https://docs.un.org/en/A/78/540>.

⁴³⁵ *Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine to the General Assembly (A/78/540)*, Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, Human Rights Council, para. 81 (Oct. 19, 2023) <https://docs.un.org/en/A/78/540>.

⁴³⁶ Monika Pronczuk and Ada Petriczko. 'No One to Talk To': *The Lingering Trauma of Russian Rape in Ukraine*. *The New York Times*. (Jul. 27, 2024) <https://www.nytimes.com/2024/07/27/world/europe/rape-ukraine-russia-soldiers.html>.

⁴³⁷ Sarah Lawrynuik. *Ukrainian survivors of sexual violence, torture say country will have to share burden of their trauma*. *CBC News*. (Mar. 10, 2024) <https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/ukrainians-sexual-violence-russian-war-1.7127670>.

⁴³⁸ Sarah Lawrynuik. *Ukrainian survivors of sexual violence, torture say country will have to share burden of their trauma*. *CBC News*. (Mar. 10, 2024) <https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/ukrainians-sexual-violence-russian-war-1.7127670>.

⁴³⁹ Sarah Lawrynuik. *Ukrainian survivors of sexual violence, torture say country will have to share burden of their trauma*. *CBC News*. (Mar. 10, 2024) <https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/ukrainians-sexual-violence-russian-war-1.7127670>.

others, including children and the elderly.⁴⁴⁰ These individuals were subjected to rape, physical assault, and various forms of degradation, such as the insertion of objects into their genitals and the forcible removal of their teeth.⁴⁴¹

- In MAR 2022, a village near Bucha, Kyiv Oblast, Halyna, a 61-year-old woman, reported being forcibly stripped and subjected to sexual violence by two Russian soldiers.⁴⁴²
- On 7 MAR 2022, in a rural neighborhood located 70 kilometers west of Kyiv, Kyiv Oblast, a woman reported being subjected to sexual violence, while her husband was killed by Russian soldiers.⁴⁴³
- In Bucha, Kyiv Oblast, from 24 FEB to 11 APR 2022, the local populace was subjected to a brutal campaign of sexual violence.⁴⁴⁴ Of note, twenty-five girls and women, aged fourteen to twenty-four, were kept in the basement of Russian command post where soldiers kept them as sex slaves and repeatedly raped and subjected them to various forms of sexual violence.⁴⁴⁵

I. Torture

Torture, causing unnecessary suffering, outrages upon personal dignity, inhuman treatment, and other related acts committed during war time are violations of the Rome Statute.⁴⁴⁶ Reports of torture and similar acts committed by Russian soldiers against civilians and other non-combatants are widespread.⁴⁴⁷ Torture has been confirmed in all 9 provinces of Ukraine where Russia has occupied territory.⁴⁴⁸

⁴⁴⁰ Sarah Lawrynuik. *Ukrainian survivors of sexual violence, torture say country will have to share burden of their trauma*. CBC News. (Mar. 10, 2024)

<https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/ukrainians-sexual-violence-russian-war-1.7127670>.

⁴⁴¹ Sarah Lawrynuik. *Ukrainian survivors of sexual violence, torture say country will have to share burden of their trauma*. CBC News. (Mar. 10, 2024)

<https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/ukrainians-sexual-violence-russian-war-1.7127670>.

⁴⁴² Liz Cookman. 'I just want justice': Ukrainians struggle with hidden war crime of sexual violence. *The Guardian*. (Sep. 26, 2023)

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/26/i-just-want-justice-ukrainians-struggle-with-hidden-war-of-sexual-violence>.

⁴⁴³ Yogita Limaye. *Ukraine conflict: 'Russian soldiers raped me and killed my husband'*. BBC. (Apr. 11, 2022)

<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61071243>.

⁴⁴⁴ Carlotta Gall, 'Fear Still Remains': Ukraine Finds Sexual Crimes Where Russian Troops Ruled, *THE NEW YORK TIMES* (5 Jan., 2023) <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/05/world/europe/ukraine-sexual-violence-russia.html>.

⁴⁴⁵ Carlotta Gall, *Bucha's Month of Terror*, *THE NEW YORK TIMES* (11 Apr. 2022)

<https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/04/11/world/europe/bucha-terror.html>; Lorenzo Tondo and Isobel Koshiw, *Evidence some Ukrainian women raped before being killed, say doctors*, *THE GUARDIAN* (25 Apr. 2022)

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/25/evidence-ukraine-women-raped-before-being-killed-say-doctors-russia-war>.

⁴⁴⁶ Rome Statute Arts. 8(2)(a)(iii), 8(2)(b)(xxi), 8(2)(c)(i).

⁴⁴⁷ *Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine to the General Assembly (A/79/549)*, Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, Human Rights Council, para. 33 (Oct. 25, 2024) <https://docs.un.org/en/A/79/549>.

⁴⁴⁸ *Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine to the General Assembly (A/79/549)*, Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, Human Rights Council, para 33 (Oct. 25, 2024) <https://docs.un.org/en/A/79/549>.

Russian authorities that have been confirmed to have committed torture against civilians and prisoners of war include the Russian Armed Forces,⁴⁴⁹ the Federal Security Service (FSB), and by both regular personnel and special-purpose units of the Federal Penitentiary Service (FSIN) in detention facilities.⁴⁵⁰ The National Guard of Russia, soldiers of the Donetsk People's Republic and personnel of the Wagner Group were also reported to have committed torture.⁴⁵¹

Detainees were transferred to facilities operated by the FSIN in Ukraine or the Russian Federation; torture occurred at multiple makeshift,⁴⁵² temporary and permanent detention facilities,⁴⁵³ with some victims having reported being transferred to and tortured at multiple different detention facilities.⁴⁵⁴ Detention facilities in Russia are run by the FSIN, a part of the Russian Ministry of Justice.⁴⁵⁵ Since 2022, the FSIN has deployed personnel at detention facilities in Donetsk Oblast, Luhansk Oblast, Kherson Oblast, and Zaporizhia Oblast.⁴⁵⁶

As Russian control is established on a front, the armed forces engage in torture, carrying out “long interrogation sessions, sometimes lasting for days, which were combined with threats, intimidation, ill-treatment, sexual violence and torture... aimed at extracting information about the Ukrainian Armed Forces and their positions and local resistance groups or to identify collaborators with Ukrainian Armed Forces.”⁴⁵⁷

Reports indicate that at least five Ukrainian prisoners have died as a result of torture.⁴⁵⁸

⁴⁴⁹ *Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine to the General Assembly (A/79/549)*, Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, Human Rights Council, para 68 (Oct. 25, 2024) <https://docs.un.org/en/A/79/549>.

⁴⁵⁰ *Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine to the General Assembly (A/79/549)*, Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, Human Rights Council, para. 66 (Oct. 25, 2024) <https://docs.un.org/en/A/79/549>.

⁴⁵¹ *Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine to the General Assembly (A/78/540)*, Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, Human Rights Council, para. 53 (Oct. 19, 2023) <https://docs.un.org/en/A/78/540>.

⁴⁵² *Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine to the General Assembly (A/78/540)*, Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, Human Rights Council, para. 54 (Oct. 19, 2023) <https://docs.un.org/en/A/78/540>.

⁴⁵³ *Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine to the General Assembly (A/79/549)*, Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, Human Rights Council, annex (Oct. 25, 2024) <https://docs.un.org/en/A/79/549>.

⁴⁵⁴ *Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine to the General Assembly (A/78/540)*, Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, Human Rights Council, para. 57 (Oct. 19, 2023) <https://docs.un.org/en/A/78/540>.

⁴⁵⁵ *Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine to the General Assembly (A/79/549)*, Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, Human Rights Council, para. 42 (Oct. 25, 2024) <https://docs.un.org/en/A/79/549>.

⁴⁵⁶ *Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine to the General Assembly (A/79/549)*, Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, Human Rights Council, para. 42 (Oct. 25, 2024) <https://docs.un.org/en/A/79/549>.

⁴⁵⁷ *Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine to the General Assembly (A/77/533)*, Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, Human Rights Council, para. 82 (Oct. 18, 2022) <https://docs.un.org/en/A/77/533>.

⁴⁵⁸ *Three Years After the Russian Invasion: Torture is Used as a Tool of Repression*, Dignity (Feb. 24, 2025), <https://dignity.dk/en/news/three-years-after-the-russian-invasion-torture-is-used-as-a-tool-of-repression/>.

Documented methods of torture allegedly employed against captured Ukrainian soldiers include the use of blunt weapons, electrocution, simulated mock executions, and various forms of sexual violence.⁴⁵⁹

One soldier recounted experiencing severe physical abuse, including being suspended upside down from the ceiling and subjected to a method referred to as "stretching."⁴⁶⁰ This practice involves forcing the individual to stand with their arms and legs spread wide, creating intense physical tension and excruciating pain.⁴⁶¹

Russian authorities in temporarily occupied territories have reportedly employed coercive measures, including beatings and electroshock torture, to compel Ukrainian teachers to adopt the Russian school curriculum.⁴⁶²

Reports indicate that Russian authorities punished a student for speaking Ukrainian in school.⁴⁶³ The student was reportedly driven several kilometers to a remote area with a bag placed over his head and subsequently abandoned, forcing him to navigate his way back alone.⁴⁶⁴

Russian authorities in occupied territories have reportedly engaged in the conscription of Ukrainian civilians and detainees, forcibly enlisting them into Russia's military.⁴⁶⁵ Accounts suggest that detainees have been subjected to inhumane conditions, including deprivation of water and the provision of rotten food.⁴⁶⁶ In many cases, enlisting in Russia's military is

⁴⁵⁹ *Three Years After the Russian Invasion: Torture is Used as a Tool of Repression*, Dignity (Feb. 24, 2025), <https://dignity.dk/en/news/three-years-after-the-russian-invasion-torture-is-used-as-a-tool-of-repression/>.

⁴⁶⁰ U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, *39th Periodic Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine* (Feb. 7, 2024), <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/ukraine/2024/24-07-02-OHCHR-39th-periodic-report-Ukraine.pdf>.

⁴⁶¹ U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, *39th Periodic Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine* (Feb. 7, 2024), <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/ukraine/2024/24-07-02-OHCHR-39th-periodic-report-Ukraine.pdf>.

⁴⁶² Human Rights Watch, *Education Under Occupation: Forced Russification of the School System in Occupied Ukrainian Territories* (June 20, 2024), <https://www.hrw.org/report/2024/06/20/education-under-occupation/forced-russification-school-system-occupied-ukrainian>.

⁴⁶³ Human Rights Watch, *Education Under Occupation: Forced Russification of the School System in Occupied Ukrainian Territories* (June 20, 2024), <https://www.hrw.org/report/2024/06/20/education-under-occupation/forced-russification-school-system-occupied-ukrainian>.

⁴⁶⁴ Human Rights Watch, *Education Under Occupation: Forced Russification of the School System in Occupied Ukrainian Territories* (June 20, 2024), <https://www.hrw.org/report/2024/06/20/education-under-occupation/forced-russification-school-system-occupied-ukrainian>.

⁴⁶⁵ Human Rights Watch, *Russia Forces Ukrainians in Occupied Areas into Military Service* (Dec. 20, 2023), <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/12/20/russia-forces-ukrainians-occupied-areas-military>.

⁴⁶⁶ Human Rights Watch, *Russia Forces Ukrainians in Occupied Areas into Military Service* (Dec. 20, 2023), <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/12/20/russia-forces-ukrainians-occupied-areas-military>.

presented as the sole means of escape from these dire circumstances.⁴⁶⁷

Since February 2022 until the end of the reporting period of 31 MAY 2025, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights documented deaths of 32 Ukrainian civilians “as a result of torture, inadequate medical assistance or inhuman conditions of detention in official and unofficial places of detention in occupied territory and the Russian Federation.”⁴⁶⁸ Additionally, the UN OHCHR reported in its 4 OCT 2023 Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine that from FEB 2022 until the end of that report period on 31 JUL 2023, 996 Ukrainian civilians were subjected to arbitrary detention, with eighty of these victims documented to have died in detention with signs of violence on their bodies.⁴⁶⁹

- In the Russian Federation, in FEB 2025, a Crimean Tatar man died having communicated to his family his subjection to beatings by Russian authorities and the development of diabetes and pulmonary oedema in detention. He was serving an eight-year sentence for participation in an organization deemed by the Russian government to be ‘terrorist’.⁴⁷⁰
- In Zaporizhia Oblast, in AUG 2024, a Ukrainian civilian man was detained by Russian forces for alleged curfew violations and subjected to torture during interrogation, including sexual violence in which electroshocks were administered against him with wires connected to his nipples and genitals.⁴⁷¹
- In MAR 2024, a Ukrainian Prisoner of War died three days after suffering severe beatings in a detention facility in the Russian Federation, having been denied medical care or hospitalization.⁴⁷²
- From 1 DEC 2023 to 29 FEB 2024, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights interviewed sixty Ukrainian prisoners of war following their release as

⁴⁶⁷ Human Rights Watch, *Russia Forces Ukrainians in Occupied Areas into Military Service* (Dec. 20, 2023), <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/12/20/russia-forces-ukrainians-occupied-areas-military>.

⁴⁶⁸ Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine: 1 December 2024-31 May 2025, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 12 (Jun. 30, 2025), https://ukraine.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2025-07/2025-06-30%20OHCHR%2042nd%20periodic%20report%20on%20Ukraine_2.pdf.

⁴⁶⁹ Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine: 1 February to 31 July 2024, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 11 (Oct. 4, 2023), <https://ukraine.un.org/sites/default/files/2023-10/23-10-04%20OHCHR%2036th%20periodic%20report.pdf>.

⁴⁷⁰ Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine: 1 December 2024-31 May 2025, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 12 (Jun. 30, 2025), https://ukraine.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2025-07/2025-06-30%20OHCHR%2042nd%20periodic%20report%20on%20Ukraine_2.pdf.

⁴⁷¹ Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine: 1 December 2024-31 May 2025, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 11 (Jun. 30, 2025), https://ukraine.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2025-07/2025-06-30%20OHCHR%2042nd%20periodic%20report%20on%20Ukraine_2.pdf.

⁴⁷² Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine: 1 December 2024-31 May 2025, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 9 (Jun. 30, 2025), https://ukraine.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2025-07/2025-06-30%20OHCHR%2042nd%20periodic%20report%20on%20Ukraine_2.pdf.

part of a prisoner exchange. Held for periods ranging from a few weeks to 22 months in both occupied territories and within the Russian Federation, fifty-eight of the sixty reported torture and ill-treatment in captivity perpetrated by Russian servicemen and officials, indicating the consistent and widespread nature of the use of torture by Russian authorities against Ukrainian Prisoners of War. Torture and inhumane treatment included severe beatings, the administration of electric shocks using stun guns, and as well as violations of bodily autonomy and dignity such as being forced to stand in their cells for long periods of time or even the entire, and walking naked and barefoot outside during winter.⁴⁷³

- In Izium, Kharkiv Oblast, from 1 APR to 10 SEP 2022, there was a torture campaign in which Russian soldiers would arbitrarily abduct, detain, and imprison civilians at 10 different locations⁴⁷⁴. There, detainees would be subjected to beatings, electroshocks, deprivation of food and medical care, fake executions, and stress positions.⁴⁷⁵ Female detainees would also be often tortured through rape and other forms of sexual violence.⁴⁷⁶
- In Kherson, Kherson Oblast, in AUG 2022, an aid worker was detained for several days while Russian soldiers tortured him through electroshocks to his genitals.⁴⁷⁷
- In Balakliia, Kharkiv Oblast, during March 2022, over 200 civilians, including 30 women, were reportedly detained and subjected to degrading treatment over a seven-month period until the city was liberated by Ukrainian armed forces.⁴⁷⁸ Among those detained, at least 150 men were allegedly tortured and seven civilians killed.⁴⁷⁹

J. Pillaging

Looting and any other form of pillaging during war time are violations of the Rome Statute

⁴⁷³ Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine: 1 December 2023-29 February 2024, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 11 (Mar. 26, 2024).
<https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/ukraine/2024/report-human-rights-situation-ukraine-1-dec-2023-29-feb-2024.pdf>.

⁴⁷⁴ *Ukraine: Russian Forces Tortured Izium Detainees*, HRW (19 Oct. 2022),
<https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/10/19/ukraine-russian-forces-tortured-izium-detainees>.

⁴⁷⁵ *Ukraine: Russian Forces Tortured Izium Detainees*, HRW (19 Oct. 2022),
<https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/10/19/ukraine-russian-forces-tortured-izium-detainees>.

⁴⁷⁶ *Ukraine: Russian Forces Tortured Izium Detainees*, HRW (19 Oct. 2022),
<https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/10/19/ukraine-russian-forces-tortured-izium-detainees>.

⁴⁷⁷ Emma Graham-Harrison and Artem Mazhulin. ‘Carved on bodies and souls’: Ukrainian men face ‘systemic’ sexual torture in Russian detention centres. *The Guardian*. (Oct. 29, 2024),
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/oct/29/carved-on-bodies-and-souls-russias-use-of-male-sexual-torture-in-ukraine>.

⁴⁷⁸ Lorenzo Tondo. Electric cables, hammers and guns: Ukrainians tell of Russian torture. *The Guardian* (Oct. 23, 2023)
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/23/electric-cables-hammers-and-guns-ukrainians-tell-of-russian-torture>.

⁴⁷⁹ Lorenzo Tondo. Electric cables, hammers and guns: Ukrainians tell of Russian torture. *The Guardian* (Oct. 23, 2023)
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/23/electric-cables-hammers-and-guns-ukrainians-tell-of-russian-torture>.

Article 8(2)(b)(xvi), which establishes that “pillaging a town or place, even when taken by assault” is a war crime.⁴⁸⁰ Russian soldiers and their commanders often looted the homes of Ukrainian civilians in territories occupied by Russian forces. Additionally, civilians detained by Russian soldiers would often only be released after being extorted by their captors.⁴⁸¹

- On 3 JUN 2025, it was reported that Russian authorities had developed an industrial-scale system of grain looting against the Ukrainian farming and agricultural sector, as well as the confiscation of agricultural lands and equipment.⁴⁸² Grain was transported out of Ukraine into Russia or Belarus, or exported via occupied ports such as Mariupol.⁴⁸³
- On 30 SEP 2024, the International Partnership for Human Rights produced a joint-report with the non-profit State Capture: Research and Action that described how “Russian occupying authorities have systematically and unlawfully appropriated Ukrainian public and private assets without the owners’ consent, and in so doing perpetrated the war crime of pillaging.”⁴⁸⁴ Furthermore, the report established that Russia commits the crime of pillaging in multiple different stages of occupation “[t]ypically, in a first wave of foot soldiers and field commanders strip the occupied land of movable property *e.g., washing machines, cars and agricultural equipment), A second wave of pillage is focused on immovable property and enterprise capital through local administrations and Federal agencies,” which “is often followed by asset stripping (e.g., metals, grain) using state-controlled transport infrastructure.”⁴⁸⁵
- In Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast, in MAR and APR 2022, Russian forces seized more than 2,000 artworks from museums in the city, including the Kuindzhi Art Museum and the Mariupol Local History Museum.⁴⁸⁶
- In Izium, Kharkiv Oblast, during the town’s occupation by Russian soldiers from 1 APR to 10 SEP 2022, Russian soldiers arbitrarily detained and imprisoned civilians and often only released them after the detainees provided money, valuable items, or information

⁴⁸⁰ Rome Statute Art. 8(2)(b)(xvi).

⁴⁸¹ Denis Glushko, *Threatened to Shoot if Victims Don’t Give Money: Three Russian Soldiers to be Judged*, Gwara Media, (Mar. 31, 2023)

<https://gwaramedia.com/en/kharkiv-under-attack-russians-launched-9-missiles-on-march-30/>.

⁴⁸² *Report says Russia committing ‘war crime’ by systematically looting Ukraine’s grain*, TVP World (Jun. 3, 2025)

<https://tvpworld.com/87066818/report-says-russia-committing-war-crime-by-systematically-looting-ukraines-grain>.

⁴⁸³ *Report says Russia committing ‘war crime’ by systematically looting Ukraine’s grain*, TVP World (Jun. 3, 2025)

<https://tvpworld.com/87066818/report-says-russia-committing-war-crime-by-systematically-looting-ukraines-grain>.

⁴⁸⁴ *Thieves in Law: Russian Pillage in Ukraine*, International Partnership for Human Rights (Oct. 30, 2024)

<https://iphonline.org/articles/thieves-in-law-russian-pillage-in-occupied-ukraine/>.

⁴⁸⁵ *Thieves in Law: Russian Pillage in Ukraine*, International Partnership for Human Rights and State Capture: Research and Action, at 4, (Oct. 30, 2024),

<https://iphonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/pillage-report-public-24.09.pdf>.

⁴⁸⁶ Eileen Kinsella, *Ukrainian Officials Accuse Russian Forces of Looting Thousands of Priceless Gold Artifacts and Works of Art*, Artnet (May 2, 2022) .

<https://news.artnet.com/art-world-archives/ukraine-art-theft-scythian-gold-2107258>.

such as bank account numbers.⁴⁸⁷

- In Kherson, Kherson Oblast, during the city's occupation by Russian forces from 24 FEB to 11 NOV 2022, Russian soldiers routinely looted homes for valuables (such as money and jewelry) and staple goods (such as food and clothing).⁴⁸⁸ Just before their eventual withdrawal, Russian forces took key infrastructure items such as ambulances, parts of cell towers, and tractors.⁴⁸⁹ Additionally, Russian soldiers looted museums and historical sites for their artifacts.⁴⁹⁰
- In Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast, from MAR 2022 to APR 2022, it was reported that Russian troops looted 5 million dollars of farm vehicles from a farm vehicle dealership.⁴⁹¹
- In Bucha, Kyiv Oblast, on 4 MAR 2022, Russian soldiers, thought to be paratroopers from the 234th Air Assault Regiment from Pskov under the direction of Sergeant Vladimir Borzunov, looted a grocery store.⁴⁹²

K. Employing Poison or Poisoned Weapons

Employing poison or the use of poisoned weapons constitutes a war crime in international armed conflicts under the Rome Statute Article 8(2)(b)(xvii). Definitions of this amongst countries in the international community vary, but in the *Nuclear Weapons* advisory opinion the United States and United Kingdom submitted formal definitions to the ICJ which state that this applies to weapons that have the intent to kill or injure due to the effect of that poison.⁴⁹³ The ICJ stated that the use of the words “poison” and “poisoned weapons” “have been understood, in the

⁴⁸⁷ *Ukraine: Russian Forces Tortured Izium Detainees*, HRW (19 Oct. 2022)

<https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/10/19/ukraine-russian-forces-tortured-izium-detainees>.

⁴⁸⁸ Luke Harding, *Russian troops loot Kherson as lines redrawn ahead of final battle for city*, THE GUARDIAN (5 Nov. 2022) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/nov/05/ukraine-russian-troops-loot-kherson-as-lines-redrawn-ahead-of-final-battle-for-city>; Marc Santora and Eric Nagourney, *Reports of Looting in Kherson as Ukrainians Battle to Retake the City*, THE NEW YORK TIMES (26 Oct. 2022) <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/26/world/europe/kherson-ukraine-russia-war.html>.

⁴⁸⁹ Luke Harding, *Russian troops loot Kherson as lines redrawn ahead of final battle for city*, THE GUARDIAN (5 Nov. 2022) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/nov/05/ukraine-russian-troops-loot-kherson-as-lines-redrawn-ahead-of-final-battle-for-city>; Marc Santora and Eric Nagourney, *Reports of Looting in Kherson as Ukrainians Battle to Retake the City*, THE NEW YORK TIMES (26 Oct. 2022) <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/26/world/europe/kherson-ukraine-russia-war.html>.

⁴⁹⁰ Luke Harding, *Russian troops loot Kherson as lines redrawn ahead of final battle for city*, THE GUARDIAN (5 Nov. 2022) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/nov/05/ukraine-russian-troops-loot-kherson-as-lines-redrawn-ahead-of-final-battle-for-city>; Marc Santora and Eric Nagourney, *Reports of Looting in Kherson as Ukrainians Battle to Retake the City*, THE NEW YORK TIMES (26 Oct. 2022) <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/26/world/europe/kherson-ukraine-russia-war.html>.

⁴⁹¹ Oleksandr Fylyppov and Tim Lister, *Russians plunder \$5M Farm Vehicles from Ukraine - to find they've been remotely disabled*, CNN (May 1, 2022) <https://www.cnn.com/2022/05/01/europe/russia-farm-vehicles-ukraine-disabled-melitopol-intl/index.html>.

⁴⁹² Valentyna Romanenko, *Radio Liberty release footage of Russian looting and execution of civilian in Bucha*, Ukrainska Pravda, (Aug. 6, 2025) <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2025/08/6/7525023/>.

⁴⁹³ International Committee of the Red Cross, *Rule 72. Poison and Poisoned Weapons*, IHL Database, <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule72>. See also *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (July 8).

practice of States, in their ordinary sense as covering weapons whose prime, or even exclusive, effect is to poison or asphyxiate.”⁴⁹⁴

- On 17 AUG 2024, Ukrainian authorities detected that the Seym river, which flows from the Kursk Oblast in Russia to Ukraine’s Sumy Oblast, had been poisoned with massive amounts of industrial pollutants.⁴⁹⁵ The waste was sourced from a sugar factory in Tetkino, a town on the Seym over the border in Russia’s Kursk Oblast, where the disposal into the river had included toxic levels of ammonia, magnesium, and other nitrates.⁴⁹⁶ This poisoning caused the collapse of the river’s ecological balance and its ecosystem.⁴⁹⁷ Water samples from the Seym taken in Baturyn on 30 AUG 2024 showed oxygen levels as low as 0 mg/dm³ on 29 AUG 2024.⁴⁹⁸ According to Serhiy Zhuk, the head of the ecology inspectorate of Chernihiv Oblast, 650 kilometers of the Seym and Desna (which connected to the Seym) river ways were contaminated.⁴⁹⁹ This incident had a detrimental impact to water and food security.⁵⁰⁰ The Seym and Desna Rivers feed a reservoir that is a major water resource for Kyiv.⁵⁰¹ Amid the war, the Ukrainian government has not yet been able to positively attribute this act to the Russian government, but if proven, it would constitute the weaponization of an important transboundary waterway in order to poison Ukrainian water and food resources on which civilian populations and Ukrainian ecosystems depend.⁵⁰²

⁴⁹⁴ International Committee of the Red Cross, *Rule 72. Poison and Poisoned Weapons*, IHL Database, <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule72>. See also *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (July 8).

⁴⁹⁵ Luke Harding and Artem Mazhulin, ‘Everything is dead’: Ukraine rushes to stem ecocide after river poisoning, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 1, 2024), <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/oct/01/ukraine-seim-river-poisoning-chernihiv-ecocide->.

⁴⁹⁶ Jacques Follorou, *Who killed Ukraine’s Seym River? Investigation into accusations of ecocide*, LE MONDE (Nov. 5, 2024), https://www.lemonde.fr/en/environment/article/2024/11/05/who-killed-ukraine-s-seym-river-investigation-into-accusations-of-ecocide_6731683_114.html.

⁴⁹⁷ Luke Harding and Artem Mazhulin, ‘Everything is dead’: Ukraine rushes to stem ecocide after river poisoning, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 1, 2024), <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/oct/01/ukraine-seim-river-poisoning-chernihiv-ecocide->.

⁴⁹⁸ Luke Harding and Artem Mazhulin, ‘Everything is dead’: Ukraine rushes to stem ecocide after river poisoning, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 1, 2024), <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/oct/01/ukraine-seim-river-poisoning-chernihiv-ecocide->.

⁴⁹⁹ See Luke Harding and Artem Mazhulin, ‘Everything is dead’: Ukraine rushes to stem ecocide after river poisoning, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 1, 2024), <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/oct/01/ukraine-seim-river-poisoning-chernihiv-ecocide->.

⁵⁰⁰ See Luke Harding and Artem Mazhulin, ‘Everything is dead’: Ukraine rushes to stem ecocide after river poisoning, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 1, 2024), <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/oct/01/ukraine-seim-river-poisoning-chernihiv-ecocide->.

⁵⁰¹ See Luke Harding and Artem Mazhulin, ‘Everything is dead’: Ukraine rushes to stem ecocide after river poisoning, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 1, 2024), <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/oct/01/ukraine-seim-river-poisoning-chernihiv-ecocide->.

⁵⁰² Luke Harding and Artem Mazhulin, ‘Everything is dead’: Ukraine rushes to stem ecocide after river poisoning”, The Guardian (Oct. 1, 2024), <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/oct/01/ukraine-seim-river-poisoning-chernihiv-ecocide->. See also *Rule 72. Poison*, INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. DATABASES, <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule72>.

L. Chemical Warfare

Employing chemical weapons constitutes a war crime in international armed conflicts under the Rome Statute Article 8(2)(b)(xviii).⁵⁰³ Ukraine has claimed that Russia has employed widespread usage of chemical weapons during the war.

- On 7 JUL 2025, the Netherlands Defence Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD), the Netherlands General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD), and the German Federal Security Service (BND) announced that Russian forces had intensified the use of chemical weapons, and confirmed the use of the chloropicrin known as PS, a chemical choking agent, by the Russian military.⁵⁰⁴
- On 20 JUN 2025, the Organization of the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) released a report for two visits to Ukraine's Dnipropetrovsk regarding an incident on 28 FEB 2025.⁵⁰⁵ The visit took place near the village of Mariivka in the Nikopol district of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.⁵⁰⁶ There, Ukrainian security forces shot down an approaching drone whose FPV-style flight images they had intercepted, and which was rigged with grenades and exploded after hitting the ground.⁵⁰⁷ The report confirmed the presence of chemical weapon 2-Chlorobezylidene Malonitrite known as CS and traces of its precursors or degradation products in the samples of the grenade shells, and at lower levels in samples of soil and vegetation up to 15 metres away from the grenade locations as well as on the frame of the drone.⁵⁰⁸
- In SEP 2024, OPCW deployed to Ukraine's Dnipropetrovsk Oblast to investigate suspicion of a chemical attack incident on 20 SEP 2024 near the village of Illinka in the Nikopol district of Dnipropetrovsky Oblast.⁵⁰⁹ The team tested the shell of a grenade allegedly dropped into a Ukrainian trench by a Russian UAV for the purpose of gassing

⁵⁰³ International Committee of the Red Cross, *Rule 72. Poison and Poisoned Weapons*, IHL Database, <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule72>.

⁵⁰⁴ *Russia further intensifies its use of Chemical Weapons in Ukraine*, Ministry of Defence of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (Jul. 4, 2025), <https://english.defensie.nl/latest/news/2025/07/04/russia-further-intensifies-its-use-of-chemical-weapons-in-ukraine>.

⁵⁰⁵ Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, *Report of the Technical Assistance Visit on the Activities Carried Out in Support of a Request by Ukraine (Technical Assistance Visit TAV/02/25 and TAV/03/25)* (Jun. 20, 2025), <https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2025/06/s-2415-2025%28e%29.pdf>.

⁵⁰⁶ Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, *Report of the Technical Assistance Visit on the Activities Carried Out in Support of a Request by Ukraine (Technical Assistance Visit TAV/02/25 and TAV/03/25)* (Jun. 20, 2025), <https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2025/06/s-2415-2025%28e%29.pdf>.

⁵⁰⁷ Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, *Report of the Technical Assistance Visit on the Activities Carried Out in Support of a Request by Ukraine (Technical Assistance Visit TAV/02/25 and TAV/03/25)* (Jun. 20, 2025), <https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2025/06/s-2415-2025%28e%29.pdf>.

⁵⁰⁸ Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, *Report of the Technical Assistance Visit on the Activities Carried Out in Support of a Request by Ukraine (Technical Assistance Visit TAV/02/25 and TAV/03/25)* (Jun. 20, 2025), <https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2025/06/s-2415-2025%28e%29.pdf>.

⁵⁰⁹ Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, *OPCW Issues Report on Its Technical Assistance Visit to Ukraine Following an Alleged Incident of Use of Toxic Chemicals as a Weapon* (Nov. 18, 2024), <https://www.opcw.org/media-centre/news/2024/11/opcw-issues-report-its-technical-assistance-visit-ukraine-followin> g.

the Ukrainian soldiers out of their defensive positions.⁵¹⁰ The OPCW, following intensive testing, confirmed that the grenade and soil samples collected from the trench contained the riot control agent 2-Chlorobenzylidene Malononitrile known as CS. The use of riot control agents as a method of warfare is prohibited and classified as a war crime.⁵¹¹

- On 2 MAY 2024, the United States confirmed that Russia used chemical weapons on the battlefield.⁵¹² Colonel Artem Vlasiuk, of Ukraine's Radiation, Chemical, and Biological protection team has stated that there have been over 4,800 chemical related incidents that have occurred which have resulted in more than 2,000 Ukrainian Soldiers being treated for chemical exposure.⁵¹³

M. Unlawful use of Enemy Uniforms

The unauthorized use of enemy uniforms during armed conflict is recognized as a breach of international humanitarian law and, under specific circumstances, qualifies as a war crime.⁵¹⁴ Article 39(2) of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions explicitly prohibits the use of enemy flags, military emblems, insignia, or uniforms during attacks or for purposes of shielding, facilitating, or obstructing military operations.⁵¹⁵

The Lieber Institute at West Point reports allegations that special forces may have utilized Ukrainian military uniforms and commandeered captured Ukrainian and OSCE vehicles to conceal their operations.⁵¹⁶ These actions indicate a calculated effort to deceive Ukrainian defenders and execute operations under false pretenses, which may constitute perfidy as defined by international humanitarian law.

- On NOV 13 2024, in Kupiansk, Kharkiv Oblast, Russian forces reportedly donned Ukrainian military uniforms during frontline combat in an attempt to infiltrate the city.⁵¹⁷

⁵¹⁰ Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, *OPCW Issues Report on Its Technical Assistance Visit to Ukraine Following an Alleged Incident of Use of Toxic Chemicals as a Weapon* (Nov. 18, 2024), <https://www.opcw.org/media-centre/news/2024/11/opcw-issues-report-its-technical-assistance-visit-ukraine-following>.

⁵¹¹ Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, *OPCW Issues Report on Its Technical Assistance Visit to Ukraine Following an Alleged Incident of Use of Toxic Chemicals as a Weapon* (Nov. 18, 2024), <https://www.opcw.org/media-centre/news/2024/11/opcw-issues-report-its-technical-assistance-visit-ukraine-following>.

⁵¹² US Confirms Russia's Use of 'Chemical Weapons' in Ukraine, *The Defense Post* (May 2, 2024), <https://thedefensepost.com/2024/05/02/us-confirms-russia-chemical-weapons/>.

⁵¹³ "Over 2,000 Ukrainian Soldiers Poisoned by Russia's Chemical Weapons: Official," *The Defense Post* (Dec. 19, 2024), <https://thedefensepost.com/2024/12/19/ukrainian-soldiers-poisoned-russia/>.

⁵¹⁴ Laurie R. Blank, *Combatant Privileges and Protections*, *Articles of War* (Mar. 4, 2022) <https://lieber.westpoint.edu/combatant-privileges-and-protections/>.

⁵¹⁵ Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions Art. 39(2).

⁵¹⁶ Ken Watkin, *Special Forces, Unprivileged Belligerency, and the War in the Shadows*, *Articles of War* (Mar. 8, 2022) <https://lieber.westpoint.edu/special-forces-unprivileged-belligerency-war-shadows/>.

⁵¹⁷ Maya Mehrara, *Russians Disguised as Ukrainians Attempt to Seize City*, *Newsweek* (Nov. 15, 2024) <https://www.newsweek.com/russians-disguised-ukrainians-attempt-seize-city-1986270>.

- In SEP 2023, on the Tavria front in southern Ukraine, Russian forces reportedly utilized Ukrainian Armed Forces uniforms to disguise their operations.⁵¹⁸ However, according to Oleksandr Shtupun, spokesperson for the Tavria front defense forces, the Ukrainian military successfully identified the enemy and prevented their advance.⁵¹⁹
- In MAY 2022, in Mykolaiv Oblast, Russian forces reportedly donned Ukrainian Armed Forces uniforms in an attempt to seize a Ukrainian observation post.⁵²⁰

⁵¹⁸ Oleksandra Bashchenko. *Russians use Ukrainian army uniforms on Tavria front*. RBC-Ukraine. (Sep. 25, 2023) <https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/russians-use-ukrainian-army-uniforms-on-tavria-1695663078.html>

⁵¹⁹ Oleksandra Bashchenko. *Russians use Ukrainian army uniforms on Tavria front*. RBC-Ukraine. (Sep. 25, 2023) <https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/russians-use-ukrainian-army-uniforms-on-tavria-1695663078.html>.

⁵²⁰ Anastasiia Kalatur. *Mykolaiv Oblast: Russian soldiers wearing Ukrainian military uniforms attempt to capture Ukrainian observation post*. Ukrainska Pravda. (May 25, 2022) <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/05/25/7348353/>

VII. CONCLUSION

Since the invasion, Ukrainian citizens have been forced to endure kidnappings, property destruction, starvation, terror, shellings, and murder at the hands of the Russian Federation and responsible individuals. As is consistent with the complex and intricate history of Ukraine, Russia once again seeks to assert its dominance and control of the territory in wanton violation of international law and Ukrainian sovereignty.

At their foundation, international law and the laws of humanity establish self-determination and self-expression of a people as fundamental rights free from infringement by foreign powers. The international community cannot remain silent in the face of Russian aggression and blatant violation of international law.

Justice and accountability must take center stage as a response to authoritarian acts of transboundary aggression. The international legal mechanisms have worked in the past to hold war criminals accountable. The Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Sierra Leone have shown that countering injustice and enforcing accountability is possible. However, the international criminal accountability system cannot remain a tool to wield against only African nations or areas lying in the remnants of a dissolved state.



APPENDIX CONTENTS

A. MOST EGREGIOUS INCIDENTS

B. RUSSIAN MOST RESPONSIBLE PARTIES DOSSIER

**C. STATUTE FOR THE SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR UKRAINE ON THE CRIME
OF AGGRESSION**



A. MOST EGREGIOUS INCIDENTS APPENDIX

MOST EGREGIOUS INCIDENTS

The following crimes committed by the Russian Federation within Ukraine were chosen based on the severity and extent of the atrocity committed. This index describes atrocities consisting of either a single event or a series of connected events that resulted in the deaths of civilians or destruction of civilian infrastructure. It further lists the respective international law that has been violated and analyzes potential violations of the Rome Statute and in one instance a specific violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Though international law other than the Rome Statute, such as the Geneva Conventions, is mentioned as potential violations for these specific events, the analysis will focus on the elements of the Rome Statute. These elements are taken verbatim from the International Criminal Court's publication, *Elements of Crimes*.⁵²¹ As this paper is entitled *Russian War Crimes Against Ukraine* the following analysis will focus solely on Articles within the Rome Statute that pertain to war crimes rather than crimes against humanity. This does not indicate in any way however, that the articles on crimes against humanity are irrelevant.

Some analysis will make mention of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention, originally written to be specific to non-international conflicts, since its creation its use has expanded to all armed conflicts, including those of an international nature.⁵²² For example in *Prosecutor v. Delalic et al*, the ICTY followed the example that the ICJ set in *Nicaragua v. United States of America*,⁵²³ by stating that “Common Article 3 may thus be considered as the ‘minimum yardstick’ of rules of international humanitarian law...applicable to both internal and international conflicts.”⁵²⁴

This edition's list of Most Egregious Incidents include those previously analyzed in past editions. However, the analysis has narrowed to the elements of the crimes in the Rome Statute as published by the ICC. Some incidents were not re-analyzed and can still be found in the previous editions.

⁵²¹ International Criminal Court, *Elements of Crimes*, 2013, <https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/Publications/Elements-of-Crimes.pdf>.

⁵²² GARY D. SOLIS, *THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT* 93-94 (3rd ed., 2022).

⁵²³ ICJ, *Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua* (Nicaragua v. United States), Merits (27 June 1986), para. 218, ICJ Reports 14.

⁵²⁴ ICTY, *Prosecutor v. Delalic et al*, IT-96-21-A (20 February 2001), para. 147.

Incident: MAR 2022 Invasion of Bucha

Assessment: We assess with high confidence that the occupation of Bucha, Ukraine by Russian Forces resulted in human rights violations that took the lives of over 400 individuals.

Narrative: The Invasion of Bucha took place from 4 March through 31 March 2022.⁵²⁵ During the Russian occupation of the Ukrainian city, Russian forces have been accused of committing a litany of human rights violations and war crimes.⁵²⁶ Over the course of the occupation, hundreds of civilians were killed, with several incidents detailed below.⁵²⁷

On 4 March 2022, a man named Volodymyr Feoktiskov was shot and killed on the street while he was headed to his neighbor's house to get fresh bread.⁵²⁸ On that same day, five unnamed civilians were rounded up by Russian forces, one of whom was shot in the back of the head.⁵²⁹ A witness described how she and several other civilians were threatened out of hiding by Russian forces and then made to watch as the Russian soldiers forced those five men to kneel on the street, pulled their shirts over their heads, and shot one in the head, execution style.⁵³⁰

On 5 March 2022, a retired teacher named Lyudmyla affectionately referred to as Auntie Lyuda, was shot as she opened the front door of her house.⁵³¹ Forty-eight-year-old Viktor Koval was also killed when Russian forces attacked a house where he and other civilians were taking shelter from the fighting.⁵³² A man and his son-in-law named Roman were also taking shelter in Bucha on 5 March, hiding in a basement with family due to ongoing shelling and gunfire.⁵³³ Around 1630 that afternoon, when the fighting appeared to have quieted down, the man and Roman

⁵²⁵ *Ukraine: Russian Forces' Trail of Death in Bucha*, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 21, 2022) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/21/ukraine-russian-forces-trail-death-bucha>.

⁵²⁶ *Ukraine: Russian Forces' Trail of Death in Bucha*, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 21, 2022) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/21/ukraine-russian-forces-trail-death-bucha>.

⁵²⁷ *Ukraine: Russian Forces' Trail of Death in Bucha*, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 21, 2022) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/21/ukraine-russian-forces-trail-death-bucha>.

⁵²⁸ Carlotta Gall, *Bucha's Month of Terror*, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2022) www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/04/11/world/europe/bucha-terror.html.

⁵²⁹ *Ukraine: Russian Forces' Trail of Death in Bucha*, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 21, 2022) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/21/ukraine-russian-forces-trail-death-bucha>.

⁵³⁰ Fatima Tlis, *Flagrantly False: Russia's Claim That Bucha Killings Were 'Staged'*, VOA NEWS (Apr. 5, 2022)

https://www.voanews.com/a/fact-check-russia-bucha-denials-false/6743339.html?utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=redirect&utm_source=polygraphinfo; see also Franklin Foer, *The Horrors of Bucha*, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 4, 2022) <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/04/russia-bucha-killings-war-crimes-genocide/629470/>.

⁵³¹ Carlotta Gall, *Bucha's Month of Terror*, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2022) www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/04/11/world/europe/bucha-terror.html.

⁵³² *Ukraine: Russian Forces' Trail of Death in Bucha*, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 21, 2022) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/21/ukraine-russian-forces-trail-death-bucha>.

⁵³³ *Ukraine: Russian Forces' Trail of Death in Bucha*, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 21, 2022) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/21/ukraine-russian-forces-trail-death-bucha>.

stepped outside, which was where Roman collapsed, his left side torn open.⁵³⁴ Roman died the following morning.⁵³⁵ Also on 5 March, Oleh Abramov was taken outside and killed by Russian forces after he was taken into custody.⁵³⁶ Oleh's body was not found until 31 March.⁵³⁷

On 7 March 2022, a thirty-two-year-old man named Vasil Yushenko was standing on the enclosed balcony of the apartment he shared with his family when he was shot in the neck.⁵³⁸ The following day, 8 March, an elderly man was found slumped over on his walker after having been fatally shot.⁵³⁹

A mass grave was found in Bucha on 9 March 2022, with over 67 bodies found inside.⁵⁴⁰ The body count continued to rise the same day when six elderly residents in a nursing home, with either Alzheimer's or Dementia, perished from a lack of food, medicine, and heat.⁵⁴¹ The lack of supplies was commonplace in Bucha, as many houses, including the nursing home where the six residents died, were condemned to no electricity, running water or natural gas due to the destruction caused by the invasion.⁵⁴²

Although the exact date of death is unknown, it is estimated that between 28 February 2022 and 9 March 2022, a woman was fired upon by two armored vehicles while she was dismounting her bike on Yablunska Street.⁵⁴³ A few days later, on 12 March 2022, sixty-one-year-old Ilia Navalnyi was shot and killed by Russian forces.⁵⁴⁴

Russian forces attacked a man and his son on 17 March 2022, while the two were traveling to get

⁵³⁴ *Ukraine: Russian Forces' Trail of Death in Bucha*, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 21, 2022) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/21/ukraine-russian-forces-trail-death-bucha>.

⁵³⁵ *Ukraine: Russian Forces' Trail of Death in Bucha*, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 21, 2022) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/21/ukraine-russian-forces-trail-death-bucha>.

⁵³⁶ *"He's Not Coming Back" War Crimes in Northwest Areas of Kyiv Oblast*, AMNESTY INT'L 9 (2022) <https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/EUR5055612022ENGLISH.pdf>.

⁵³⁷ *Ukraine: Russian Forces' Trail of Death in Bucha*, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 21, 2022) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/21/ukraine-russian-forces-trail-death-bucha>.

⁵³⁸ *Ukraine: Russian Forces' Trail of Death in Bucha*, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 21, 2022) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/21/ukraine-russian-forces-trail-death-bucha>.

⁵³⁹ *Ukraine: Russian Forces' Trail of Death in Bucha*, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 21, 2022) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/21/ukraine-russian-forces-trail-death-bucha>.

⁵⁴⁰ *Massacre in Bucha*, MEDUZA (Apr. 7, 2022) <https://meduza.io/en/feature/2022/04/08/massacre-in-bucha>.

⁵⁴¹ *War Crimes Watch Ukraine*, PBS, <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/interactive/ap-russia-war-crimes-ukraine/?facets=Bucha%7C%7C> (last updated Feb. 24, 2023).

⁵⁴² Carlotta Gall, *Bucha's Month of Terror*, N.Y. TIMES. (Apr. 11, 2022) www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/04/11/world/europe/bucha-terror.html.

⁵⁴³ *Ukraine: Russian Forces' Trail of Death in Bucha*, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 21, 2022) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/21/ukraine-russian-forces-trail-death-bucha>.

⁵⁴⁴ *Ukraine: Russian Forces' Trail of Death in Bucha*, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 21, 2022) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/21/ukraine-russian-forces-trail-death-bucha>.

supplies.⁵⁴⁵ Ruslan and his son Yury took their bikes, which had white ribbons to indicate their civilian status to the Russian forces, to get food and medicine when they were stopped by a Russian soldier and shot multiple times.⁵⁴⁶ Ruslan was killed, while Yury was injured after being shot in the head.⁵⁴⁷

On 20 March 2022, a thirty-seven-year-old man named Artem was going to his garage to grab food stored there when he was killed by Russian forces.⁵⁴⁸ Another man, who has not been identified besides the fact he was wearing a black tracksuit, was shot and killed.⁵⁴⁹

A woman named Tetiana Sr. was walking to visit family on 24 March 2022 when she was shot and killed by Russian forces.⁵⁵⁰ The soldiers then detained her husband.⁵⁵¹ When her husband requested to retrieve Tetiana's body, the Russian soldiers put a bag on his head and dumped him in a completely different part of town.⁵⁵² The following day, on 25 March 2022, a Russian soldier shot and killed a person kneeling in front of him.⁵⁵³

Several other incidents occurred during the invasion of Bucha that do not have a specific date of occurrence.⁵⁵⁴ An adult man was shot and killed in front of his father while they were both out for a walk.⁵⁵⁵ Another man who was riding his bike was struck by the fire of an armored vehicle, an incident which was recorded and documented by the Ukrainian military.⁵⁵⁶ The nephew of a woman named Natalya Oleksandra was detained by Russian forces and held for three weeks

⁵⁴⁵ *Massacre in Bucha*, MEDUZA (Apr. 7, 2022)

<https://meduza.io/en/feature/2022/04/08/massacre-in-bucha>. See also *War Crimes Watch Ukraine*, PBS,

<https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/interactive/ap-russia-war-crimes-ukraine/?facets=Bucha%7C%7C> (last updated Feb. 24, 2023).

⁵⁴⁶ *Massacre in Bucha*, MEDUZA (Apr. 7, 2022) <https://meduza.io/en/feature/2022/04/08/massacre-in-bucha>.

⁵⁴⁷ *Massacre in Bucha*, MEDUZA (Apr. 7, 2022)

<https://meduza.io/en/feature/2022/04/08/massacre-in-bucha>; *War Crimes Watch Ukraine*, PBS, <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/interactive/ap-russia-war-crimes-ukraine/?facets=Bucha%7C%7C> (last updated Feb. 24, 2023).

⁵⁴⁸ *Ukraine: Russian Forces' Trail of Death in Bucha*, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 21, 2022)

<https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/21/ukraine-russian-forces-trail-death-bucha>.

⁵⁴⁹ *Ukraine: Russian Forces' Trail of Death in Bucha*, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 21, 2022)

<https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/21/ukraine-russian-forces-trail-death-bucha>.

⁵⁵⁰ Carlotta Gall, *Bucha's Month of Terror*, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2022)

www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/04/11/world/europe/bucha-terror.html.

⁵⁵¹ Carlotta Gall, *Bucha's Month of Terror*, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2022)

www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/04/11/world/europe/bucha-terror.html.

⁵⁵² Carlotta Gall, *Bucha's Month of Terror*, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2022)

www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/04/11/world/europe/bucha-terror.html.

⁵⁵³ *Massacre in Bucha*, MEDUZA. (Apr. 7, 2022)

<https://meduza.io/en/feature/2022/04/08/massacre-in-bucha>.

⁵⁵⁴ Franklin Foer, *The Horrors of Bucha*, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 4, 2022)

<https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/04/russia-killings-war-crimes-genocide/629470/>.

⁵⁵⁵ Carlotta Gall, *Bucha's Month of Terror*, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2022)

www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/04/11/world/europe/bucha-terror.html.

⁵⁵⁶ *Massacre in Bucha*, MEDUZA. (Apr. 7, 2022) <https://meduza.io/en/feature/2022/04/08/massacre-in-bucha>.

before he was found dead in a basement, having been shot through the ear.⁵⁵⁷ A woman wearing only a fur coat was found dead inside of a basement in a family's house, with discarded condom wrappers nearby.⁵⁵⁸ Five bodies, including two women and one child, were found dumped and burned on the street.⁵⁵⁹ A ten-year-old girl was running away from Russian forces with an adult man, Volodymyr Rubailo.⁵⁶⁰ The soldiers shot and killed the man.⁵⁶¹ The young girl was also shot, but survived, though her injury was so severe that her arm was required to be amputated.⁵⁶² An elderly man died due to his oxygen concentrator not working as a result of the prolonged power outages in the city, similar to how the residents in the nursing home had died in early March.⁵⁶³

Funeral workers collecting bodies that littered the streets of the city found at least 50 bodies with their hands bound.⁵⁶⁴ Another five bodies were found shot with their arms bound in the basement of a children's camp.⁵⁶⁵ Dozens of other citizens found dead were discovered to have been shot and killed with metal darts (also known as flechettes).⁵⁶⁶ Another 360 bodies were recovered in Bucha, with at least 250 reported to have been killed by bullets or shrapnel.⁵⁶⁷ Journalists came

⁵⁵⁷ Carlotta Gall, *Bucha's Month of Terror*, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2022)

www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/04/11/world/europe/bucha-terror.html.

⁵⁵⁸ Carlotta Gall, *Bucha's Month of Terror*, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2022)

www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/04/11/world/europe/bucha-terror.html.

⁵⁵⁹ Carlotta Gall, *Bucha's Month of Terror*, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2022)

www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/04/11/world/europe/bucha-terror.html.

⁵⁶⁰ *Ukraine: Russian Forces' Trail of Death in Bucha*, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 21, 2022)

<https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/21/ukraine-russian-forces-trail-death-bucha>.

⁵⁶¹ Scott Pelley, *The Stories of the Victims Found in a Mass Grave in Bucha, Ukraine*, CBS NEWS (Oct. 16, 2022)

<https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ukraine-russia-bucha-civilians-60-minutes-2022-10-16/>. See also

Ukraine: Russian Forces' Trail of Death in Bucha, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 21, 2022)

<https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/21/ukraine-russian-forces-trail-death-bucha>.

⁵⁶² *Ukraine: Russian Forces' Trail of Death in Bucha*, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 21, 2022)

<https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/21/ukraine-russian-forces-trail-death-bucha>.

⁵⁶³ *Ukraine: Russian Forces' Trail of Death in Bucha*, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 21, 2022)

<https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/21/ukraine-russian-forces-trail-death-bucha>. See also *War*

Crimes Watch Ukraine, PBS,

<https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/interactive/ap-russia-war-crimes-ukraine/?facets=Bucha%7C%7C> (last updated Feb. 24, 2023).

⁵⁶⁴ *Ukraine: Russian Forces' Trail of Death in Bucha*, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 21, 2022)

<https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/21/ukraine-russian-forces-trail-death-bucha>.

⁵⁶⁵ Carlotta Gall, *Bucha's Month of Terror*, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2022)

www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/04/11/world/europe/bucha-terror.html. See also *War Crimes Watch Ukraine*, PBS,

<https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/interactive/ap-russia-war-crimes-ukraine/?facets=Bucha%7C%7C> (last updated Feb. 24, 2023).

⁵⁶⁶ Lorenzo Tondo, *Dozens of Bucha Civilians Were Killed by Metal Darts from Russian Artillery*, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 24, 2022)

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/24/dozens-bucha-civilians-killed-flechettes-metal-darts-russian-artillery>.

⁵⁶⁷ Carlotta Gall, *Bucha's Month of Terror*, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2022)

www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/04/11/world/europe/bucha-terror.html.

across decaying bodies in a basement, which were contorted and bloodied.⁵⁶⁸ Some of the bodies had their arms tied behind their backs or had been kneecapped, and then shot multiple times.⁵⁶⁹

Some of the bodies that were recovered have been identified.⁵⁷⁰ Roman Havryliuk and his brother Serhiy Dukhil were found dead in their yard, along with the body of an unidentified man.⁵⁷¹ A forty-seven-year-old man named Vasily Nedashkivskyi was taken by Russian soldiers.⁵⁷² He was later found dead in an outdoor basement stairwell, along with the body of another individual named Igor Lytvynenko.⁵⁷³

In total, Ukrainian authorities state that at least 400 civilians were killed during the Russian occupation of Bucha, with at least 340 bodies reported as having been buried in Bucha in the month of March alone.⁵⁷⁴

Parties Involved: The Russian soldiers invading Bucha are noted as responsible for numerous human rights violations and war crimes.⁵⁷⁵ One of the individuals named as responsible is Azatbek Omurbekov.⁵⁷⁶ Known as the “Butcher of Bucha,” Omurbekov is alleged to have led the troops in Bucha that were responsible for the killing, rape, and torture of numerous civilians.⁵⁷⁷ Omurbekov reported to and responded to the orders given by Oleg Salyukov, the army general

⁵⁶⁸ Oleksandr Stashevskiy & Cara Anna, *In Bucha, Ukraine, Burned, Piled Bodies Among Latest Horrors*, AP NEWS. (Apr. 6, 2022)

<https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-bucha-bodies-3f5deb515b3036c0f115c3fccc0e34a6>.

⁵⁶⁹ Tara John, et al., *Bodies Tied Up, Shot and Left to Rot in Bucha Hint at Gruesome Reality of Russia's Occupation of Ukraine*, CNN (Apr. 5, 2022)

<https://www.cnn.com/2022/04/05/europe/bucha-ukraine-russian-occupation-reality-intl-cmd/index.html>.

⁵⁷⁰ *Ukraine: Russian Forces' Trail of Death in Bucha*, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 21, 2022)

<https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/21/ukraine-russian-forces-trail-death-bucha>.

⁵⁷¹ Carlotta Gall, *Bucha's Month of Terror*, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2022)

www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/04/11/world/europe/bucha-terror.html.

⁵⁷² *Ukraine: Russian Forces' Trail of Death in Bucha*, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 21, 2022)

<https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/21/ukraine-russian-forces-trail-death-bucha>.

⁵⁷³ *Ukraine: Russian Forces' Trail of Death in Bucha*, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 21, 2022)

<https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/21/ukraine-russian-forces-trail-death-bucha>.

⁵⁷⁴ *'Not Isolated Incidents': Amnesty Accuses Russia of War Crimes*, AL JAZEERA (May 6, 2022)

<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/5/6/amnesty-says-evidence-shows-russian-troops-committed-war-crimes>. See also *Massacre in Bucha*, MEDUZA (Apr. 7, 2022)

<https://meduza.io/en/feature/2022/04/08/massacre-in-bucha>.

⁵⁷⁵ *Ukraine: Russian Forces' Trail of Death in Bucha*, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 21, 2022)

<https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/21/ukraine-russian-forces-trail-death-bucha>. See also *War Crimes Watch Ukraine*, PBS,

<https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/interactive/ap-russia-war-crimes-ukraine/?facets=Bucha%7C%7C> (last updated Feb. 24, 2023).

⁵⁷⁶ *EU Blacklist Names Russian Army's 'Butchers' of Bucha, Mariupol*, AL JAZEERA (June 3, 2022)

<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/6/3/eu-blacklists-bucha-butchers-in-latest-russia-sanctions>.

⁵⁷⁷ *EU Blacklist Names Russian Army's 'Butchers' of Bucha, Mariupol*, AL JAZEERA. (June 3, 2022)

<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/6/3/eu-blacklists-bucha-butchers-in-latest-russia-sanctions>.

and commander-in-chief of the Russian forces.⁵⁷⁸ German Intelligence additionally pointed blame towards the Wagner Group for being a driving force in this massacre.⁵⁷⁹

Legal Analysis: The invasion of Bucha may violate both the Rome Statutes and Geneva Conventions some of which are listed and analyzed below.⁵⁸⁰

Count 1: The War Crime of Willful Killing

Rome Statute **8(2)(a)(i)**⁵⁸¹

Geneva Convention **Common Article 3(1)(a)**⁵⁸²

Elements:

1. The perpetrator killed one or more persons.
2. Such person or persons were protected under one or more of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
3. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that protected status.
4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.
5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Element 1: The perpetrator killed one or more persons.

There were over 400 civilians killed, per the Ukrainian Prosecutor General.⁵⁸³ Indiscriminately firing at civilians in a residential area would likely result in injury or death in the ordinary course

⁵⁷⁸ Lorenzo Tondo & Pjotr Sauer, *The 4-Metre-Wide Board Detailing the Entire Russian Military Chain of Command in Ukraine*, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 14, 2022) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/mar/14/the-4-metre-wide-board-detailing-the-entire-russian-military-chain-of-command-in-ukraine>.

⁵⁷⁹ Ken Bredemeier, *German Intel Claims Intercepts Show Russians Discussing Killing Ukrainian Civilians*, VOA NEWS (Apr. 7, 2022) <https://www.voanews.com/a/german-intel-claims-intercepts-show-russians-discussing-killing-ukrainian-civilians/6519448.html>.

⁵⁸⁰ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (July 17, 1998); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (Aug. 12, 1949); 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (Aug. 12, 1949).

⁵⁸¹ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(a)(i), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.

⁵⁸² Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 3(1)(a), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31.

⁵⁸³ Mansur Mirovalev, *Bucha Killings: 'The World Cannot be Tricked Anymore,'* AL JAZEERA (Apr. 4, 2022) www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/4/will-the-bucha-massacre-wake-up-the-world.

of events. Russian troops actively fired at individuals standing either in or near their homes and at anyone who attempted to flee.⁵⁸⁴ Soldiers tied up and executed many citizens and left their bodies in the streets.⁵⁸⁵ Such actions are indicative of intent to kill or cause death.

Element 2: Such person or persons were protected under one or more of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

The victims of the attack on Bucha were civilians, including many women and children.⁵⁸⁶ Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions protects civilians, as they are “[p]ersons taking no active part in hostilities.”⁵⁸⁷

Element 3: The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that protected status.

Bucha was a residential city in the Kyiv Oblast.⁵⁸⁸ It was a community of approximately 37,000 civilians.⁵⁸⁹ Many of the civilians killed were not actively taking part in the hostilities, including wearing white ribbons to indicate their civilian status to Russian troops.⁵⁹⁰

Element 4: The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine commenced in February 2022 and has continued since the initial strike.⁵⁹¹

Element 5: The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

⁵⁸⁴ *Ukraine: Russian Forces’ Trail of Death in Bucha*, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 21, 2022) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/21/ukraine-russian-forces-trail-death-bucha>. See also Mansur Mirovalev, *Bucha Killings: ‘The World Cannot be Tricked Anymore,’* AL JAZEERA (Apr. 4, 2022) <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/4/will-the-bucha-massacre-wake-up-the-world>.

⁵⁸⁵ Carlotta Gall, *Bucha’s Month of Terror*, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2022) www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/04/11/world/europe/bucha-terror.html.

⁵⁸⁶ Mansur Mirovalev, *Bucha Killings: ‘The World Cannot be Tricked Anymore,’* AL JAZEERA (Apr. 4, 2022) www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/4/will-the-bucha-massacre-wake-up-the-world.

⁵⁸⁷ Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (Aug. 12, 1949).

⁵⁸⁸ *Massacre in Bucha*, MEDUZA (Apr. 7, 2022) <https://meduza.io/en/feature/2022/04/08/massacre-in-bucha>.

⁵⁸⁹ *‘Not Isolated Incidents’: Amnesty Accuses Russia of War Crimes*, AL JAZEERA (May 6, 2022) <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/5/6/amnesty-says-evidence-shows-russian-troops-committed-war-crimes>.

⁵⁹⁰ *Massacre in Bucha*, MEDUZA (Apr. 7, 2022) <https://meduza.io/en/feature/2022/04/08/massacre-in-bucha>.

⁵⁹¹ Fatima Tlis, *Flagrantly False: Russia’s Claim That Bucha Killings Were ‘Staged’*, VOA NEWS (Apr. 5, 2022) https://www.voanews.com/a/fact-check-russia-bucha-denials-false/6743339.html?utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=redirect&utm_source=polygraphinfo.

The invasion of Bucha was part of the broader, ongoing “special military operation” commenced by Russian leader Vladimir Putin on 22 February 2022 when he ordered the invasion of Ukraine.⁵⁹²

Count 2: The War Crime of Causing Unnecessary Suffering

Rome Statute **Article 8(2)(a)(iii)**⁵⁹³

Geneva Convention Common **Article 3(1)(a)**⁵⁹⁴

Elements:

1. The perpetrator caused great physical or mental pain or suffering to, or serious injury to body or health of, one or more persons.
2. Such person or persons were protected under one or more of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
3. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that protected status.
4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.
5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Element 1: The perpetrator caused great physical or mental pain or suffering to, or serious injury to body or health of, one or more persons.

There were over 400 civilians killed, per the Ukrainian Prosecutor General, with several noted as having been tortured or executed.⁵⁹⁵ Soldiers tied up and executed many citizens and left their bodies in the streets.⁵⁹⁶ Such actions are indicative of intent to cause suffering.

Element 2: Such person or persons were protected under one or more of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

⁵⁹² Tara John, et al., *Bodies Tied Up, Shot and Left to Rot in Bucha Hint at Gruesome Reality of Russia's Occupation of Ukraine*, CNN (Apr. 5, 2022) <https://www.cnn.com/2022/04/05/europe/bucha-ukraine-russian-occupation-reality-intl-cmd/index.html>.

⁵⁹³ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7(1)(a), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.

⁵⁹⁴ Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 3(1)(a), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31.

⁵⁹⁵ ‘Not Isolated Incidents’: *Amnesty Accuses Russia of War Crimes*, AL JAZEERA (May 6, 2022) <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/5/6/amnesty-says-evidence-shows-russian-troops-committed-war-crimes>.

⁵⁹⁶ Carlotta Gall, *Bucha's Month of Terror*, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2022) www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/04/11/world/europe/bucha-terror.html.

The victims of the attack on Bucha were civilians, including many women and children.⁵⁹⁷ Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions protects civilians, as they are “[p]ersons taking no active part in hostilities.”⁵⁹⁸

Element 3: The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that protected status.

Bucha was a residential city in the Kyiv Oblast.⁵⁹⁹ It was a community of approximately 37,000 civilians.⁶⁰⁰ Many of the civilians killed were not actively taking part in the hostilities, including wearing white ribbons to indicate their civilian status to Russian troops.⁶⁰¹

Element 4: The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine commenced in February 2022 and has continued since the initial strike.⁶⁰²

Element 5: The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

The invasion of Bucha was part of the broader, ongoing “special military operation” commenced by Russian leader Vladimir Putin on 22 February 2022 when he ordered the invasion of Ukraine.⁶⁰³

Count 3: The War Crime of Intentionally Attacking Civilians

Rome Statute 8(2)(b)(i)⁶⁰⁴

⁵⁹⁷ Mansur Mirovalev, *Bucha killings: ‘The World Cannot be Tricked Anymore,’* AL JAZEERA (Apr. 4, 2022) www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/4/will-the-bucha-massacre-wake-up-the-world.

⁵⁹⁸ Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (Aug. 12, 1949).

⁵⁹⁹ *Massacre in Bucha*, MEDUZA (Apr. 7, 2022) <https://meduza.io/en/feature/2022/04/08/massacre-in-bucha>.

⁶⁰⁰ ‘Not Isolated Incidents’: Amnesty Accuses Russia of War Crimes, AL JAZEERA (May 6, 2022) <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/5/6/amnesty-says-evidence-shows-russian-troops-committed-war-crimes>.

⁶⁰¹ *Massacre in Bucha*, MEDUZA (Apr. 7, 2022) <https://meduza.io/en/feature/2022/04/08/massacre-in-bucha>.

⁶⁰² Fatima Tlis, *Flagrantly False: Russia’s Claim That Bucha Killings Were ‘Staged’*, VOA NEWS (Apr. 5, 2022)

https://www.voanews.com/a/fact-check-russia-bucha-denials-false/6743339.html?utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=redirect&utm_source=polygraphinfo.

⁶⁰³ Tara John, et al., *Bodies Tied Up, Shot and Left to Rot in Bucha Hint at Gruesome Reality of Russia’s Occupation of Ukraine*, CNN (Apr. 5, 2022) <https://www.cnn.com/2022/04/05/europe/bucha-ukraine-russian-occupation-reality-intl-cmd/index.html>.

⁶⁰⁴ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 8(2)(b)(i), 8(2)(e)(i), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.

Elements:

1. The perpetrator directed an attack.
2. The object of the attack was a civilian population as such or individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities.
3. The perpetrator intended the civilian population as such or individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities to be the object of the attack.
4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.
5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Element 1: The perpetrator directed an attack.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine commenced in February 2022 and has continued since the initial strike.⁶⁰⁶

Element 2: The object of the attack was a civilian population as such or individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities.

Bucha was a residential city in the Kyiv Oblast.⁶⁰⁷ It was a community of approximately 37,000 civilians, not a military area or anything related to military operations.⁶⁰⁸

Element 3: The perpetrator intended the civilian population as such or individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities to be the object of the attack.

Bucha was a residential city in the Kyiv Oblast.⁶⁰⁹ It was a community of approximately 37,000

⁶⁰⁵ Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 3(1)(a), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 51, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.

⁶⁰⁶ Fatima Tlis, *Flagrantly False: Russia's Claim That Bucha Killings Were 'Staged'*, VOA NEWS (Apr. 5, 2022)

https://www.voanews.com/a/fact-check-russia-bucha-denials-false/6743339.html?utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=redirect&utm_source=polygraphinfo.

⁶⁰⁷ *Massacre in Bucha*, MEDUZA (Apr. 7, 2022) <https://meduza.io/en/feature/2022/04/08/massacre-in-bucha>.

⁶⁰⁸ *'Not Isolated Incidents': Amnesty Accuses Russia of War Crimes*, AL JAZEERA (May 6, 2022) <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/5/6/amnesty-says-evidence-shows-russian-troops-committed-war-crimes>; *Massacre in Bucha*, MEDUZA (Apr. 7, 2022)

<https://meduza.io/en/feature/2022/04/08/massacre-in-bucha>.

⁶⁰⁹ *Massacre in Bucha*, MEDUZA (Apr. 7, 2022) <https://meduza.io/en/feature/2022/04/08/massacre-in-bucha>.

civilians.⁶¹⁰ Many of the civilians killed were not actively taking part in the hostilities, including wearing white ribbons to indicate their civilian status to Russian troops.⁶¹¹ Indiscriminately firing at civilians in a residential area would likely result in injury or death in the ordinary course of events. Russian troops actively fired at individuals standing either in or near their homes and at anyone who attempted to flee.⁶¹²

Element 4: The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.

The invasion of Bucha was part of the “special military operation” commenced by Russian leader Vladimir Putin.⁶¹³

Element 5: The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

The invasion of Bucha was part of the broader, ongoing “special military operation” commenced by Russian leader Vladimir Putin on 22 February 2022 when he ordered the invasion of Ukraine.⁶¹⁴

Count 4: The War Crime of Destroying undefended civilian objects

Rome Statute 8(2)(b)(v)⁶¹⁵

Geneva Convention IV Art. 53; API Art. 52⁶¹⁶

Elements:

⁶¹⁰ ‘Not Isolated Incidents’: Amnesty Accuses Russia of War Crimes, AL JAZEERA (May 6, 2022) <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/5/6/amnesty-says-evidence-shows-russian-troops-committed-war-crimes>.

⁶¹¹ Massacre in Bucha, MEDUZA (Apr. 7, 2022) <https://meduza.io/en/feature/2022/04/08/massacre-in-bucha>.

⁶¹² Ukraine: Russian Forces’ Trail of Death in Bucha, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 21, 2022) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/21/ukraine-russian-forces-trail-death-bucha>. See also Mansur Mirovalev, Bucha Killings: ‘The World Cannot be Tricked Anymore,’ AL JAZEERA (Apr. 4, 2022) <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/4/will-the-bucha-massacre-wake-up-the-world>.

⁶¹³ Tara John, et al., Bodies Tied Up, Shot and Left to Rot in Bucha Hint at Gruesome Reality of Russia’s Occupation of Ukraine, CNN (Apr. 5, 2022) <https://www.cnn.com/2022/04/05/europe/bucha-ukraine-russian-occupation-reality-intl-cmd/index.html>.

⁶¹⁴ Tara John, et al., Bodies Tied Up, Shot and Left to Rot in Bucha Hint at Gruesome Reality of Russia’s Occupation of Ukraine. CNN (Apr. 5, 2022) <https://www.cnn.com/2022/04/05/europe/bucha-ukraine-russian-occupation-reality-intl-cmd/index.html>.

⁶¹⁵ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 8(2)(b)(v).

⁶¹⁶ Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 3(1)(a), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 51, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.

1. The perpetrator attacked one or more towns, villages, dwellings or buildings.
2. Such towns, villages, dwellings or buildings were open for unresisted occupation.
3. Such towns, villages, dwellings or buildings did not constitute military objectives.
4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.
5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Element 1: The perpetrator attacked one or more towns, villages, dwellings or buildings.

Bucha was a residential city in the Kyiv Oblast.⁶¹⁷ It was a community of approximately 37,000 civilians, not a military area or anything related to military operations.⁶¹⁸

Element 2: Such towns, villages, dwellings or buildings were open for unresisted occupation.

Bucha had not been involved in any of the fighting as part of the Russian occupation of Ukraine when the attack occurred.⁶¹⁹ There is no evidence that there was any resistance or persons taking an active part in hostilities who were resisting occupation by Russian forces.⁶²⁰

Element 3: Such towns, villages, dwellings or buildings did not constitute military objectives.

Bucha was a residential city in the Kyiv Oblast.⁶²¹ It was a community of approximately 37,000 civilians, not a military area or anything related to military operations.⁶²² Any due diligence done by Russian forces would have easily confirmed that there was no military presence that warranted an attack on an otherwise undefended city.⁶²³

Element 4: The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine commenced in February 2022 and has continued since the

⁶¹⁷ *Massacre in Bucha*, MEDUZA (Apr. 7, 2022) <https://meduza.io/en/feature/2022/04/08/massacre-in-bucha>.

⁶¹⁸ 'Not Isolated Incidents': *Amnesty Accuses Russia of War Crimes*, AL JAZEERA (May 6, 2022) <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/5/6/amnesty-says-evidence-shows-russian-troops-committed-war-crimes>; *Massacre in Bucha*, MEDUZA (Apr. 7, 2022) <https://meduza.io/en/feature/2022/04/08/massacre-in-bucha>.

⁶¹⁹ *Massacre in Bucha*, MEDUZA (Apr. 7, 2022) <https://meduza.io/en/feature/2022/04/08/massacre-in-bucha>.

⁶²⁰ Mansur Mirovalev, *Bucha killings: 'The World Cannot be Tricked Anymore'*, AL JAZEERA (Apr. 4, 2022) www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/4/will-the-bucha-massacre-wake-up-the-world.

⁶²¹ *Massacre in Bucha*, MEDUZA (Apr. 7, 2022) <https://meduza.io/en/feature/2022/04/08/massacre-in-bucha>.

⁶²² 'Not Isolated Incidents': *Amnesty Accuses Russia of War Crimes*, AL JAZEERA (May 6, 2022) <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/5/6/amnesty-says-evidence-shows-russian-troops-committed-war-crimes>; *Massacre in Bucha*, MEDUZ. (Apr. 7, 2022) <https://meduza.io/en/feature/2022/04/08/massacre-in-bucha>.

⁶²³ *Massacre in Bucha*, MEDUZA (Apr. 7, 2022) <https://meduza.io/en/feature/2022/04/08/massacre-in-bucha>.

initial strike.⁶²⁴

Element 5: The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

The invasion of Bucha was part of the broader, ongoing “special military operation” commenced by Russian leader Vladimir Putin on 22 February 2022 when he ordered the invasion of Ukraine.⁶²⁵

⁶²⁴ Fatima Tlis, *Flagrantly False: Russia’s Claim That Bucha Killings Were ‘Staged’*, VOA NEWS (Apr. 5, 2022)

https://www.voanews.com/a/fact-check-russia-bucha-denials-false/6743339.html?utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=redirect&utm_source=polygraphinfo.

⁶²⁵ Tara John, et al., *Bodies Tied Up, Shot and Left to Rot in Bucha Hint at Gruesome Reality of Russia’s Occupation of Ukraine*. CNN (Apr. 5, 2022)

<https://www.cnn.com/2022/04/05/europe/bucha-ukraine-russian-occupation-reality-intl-cmd/index.html>.

Incident: 16 MAR 2022, Mariupol Drama Theater Bombing

Assessment: We assess with high confidence that on 16 MAR 2022, Russian military forces struck the Mariupol drama theater in Ukraine, killing an estimated 600 and injuring dozens more.

Narrative: On 16 MAR 2022, Russian warplanes dropped two 500 kilogram bombs on the Mariupol drama theater, which detonated simultaneously.⁶²⁶ The theater had been repurposed as a shelter for civilians seeking refuge there after other attacks in MAR 2022.⁶²⁷ There was no significant military presence inside or near the theater at the time of attack nor in the days immediately preceding the attack and two large signs spelling “children” in Cyrillic had been painted outside of the theater that were visible from the air.⁶²⁸ Up to 1,300 people were inside of the theater when the bombs struck, killing hundreds, injuring many more, and destroying the theater itself.⁶²⁹

The Russian Ministry of Defense and official Russian media denied responsibility, claiming it was Ukraine’s Azov Regiment that blew up the theater in order to blame Russia for the attack.⁶³⁰ Subsequent investigations deemed that possibility implausible, and placed responsibility on Russian military forces and aircraft.⁶³¹ Based on the available credible evidence, the investigation found the bombing to be a deliberate air strike by Russian forces targeting a civilian object.⁶³²

Parties Involved: This attack involved the Russian military and Ukrainian civilians.

Legal Analysis: These actions violate both the Rome Statutes and Geneva Conventions some of which are listed and analyzed below.⁶³³

⁶²⁶ “Children”: The Attack on the Donetsk Regional Academic Drama Theatre in Mariupol, Ukraine AMNESTY INT’L 28 (2022) <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur50/5713/2022/en/>.

⁶²⁷ “Children”: The Attack on the Donetsk Regional Academic Drama Theatre in Mariupol, Ukraine AMNESTY INT’L 18 (2022) <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur50/5713/2022/en/>.

⁶²⁸ “Children”: The Attack on the Donetsk Regional Academic Drama Theatre in Mariupol, Ukraine AMNESTY INT’L 4-5 (2022) <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur50/5713/2022/en/>.

⁶²⁹ Lori Hinnant et al., *AP Evidence Points to 600 Dead in Mariupol Theater Airstrike*, ASSOC. PRESS (May 4, 2022) <https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-mariupol-theater-c321a196fbd568899841b506afcac7a1>.

⁶³⁰ “Children”: The Attack on the Donetsk Regional Academic Drama Theatre in Mariupol, Ukraine AMNESTY INT’L 6 (2022) <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur50/5713/2022/en/>.

⁶³¹ “Children”: The Attack on the Donetsk Regional Academic Drama Theatre in Mariupol, Ukraine AMNESTY INT’L 4 (2022) <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur50/5713/2022/en/>.

⁶³² “Children”: The Attack on the Donetsk Regional Academic Drama Theatre in Mariupol, Ukraine AMNESTY INT’L 4 (2022) <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur50/5713/2022/en/>.

⁶³³ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (July 17, 1998); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (Aug. 12, 1949); 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (Aug. 12, 1949).

Count 1: The War Crime of Willful Killing

Rome Statute **Articles 8(2)(a)(i)**⁶³⁴

Geneva Convention **Common Article 3(1)(a); IV Article 27**⁶³⁵

Elements:

1. The perpetrator killed one or more persons.
2. Such person or persons were protected under one or more of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
3. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that protected status.
4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.
5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Element 1: The perpetrator killed one or more persons.

Between 300-600 people were killed as a result of the attack.⁶³⁶

Element 2: Such person or persons were protected under one or more of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

The victims of the attack were civilians.⁶³⁷ Civilians are protected under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions as “[p]ersons taking no active part in hostilities.”⁶³⁸

Element 3: The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that protected status.

The theater was a known civilian shelter, as it had been used as such for at least three weeks

⁶³⁴ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 8(2)(a)(i), 8(2)(c)(i), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.

⁶³⁵ Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 3(1)(a), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 27, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.

⁶³⁶ Lori Hinnant et al., *AP Evidence Points to 600 Dead in Mariupol Theater Airstrike*, ASSOC. PRESS (May 4, 2022)

<https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-mariupol-theater-c321a196fbd568899841b506afcac7a1>.

⁶³⁷ Lori Hinnant Et Al., *AP Evidence Points to 600 Dead in Mariupol Theater Airstrike*, ASSOC. PRESS (May 4, 2022),

<https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-mariupol-theater-c321a196fbd568899841b506afcac7a1>.

⁶³⁸ Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.

prior to the attack.⁶³⁹ There was also signage visible to aircraft indicating that children were inside.⁶⁴⁰

Element 4: The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.

The attack was committed as part of the ongoing military siege of Mariupol, Ukraine which was a part of the larger armed conflict that began with Russia invading Ukraine.⁶⁴¹

Element 5: The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Performing an airstrike during the ongoing campaign necessarily brings with it awareness of the existence of an armed conflict.⁶⁴²

Count 2: The War Crime of Willfully Causing Great Suffering

Rome Statute **Articles 8(2)(a)(iii)**⁶⁴³

Geneva Conventions **Common Article 3(1)(a); IV Article 27**⁶⁴⁴

Elements:

1. The perpetrator caused great physical or mental pain or suffering to, or serious injury to body or health of, one or more persons.
2. Such person or persons were protected under one or more of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
3. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that protected status.
4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.
5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an

⁶³⁹ Lori Hinnant Et Al., *AP Evidence Points to 600 Dead in Mariupol Theater Airstrike*, ASSOC. PRESS (May 4, 2022),

<https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-mariupol-theater-c321a196fbd568899841b506afcac7a1>.

⁶⁴⁰ “Children”: *The Attack on the Donetsk Regional Academic Drama Theatre in Mariupol, Ukraine* AMNESTY INT’L 4 (2022) <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur50/5713/2022/en/>.

⁶⁴¹ “Children”: *The Attack on the Donetsk Regional Academic Drama Theatre in Mariupol, Ukraine* AMNESTY INT’L 4 (2022) <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur50/5713/2022/en/>.

⁶⁴² “Children”: *The Attack on the Donetsk Regional Academic Drama Theatre in Mariupol, Ukraine* AMNESTY INT’L 2 (2022) <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur50/5713/2022/en/>.

⁶⁴³ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 8(2)(a)(iii), 8(2)(c)(i), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.

⁶⁴⁴ Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 3(1)(a), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 27, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.

armed conflict.

Element 1: The perpetrator caused great physical or mental pain or suffering to, or serious injury to body or health of, one or more persons.

An estimated 600 people were killed with dozens more injured.⁶⁴⁵ Many casualties included loss of limbs, broken bones, and other significant injuries.⁶⁴⁶ There was likely significant emotional trauma from the bombing as well.⁶⁴⁷ The bombs were dropped by aircraft directly on top of a building full of people; doing so indicates that the perpetrator was aware that their conduct would result in casualties and suffering.⁶⁴⁸

Element 2: Such person or persons were protected under one or more of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

The victims of the attack were civilians.⁶⁴⁹ Civilians are protected under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions as “[p]ersons taking no active part in hostilities.”⁶⁵⁰

Element 3: The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that protected status.

The theater was a known civilian shelter, as it had been used as such for at least three weeks prior to the attack.⁶⁵¹ There was also signage visible to aircraft indicating that children were inside.⁶⁵²

Element 4: The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international

⁶⁴⁵ Lori Hinnant et al., *AP Evidence Points to 600 Dead in Mariupol Theater Airstrike*, ASSOC. PRESS (May 4, 2022)

<https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-mariupol-theater-c321a196fbd568899841b506afc7a1>.

⁶⁴⁶ “Children”: *The Attack on the Donetsk Regional Academic Drama Theatre in Mariupol, Ukraine* AMNESTY INT’L 52-54 (2022) <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur50/5713/2022/en/>.

⁶⁴⁷ Lori Hinnant et al., *AP Evidence Points to 600 Dead in Mariupol Theater Airstrike*, ASSOC. PRESS (May 4, 2022)

<https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-mariupol-theater-c321a196fbd568899841b506afc7a1>.

⁶⁴⁸ “Children”: *The Attack on the Donetsk Regional Academic Drama Theatre in Mariupol, Ukraine* AMNESTY INT’L 67 (2022) <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur50/5713/2022/en/>.

⁶⁴⁹ Lori Hinnant et al., *AP Evidence Points to 600 Dead in Mariupol Theater Airstrike*, ASSOC. PRESS (May 4, 2022)

<https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-mariupol-theater-c321a196fbd568899841b506afc7a1>.

⁶⁵⁰ Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.

⁶⁵¹ Lori Hinnant et al., *AP Evidence Points to 600 Dead in Mariupol Theater Airstrike*, ASSOC. PRESS (May 4, 2022)

<https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-mariupol-theater-c321a196fbd568899841b506afc7a1>.

⁶⁵² “Children”: *The Attack on the Donetsk Regional Academic Drama Theatre in Mariupol, Ukraine* AMNESTY INT’L 4 (2022) <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur50/5713/2022/en/>.

armed conflict.

The attack was committed as part of Russia's military siege of Ukraine.⁶⁵³

Element 5: The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Performing an airstrike during Russia's campaign necessarily brings with it awareness of the existence of an armed conflict.⁶⁵⁴

Count 3: The War Crime of Attacking Undefended Places

Rome Statute **Article 8(2)(b)(v)**⁶⁵⁵

Geneva Convention **IV Article 53**; **API Article 52**⁶⁵⁶

Elements:

1. The perpetrator attacked one or more towns, villages, dwellings or buildings.
2. Such towns, villages, dwellings or buildings were open for unresisted occupation.
3. Such towns, villages, dwellings or buildings did not constitute military objectives.
4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.
5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Element 1: The perpetrator attacked one or more towns, villages, dwellings or buildings.

Russia attacked the Drama Theater in the town of Mariupol, Ukraine was attacked.⁶⁵⁷

Element 2: Such towns, villages, dwellings or buildings were open for unresisted occupation.

There is no evidence that there was any resistance or persons taking an active part in hostilities

⁶⁵³ "Children": The Attack on the Donetsk Regional Academic Drama Theatre in Mariupol, Ukraine AMNESTY INT'L 4 (2022) <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur50/5713/2022/en/>.

⁶⁵⁴ "Children": The Attack on the Donetsk Regional Academic Drama Theatre in Mariupol, Ukraine AMNESTY INT'L 2 (2022) <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur50/5713/2022/en/>.

⁶⁵⁵ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(b)(v), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.

⁶⁵⁶ Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 53, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 52, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.

⁶⁵⁷ Lori Hinnant et al., *AP Evidence Points to 600 Dead in Mariupol Theater Airstrike*, ASSOC. PRESS (May 4, 2022)

<https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-mariupol-theater-c321a196fbd568899841b506afcac7a1>.

who were resisting occupation by Russian forces.⁶⁵⁸

Element 3: Such towns, villages, dwellings or buildings did not constitute military objectives.

There is no indication that the targeted theater was a military objective.⁶⁵⁹ The theater was a known civilian shelter, as it had been used as such for at least three weeks prior to the attack.⁶⁶⁰ There was also signage visible to aircraft indicating that children were inside.⁶⁶¹

Element 4: The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.

The airstrike was conducted by Russian military forces during their efforts to control the Ukrainian city of Mariupol as part of an ongoing military campaign.⁶⁶²

Element 5: The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Performing an airstrike during Russia's ongoing campaign necessarily brings with it awareness of the existence of an armed conflict.⁶⁶³

Count 4: The War Crime of Attacking Protected Objects

Rome Statute **Article 8(2)(b)(ix)**⁶⁶⁴

Geneva Convention **IV Article 18; API Article 53**⁶⁶⁵

Elements:

1. The perpetrator directed an attack.

⁶⁵⁸ “Children”: *The Attack on the Donetsk Regional Academic Drama Theatre in Mariupol, Ukraine* AMNESTY INT’L 4-5 (2022) <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur50/5713/2022/en/>.

⁶⁵⁹ “Children”: *The Attack on the Donetsk Regional Academic Drama Theatre in Mariupol, Ukraine* AMNESTY INT’L 4-5 (2022) <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur50/5713/2022/en/>.

⁶⁶⁰ Lori Hinnant Et Al., *AP Evidence Points to 600 Dead in Mariupol Theater Airstrike*, ASSOC. PRESS (May 4, 2022), <https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-mariupol-theater-c321a196fbd568899841b506afcac7a1>.

⁶⁶¹ “Children”: *The Attack on the Donetsk Regional Academic Drama Theatre in Mariupol, Ukraine* AMNESTY INT’L 4 (2022) <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur50/5713/2022/en/>.

⁶⁶² “Children”: *The Attack on the Donetsk Regional Academic Drama Theatre in Mariupol, Ukraine* AMNESTY INT’L 4 (2022) <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur50/5713/2022/en/>.

⁶⁶³ “Children”: *The Attack on the Donetsk Regional Academic Drama Theatre in Mariupol, Ukraine* AMNESTY INT’L 2 (2022) <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur50/5713/2022/en/>.

⁶⁶⁴ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(e)(iv), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.

⁶⁶⁵ Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 18, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 53, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.

2. The object of the attack was one or more buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals or places where the sick and wounded are collected, which were not military objectives.
3. The perpetrator intended such building or buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals or places where the sick and wounded are collected, which were not military objectives, to be the object of the attack.
4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.
5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Element 1: The perpetrator directed an attack.

Russia conducted a precision air strike on the Drama Theater in the town of Mariupol, Ukraine.⁶⁶⁶

Element 2: The object of the attack was one or more buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals or places where the sick and wounded are collected, which were not military objectives.

The building that was attacked was the Drama Theater, which was a historic, 60-year old building dedicated to the dramatic arts.⁶⁶⁷

Element 3: The perpetrator intended such building or buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals or places where the sick and wounded are collected, which were not military objectives, to be the object of the attack.

Russia conducted a direct and precise bombing of the theater; doing so indicates that the theater was the intended target.⁶⁶⁸

Element 4: The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.

⁶⁶⁶ Lori Hinnant et al., *AP Evidence Points to 600 Dead in Mariupol Theater Airstrike*, ASSOC. PRESS (May 4, 2022)

<https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-mariupol-theater-c321a196fbd568899841b506afcac7a1>.

⁶⁶⁷ Lori Hinnant et al., *AP Evidence Points to 600 Dead in Mariupol Theater Airstrike*, ASSOC. PRESS (May 4, 2022)

<https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-mariupol-theater-c321a196fbd568899841b506afcac7a1>.

⁶⁶⁸ “‘Children’: The Attack on the Donetsk Regional Academic Drama Theatre in Mariupol, Ukraine AMNESTY INT’L 2 (2022) <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur50/5713/2022/en/>.

The attack was committed as part of Russia's military operations in Ukraine.⁶⁶⁹

Element 5: The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Russia conducting an airstrike during the ongoing campaign necessarily brings with it awareness of the existence of an armed conflict.⁶⁷⁰

⁶⁶⁹ A “Children”: *The Attack on the Donetsk Regional Academic Drama Theatre in Mariupol, Ukraine* AMNESTY INT’L 4 (2022) <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur50/5713/2022/en/>.

⁶⁷⁰ “Children”: *The Attack on the Donetsk Regional Academic Drama Theatre in Mariupol, Ukraine* AMNESTY INT’L 2 (2022) <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur50/5713/2022/en/>.

Incident: 8 APR 2022, Kramatorsk Railway Station Bombing

Assessment: We assess with high confidence that on 8 April 2022, forces aligned with the Russian Armed Forces (RAF) and/or the People's Republic of Donetsk (PRD) launched a missile strike from the PRD-controlled city of Shakhtarsk and that the strike killed approximately fifty-three civilian adults and seven children and injured at least 111 more.⁶⁷¹

Narrative: On 8 April 2022 at about 10:25 am local time, a Tochka-U missile launched from the city of Shakhtarsk struck a railway station in Kramatorsk in the Governorate of Donetsk, Ukraine.⁶⁷² Another airstrike the day before damaged a railway bridge leading out of the region, preventing an evacuation train from leaving on the afternoon of 7 April 2022.⁶⁷³ Because of this delay, which may constitute a broader campaign of strikes to prevent civilian evacuation, 1,000-4,000 civilians seeking evacuation were sheltering in the vicinity of the train station from the early morning of 8 April 2022.⁶⁷⁴ Damage from the missile and the sub-munitions of its cluster warhead largely destroyed the train station, killed sixty civilians (including seven children), and injured approximately 111 more.⁶⁷⁵

The government of Ukraine, the EU, the UN, and major international non-profits immediately attributed the strikes to Russia and its allies.⁶⁷⁶ The Russian Federation denied responsibility for the attacks and claimed that its forces no longer deployed Tochka-U missiles.⁶⁷⁷

Parties involved: The RAF and military associated with the PRD are implicated with high confidence. The strike targeted civilian rail infrastructure in a part of Donetsk under the control

⁶⁷¹ Haley Ott, *Ukraine says at least 52 people killed in Russian rocket attack on Kramatorsk train station*, CBS NEWS (Apr. 8, 2022, 7:06 PM),

<https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ukraine-russia-kramatorsk-train-station-donetsk-strike/>

⁶⁷² Jonathan Beale, *Ukraine War: Disbelief and Horror After Kramatorsk Train Station Attack*, BBC NEWS (Apr. 9, 2022) <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61055105>

⁶⁷³ *Death at the Station Russian Cluster Munition Attack in Kramatorsk: A Human Rights Watch and SITU Research Investigation*, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & SITU, <https://www.hrw.org/video-photos/interactive/2023/02/21/death-at-the-station/russian-cluster-munition-attack-in-kramatorsk>

⁶⁷⁴ Haley Ott, *Ukraine says at least 52 people killed in Russian rocket attack on Kramatorsk train station*, CBS NEWS (Apr. 8, 2022, 7:06 PM),

<https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ukraine-russia-kramatorsk-train-station-donetsk-strike/>

⁶⁷⁵ Haley Ott, *Ukraine says at least 52 people killed in Russian rocket attack on Kramatorsk train station*, CBS NEWS (Apr. 8, 2022, 7:06 PM),

<https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ukraine-russia-kramatorsk-train-station-donetsk-strike/>

⁶⁷⁶ *Kramatorsk station attack: What we know so far*, BBC (Apr. 9, 2022), <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61036740>.

⁶⁷⁷ Jonathan Beale, *Ukraine War: Disbelief and Horror After Kramatorsk Train Station Attack*, BBC NEWS (Apr. 9, 2022) <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61055105>

of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry.⁶⁷⁸ The Institute for the Study of War assessed that the Russian 8th Guards Combined Arms Army, active in the region, was equipped with Tochka-U missiles at the time of the strike.⁶⁷⁹

Legal Analysis: These actions violate both the Rome Statutes and Geneva Conventions, some of which are listed and analyzed below.⁶⁸⁰

Count 1: The War Crime of Willful Killing

Rome Statute **Article 8(2)(a)(i)**⁶⁸¹

Geneva Convention Common **Article 3(1)(a); IV Article 27**⁶⁸²

Elements:

1. The perpetrator killed one or more persons.
2. Such person or persons were protected under one or more of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
3. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that protected status.
4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.
5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Element 1: The perpetrator killed one or more persons.

Russia's attack killed sixty civilians.⁶⁸³

⁶⁷⁸ *Death at the Station Russian Cluster Munition Attack in Kramatorsk: A Human Rights Watch and SITU Research Investigation*, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & SITU, <https://www.hrw.org/video-photos/interactive/2023/02/21/death-at-the-station/russian-cluster-munition-attack-in-kramatorsk>.

⁶⁷⁹ Mason Clark and Kateryna Stepanenko, *Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 8*, INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR (Apr. 8, 2022, 5:00 PM), <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-8>.

⁶⁸⁰ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (July 17, 1998); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (Aug. 12, 1949); 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (Aug. 12, 1949); Geneva Convention, Art. 3(1)(a); Geneva Convention IV, Arts. 27 and 53; Art. 51 of the Additional Protocol I.

⁶⁸¹ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(a), Jul. 18, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.

⁶⁸² Geneva Convention (I) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.

⁶⁸³ Jonathan Beale, *Ukraine War: Disbelief and Horror After Kramatorsk Train Station Attack*, BBC NEWS (Apr. 9, 2022) <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61055105>.

Element 2: Such person or persons were protected under one or more of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

Civilians are protected under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions as they are “[p]ersons taking no active part in hostilities.”⁶⁸⁴

Element 3: The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that protected status.

The rail station was a well known evacuation hub for civilians and had been publicly shared as such by local officials in the days leading up to the attack.⁶⁸⁵

Element 4: The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.

This attack was conducted by Russian military forces as part of the ongoing invasion of Ukraine.⁶⁸⁶

Element 5: The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Russia’s military occupation of Ukraine necessarily brings with it awareness of the existence of an armed conflict.⁶⁸⁷

Count 2: The War Crime of Wilfully Causing Great Suffering

Rome Statute **Articles 8(2)(a)(iii)**⁶⁸⁸

Geneva Conventions Common **Article 3(1)(a); IV Article 27**⁶⁸⁹

Elements:

⁶⁸⁴ Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.

⁶⁸⁵ *Ukraine: New Light on Russia’s Rail Station Attack*, Human Rights Watch. (Feb. 21, 2023) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/02/21/ukraine-new-light-russias-rail-station-attack>.

⁶⁸⁶ *Ukraine: New Light on Russia’s Rail Station Attack*, Human Rights Watch. (Feb. 21, 2023) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/02/21/ukraine-new-light-russias-rail-station-attack>.

⁶⁸⁷ *Ukraine: New Light on Russia’s Rail Station Attack*, Human Rights Watch. (Feb. 21, 2023) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/02/21/ukraine-new-light-russias-rail-station-attack>.

⁶⁸⁸ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(a), Jul. 18, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.

⁶⁸⁹ Geneva Convention (I) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.

1. The perpetrator caused great physical or mental pain or suffering to, or serious injury to body or health of, one or more persons.
2. Such person or persons were protected under one or more of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
3. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that protected status.
4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.
5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Element 1: The perpetrator caused great physical or mental pain or suffering to, or serious injury to body or health of, one or more persons.

In addition to the sixty people killed, 111 civilians were injured.⁶⁹⁰ The injuries sustained by the victims of the attack included traumatically amputated limbs and other body parts as well as shrapnel injuries, major lacerations, severe head trauma, broken bones, burns, and traumatic shock.⁶⁹¹

Element 2: Such person or persons were protected under one or more of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

Civilians are protected under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions as they are “[p]ersons taking no active part in hostilities.”⁶⁹²

Element 3: The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that protected status.

The rail station was a well known evacuation hub for civilians and had been publicly shared as such by local officials in the days leading up to the attack.⁶⁹³

Element 4: The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.

⁶⁹⁰Jonathan Beale, *Ukraine War: Disbelief and Horror After Kramatorsk Train Station Attack*, BBC NEWS (Apr. 9, 2022) <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61055105>

⁶⁹¹ *Ukraine: New Light on Russia's Rail Station Attack*, Human Rights Watch. (Feb. 21, 2023) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/02/21/ukraine-new-light-russias-rail-station-attack>.

⁶⁹² Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.

⁶⁹³ *Ukraine: New Light on Russia's Rail Station Attack*, Human Rights Watch. (Feb. 21, 2023) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/02/21/ukraine-new-light-russias-rail-station-attack>.

This attack was conducted by Russian military forces as part of the ongoing invasion of Ukraine.⁶⁹⁴

Element 5: The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Russia's military occupation of Ukraine necessarily brings with it awareness of the existence of an armed conflict.⁶⁹⁵

Count 3: The War Crime of Intentionally Attacking Civilians

Rome Statute **Article 8(2)(b)(i)**⁶⁹⁶

Geneva Convention Common **Article 3(1)(a)**; **API Article 51**⁶⁹⁷

Elements:

1. The perpetrator directed an attack.
2. The object of the attack was a civilian population as such or individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities.
3. The perpetrator intended the civilian population as such or individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities to be the object of the attack.
4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.
5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Element 1: The perpetrator directed an attack.

Russia launched a cluster munition into a train station where thousands of civilians gathered in preparation for evacuation.⁶⁹⁸

⁶⁹⁴ *Ukraine: New Light on Russia's Rail Station Attack*, Human Rights Watch. (Feb. 21, 2023) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/02/21/ukraine-new-light-russias-rail-station-attack>.

⁶⁹⁵ *Ukraine: New Light on Russia's Rail Station Attack*, Human Rights Watch. (Feb. 21, 2023) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/02/21/ukraine-new-light-russias-rail-station-attack>.

⁶⁹⁶ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(b)(i), Jul. 18, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.

⁶⁹⁷ Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 3(1)(a), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 51, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.

⁶⁹⁸ *Ukraine: New Light on Russia's Rail Station Attack*, Human Rights Watch. (Feb. 21, 2023) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/02/21/ukraine-new-light-russias-rail-station-attack>.

Element 2: The object of the attack was a civilian population as such or individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities.

The train station was being used by civilians to evacuate away from the conflict and the civilians were taking no active part in the hostilities.⁶⁹⁹

Element 3: The perpetrator intended the civilian population as such or individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities to be the object of the attack.

Intent is imputed where it was publicly known that the station was used for mass civilian evacuation.⁷⁰⁰

Element 4: The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.

This attack was conducted by Russian military forces as part of the ongoing invasion of Ukraine.⁷⁰¹

Element 5: The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Russia's military occupation of Ukraine necessarily brings with it awareness of the existence of an armed conflict.⁷⁰²

Count 4: The War Crime of Destruction and Appropriation of Property

Rome Statute **Article 8(2)(a)(iv)**⁷⁰³

Geneva Convention **IV Article 53**⁷⁰⁴

Elements:

1. The perpetrator destroyed or appropriated certain property.

⁶⁹⁹ *Ukraine: New Light on Russia's Rail Station Attack*, Human Rights Watch. (Feb. 21, 2023) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/02/21/ukraine-new-light-russias-rail-station-attack>.

⁷⁰⁰ *Ukraine: New Light on Russia's Rail Station Attack*, Human Rights Watch. (Feb. 21, 2023) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/02/21/ukraine-new-light-russias-rail-station-attack>.

⁷⁰¹ *Ukraine: New Light on Russia's Rail Station Attack*, Human Rights Watch. (Feb. 21, 2023) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/02/21/ukraine-new-light-russias-rail-station-attack>.

⁷⁰² *Ukraine: New Light on Russia's Rail Station Attack*, Human Rights Watch. (Feb. 21, 2023) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/02/21/ukraine-new-light-russias-rail-station-attack>.

⁷⁰³ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 8(2)(a)(iv), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.

⁷⁰⁴ Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 53, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.

2. The destruction or appropriation was not justified by military necessity.
3. The destruction or appropriation was extensive and carried out wantonly.
4. Such property was protected under one or more of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
5. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that protected status.
6. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.
7. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Element 1: The perpetrator destroyed or appropriated certain property.

Russia launched a cluster munition into a train station where thousands of civilians gathered in preparation for evacuation, and destroyed it.⁷⁰⁵

Element 2: The destruction or appropriation was not justified by military necessity.

The train station was being used by civilians to evacuate away from the conflict and the civilians were taking no active part in the hostilities.⁷⁰⁶ President Zelensky stated that no soldiers were at the station.⁷⁰⁷

Element 3: The destruction or appropriation was extensive and carried out wantonly.

The attack was carried out with at least one Tochka-U ballistic missile which carries cluster munition warheads, Russia is known to have a stockpile of these missiles, though it denies the existence of this stockpile.⁷⁰⁸ Furthermore, there is evidence that Russia had the equipment necessary to launch these missiles near Kunie village, an area within 120 kilometers of the train station and therefore within the effective range of the missiles.⁷⁰⁹ Each missile carries 1.45 kilograms of explosive and there was an estimated 15,800 lethal metal fragments released by this attack. The attack killed sixty people and injured 111 civilians.⁷¹⁰

⁷⁰⁵ *Ukraine: New Light on Russia's Rail Station Attack*, Human Rights Watch. (Feb. 21, 2023) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/02/21/ukraine-new-light-russias-rail-station-attack>.

⁷⁰⁶ *Ukraine: New Light on Russia's Rail Station Attack*, Human Rights Watch. (Feb. 21, 2023) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/02/21/ukraine-new-light-russias-rail-station-attack>.

⁷⁰⁷ *Kramatorsk station attack: What we know so far*, BBC, (Apr. 9, 2022), <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61036740>.

⁷⁰⁸ *Ukraine: New Light on Russia's Rail Station Attack*, Human Rights Watch. (Feb. 21, 2023) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/02/21/ukraine-new-light-russias-rail-station-attack>.

⁷⁰⁹ *Ukraine: New Light on Russia's Rail Station Attack*, Human Rights Watch. (Feb. 21, 2023) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/02/21/ukraine-new-light-russias-rail-station-attack>.

⁷¹⁰ Jonathan Beale, *Ukraine War: Disbelief and Horror After Kramatorsk Train Station Attack*, BBC NEWS (Apr. 9, 2022) <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61055105>.

Element 4: Such property was protected under one or more of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

The train station was being used by civilians to evacuate away from the conflict and the civilians were taking no active part in the hostilities.⁷¹¹ Furthermore, Additional Protocol I establishes that “[i]n case of doubt whether an object which is normally dedicated to civilian purposes, such as a place of worship, a house or other dwelling or a school, is being used to make an effective contribution to military action, it shall be presumed not to be so used.”⁷¹²

Element 5: The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that protected status.

The rail station was a well known evacuation hub for civilians and had been publicly shared as such by local officials in the days leading up to the attack.⁷¹³ Awareness is imputed where it was publicly known that the station was used for mass civilian evacuation.⁷¹⁴

Element 6: The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.

This attack was conducted by Russian military forces as part of the ongoing invasion of Ukraine.⁷¹⁵

Element 7: The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Russia’s military occupation of Ukraine necessarily brings with it awareness of the existence of an armed conflict.⁷¹⁶

⁷¹¹ *Ukraine: New Light on Russia’s Rail Station Attack*, Human Rights Watch. (Feb. 21, 2023) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/02/21/ukraine-new-light-russias-rail-station-attack>.

⁷¹² Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 52, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.

⁷¹³ *Ukraine: New Light on Russia’s Rail Station Attack*, Human Rights Watch. (Feb. 21, 2023) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/02/21/ukraine-new-light-russias-rail-station-attack>.

⁷¹⁴ Jonathan Beale, *Ukraine War: Disbelief and Horror After Kramatorsk Train Station Attack*, BBC NEWS (Apr. 9, 2022) <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61055105>.

⁷¹⁵ *Ukraine: New Light on Russia’s Rail Station Attack*, Human Rights Watch. (Feb. 21, 2023) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/02/21/ukraine-new-light-russias-rail-station-attack>.

⁷¹⁶ *Ukraine: New Light on Russia’s Rail Station Attack*, Human Rights Watch. (Feb. 21, 2023) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/02/21/ukraine-new-light-russias-rail-station-attack>.

Incident: The Destruction of Dzarylhach National Park

Assessment: We assess with high confidence that the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Government of Russia, and Russian aligned forces are purposely destroying the Dzarylhach National Nature Park.

Narrative: The Dzarylhach National Nature Park is a large, protected area in Southern Ukraine.⁷¹⁷ It is located on the largest island in Ukraine with a connection to the mainland at low tide.⁷¹⁸ The park has diverse flora and fauna, including many rare or endangered birds, bottlenose and common dolphins, beluga whales, and loggerhead sea turtles.⁷¹⁹ The park's website characterizes it as one of the last places where "unploughed steppe has been preserved."⁷²⁰

Beginning in early March 2022, the park was occupied by Russian forces.⁷²¹ Russian forces initially stated the park would be used for hunting, fishing, and tourism, as well as clay and salt mining.⁷²² Military intelligence suggests that the park has been converted into a training ground and hosts 300 soldiers.⁷²³ Warehouses of vehicles and ammunition are believed to be on site.⁷²⁴ Satellite imagery from the summer of 2023 would indicate a significant military presence as well as the construction of significant earthworks such as trench lines along the spit.⁷²⁵ The construction of earthworks impacts vegetation and root systems that are vital to preventing erosion of the island.⁷²⁶

In August 2023, a significant fire burned approximately 1,500 hectares of land on the island.⁷²⁷ There was low fire danger on the day of the fire's ignition which would suggest an

⁷¹⁷ *Dzharylach National Nature Park*, NATURE RSRV. FUND OF UKRAINE, <https://wownature.in.ua/en/parks-and-reserves/dzharylach-national-nature-park/> (last visited Mar. 28. 2025).

⁷¹⁸ Conflict & Env't Observatory, *Ukraine Conflict Environmental Briefing 7. Nature*, (Jan. 2024), <https://ceobs.org/ukraine-conflict-environmental-briefing-nature/#8>.

⁷¹⁹ Conflict & Env't Observatory, *Ukraine Conflict Environmental Briefing 7. Nature*, (Jan. 2024), <https://ceobs.org/ukraine-conflict-environmental-briefing-nature/#8>.

⁷²⁰ *Dzharylach National Nature Park*, NATURE RSRV. FUND OF UKRAINE, <https://wownature.in.ua/en/parks-and-reserves/dzharylach-national-nature-park/> (last visited Mar. 28. 2025).

⁷²¹ Conflict & Env't Observatory, *Ukraine Conflict Environmental Briefing 7. Nature*, (Jan. 2024), <https://ceobs.org/ukraine-conflict-environmental-briefing-nature/#8>.

⁷²² Olesya Petrovych et. al., *The Future of Protected Areas in Ukraine*, WWF 14 (Mar. 2024) https://wwfeu.awsassets.panda.org/downloads/2_wwf_a4_the_future_of_protected_areas_in_ukraine_eng_version_digital.pdf.

⁷²³ Conflict & Env't Observatory, *Ukraine Conflict Environmental Briefing 7. Nature*, (Jan. 2024), <https://ceobs.org/ukraine-conflict-environmental-briefing-nature/#8>.

⁷²⁴ Conflict & Env't Observatory, *Ukraine Conflict Environmental Briefing 7. Nature*, (Jan. 2024), <https://ceobs.org/ukraine-conflict-environmental-briefing-nature/#8>.

⁷²⁵ Conflict & Env't Observatory, *Ukraine Conflict Environmental Briefing 7. Nature*, (Jan. 2024), <https://ceobs.org/ukraine-conflict-environmental-briefing-nature/#8>.

⁷²⁶ Olesya Petrovych et. al., *The Future of Protected Areas in Ukraine*, WWF 14 (Mar. 2024) https://wwfeu.awsassets.panda.org/downloads/2_wwf_a4_the_future_of_protected_areas_in_ukraine_eng_version_digital.pdf.

⁷²⁷ Conflict & Env't Observatory, *Ukraine Conflict Environmental Briefing 7. Nature*, (Jan. 2024), <https://ceobs.org/ukraine-conflict-environmental-briefing-nature/#8>.

origin from the Russian forces on the island.⁷²⁸ There is significant concern with the use of the island as a military training facility.⁷²⁹ This will lead to environmental contamination from the use of munitions in training.⁷³⁰ The acoustic effects from explosions may also harm animals in the bays surrounding the island, such as dolphins.⁷³¹ Evidence shows that the island is increasingly becoming a battlefield with HIMARS missile strikes being conducted in August 2023.⁷³²

Parties Involved: Because of the facts surrounding this, including the occupation of Southern Ukraine by Russia and statements made by actors aligned with Russia, the destruction of the park implicates Russia and Russian-aligned military forces.

Legal Analysis: These actions violate both the Rome Statutes and Geneva Conventions, some of which are listed and analyzed below.⁷³³

Count 1: The War Crime of Destruction and Appropriation of Property

Rome Statute Article 8(2)(a)(iv)⁷³⁴

Geneva Convention API Art. 52⁷³⁵

Elements:

1. The perpetrator destroyed or appropriated certain property.
2. The destruction or appropriation was not justified by military necessity.
3. The destruction or appropriation was extensive and carried out wantonly.
4. Such property was protected under one or more of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

⁷²⁸ Conflict & Env't Observatory, *Ukraine Conflict Environmental Briefing 7. Nature*, (Jan. 2024), <https://ceobs.org/ukraine-conflict-environmental-briefing-nature/#8>.

⁷²⁹ Olesya Petrovych et. al., *The Future of Protected Areas in Ukraine*, WWF 14 (Mar. 2024) https://wwfeu.awsassets.panda.org/downloads/2_wwf_a4_the_future_of_protected_areas_in_ukraine_eng_version_digital.pdf.

⁷³⁰ Conflict & Env't Observatory, *Ukraine Conflict Environmental Briefing 7. Nature*, (Jan. 2024), <https://ceobs.org/ukraine-conflict-environmental-briefing-nature/#8>.

⁷³¹ Olesya Petrovych et. al., *The Future of Protected Areas in Ukraine*, WWF 14 (Mar. 2024) https://wwfeu.awsassets.panda.org/downloads/2_wwf_a4_the_future_of_protected_areas_in_ukraine_eng_version_digital.pdf.

⁷³² Conflict & Env't Observatory, *Ukraine Conflict Environmental Briefing 7. Nature*, (Jan. 2024), <https://ceobs.org/ukraine-conflict-environmental-briefing-nature/#8>.

⁷³³ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (July 17, 1998); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (Aug. 12, 1949); 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (Aug. 12, 1949).

⁷³⁴ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Jul. 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3.

⁷³⁵ Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 53 Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.

5. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that protected status.
6. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.
7. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Element 1: The perpetrator destroyed or appropriated certain property.

The park was occupied by Russian forces and much of it has been damaged or destroyed.⁷³⁶

Element 2: The destruction or appropriation was not justified by military necessity.

As it is generally accepted that the natural environment is civilian in character, the National Park is civilian in character.⁷³⁷ There is no indication that the park was being used by Ukrainian forces.⁷³⁸ Russian forces present on the island would have quickly discovered no Ukrainian military presence.⁷³⁹

Element 3: The destruction or appropriation was extensive and carried out wantonly.

Fires have burnt 1,500 hectares of land. Significant earthworks are impacting vegetation and root systems.⁷⁴⁰ Satellite imagery shows significant construction of earthworks and significant destruction of the island in a fire believed to have been started by Russian forces.⁷⁴¹

Element 4: Such property was protected under one or more of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

As it is generally accepted that the natural environment is civilian in character; the National Park is civilian in character.⁷⁴² Civilian objects are protected under Additional Protocol I and defined

⁷³⁶ Conflict & Env't Observatory, *Ukraine Conflict Environmental Briefing 7. Nature*, (Jan. 2024), <https://ceobs.org/ukraine-conflict-environmental-briefing-nature/#8>.

⁷³⁷ *Guidelines on the Protection of the Natural Environment in Armed Conflict*, INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS 46, https://www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/document_new/file_list/guidelines_on_the_protection_of_the_natural_environment_in_armed_conflict_advance-copy.pdf (last visited 23 February 2025).

⁷³⁸ Conflict & Env't Observatory, *Ukraine Conflict Environmental Briefing 7. Nature*, (Jan. 2024), <https://ceobs.org/ukraine-conflict-environmental-briefing-nature/#8>.

⁷³⁹ Conflict & Env't Observatory, *Ukraine Conflict Environmental Briefing 7. Nature*, (Jan. 2024), <https://ceobs.org/ukraine-conflict-environmental-briefing-nature/#8>.

⁷⁴⁰ Conflict & Env't Observatory, *Ukraine Conflict Environmental Briefing 7. Nature*, (Jan. 2024), <https://ceobs.org/ukraine-conflict-environmental-briefing-nature/#8>.

⁷⁴¹ Conflict & Env't Observatory, *Ukraine Conflict Environmental Briefing 7. Nature*, (Jan. 2024), <https://ceobs.org/ukraine-conflict-environmental-briefing-nature/#8>.

⁷⁴² *Guidelines on the Protection of the Natural Environment in Armed Conflict*, INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS 46, https://www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/document_new/file_list/guidelines_on_the_protection_of_the_natural_environment_in_armed_conflict_advance-copy.pdf (last visited 23 February 2025).

as “all objects which are not military objectives . . . [i]n case of doubt whether an object which is normally dedicated to civilian purposes, such as a place of worship, a house or other dwelling or a school, is being used to make an effective contribution to military action, it shall be presumed not to be so used.”⁷⁴³

Element 5: The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that protected status.

Russian forces present on the island would have quickly discovered no Ukrainian military presence.⁷⁴⁴ Again, as it is generally accepted that the natural environment is civilian in character, the National Park is civilian in character and Russia would have been aware of that fact.⁷⁴⁵

Element 6: The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.

The occupation of the park was part of Russia’s ongoing armed conflict with Ukraine.⁷⁴⁶

Element 7: The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Russia’s military occupation of Ukraine necessarily brings with it awareness of the existence of an armed conflict.⁷⁴⁷

⁷⁴³ Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 52, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3

⁷⁴⁴ Conflict & Env’t Observatory, *Ukraine Conflict Environmental Briefing 7. Nature*, (Jan. 2024), <https://ceobs.org/ukraine-conflict-environmental-briefing-nature/#8>.

⁷⁴⁵ *Guidelines on the Protection of the Natural Environment in Armed Conflict*, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS 46, https://www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/document_new/file_list/guidelines_on_the_protection_of_the_natural_environment_in_armed_conflict_advance-copy.pdf (last visited 23 February 2025).

⁷⁴⁶ Conflict & Env’t Observatory, *Ukraine Conflict Environmental Briefing 7. Nature*, (Jan. 2024), <https://ceobs.org/ukraine-conflict-environmental-briefing-nature/#8>.

⁷⁴⁷ Conflict & Env’t Observatory, *Ukraine Conflict Environmental Briefing 7. Nature*, (Jan. 2024), <https://ceobs.org/ukraine-conflict-environmental-briefing-nature/#8>.

Incident: The Destruction of Ukrainian Grain Infrastructure

Assessment: We assess with high confidence that Russian military forces are carrying out systematic destruction of Ukraine's grain infrastructure.

Narrative: Since 22 February 2022, Russian forces have deliberately destroyed large amounts of the infrastructure needed by Ukraine to grow, harvest, and export its grain products.⁷⁴⁸ In the first five months of the full-scale invasion of Ukrainian territory, 8.49 million tons of grain storage capacity was affected.⁷⁴⁹ This includes silos, crop elevators, grain bins, among other essential infrastructure.⁷⁵⁰ Even if a building remains usable, damage to the facility can affect the temperature or moisture parameters leading to further grain loss.⁷⁵¹

Russian military action against Ukrainian grain infrastructure has continued throughout the course of the war.⁷⁵² From July 2023 to October 2023, nearly 300,000 metric tons of grain were destroyed in attacks on port facilities and ships.⁷⁵³ Attacks on the grain infrastructure increased in the fall of 2023, with Russia targeting the grain ports on the Danube River, specifically the cities of Reni and Izmail.⁷⁵⁴

Russian military action has not been limited to attacks on storage facilities or shipping, heavy deployment of landmines has also restricted access to agricultural land needed for planting and growing grain products.⁷⁵⁵ Ukraine is now considered one of the most heavily landmine contaminated nations on Earth.⁷⁵⁶ Landmine contamination resulted in \$4.3 billion in losses for

⁷⁴⁸ Khoshnod et. al., *Ukraine's Crop Storage Infrastructure: Post-Invasion Impact Assessment* YALE SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH 5 (2022), <https://files-profile.medicine.yale.edu/documents/399d70ee-aaa3-4f6c-bf51-b675e22c4302>.

⁷⁴⁹ Khoshnod et. al., *Ukraine's Crop Storage Infrastructure: Post-Invasion Impact Assessment* YALE SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH 13 (2022), <https://files-profile.medicine.yale.edu/documents/399d70ee-aaa3-4f6c-bf51-b675e22c4302>.

⁷⁵⁰ *Russian Missiles Destroy Grain Storage Facilities in Odesa Region, Ukraine Says*, Reuters (Apr. 19, 2024), <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-missiles-hit-port-infrastructure-odesa-region-ukraine-says-2024-04-19/>.

⁷⁵¹ Khoshnod et. al., *Ukraine's Crop Storage Infrastructure: Post-Invasion Impact Assessment* YALE SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH 10 (2022), <https://files-profile.medicine.yale.edu/documents/399d70ee-aaa3-4f6c-bf51-b675e22c4302>.

⁷⁵² *Russian Missiles Destroy Grain Storage Facilities in Odesa Region, Ukraine Says*, Reuters (Apr. 19, 2024), <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-missiles-hit-port-infrastructure-odesa-region-ukraine-says-2024-04-19/>.

⁷⁵³ *Russia Destroyed 300,000 Tons of Grain Since July in Port, Ship Attacks, Kyiv Says*, Reuters (Oct. 13, 2023), <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-destroyed-300000-tons-grain-since-july-port-ship-attacks-kyiv-2023-10-13/>.

⁷⁵⁴ Jake Horton et. al., *Satellite Images Reveal Damage to Ukraine Grain Ports*, BBC (Sep. 8, 2023), <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66328810>.

⁷⁵⁵ The Assessment Capacities Project, *Ukraine Humanitarian Implications of Mine Contamination* 1 (Jan. 24, 2024), https://www.acaps.org/fileadmin/Data_Product/Main_media/20240124_ACAPS_thematic_report_Ukraine_Analysis_Hub_Humanitarian_implications_of_mine_contamination_.pdf.

⁷⁵⁶ The Assessment Capacities Project, *Ukraine Humanitarian Implications of Mine Contamination* 1 (Jan. 24, 2024), https://www.acaps.org/fileadmin/Data_Product/Main_media/20240124_ACAPS_thematic_report_Ukraine_Analysis_Hub_Humanitarian_implications_of_mine_contamination_.pdf.

the Ukrainian agriculture sector.⁷⁵⁷ Areas where Ukrainian forces have regained control are the site of most accidents involving landmines, with 21% of all accidents occurring in agricultural fields.⁷⁵⁸ Almost all agricultural fields near the frontline are assessed to be contaminated with landmines.⁷⁵⁹

Parties Involved: Because of the facts surrounding these attacks and military action, namely the continued air and missile strikes against facilities being used by Ukrainian grain farmers and businesses, these attacks implicate Russia and Russian-aligned military forces.

Legal Analysis: These actions violate both the Rome Statutes and Geneva Conventions, some of which are listed and analyzed below.⁷⁶⁰

Count 1: The War Crime of Attacking undefended Places

Rome Statute **8(2)(b)(v)**⁷⁶¹

Geneva Convention **IV Art. 53; API Art. 52**⁷⁶²

Elements:

1. The perpetrator attacked one or more towns, villages, dwellings or buildings.
2. Such towns, villages, dwellings or buildings were open for unresisted occupation.
3. Such towns, villages, dwellings or buildings did not constitute military objectives.
4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.
5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

⁷⁵⁷ The Assessment Capacities Project, *Ukraine Humanitarian Implications of Mine Contamination* 5 (Jan. 24, 2024), https://www.acaps.org/fileadmin/Data_Product/Main_media/20240124_ACAPS_thematic_report_Ukraine_Analysis_Hub_Humanitarian_implications_of_mine_contamination_.pdf.

⁷⁵⁸ The Assessment Capacities Project, *Ukraine Humanitarian Implications of Mine Contamination* 3 (Jan. 24, 2024), https://www.acaps.org/fileadmin/Data_Product/Main_media/20240124_ACAPS_thematic_report_Ukraine_Analysis_Hub_Humanitarian_implications_of_mine_contamination_.pdf.

⁷⁵⁹ The Assessment Capacities Project, *Ukraine Humanitarian Implications of Mine Contamination* 4 (Jan. 24, 2024), https://www.acaps.org/fileadmin/Data_Product/Main_media/20240124_ACAPS_thematic_report_Ukraine_Analysis_Hub_Humanitarian_implications_of_mine_contamination_.pdf.

⁷⁶⁰ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (July 17, 1998); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (Aug. 12, 1949); 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (Aug. 12, 1949).

⁷⁶¹ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8, ¶(2)(b)(v) Jul. 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3.

⁷⁶² Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 53 Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.

Element 1: The perpetrator attacked one or more towns, villages, dwellings or buildings.

Russia's attacks struck many grain ports, elements of grain infrastructure, and farm facilities.⁷⁶³

Element 2: Such towns, villages, dwellings or buildings were open for unresisted occupation.

There is no evidence that there was any resistance or persons taking an active part in hostilities who were resisting occupation by Russian forces at these facilities.⁷⁶⁴

Element 3: Such towns, villages, dwellings or buildings did not constitute military objectives.

There is no indication that Russia had a military objective in the destruction of grain infrastructure.⁷⁶⁵ These facilities were civilian in nature, as there is no evidence that they were being used for military purposes and were therefore not valid military objectives.⁷⁶⁶

Element 4: The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.

These strikes have been conducted by Russian military forces as part of the ongoing invasion of Ukraine.⁷⁶⁷

Element 5: The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Russia's military occupation of Ukraine necessarily brings with it awareness of the existence of an armed conflict.⁷⁶⁸

⁷⁶³ Khoshnod et. al., *Ukraine's Crop Storage Infrastructure: Post-Invasion Impact Assessment* YALE SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH 8 (2022), <https://files-profile.medicine.yale.edu/documents/399d70ee-aaa3-4f6c-bf51-b675e22c4302>.

⁷⁶⁴ Khoshnod et. al., *Ukraine's Crop Storage Infrastructure: Post-Invasion Impact Assessment* YALE SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH 8 (2022), <https://files-profile.medicine.yale.edu/documents/399d70ee-aaa3-4f6c-bf51-b675e22c4302>.

⁷⁶⁵ *Russia Destroyed 300,000 Tons of Grain Since July in Port, Ship Attacks, Kyiv Says*, Reuters (Oct. 13, 2023), <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-destroyed-300000-tons-grain-since-july-port-ship-attacks-kyiv-2023-10-13/>.

⁷⁶⁶ *New Report Reveals Russian Campaign to Cripple Ukraine's Grain Trade and Economy*, GLOBAL RIGHTS COMPLIANCE (May 21, 2025), <https://globalrightscpliance.org/new-report-reveals-russian-campaign-to-cripple-ukraines-grain-trade-and-economy/>.

⁷⁶⁷ Khoshnod et. al., *Ukraine's Crop Storage Infrastructure: Post-Invasion Impact Assessment* YALE SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH 8 (2022), <https://files-profile.medicine.yale.edu/documents/399d70ee-aaa3-4f6c-bf51-b675e22c4302>.

⁷⁶⁸ The Assessment Capacities Project, *Ukraine Humanitarian Implications of Mine Contamination* 5 (Jan. 24, 2024), https://www.acaps.org/fileadmin/Data_Product/Main_media/20240124_ACAPS_thematic_report_Ukraine_Analysis_Hub_Humanitarian_implications_of_mine_contamination_.pdf.

Count 2: The War Crime of Destruction and Appropriation of Property

Rome Statute Article **8(2)(a)(iv)**⁷⁶⁹

Geneva Convention **IV Art. 53**⁷⁷⁰

Elements:

1. The perpetrator destroyed or appropriated certain property.
2. The destruction or appropriation was not justified by military necessity.
3. The destruction or appropriation was extensive and carried out wantonly.
4. Such property was protected under one or more of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
5. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that protected status.
6. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.
7. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Element 1: The perpetrator destroyed or appropriated certain property.

Many facilities related to the growing, storage, and export of grain have been destroyed or damaged by the Russian military in such a way as to render them inoperable.⁷⁷¹

Element 2: The destruction or appropriation was not justified by military necessity.

There is no indication that Russia can justify the targeting and destruction of grain infrastructure through military necessity.⁷⁷² These facilities were civilian in nature, as there is no evidence that

⁷⁶⁹ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8, ¶(2)(a)(iv) Jul. 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3.

⁷⁷⁰ Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 53 Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.

⁷⁷¹ Khoshnod et. al., *Ukraine's Crop Storage Infrastructure: Post-Invasion Impact Assessment* YALE SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH 13 (2022), <https://files-profile.medicine.yale.edu/documents/399d70ee-aaa3-4f6c-bf51-b675e22c4302>; *New Report Reveals Russian Campaign to Cripple Ukraine's Grain Trade and Economy*, GLOBAL RIGHTS COMPLIANCE (May 21, 2025), <https://globalrightscompliance.org/new-report-reveals-russian-campaign-to-cripple-ukraines-grain-trade-and-economy/>.

⁷⁷² *Russia Destroyed 300,000 Tons of Grain Since July in Port, Ship Attacks, Kyiv Says*, Reuters (Oct. 13, 2023), <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-destroyed-300000-tons-grain-since-july-port-ship-attacks-kyiv-2023-10-13/>.

they were being used for military purposes and therefore their targeting cannot be justified by military necessity.⁷⁷³

Element 3: The destruction or appropriation was extensive and carried out wantonly.

In the first five months of Russia's invasion of Ukrainian territory, 8.49 million tons of grain storage capacity were affected.⁷⁷⁴ More than 101,000 square meters of grain storage have been destroyed by Russian forces and 60,000 tons of grain were destroyed in one single attack.⁷⁷⁵

Element 4: Such property was protected under one or more of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

Farms and export facilities for grain to global markets are civilian infrastructure.⁷⁷⁶ Civilian objects are protected under Additional Protocol I and defined as "all objects which are not military objectives . . . [i]n case of doubt whether an object which is normally dedicated to civilian purposes, such as a place of worship, a house or other dwelling or a school, is being used to make an effective contribution to military action, it shall be presumed not to be so used."⁷⁷⁷

Element 5: The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that protected status.

The Russian military was likely aware of the facilities' protected status based on statements made by Russia's government and its sponsored actors.⁷⁷⁸ Furthermore, Additional Protocol I establishes that "[i]n case of doubt whether an object which is normally dedicated to civilian purposes, such as a place of worship, a house or other dwelling or a school, is being used to make an effective contribution to military action, it shall be presumed not to be so used."⁷⁷⁹

⁷⁷³ *New Report Reveals Russian Campaign to Cripple Ukraine's Grain Trade and Economy*, GLOBAL RIGHTS COMPLIANCE (May 21, 2025), <https://globalrightscompliance.org/new-report-reveals-russian-campaign-to-cripple-ukraines-grain-trade-and-economy/>.

⁷⁷⁴ Khoshnod et. al., *Ukraine's Crop Storage Infrastructure: Post-Invasion Impact Assessment* YALE SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH 13 (2022), <https://files-profile.medicine.yale.edu/documents/399d70ee-aaa3-4f6c-bf51-b675e22c4302>.

⁷⁷⁵ *New Report Reveals Russian Campaign to Cripple Ukraine's Grain Trade and Economy*, GLOBAL RIGHTS COMPLIANCE (May 21, 2025), <https://globalrightscompliance.org/new-report-reveals-russian-campaign-to-cripple-ukraines-grain-trade-and-economy/>.

⁷⁷⁶ *New Report Reveals Russian Campaign to Cripple Ukraine's Grain Trade and Economy*, GLOBAL RIGHTS COMPLIANCE (May 21, 2025), <https://globalrightscompliance.org/new-report-reveals-russian-campaign-to-cripple-ukraines-grain-trade-and-economy/>.

⁷⁷⁷ Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 52, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3

⁷⁷⁸ *New Report Reveals Russian Campaign to Cripple Ukraine's Grain Trade and Economy*, GLOBAL RIGHTS COMPLIANCE (May 21, 2025), <https://globalrightscompliance.org/new-report-reveals-russian-campaign-to-cripple-ukraines-grain-trade-and-economy/>.

⁷⁷⁹ Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of

Element 6: The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.

These actions have been committed as part of Russia's ongoing invasion of Ukraine.⁷⁸⁰

Element 7: The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Russia's military occupation of Ukraine necessarily brings with it awareness of the existence of an armed conflict.⁷⁸¹

International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 52, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.

⁷⁸⁰ Khoshnod et. al., *Ukraine's Crop Storage Infrastructure: Post-Invasion Impact Assessment* YALE SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH 8 (2022), <https://files-profile.medicine.yale.edu/documents/399d70ee-aaa3-4f6c-bf51-b675e22c4302>.

⁷⁸¹ The Assessment Capacities Project, *Ukraine Humanitarian Implications of Mine Contamination* 5 (Jan. 24, 2024), https://www.acaps.org/fileadmin/Data_Product/Main_media/20240124_ACAPS_thematic_report_Ukraine_Analysis_Hub_Humanitarian_implications_of_mine_contamination_.pdf.

Incident: The Use of Banned Chemical Weapons Against Ukrainian Forces

Assessment: We assess with high confidence that the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation has used banned chemical weapons, in contravention of its treaty obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention⁷⁸² and

Narrative: On 22 DEC 2023, Battalion Commander Vladislav Vodolazsky of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade claimed Russian forces under his command were dropping K-51 grenades from drones onto fortified Ukrainian positions in the Kherson region for the purpose of “smoking them out.”⁷⁸³ The K-51 is a riot-control hand grenade that is filled with an irritant agent and manufactured in the Russian Federation.⁷⁸⁴ Irritant agents used for riot control work by causing irritation to the area of contact such as the nose or eyes within seconds of exposure.⁷⁸⁵ The effects will last between 15 and 30 minutes and require the afflicted person to be away from the source and cleaned off.⁷⁸⁶

On 2 May 2024, the government of the United States of America accused Russian forces of deploying chloropicrin.⁷⁸⁷ Chloropicrin is an oily substance that causes irritation of the lungs, eyes, and skin.⁷⁸⁸ It was used extensively during the First World War.⁷⁸⁹ As many as 500 Ukrainian soldiers were treated for exposure.⁷⁹⁰ On 8 OCT 2024, the government of the United

⁷⁸² *Russia Spreads Disinformation to Cover Up its Use of Chemical Weapons in Ukraine*, US DEPT. OF STATE (Jun. 10, 2025)

<https://pl.usembassy.gov/russia-spreads-disinformation-to-cover-up-its-use-of-chemical-weapons-in-ukraine/>

⁷⁸³ Angelica Evans, et al., *Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 23, 2023* INST. FOR THE STUD. OF WAR 3,

<https://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%2C%20December%2023%2C%202023%20%28PDF%29.pdf> (last updated Dec. 24, 2023, 2:19 PM).

⁷⁸⁴ Angelica Evans, et al., *Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 23, 2023* INST. FOR THE STUD. OF WAR 3,

<https://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%2C%20December%2023%2C%202023%20%28PDF%29.pdf> (last updated Dec. 24, 2023, 2:19 PM).

[20Campaign%20Assessment%2C%20December%2023%2C%202023%20%28PDF%29.pdf](https://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%2C%20December%2023%2C%202023%20%28PDF%29.pdf).

⁷⁸⁵ Ellie Cook, *Russian Black Sea Fleet Brigade Apparently Using Chemical Weapons*, NEWSWEEK.

<https://www.newsweek.com/russia-black-sea-chemical-weapons-kherson-dnieper-river-ukraine-1855249> ((last updated Dec. 24, 2023, 2:19 PM).

⁷⁸⁶ *Riot Control Agents Chemical Fact Sheet*, CDC (Sept. 6, 2024)

<https://www.cdc.gov/chemical-emergencies/chemical-fact-sheets/riot-control-agents.html>.

⁷⁸⁷ Matt Murphy, *Russia Using Chemical Choking Agents in Ukraine, US Says*, BBC (May 2, 2024)

<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-68941220>.

⁷⁸⁸ Matt Murphy, *Russia Using Chemical Choking Agents in Ukraine, US Says*, BBC (May 2, 2024)

<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-68941220>.

⁷⁸⁹ Matt Murphy, *Russia Using Chemical Choking Agents in Ukraine, US Says*, BBC (May 2, 2024)

<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-68941220>.

⁷⁹⁰ Matt Murphy, *Russia Using Chemical Choking Agents in Ukraine, US Says*, BBC (May 2, 2024)

<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-68941220>.

Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland sanctioned Russian forces for its use of chemical agents on the battlefield.⁷⁹¹

The Russian Federation is a signatory to the Chemical Weapons Convention.⁷⁹² The Chemical Weapons Convention prohibits the use of riot control agents such as chloropicrin or CS gas.⁷⁹³ The Russian Federation is therefore in violation of its treaty obligations under the CWC.⁷⁹⁴

Parties Involved: Based on the party's own admission, these actions implicate the armed forces of the Russian Federation.

Legal Analysis: This action may violate the following Chemical Weapons Convention Article: Article I(5).⁷⁹⁵ The use of banned chemical weapons against Ukrainian forces may violate both the Rome Statutes and Geneva Conventions, some of which are listed and analyzed below.⁷⁹⁶

Count 1: Treaty Violation of Using Riot Control Agents as a Method of Warfare

Chemical Weapons Convention **Article I(5)**⁷⁹⁷

Article:

Each State Party undertakes not to use riot control agents as a method of warfare.

Analysis:

⁷⁹¹ Press Release, *UK Sanctions Russian Troops Deploying Chemical Weapons on the Battlefield*, FOREIGN, COMMONWEALTH, & DEV. OFFICE (Oct. 8, 2024) (on file with author)

<https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-sanctions-russian-troops-deploying-chemical-weapons-on-the-battlefield>.

⁷⁹² Angelica Evans, et al., *Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 23, 2023* INST. FOR THE STUD. OF WAR 3,

<https://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%2C%20December%2023%2C%202023%20%28PDF%29.pdf> (last updated Dec. 24, 2023, 2:19 PM).

⁷⁹³ Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction art. I, 5, Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 U.N.T.S. 317, 32 I.L.M. 800 (entered into force Apr. 29, 1997).

⁷⁹⁴ Angelica Evans, et al., *Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 23, 2023* INST. FOR THE STUD. OF WAR 3,

<https://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%2C%20December%2023%2C%202023%20%28PDF%29.pdf> (last updated Dec. 24, 2023, 2:19 PM).

⁷⁹⁵ Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction art. I, 5, Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 U.N.T.S. 317, 32 I.L.M. 800 (entered into force Apr. 29, 1997).

⁷⁹⁶ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (July 17, 1998); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (Aug. 12, 1949); 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (Aug. 12, 1949).

⁷⁹⁷ Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction art. I, 5, Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 U.N.T.S. 317, 32 I.L.M. 800 (entered into force Apr. 29, 1997).

Riot control agents were used as a method of warfare. By their own volition, the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade extensively deployed riot control agents as a method of warfare.⁷⁹⁸ Battalion Commander Vladislav Vodolazsky admitted on social media to the use of K-51 riot control hand grenades against Ukrainian forces in Kherson Oblast.⁷⁹⁹

Count 2: The War Crime of Employing Prohibited Gases, Liquids, Materials or Devices

Rome Statute Art. 8(2)(b)(xviii)⁸⁰⁰

Elements:

1. The perpetrator employed a gas or other analogous substance or device.
2. The gas, substance or device was such that it causes death or serious damage to health in the ordinary course of events, through its asphyxiating or toxic properties.
3. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.
4. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Element 1: The perpetrator employed a gas or other analogous substance or device.

The 810th Naval Infantry Brigade of the Russian military deployed K-51 riot control hand grenades against Ukrainian forces in Kherson Oblast.⁸⁰¹

Element 2: The gas, substance or device was such that it causes death or serious damage to health in the ordinary course of events, through its asphyxiating or toxic properties.

K-51 riot control hand grenades were dropped from Russian drones upon Ukrainian forces.⁸⁰² The purpose for this was to cause irritation to the nose and eyes in order to drive Ukrainian

⁷⁹⁸ Ellie Cook, *Russian Black Sea Fleet Brigade Apparently Using Chemical Weapons*, NEWSWEEK, <https://www.newsweek.com/russia-black-sea-chemical-weapons-kherson-dnieper-river-ukraine-1855249> (last updated Dec. 24, 2023, 2:19 PM).

⁷⁹⁹ Angelica Evans, et al., *Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 23, 2023* INST. FOR THE STUD. OF WAR 3, <https://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%2C%20December%2023%2C%202023%20%28PDF%29.pdf> (last updated Dec. 24, 2023, 2:19 PM).

⁸⁰⁰ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 8(2)(b)(xvii), 8(2)(b)(xviii), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.

⁸⁰¹ Ellie Cook, *Russian Black Sea Fleet Brigade Apparently Using Chemical Weapons*, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 24, 2023) <https://www.newsweek.com/russia-black-sea-chemical-weapons-kherson-dnieper-river-ukraine-1855249>.

⁸⁰² Ellie Cook, *Russian Black Sea Fleet Brigade Apparently Using Chemical Weapons*, Newsweek, <https://www.newsweek.com/russia-black-sea-chemical-weapons-kherson-dnieper-river-ukraine-1855249> (last updated Dec. 24, 2023, 2:19 PM).

forces from their positions on the battlefield.⁸⁰³ The gas used is known to cause severe irritation to the respiratory tract, eyes, and skin and can cause burns to the mouth and stomach and can also cause vomiting, nausea, diarrhea, and shortness of breath.⁸⁰⁴ Hundreds of Ukrainian soldiers required treatment for chemical exposure and at least one was killed by suffocating on the gas.⁸⁰⁵

Element 3: The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.

The riot gas was released as part of Russia's ongoing armed conflict with Ukraine.⁸⁰⁶

Element 4: The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Russia's military occupation of Ukraine necessarily brings with it awareness of the existence of an armed conflict.⁸⁰⁷

⁸⁰³ Angelica Evans, et al., Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 23, 2023 INST. FOR THE STUD. OF WAR 3,

<https://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%2C%20December%2023%2C%202023%20%28PDF%29.pdf> (last updated Dec. 24, 2023, 2:19 PM).

⁸⁰⁴ Anthony Deautch, *Russian Use of Chemical Weapons Against Ukraine 'Widespread'*, *Dutch Defence Minister Says*, REUTERS (Jul. 4 2025),

<https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-use-chemical-weapons-against-ukraine-widespread-dutch-defence-minister-2025-07-04/>.

⁸⁰⁵ Matt Murphy, *Russia Using Chemical Choking Agents in Ukraine, US Says*, BBC (May 2, 2024), <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-68941220>.

⁸⁰⁶ Ellie Cook, *Russian Black Sea Fleet Brigade Apparently Using Chemical Weapons*, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 24, 2023) <https://www.newsweek.com/russia-black-sea-chemical-weapons-kherson-dnieper-river-ukraine-1855249>.

⁸⁰⁷ Ellie Cook, *Russian Black Sea Fleet Brigade Apparently Using Chemical Weapons*, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 24, 2023) <https://www.newsweek.com/russia-black-sea-chemical-weapons-kherson-dnieper-river-ukraine-1855249>.

Incident: 6 JUN 2023 The Destruction of the Nova Kakhova Dam

Assessment: We assess with high confidence that on 6 July 2023, The Russian Armed Forces breached the Nova Kakhova Dam resulting in the deaths of sixty to more than 500 people, physical destruction of the dam, and long-term consequences for both surrounding communities and the environment.⁸⁰⁸

Narrative: On 6 June 2023, the Nova Kakhovka Dam and hydroelectric plant, located on the Dnipro River in the Kherson Oblast was destroyed.⁸⁰⁹ Evidence has pointed towards an explosion early in the morning that led to its collapse.⁸¹⁰ Norsar, the Norwegian Seismic Array, detected seismic data signals from a regional station in Romania which indicated an explosion at 2:54 AM.⁸¹¹ Residents in the vicinity of the hydroelectric plant reported hearing a major explosion at approximately the same time.⁸¹²

According to experts, an internal explosion was the most likely cause for the dam's destruction.⁸¹³ Ihor Syrota, head of Ukrhydroenergo, the Ukrainian State's hydroelectric company, had identified the structure as being designed to withstand the external force of an atomic bomb.⁸¹⁴ A blast from inside of the structure would have had the most damaging impact.⁸¹⁵ Notably, after more than a year of intense fighting in the region, the Nova Kakhovka Dam had been damaged, however, it is believed that the dam's breakdown was not entirely

⁸⁰⁸ TRUTH HOUNDS, PROJECT EXPEDITE JUST., STUDY OF THE DESTRUCTION OF THE KAKHOVKA DAM AND ITS IMPACTS ON ECOSYSTEMS, AGRARIANS, OTHER CIVILIANS, AND INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE (June 6, 2024), *available at* <https://truth-hounds.org/en/cases/submerged-study-of-the-destruction-of-the-kakhovka-dam-and-its-impacts-on-ecosystems-agrarians-other-civilians-and-international-justice/>.

⁸⁰⁹ Julian Borger & Pjotr Sauer, *Seismic Data Adds to Evidence Ukraine's Kakhovka Dam was Blown Up*, THE GUARDIAN (June 9, 2023), <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jun/06/nova-kakhovka-dam-everything-you-need-to-know-about-ukraines-strategically-important-reservoir>

⁸¹⁰ Julian Borger & Pjotr Sauer, *Seismic Data Adds to Evidence Ukraine's Kakhovka Dam was Blown Up*, THE GUARDIAN (June 9, 2023), <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jun/06/nova-kakhovka-dam-everything-you-need-to-know-about-ukraines-strategically-important-reservoir>.

⁸¹¹ Julian Borger & Pjotr Sauer, *Seismic Data Adds to Evidence Ukraine's Kakhovka Dam was Blown Up*, THE GUARDIAN (June 9, 2023), <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jun/06/nova-kakhovka-dam-everything-you-need-to-know-about-ukraines-strategically-important-reservoir>.

⁸¹² Julian Borger & Pjotr Sauer, *Seismic Data Adds to Evidence Ukraine's Kakhovka Dam was Blown Up*, THE GUARDIAN (June 9, 2023), <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jun/06/nova-kakhovka-dam-everything-you-need-to-know-about-ukraines-strategically-important-reservoir>.

⁸¹³ James Glanz, et al., *Internal Blast Probably Breached Ukraine Dam, Experts Say (Cautiously)*, THE N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2023), <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/06/world/europe/ukraine-kakhovka-dam-russia.html>.

⁸¹⁴ James Glanz, et al., *Internal Blast Probably Breached Ukraine Dam, Experts Say (Cautiously)*, THE N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2023), <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/06/world/europe/ukraine-kakhovka-dam-russia.html>.

⁸¹⁵ James Glanz, et al., *Internal Blast Probably Breached Ukraine Dam, Experts Say (Cautiously)*, THE N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2023), <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/06/world/europe/ukraine-kakhovka-dam-russia.html>.

attributed to the external damage it sustained during the war.⁸¹⁶ Furthermore, at the time of its destruction, Russian forces were in control of the dam.⁸¹⁷

The Nova Kakhovka Dam's destruction has had a devastating impact on the surrounding communities and environment.⁸¹⁸ The dam, which served as the sixth and southernmost structure in the Dnipro River Cascade, a series of dams and hydroelectric plants constructed in the 1950s on the Dnipro River, created the largest reservoir of water in Ukraine in terms of volume prior to its destruction.⁸¹⁹ The reservoir created by the dam had been deemed a critical water source for millions of people in Kherson as well as the Dnipro and Zaporizhzhia regions.⁸²⁰ The water of the reservoir was key in agricultural irrigation for much of southern Kherson and the Crimean peninsula.⁸²¹

Initially, according to the Ukrainian Agricultural Ministry, the dam's collapse left 94% of irrigation systems in the Kherson region without water.⁸²² Further, 74% of irrigation systems in the Zaporizhzhia region and 30% of irrigation systems in the Dnipro region were also left without a source of water.⁸²³ The dam's destruction also led to catastrophic flooding of both agricultural land and civilian infrastructure.⁸²⁴ The flooding affected about 100,000 people in the

⁸¹⁶ James Glanz, et al., *Internal Blast Probably Breached Ukraine Dam, Experts Say (Cautiously)*, THE N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2023), <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/06/world/europe/ukraine-kakhovka-dam-russia.html>.

⁸¹⁷ James Glanz, et al., *Internal Blast Probably Breached Ukraine Dam, Experts Say (Cautiously)*, THE N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2023), <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/06/world/europe/ukraine-kakhovka-dam-russia.html>.

⁸¹⁸ James Glanz, et al., *Internal Blast Probably Breached Ukraine Dam, Experts Say (Cautiously)*, THE N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2023), <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/06/world/europe/ukraine-kakhovka-dam-russia.html>.

⁸¹⁹ Josh Pennington, et al., *Collapse of Ukraine's Nova Kakhovka Dam an 'Ecological Catastrophe'*, CNN (June 7, 2023), <https://www.cnn.com/2023/06/07/europe/ukraine-nova-kakhovka-dam-environment-damage-intl-hnk/index.html#:~:text=Ukrainian%20Environment%20Minister%20Ruslan%20Strilets,million.>

⁸²⁰ Josh Pennington, et al., *Collapse of Ukraine's Nova Kakhovka Dam an 'Ecological Catastrophe'*, CNN (June 7, 2023), <https://www.cnn.com/2023/06/07/europe/ukraine-nova-kakhovka-dam-environment-damage-intl-hnk/index.html#:~:text=Ukrainian%20Environment%20Minister%20Ruslan%20Strilets,million.>

⁸²¹ Josh Pennington, et al., *Collapse of Ukraine's Nova Kakhovka Dam an 'Ecological Catastrophe'*, CNN (June 7, 2023), <https://www.cnn.com/2023/06/07/europe/ukraine-nova-kakhovka-dam-environment-damage-intl-hnk/index.html#:~:text=Ukrainian%20Environment%20Minister%20Ruslan%20Strilets,million..>

⁸²² Josh Pennington, et al., *Collapse of Ukraine's Nova Kakhovka Dam an 'Ecological Catastrophe'*, CNN (June 7, 2023), <https://www.cnn.com/2023/06/07/europe/ukraine-nova-kakhovka-dam-environment-damage-intl-hnk/index.html#:~:text=Ukrainian%20Environment%20Minister%20Ruslan%20Strilets,million.>

⁸²³ Josh Pennington, et al., *Collapse of Ukraine's Nova Kakhovka Dam an 'Ecological Catastrophe'*, CNN (June 7, 2023), <https://www.cnn.com/2023/06/07/europe/ukraine-nova-kakhovka-dam-environment-damage-intl-hnk/index.html#:~:text=Ukrainian%20Environment%20Minister%20Ruslan%20Strilets,million.>

⁸²⁴ *Floods in Ukraine: Destruction of Kakhovka Dam will Impact Thousands*, UN OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS (June 3, 2023), <https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/floods-ukraine-destruction-kakhovka-dam-will-impact-thousands>.

immediate term.⁸²⁵ Over eighty settlements were impacted by the flooding.⁸²⁶ About 4,000 individuals were displaced.⁸²⁷ The flooding has also brought concerns of displaced landmines being spread into areas once deemed safe.⁸²⁸ In addition, thousands of animals died and investigations are ongoing into the cause of hundreds of dolphin deaths in the Black Sea.⁸²⁹ Ruslan Strilets, the Ukrainian Environment Minister, has also claimed that at least 150 metric tons of oil from the dam have been leaked into the Dnipro River.⁸³⁰ According to Yevheniia Zasiadko, Head of Climate Department at Ecoaction, a Kyiv-based environmental non-profit organization, just one liter of oil can contaminate one million liters of water.⁸³¹ The oil is able to spread over the water's surface, preventing oxygen from reaching plants and animals that live in the water.⁸³² The oil will also spread into the Black Sea as it travels with the Dnipro River, affecting the marine ecosystem as the contaminated water spreads.⁸³³ Overall, the destruction of the Khakhova Dam has caused damage estimated to be approximately \$14 billion USD.⁸³⁴

Parties Involved: Russian Armed Forces

Legal Analysis: These actions violate both the Rome Statutes and Geneva Conventions, some of which are listed and analyzed below.⁸³⁵

⁸²⁵ *Kakhovka Dam destruction inflicted US\$14 billion damage and loss on Ukraine*, GOV'T OF UKR. (Oct. 17, 2023), <https://ukraine.un.org/en/249742-kakhovka-dam-destruction-inflicted-us14-billion-damage-and-loss-ukraine-government-ukraine>. See also *See Kakhovka Dam destruction, one year on*, UNITED NATIONS (June 6, 2024), <https://ukraine.un.org/en/270890-kakhovka-dam-destruction-one-year>.

⁸²⁶ TRUTH HOUNDS, PROJECT EXPEDITE JUST., STUDY OF THE DESTRUCTION OF THE KAKHOVKA DAM AND ITS IMPACTS ON ECOSYSTEMS, AGRARIANS, OTHER CIVILIANS, AND INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE (June 6, 2024), available at <https://truth-hounds.org/en/cases/submerged-study-of-the-destruction-of-the-kakhovka-dam-and-its-impacts-on-ecosystems-agrarians-other-civilians-and-international-justice/>.

⁸²⁷ Ma Xinmin, *Statement on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts* (2007). 7 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 563, 563-566, (July 2008). See also TRUTH HOUNDS, PROJECT EXPEDITE JUST., STUDY OF THE DESTRUCTION OF THE KAKHOVKA DAM AND ITS IMPACTS ON ECOSYSTEMS, AGRARIANS, OTHER CIVILIANS, AND INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE (June 6, 2024), available at <https://truth-hounds.org/en/cases/submerged-study-of-the-destruction-of-the-kakhovka-dam-and-its-impacts-on-ecosystems-agrarians-other-civilians-and-international-justice/>.

⁸²⁸ *Membership*, INT'L L. COMM'N <https://legal.un.org/ilc/ilcmembe.shtml> (Jul. 31, 2024).

⁸²⁹ *Membership*, INT'L L. COMM'N <https://legal.un.org/ilc/ilcmembe.shtml> (Jul. 31, 2024); RLD (June 7, 2023), <https://www.cnn.com/2023/06/07/europe/ukraine-nova-kakhovka-dam-environment-damage-intl-hnk/index.html>; Marc Santora, *As dead dolphins wash ashore, Ukraine builds the case for ecocide*, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Aug. 17, 2023), <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/17/world/europe/russia-war-dolphin-deaths-ukraine.html>.

⁸³⁰ *Membership*, INT'L L. COMM'N <https://legal.un.org/ilc/ilcmembe.shtml> (Jul. 31, 2024).

⁸³¹ *Membership*, INT'L L. COMM'N <https://legal.un.org/ilc/ilcmembe.shtml> (Jul. 31, 2024).

⁸³² *Membership*, INT'L L. COMM'N <https://legal.un.org/ilc/ilcmembe.shtml> (Jul. 31, 2024).

⁸³³ *Membership*, INT'L L. COMM'N <https://legal.un.org/ilc/ilcmembe.shtml> (Jul. 31, 2024).

⁸³⁴ *See Kakhovka Dam destruction inflicted US\$14 billion damage and loss on Ukraine*, GOV'T OF UKR. (Oct. 17, 2023), <https://ukraine.un.org/en/249742-kakhovka-dam-destruction-inflicted-us14-billion-damage-and-loss-ukraine-government-ukraine>.

⁸³⁵ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (July 17, 1998); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (Aug. 12, 1949); 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (Aug. 12, 1949); Geneva Convention, Art. 3(1)(a); Geneva Convention IV, Arts. 27 and 53; Art. 51 of the Additional Protocol I.

Count 1: The War Crime of Excessive Incidental Death, Injury, or Damage

Rome Statute Article 8(2)(b)(iv)

API Article 55(1)

Elements

1. The perpetrator launched an attack.
2. The attack was such that it would cause incidental death or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment and that such death, injury or damage would be of such an extent as to be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated.
3. The perpetrator knew that the attack would cause incidental death or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment and that such death, injury or damage would be of such an extent as to be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated.
4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.
5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Element 1: The perpetrator launched an attack

At the time of its destruction, Russian forces were in control of the dam.⁸³⁶ It is believed that the dam's breakdown was not entirely attributed to the external damage it sustained during the war.⁸³⁷ Thus experts believe that an internal explosion was the most likely cause for the dam's destruction.⁸³⁸

Element 2: The attack was such that it would cause incidental death or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment and that such death, injury or damage would be of such an extent as to be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated

⁸³⁶ James Glanz, et al., *Internal Blast Probably Breached Ukraine Dam, Experts Say (Cautiously)*, THE N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2023), <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/06/world/europe/ukraine-kakhovka-dam-russia.html>.

⁸³⁷ James Glanz, et al., *Internal Blast Probably Breached Ukraine Dam, Experts Say (Cautiously)*, THE N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2023), <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/06/world/europe/ukraine-kakhovka-dam-russia.html>.

⁸³⁸ James Glanz, et al., *Internal Blast Probably Breached Ukraine Dam, Experts Say (Cautiously)*, THE N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2023), <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/06/world/europe/ukraine-kakhovka-dam-russia.html>.

Death toll estimates as a direct result of the dams destruction range from sixty to more than 500 civilians.⁸³⁹ The flooding affected about 100,000 people in the immediate term.⁸⁴⁰ Over eighty settlements were impacted by the flooding.⁸⁴¹ About 4,000 individuals were displaced.⁸⁴²

Element 3: The perpetrator knew that the attack would cause incidental death or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment and that such death, injury or damage would be of such an extent as to be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated

Russia knew that attacking the The Nova Kakhova Dam would cause damage to the surrounding towns, civilians, agriculture, and the environment all of which are civilian objects or civilian in character.⁸⁴³ The widespread and long-term impact of the explosion on civilians, infrastructure, agriculture, and the environment is excessive in relation to any short-term military advantage that would have resulted from the attack such as temporarily stalling transfer of Ukrainian military supplies.⁸⁴⁴

Element 4: The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict

This attack was conducted by Russian military forces as part of the ongoing invasion of Ukraine.⁸⁴⁵

⁸³⁹ TRUTH HOUNDS, PROJECT EXPEDITE JUST., STUDY OF THE DESTRUCTION OF THE KAKHOVKA DAM AND ITS IMPACTS ON ECOSYSTEMS, AGRARIANS, OTHER CIVILIANS, AND INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE (June 6, 2024), *available at* <https://truth-hounds.org/en/cases/submerged-study-of-the-destruction-of-the-kakhovka-dam-and-its-impacts-on-ecosystems-agrarians-other-civilians-and-international-justice/>.

⁸⁴⁰ *Kakhovka Dam destruction inflicted US\$14 billion damage and loss on Ukraine*, GOV'T. OF UKR. (Oct. 17, 2023), <https://ukraine.un.org/en/249742-kakhovka-dam-destruction-inflicted-us14-billion-damage-and-loss-ukraine-government-ukraine>. *See also See Kakhovka Dam destruction, one year on*, UNITED NATIONS (June 6, 2024), <https://ukraine.un.org/en/270890-kakhovka-dam-destruction-one-year>.

⁸⁴¹ TRUTH HOUNDS, PROJECT EXPEDITE JUST., STUDY OF THE DESTRUCTION OF THE KAKHOVKA DAM AND ITS IMPACTS ON ECOSYSTEMS, AGRARIANS, OTHER CIVILIANS, AND INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE (June 6, 2024), *available at* <https://truth-hounds.org/en/cases/submerged-study-of-the-destruction-of-the-kakhovka-dam-and-its-impacts-on-ecosystems-agrarians-other-civilians-and-international-justice/>.

⁸⁴² Ma Xinmin, *Statement on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts* (2007). 7 CHINESE J. INT'L. L. 563, 563-566, (July 2008). *See also* TRUTH HOUNDS, PROJECT EXPEDITE JUST., STUDY OF THE DESTRUCTION OF THE KAKHOVKA DAM AND ITS IMPACTS ON ECOSYSTEMS, AGRARIANS, OTHER CIVILIANS, AND INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE (June 6, 2024), *available at*

<https://truth-hounds.org/en/cases/submerged-study-of-the-destruction-of-the-kakhovka-dam-and-its-impacts-on-ecosystems-agrarians-other-civilians-and-international-justice/>.

⁸⁴³ *Floods in Ukraine: Destruction of Kakhovka Dam will Impact Thousands*, UN OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS (June 13, 2023), <https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/floods-ukraine-destruction-kakhovka-dam-will-impact-thousands>.

⁸⁴⁴ Andersen et al., *Russian Mass Destruction of the Natural Environment in Ukraine*, I, UKRAINE ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT, 38, (2023).

⁸⁴⁵ TRUTH HOUNDS, PROJECT EXPEDITE JUST., STUDY OF THE DESTRUCTION OF THE KAKHOVKA DAM AND ITS IMPACTS ON ECOSYSTEMS, AGRARIANS, OTHER CIVILIANS, AND INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE (June 6, 2024), *available at* <https://truth-hounds.org/en/cases/submerged-study-of-the-destruction-of-the-kakhovka-dam-and-its-impacts-on-ecosystems-agrarians-other-civilians-and-international-justice/>.

Element 5: The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict

Russia's military occupation of Ukraine necessarily brings with it awareness of the existence of an armed conflict.⁸⁴⁶

⁸⁴⁶ TRUTH HOUNDS, PROJECT EXPEDITE JUST., STUDY OF THE DESTRUCTION OF THE KAKHOVKA DAM AND ITS IMPACTS ON ECOSYSTEMS, AGRARIANS, OTHER CIVILIANS, AND INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE (June 6, 2024), *available at* <https://truth-hounds.org/en/cases/submerged-study-of-the-destruction-of-the-kakhovka-dam-and-its-impacts-on-ecosystems-agrarians-other-civilians-and-international-justice/>.

Incident: The Detention, Torture, and Killing of Victoria Roshchyna

Assessment: We assess with high confidence that freelance Ukrainian Journalist Victoria Roshchyna was unlawfully detained, tortured, and assassinated by elements of the government of the Russian Federation.

Narrative: On 10 OCT 2024, the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation sent a letter to the family of Victoria Roshchyna, informing them that she died on 19 SEP 2024 in Russian captivity.⁸⁴⁷ Ms. Roshchyna was a freelance journalist who worked with *Radio Free Europe* and *Ukrainska Pravda*.⁸⁴⁸ On 27 JUL 2023, she left Ukraine for Poland in order to enter Russia.⁸⁴⁹ From Russia, Ms. Roshchyna made her way to areas of southern Ukraine and reported on life under Russian occupation.⁸⁵⁰ She contacted her family on 3 AUG 2023 and informed them that she made it through border posts but did not specify where she was.⁸⁵¹

At some point in AUG 2023, Ms. Roshchyna was arrested in Enerhodar, an occupied city in Zaporizhzhia Oblast, Ukraine.⁸⁵² The circumstances of her arrest are unclear.⁸⁵³ For several weeks, she was held in an unknown location in Melitopol, Ukraine.⁸⁵⁴ In DEC 2023, Ms. Roshchyna was transferred to a prison in Taganrog, Russia where numerous Ukrainians were

⁸⁴⁷ Rebecca Rosman, *Award-Winning Ukrainian Journalist Dies in Russian Captivity, Kyiv Says*, NPR (Oct. 11, 2024, 7:05 AM) <https://www.npr.org/2024/10/11/nx-s1-5149881/ukrainian-journalist-dies-russia-captivity>.

⁸⁴⁸ *Ukraine: RSF Concerned About the Disappearance of a Freelance Journalist Heading for the Occupied Territories*, REPS. WITHOUT BORDERS (Oct. 6, 2023) <https://rsf.org/en/ukraine-rsf-concerned-about-disappearance-freelance-journalist-heading-occupied-territories>.

⁸⁴⁹ *Ukraine: RSF Concerned About the Disappearance of a Freelance Journalist Heading for the Occupied Territories*, REPS. WITHOUT BORDERS (Oct. 6, 2023) <https://rsf.org/en/ukraine-rsf-concerned-about-disappearance-freelance-journalist-heading-occupied-territories>.

⁸⁵⁰ *Ukraine: RSF Concerned About the Disappearance of a Freelance Journalist Heading for the Occupied Territories*, REPS. WITHOUT BORDERS (Oct. 6, 2023) <https://rsf.org/en/ukraine-rsf-concerned-about-disappearance-freelance-journalist-heading-occupied-territories>.

⁸⁵¹ *Ukraine: RSF Concerned About the Disappearance of a Freelance Journalist Heading for the Occupied Territories*, REPS. WITHOUT BORDERS (Oct. 6, 2023) <https://rsf.org/en/ukraine-rsf-concerned-about-disappearance-freelance-journalist-heading-occupied-territories>.

⁸⁵² *Declared Dead by Russia: RSF Reveals the Brutal Reality of Victoria Roshchyna's Last Months in Captivity*, REPS. WITHOUT BORDERS (Mar. 3, 2025) <https://rsf.org/en/declared-dead-russia-rsf-reveals-brutal-reality-victoria-roshchyna-s-last-months-captivity>.

⁸⁵³ *Ukraine: MFRR and Partners Mourn Death and Demand Justice for Victoria Roshchyna*, IPI (Oct. 14, 2024) <https://ipi.media/ukraine-mfrr-and-partners-mourn-death-and-demand-justice-for-victoria-roshchyna/>.

⁸⁵⁴ *Declared Dead by Russia: RSF Reveals the Brutal Reality of Victoria Roshchyna's Last Months in Captivity*, REPS. WITHOUT BORDERS (Mar. 3, 2025) <https://rsf.org/en/declared-dead-russia-rsf-reveals-brutal-reality-victoria-roshchyna-s-last-months-captivity>.

being held.⁸⁵⁵ The prison in Taganrog has been the subject of many reports of torture.⁸⁵⁶ Upon admission to the prison, Ms. Roshchyna had scars and gashes visible on her body.⁸⁵⁷

Ms. Roshchyna's health deteriorated throughout 2024.⁸⁵⁸ She stopped eating, despite threats and force-feeding attempts by guards.⁸⁵⁹ Prison officials refused to provide Ms. Roshchyna with medication.⁸⁶⁰ In JUN 2024, she was transferred to a Taganrog hospital due to severe malnourishment.⁸⁶¹ Ms. Roshchyna could not lift her head and reportedly weighed about 30 kilograms.⁸⁶² Several weeks later, she was returned to the prison.⁸⁶³ At the end of August 2024, Ms. Roshchyna was able to make a brief call to family members.⁸⁶⁴ Ms. Roshchyna was last seen alive on 8 SEP 2024.⁸⁶⁵ On 19 SEP 2024, Russian authorities declared Ms. Roshchyna dead.⁸⁶⁶ It is unknown at this time what occurred between 8 and 19 SEP 2024.⁸⁶⁷ Ms. Roshchyna's body has not been returned to her family.⁸⁶⁸

⁸⁵⁵ *Ukraine: MFRR and Partners Mourn Death and Demand Justice for Victoria Roshchyna*, INT'L PRESS INST. (Oct. 14, 2024) <https://ipi.media/ukraine-mfrr-and-partners-mourn-death-and-demand-justice-for-victoria-roshchyna/>.

⁸⁵⁶ *Declared Dead by Russia: RSF Reveals the Brutal Reality of Victoria Roshchyna's Last Months in Captivity*, REPS. WITHOUT BORDERS (Mar. 3, 2025) <https://rsf.org/en/declared-dead-russia-rsf-reveals-brutal-reality-victoria-roshchyna-s-last-months-captivity>.

⁸⁵⁷ *Declared Dead by Russia: RSF Reveals the Brutal Reality of Victoria Roshchyna's Last Months in Captivity*, REPS. WITHOUT BORDERS (Mar. 3, 2025) <https://rsf.org/en/declared-dead-russia-rsf-reveals-brutal-reality-victoria-roshchyna-s-last-months-captivity>.

⁸⁵⁸ *Declared Dead by Russia: RSF Reveals the Brutal Reality of Victoria Roshchyna's Last Months in Captivity*, REPS. WITHOUT BORDERS (Mar. 3, 2025) <https://rsf.org/en/declared-dead-russia-rsf-reveals-brutal-reality-victoria-roshchyna-s-last-months-captivity>.

⁸⁵⁹ *Declared Dead by Russia: RSF Reveals the Brutal Reality of Victoria Roshchyna's Last Months in Captivity*, REPS. WITHOUT BORDERS (Mar. 3, 2025) <https://rsf.org/en/declared-dead-russia-rsf-reveals-brutal-reality-victoria-roshchyna-s-last-months-captivity>.

⁸⁶⁰ *Declared Dead by Russia: RSF Reveals the Brutal Reality of Victoria Roshchyna's Last Months in Captivity*, REPS. WITHOUT BORDERS (Mar. 3, 2025) <https://rsf.org/en/declared-dead-russia-rsf-reveals-brutal-reality-victoria-roshchyna-s-last-months-captivity>.

⁸⁶¹ *Declared Dead by Russia: RSF Reveals the Brutal Reality of Victoria Roshchyna's Last Months in Captivity*, REPS. WITHOUT BORDERS (Mar. 3, 2025) <https://rsf.org/en/declared-dead-russia-rsf-reveals-brutal-reality-victoria-roshchyna-s-last-months-captivity>.

⁸⁶² *Declared Dead by Russia: RSF Reveals the Brutal Reality of Victoria Roshchyna's Last Months in Captivity*, REPS. WITHOUT BORDERS (Mar. 3, 2025) <https://rsf.org/en/declared-dead-russia-rsf-reveals-brutal-reality-victoria-roshchyna-s-last-months-captivity>.

⁸⁶³ *Declared Dead by Russia: RSF Reveals the Brutal Reality of Victoria Roshchyna's Last Months in Captivity*, REPS. WITHOUT BORDERS (Mar. 3, 2025) <https://rsf.org/en/declared-dead-russia-rsf-reveals-brutal-reality-victoria-roshchyna-s-last-months-captivity>.

⁸⁶⁴ *Declared Dead by Russia: RSF Reveals the Brutal Reality of Victoria Roshchyna's Last Months in Captivity*, REPS. WITHOUT BORDERS (Mar. 3, 2025) <https://rsf.org/en/declared-dead-russia-rsf-reveals-brutal-reality-victoria-roshchyna-s-last-months-captivity>.

⁸⁶⁵ *Declared Dead by Russia: RSF Reveals the Brutal Reality of Victoria Roshchyna's Last Months in Captivity*, REPS. WITHOUT BORDERS (Mar. 3, 2025) <https://rsf.org/en/declared-dead-russia-rsf-reveals-brutal-reality-victoria-roshchyna-s-last-months-captivity>.

⁸⁶⁶ Rebecca Rosman, *Award-Winning Ukrainian Journalist Dies in Russian Captivity*, Kyiv Says, NPR (Oct. 11, 2024, 7:05 AM) <https://www.npr.org/2024/10/11/nx-s1-5149881/ukrainian-journalist-dies-russia-captivity>.

⁸⁶⁷ *Declared Dead by Russia: RSF Reveals the Brutal Reality of Victoria Roshchyna's Last Months in Captivity*, REPS. WITHOUT BORDERS (Mar. 3, 2025) <https://rsf.org/en/declared-dead-russia-rsf-reveals-brutal-reality-victoria-roshchyna-s-last-months-captivity>.

⁸⁶⁸ *Ukraine: MFRR and Partners Mourn Death and Demand Justice for Victoria Roshchyna*, INT'L PRESS INST. (Oct. 14, 2024) <https://ipi.media/ukraine-mfrr-and-partners-mourn-death-and-demand-justice-for-victoria-roshchyna/>.

Parties Involved: The facts surrounding the death of Ms. Roshchyna, including her detainment inside the Russian Federation at a Russian prison, implicate Russia and Russian military forces.

Legal Analysis: These actions violate both the Rome Statutes and Geneva Conventions some of which are listed and analyzed below.⁸⁶⁹

Count 1: The War Crime of Willful Killing

Rome Statute **8(2)(a)(i)**⁸⁷⁰

Geneva Convention **Common Article 3(1)(a)**⁸⁷¹

Elements:

1. The perpetrator killed one or more persons.
2. Such person or persons were protected under one or more of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
3. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that protected status.
4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.
5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Element 1: The perpetrator killed one or more persons.

The actions or lack of actions by the Russian prison system killed Victoria Roshchyna.⁸⁷² In restricting medical attention and torturing Ms. Roshchyna, Russian forces had the intent to kill and knew her death would likely occur.⁸⁷³

Element 2: Such person or persons were protected under one or more of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

⁸⁶⁹ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (July 17, 1998); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (Aug. 12, 1949); 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (Aug. 12, 1949).

⁸⁷⁰ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(a)(i), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.

⁸⁷¹ Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 3(1)(a), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31.

⁸⁷² *Ukraine: MFRR and Partners Mourn Death and Demand Justice for Victoria Roshchyna*, INT'L PRESS INST. (Oct. 14, 2024) <https://ipi.media/ukraine-mfrr-and-partners-mourn-death-and-demand-justice-for-victoria-roshchyna/>.

⁸⁷³ *Declared Dead by Russia: RSF Reveals the Brutal Reality of Victoria Roshchyna's Last Months in Captivity*, REPS. WITHOUT BORDERS (Mar. 3, 2025) <https://rsf.org/en/declared-dead-russia-rsf-reveals-brutal-reality-victoria-roshchyna-s-last-months-captivity>.

Ms. Roshchyna was a civilian.⁸⁷⁴ Civilians are protected under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions as they are “[p]ersons taking no active part in hostilities.”⁸⁷⁵

Element 3: The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that protected status.

She was an award-winning journalist who had been previously detained by Russian forces, thus her status as a civilian was known.⁸⁷⁶

Element 4: The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.

She was detained as part of Russia’s ongoing armed conflict with Ukraine.⁸⁷⁷

Element 5: The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Russia’s military occupation of Ukraine necessarily brings with it awareness of the existence of an armed conflict.⁸⁷⁸

Count 2: The War Crime of Wilfully Causing Great Suffering

Rome Statute: **Article 8(2)(a)(iii)**⁸⁷⁹

Geneva Convention: **Common Article 3(1)(a)**⁸⁸⁰

Elements:

⁸⁷⁴ Rebecca Rosman, *Award-Winning Ukrainian Journalist Dies in Russian Captivity, Kyiv Says*, NPR (Oct. 11, 2024, 7:05 AM) <https://www.npr.org/2024/10/11/nx-s1-5149881/ukrainian-journalist-dies-russia-captivity>.

⁸⁷⁵ Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31.

⁸⁷⁶ *Ukraine: RSF Concerned About the Disappearance of a Freelance Journalist Heading for the Occupied Territories*, REPS. WITHOUT BORDERS (Oct. 6, 2023) <https://rsf.org/en/ukraine-rsf-concerned-about-disappearance-freelance-journalist-heading-occupied-territories>.

⁸⁷⁷ *Declared Dead by Russia: RSF Reveals the Brutal Reality of Victoria Roshchyna’s Last Months in Captivity*, REPS. WITHOUT BORDERS (Mar. 3, 2025) <https://rsf.org/en/declared-dead-russia-rsf-reveals-brutal-reality-victoria-roshchyna-s-last-months-captivity>.

⁸⁷⁸ Rebecca Rosman, *Award-Winning Ukrainian Journalist Dies in Russian Captivity, Kyiv Says*, NPR (Oct. 11, 2024, 7:05 AM) <https://www.npr.org/2024/10/11/nx-s1-5149881/ukrainian-journalist-dies-russia-captivity>.

⁸⁷⁹ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 8(2)(a)(iii), 8(2)(c)(i), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.

⁸⁸⁰ Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 3(1)(a), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31.

1. The perpetrator caused great physical or mental pain or suffering to, or serious injury to body or health of, one or more persons.
2. Such person or persons were protected under one or more of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
3. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that protected status.
4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.
5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Element 1: The perpetrator caused great physical or mental pain or suffering to, or serious injury to body or health of, one or more persons.

Victoria Roshchyna was tortured by Russian forces.⁸⁸¹ In restricting medical attention and torturing Ms. Roshchyna, Russian forces caused her great physical and mental pain, suffering, and serious injury to her body and health.⁸⁸²

Element 2: Such person or persons were protected under one or more of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

Ms. Roshchyna was a civilian.⁸⁸³ Civilians are protected under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions as they are “[p]ersons taking no active part in hostilities.”⁸⁸⁴

Element 3: The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that protected status.

She was an award-winning journalist who had been previously detained by Russian forces, thus her status as a civilian was known.⁸⁸⁵

⁸⁸¹ *Declared Dead by Russia: RSF Reveals the Brutal Reality of Victoria Roshchyna's Last Months in Captivity*, REPS. WITHOUT BORDERS (Mar. 3. 2025)

<https://rsf.org/en/declared-dead-russia-rsf-reveals-brutal-reality-victoria-roshchyna-s-last-months-captivity>.

⁸⁸² *Declared Dead by Russia: RSF Reveals the Brutal Reality of Victoria Roshchyna's Last Months in Captivity*, REPS. WITHOUT BORDERS (Mar. 3. 2025)

<https://rsf.org/en/declared-dead-russia-rsf-reveals-brutal-reality-victoria-roshchyna-s-last-months-captivity>.

⁸⁸³ Rebecca Rosman, *Award-Winning Ukrainian Journalist Dies in Russian Captivity*, Kyiv Says, NPR (Oct. 11, 2024, 7:05 AM) <https://www.npr.org/2024/10/11/nx-s1-5149881/ukrainian-journalist-dies-russia-captivity>.

⁸⁸⁴ Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.

⁸⁸⁵ *Ukraine: RSF Concerned About the Disappearance of a Freelance Journalist Heading for the Occupied Territories*, REPS. WITHOUT BORDERS (Oct. 6, 2023)

<https://rsf.org/en/ukraine-rsf-concerned-about-disappearance-freelance-journalist-heading-occupied-territories>.

Element 4: The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.

She was detained as part of Russia's ongoing armed conflict with Ukraine.⁸⁸⁶

Element 5: The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Russia's military occupation of Ukraine necessarily brings with it awareness of the existence of an armed conflict.⁸⁸⁷

⁸⁸⁶ *Declared Dead by Russia: RSF Reveals the Brutal Reality of Victoria Roshchyna's Last Months in Captivity*, REPS. WITHOUT BORDERS (Mar. 3. 2025)

<https://rsf.org/en/declared-dead-russia-rsf-reveals-brutal-reality-victoria-roshchyna-s-last-months-captivity>.

⁸⁸⁷ Rebecca Rosman, *Award-Winning Ukrainian Journalist Dies in Russian Captivity, Kyiv Says*, NPR (Oct. 11, 2024, 7:05 AM) <https://www.npr.org/2024/10/11/nx-s1-5149881/ukrainian-journalist-dies-russia-captivity>.

Incident: 8 JUL 2024 Missile Attack on Okhmatdyt Children's Hospital in Kyiv

Assessment: We assess with high confidence that on 8 July 2024, the Russian Armed forces launched Kinzhal ballistic missiles and cruise missiles that struck Okhmatdyt Children's Hospital in Kyiv, injuring 300 people and killing twenty-seven to forty-two people.⁸⁸⁸

Narrative: On 8 July 2024 at 10:42 AM, a missile struck the intensive care department and a therapy department for chronic intoxications at Okhmatdyt Children's Hospital in Kyiv, Ukraine's largest children's hospital that treats children with cancer and other life-threatening diseases.⁸⁸⁹ At the time of the strike, three open heart surgeries were in progress.⁸⁹⁰ Blast debris from the attack fell into the patients' open chests, causing contamination.⁸⁹¹ Floors of the hospital collapsed, trapping people under the rubble.⁸⁹² Between twenty-seven and forty-two civilians, including four children, were killed and 300 people were injured, including eight children.⁸⁹³ Additionally, the intensive care, surgical wards, and the country's only oncological laboratory were severely damaged while the toxicology and traumatology departments were completely destroyed.⁸⁹⁴

⁸⁸⁸ UNITED NATIONS, *Russian Federation's Attack on Ukrainian Children's Hospital 'Not Only a War Crime' but 'Far Beyond the Limits of Humanity', Medical Director Tells Security Council*, UNITED NATIONS (July 9, 2024), [https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15761.doc.htm#:~:text=In%20Kyiv%2C%20the%20intensive%20care,including%20seven%20children%2C%20were%20injured;Russia's%20July%209%20Attack%20on%20a%20Children's%20Hospital%20in%20Ukraine,HUMAN%20RIGHTS%20WATCH,\(Jul.%2011,%202024\),https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/07/11/russias-july-8-attack-childrens-hospital-ukraine](https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15761.doc.htm#:~:text=In%20Kyiv%2C%20the%20intensive%20care,including%20seven%20children%2C%20were%20injured;Russia's%20July%209%20Attack%20on%20a%20Children's%20Hospital%20in%20Ukraine,HUMAN%20RIGHTS%20WATCH,(Jul.%2011,%202024),https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/07/11/russias-july-8-attack-childrens-hospital-ukraine).

⁸⁸⁹ UNITED NATIONS, *Russian Federation's Attack on Ukrainian Children's Hospital 'Not Only a War Crime' but 'Far Beyond the Limits of Humanity', Medical Director Tells Security Council*, UNITED NATIONS (July 9, 2024), <https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15761.doc.htm#:~:text=In%20Kyiv%2C%20the%20intensive%20care,including%20seven%20children%2C%20were%20injured>.

⁸⁹⁰ Hanna Arhirova & Illa Novikov, *Russia's heaviest bombardment of Kyiv in 4 months kills at least 31 and hits a children's hospital*, AP (July 8, 2024), <https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-kyiv-attack-33aecd50cf252ff6184c0c14f90588b5>.

⁸⁹¹ Hanna Arhirova & Illa Novikov, *Russia's heaviest bombardment of Kyiv in 4 months kills at least 31 and hits a children's hospital*, AP (July 8, 2024), <https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-kyiv-attack-33aecd50cf252ff6184c0c14f90588b5>.

⁸⁹² Joanna Kakissis et al., *Russia strikes a children's hospital in Kyiv and other sites across Ukraine*, NPR (July 8, 2024, 6:04 PM), <https://www.npr.org/2024/07/08/nx-s1-5033075/russia-ukraine-war-missile-strike-childrens-hospital-kyiv>.

⁸⁹³ UNITED NATIONS, *Russian Federation's Attack on Ukrainian Children's Hospital 'Not Only a War Crime' but 'Far Beyond the Limits of Humanity', Medical Director Tells Security Council*, UNITED NATIONS (July 9, 2024), [https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15761.doc.htm#:~:text=In%20Kyiv%2C%20the%20intensive%20care,including%20seven%20children%2C%20were%20injured;Russia's%20July%209%20Attack%20on%20a%20Children's%20Hospital%20in%20Ukraine,HUMAN%20RIGHTS%20WATCH,\(Jul.%2011,%202024\),https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/07/11/russias-july-8-attack-childrens-hospital-ukraine](https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15761.doc.htm#:~:text=In%20Kyiv%2C%20the%20intensive%20care,including%20seven%20children%2C%20were%20injured;Russia's%20July%209%20Attack%20on%20a%20Children's%20Hospital%20in%20Ukraine,HUMAN%20RIGHTS%20WATCH,(Jul.%2011,%202024),https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/07/11/russias-july-8-attack-childrens-hospital-ukraine).

⁸⁹⁴ *Russia's July 9 Attack on a Children's Hospital in Ukraine*, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, (Jul. 11, 2024), <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/07/11/russias-july-8-attack-childrens-hospital-ukraine>.

Okhmatdyt's functioning was immediately affected by the attack as the hospital lost electricity, light, water, and oxygen.⁸⁹⁵ As a result, the hospital could no longer use ventilators or provide urgent care and various departments were suspended.⁸⁹⁶

Russia denied responsibility for the attack.⁸⁹⁷ According to the representative of the Russian Federation, Council President for July, the attack was Western propaganda.⁸⁹⁸ The missile that hit the hospital was not Russia's, but rather a Ukrainian missile that intercepted a Russian missile aimed for a factory.⁸⁹⁹ He further stated that "[i]f this was a Russian strike, there would have been nothing left of the building and all the children would have been killed and not wounded."⁹⁰⁰ On the other hand, Ukraine contends that Russia was responsible for the attack, arguing that footage of flight trajectories and missile fragments retrieved from under the hospital demonstrate that the hospital was a deliberate target.⁹⁰¹

Parties Involved: Because of the fact that this attack on Okhmatdyt Children's Hospital was part of a series of attacks targeting multiple cities across Ukraine with forty different missiles, this attack implicates Russia.⁹⁰²

⁸⁹⁵ UNITED NATIONS, *Russian Federation's Attack on Ukrainian Children's Hospital 'Not Only a War Crime' but 'Far Beyond the Limits of Humanity', Medical Director Tells Security Council*, UNITED NATIONS (July 9, 2024), <https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15761.doc.htm#:~:text=In%20Kyiv%2C%20the%20intensive%20care,including%20seven%20children%2C%20were%20injured.>

⁸⁹⁶ Hanna Arhirova & Illa Novikov, *Russia's heaviest bombardment of Kyiv in 4 months kills at least 31 and hits a children's hospital*, AP (July 8, 2024), <https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-kyiv-attack-33aecd50cf252ff6184c0c14f90588b5>

⁸⁹⁷ UNITED NATIONS, *Russian Federation's Attack on Ukrainian Children's Hospital 'Not Only a War Crime' but 'Far Beyond the Limits of Humanity', Medical Director Tells Security Council*, UNITED NATIONS (July 9, 2024), <https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15761.doc.htm#:~:text=In%20Kyiv%2C%20the%20intensive%20care,including%20seven%20children%2C%20were%20injured.>

⁸⁹⁸ UNITED NATIONS, *Russian Federation's Attack on Ukrainian Children's Hospital 'Not Only a War Crime' but 'Far Beyond the Limits of Humanity', Medical Director Tells Security Council*, UNITED NATIONS (July 9, 2024), <https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15761.doc.htm#:~:text=In%20Kyiv%2C%20the%20intensive%20care,including%20seven%20children%2C%20were%20injured.>

⁸⁹⁹ UNITED NATIONS, *Russian Federation's Attack on Ukrainian Children's Hospital 'Not Only a War Crime' but 'Far Beyond the Limits of Humanity', Medical Director Tells Security Council*, UNITED NATIONS (July 9, 2024), <https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15761.doc.htm#:~:text=In%20Kyiv%2C%20the%20intensive%20care,including%20seven%20children%2C%20were%20injured.>

⁹⁰⁰ UNITED NATIONS, *Russian Federation's Attack on Ukrainian Children's Hospital 'Not Only a War Crime' but 'Far Beyond the Limits of Humanity', Medical Director Tells Security Council*, UNITED NATIONS (July 9, 2024), <https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15761.doc.htm#:~:text=In%20Kyiv%2C%20the%20intensive%20care,including%20seven%20children%2C%20were%20injured.>

⁹⁰¹ UNITED NATIONS, *Russian Federation's Attack on Ukrainian Children's Hospital 'Not Only a War Crime' but 'Far Beyond the Limits of Humanity', Medical Director Tells Security Council*, UNITED NATIONS (July 9, 2024), <https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15761.doc.htm#:~:text=In%20Kyiv%2C%20the%20intensive%20care,including%20seven%20children%2C%20were%20injured.>

⁹⁰² Hanna Arhirova & Illa Novikov, *Russia's heaviest bombardment of Kyiv in 4 months kills at least 31 and hits a children's hospital*, AP (July 8, 2024), <https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-kyiv-attack-33aecd50cf252ff6184c0c14f90588b5>

Legal Analysis: These actions violate both the Rome Statutes and Geneva Conventions, some of which are listed and analyzed below.⁹⁰³

Count 1: The War Crime of Attacking Protected Objects

Rome Statute **Article 8(2)(b)(ix)**⁹⁰⁴

Geneva Convention IV **Article 18**⁹⁰⁵

Elements:

1. The perpetrator directed an attack.
2. The object of the attack was one or more buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals or places where the sick and wounded are collected, which were not military objectives.
3. The perpetrator intended such building or buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals or places where the sick and wounded are collected, which were not military objectives, to be the object of the attack.
4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.
5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Element 1: The perpetrator directed an attack.

Russia launched a missile that struck a hospital filled with civilian patients and hospital workers.⁹⁰⁶

Element 2: The object of the attack was one or more buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals or places where the sick and wounded are collected, which were not military objectives.

⁹⁰³ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (July 17, 1998); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (Aug. 12, 1949); 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (Aug. 12, 1949); Geneva Convention, Art. 3(1)(a); Geneva Convention IV, Arts. 27 and 53; Art. 51 of the Additional Protocol I.

⁹⁰⁴ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(b)(ix), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.

⁹⁰⁵ Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 18 (Aug. 12, 1949), 75 U.N.T.S. 287

⁹⁰⁶ Joanna Kakissis et al., *Russia strikes a children's hospital in Kyiv and other sites across Ukraine*, NPR (July 8, 2024, 6:04 PM), <https://www.npr.org/2024/07/08/nx-s1-5033075/russia-ukraine-war-missile-strike-childrens-hospital-kyiv>

The object attacked was the Okhmatdyt Children's Hospital which was functioning as a children's hospital and had sick and wounded civilians.⁹⁰⁷

Element 3: The perpetrator intended such building or buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals or places where the sick and wounded are collected, which were not military objectives, to be the object of the attack.

Ukraine contends that Russia was responsible for the attack, arguing that footage of flight trajectories and missile fragments retrieved from under the hospital demonstrate that the hospital was a deliberate target.⁹⁰⁸

Element 4: The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.

This attack was conducted by Russian military forces as part of the ongoing invasion of Ukraine.⁹⁰⁹

Element 5: The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Russia's military occupation of Ukraine necessarily brings with it awareness of the existence of an armed conflict.⁹¹⁰

Count 2: The War Crime of Attacking Civilians

Rome Statute **Article 8(2)(b)(i)**⁹¹¹

Geneva Convention API **Article 51(2)**⁹¹²

Elements:

⁹⁰⁷ UNITED NATIONS, *Russian Federation's Attack on Ukrainian Children's Hospital 'Not Only a War Crime' but 'Far Beyond the Limits of Humanity', Medical Director Tells Security Council*, UNITED NATIONS (July 9, 2024), <https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15761.doc.htm#:~:text=In%20Kyiv%2C%20the%20intensive%20care,including%20seven%20children%2C%20were%20injured.>

⁹⁰⁸ UNITED NATIONS, *Russian Federation's Attack on Ukrainian Children's Hospital 'Not Only a War Crime' but 'Far Beyond the Limits of Humanity', Medical Director Tells Security Council*, UNITED NATIONS (July 9, 2024), <https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15761.doc.htm#:~:text=In%20Kyiv%2C%20the%20intensive%20care,including%20seven%20children%2C%20were%20injured.>

⁹⁰⁹ UNITED NATIONS, *Russian Federation's Attack on Ukrainian Children's Hospital 'Not Only a War Crime' but 'Far Beyond the Limits of Humanity', Medical Director Tells Security Council*, UNITED NATIONS (July 9, 2024), <https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15761.doc.htm#:~:text=In%20Kyiv%2C%20the%20intensive%20care,including%20seven%20children%2C%20were%20injured.>

⁹¹⁰ UNITED NATIONS, *Russian Federation's Attack on Ukrainian Children's Hospital 'Not Only a War Crime' but 'Far Beyond the Limits of Humanity', Medical Director Tells Security Council*, UNITED NATIONS (July 9, 2024), <https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15761.doc.htm#:~:text=In%20Kyiv%2C%20the%20intensive%20care,including%20seven%20children%2C%20were%20injured.>

⁹¹¹ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(b)(i), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.

⁹¹² Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 51(2), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.

1. The perpetrator directed an attack.
2. The object of the attack was a civilian population as such or individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities.
3. The perpetrator intended the civilian population as such or individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities to be the object of the attack.
4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.
5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Element 1: The perpetrator directed an attack.

The Russian missile struck a hospital filled with civilian patients and hospital workers.⁹¹³ The twenty-seven people killed and 300 people injured were all civilians.⁹¹⁴

Element 2: The object of the attack was a civilian population as such or individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities.

The object attacked was the Okhmatdyt Children's Hospital which was functioning as a children's hospital and had sick and wounded civilians.⁹¹⁵

Element 3: The perpetrator intended the civilian population as such or individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities to be the object of the attack.

The specific targeting of a children's hospital made civilians not taking part in hostilities the direct object of the attack.⁹¹⁶

Element 4: The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.

⁹¹³ Joanna Kakissis et al., *Russia strikes a children's hospital in Kyiv and other sites across Ukraine*, NPR (July 8, 2024, 6:04 PM),

<https://www.npr.org/2024/07/08/nx-s1-5033075/russia-ukraine-war-missile-strike-childrens-hospital-kyiv>

⁹¹⁴ UNITED NATIONS, *Russian Federation's Attack on Ukrainian Children's Hospital 'Not Only a War Crime' but 'Far Beyond the Limits of Humanity'*, Medical Director Tells Security Council, UNITED NATIONS (July 9, 2024), <https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15761.doc.htm#:~:text=In%20Kyiv%2C%20the%20intensive%20care,including%20seven%20children%2C%20were%20injured.>

⁹¹⁵ UNITED NATIONS, *Russian Federation's Attack on Ukrainian Children's Hospital 'Not Only a War Crime' but 'Far Beyond the Limits of Humanity'*, Medical Director Tells Security Council, UNITED NATIONS (July 9, 2024), <https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15761.doc.htm#:~:text=In%20Kyiv%2C%20the%20intensive%20care,including%20seven%20children%2C%20were%20injured.>

⁹¹⁶ UNITED NATIONS, *Russian Federation's Attack on Ukrainian Children's Hospital 'Not Only a War Crime' but 'Far Beyond the Limits of Humanity'*, Medical Director Tells Security Council, UNITED NATIONS (July 9, 2024), <https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15761.doc.htm#:~:text=In%20Kyiv%2C%20the%20intensive%20care,including%20seven%20children%2C%20were%20injured.>

This attack was conducted by Russian military forces as part of the ongoing invasion of Ukraine.⁹¹⁷

Element 5: The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Russia's military occupation of Ukraine necessarily brings with it awareness of the existence of an armed conflict.⁹¹⁸

Count 3: The War Crime of Excessive Incidental Death, Injury, or Damage

Rome Statute Article 8(2)(b)(iv)

Elements

1. The perpetrator launched an attack.
2. The attack was such that it would cause incidental death or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment and that such death, injury or damage would be of such an extent as to be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated.
3. The perpetrator knew that the attack would cause incidental death or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment and that such death, injury or damage would be of such an extent as to be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated.
4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.
5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Element 1: The perpetrator launched an attack.

Russia launched a missile striking Okhmatdyt Children's Hospital.⁹¹⁹

⁹¹⁷ UNITED NATIONS, *Russian Federation's Attack on Ukrainian Children's Hospital 'Not Only a War Crime' but 'Far Beyond the Limits of Humanity', Medical Director Tells Security Council*, UNITED NATIONS (July 9, 2024), <https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15761.doc.htm#:~:text=In%20Kyiv%2C%20the%20intensive%20care,including%20seven%20children%2C%20were%20injured.>

⁹¹⁸ UNITED NATIONS, *Russian Federation's Attack on Ukrainian Children's Hospital 'Not Only a War Crime' but 'Far Beyond the Limits of Humanity', Medical Director Tells Security Council*, UNITED NATIONS (July 9, 2024), <https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15761.doc.htm#:~:text=In%20Kyiv%2C%20the%20intensive%20care,including%20seven%20children%2C%20were%20injured.>

⁹¹⁹ Joanna Kakissis et al., *Russia strikes a children's hospital in Kyiv and other sites across Ukraine*, NPR (July 8, 2024, 6:04 PM), <https://www.npr.org/2024/07/08/nx-s1-5033075/russia-ukraine-war-missile-strike-childrens-hospital-kyiv>

Element 2: The attack was such that it would cause incidental death or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment and that such death, injury or damage would be of such an extent as to be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated.

The attack caused incidental death or injuries to civilians because the missile targeted a hospital that only contained civilians.⁹²⁰ The attack damaged a hospital which is a civilian object.⁹²¹ All death, injury, and damage were clearly excessive because there was no military advantage in targeting the children's hospital.

Element 3: The perpetrator knew that the attack would cause incidental death or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment and that such death, injury or damage would be of such an extent as to be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated.

Russia knew that the attack would cause incidental death or injury to civilians because it launched a missile targeting a hospital with only civilians inside.⁹²² The Russian Armed Forces knew that the attack would cause damage to civilian objects because it deliberately launched a missile towards a hospital.⁹²³

Element 4: The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.

This attack was conducted by Russian military forces as part of the ongoing invasion of Ukraine.⁹²⁴

Element 5: The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

⁹²⁰ UNITED NATIONS, *Russian Federation's Attack on Ukrainian Children's Hospital 'Not Only a War Crime' but 'Far Beyond the Limits of Humanity', Medical Director Tells Security Council*, UNITED NATIONS (July 9, 2024), <https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15761.doc.htm#:~:text=In%20Kyiv%2C%20the%20intensive%20care,including%20seven%20children%2C%20were%20injured.>

⁹²¹ HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, *Russia's July 9 Attack on a Children's Hospital in Ukraine*, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, (July 1, 2024, 6:14 AM), <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/07/11/russias-july-8-attack-childrens-hospital-ukraine>

⁹²² UNITED NATIONS, *Russian Federation's Attack on Ukrainian Children's Hospital 'Not Only a War Crime' but 'Far Beyond the Limits of Humanity', Medical Director Tells Security Council*, UNITED NATIONS (July 9, 2024), <https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15761.doc.htm#:~:text=In%20Kyiv%2C%20the%20intensive%20care,including%20seven%20children%2C%20were%20injured.>

⁹²³ UNITED NATIONS, *Russian Federation's Attack on Ukrainian Children's Hospital 'Not Only a War Crime' but 'Far Beyond the Limits of Humanity', Medical Director Tells Security Council*, UNITED NATIONS (July 9, 2024), <https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15761.doc.htm#:~:text=In%20Kyiv%2C%20the%20intensive%20care,including%20seven%20children%2C%20were%20injured.>

⁹²⁴ UNITED NATIONS, *Russian Federation's Attack on Ukrainian Children's Hospital 'Not Only a War Crime' but 'Far Beyond the Limits of Humanity', Medical Director Tells Security Council*, UNITED NATIONS (July 9, 2024), <https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15761.doc.htm#:~:text=In%20Kyiv%2C%20the%20intensive%20care,including%20seven%20children%2C%20were%20injured.>

Russia's military occupation of Ukraine necessarily brings with it awareness of the existence of an armed conflict.⁹²⁵

⁹²⁵ UNITED NATIONS, *Russian Federation's Attack on Ukrainian Children's Hospital 'Not Only a War Crime' but 'Far Beyond the Limits of Humanity', Medical Director Tells Security Council*, UNITED NATIONS (July 9, 2024), <https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15761.doc.htm#:~:text=In%20Kyiv%2C%20the%20intensive%20care,includin%20seven%20children%2C%20were%20injured.>

Incident: 1 FEB 2025 Poltava Apartment Strike

Assessment: We assess with high confidence that on 1 FEB 2025 the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation carried out a missile strike on a civilian apartment building, killing at least 15 civilians and damaging a nearby kindergarten.

Narrative: On 1 FEB 2025, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation carried out widespread missile and drone strikes across Ukraine.⁹²⁶ According to the Ukrainian Air Force, 123 drones and over 40 missiles were used in the strike, with some being intercepted.⁹²⁷ In the city of Poltava, 75 miles from the Russian border, a Kh-22 cruise missile detonated in midair at the corner of an apartment building at 7:44 am.⁹²⁸ This resulted in the destruction of the first five floors of the building.⁹²⁹ A nearby kindergarten was damaged in the strike as well.⁹³⁰ At least 15 civilians were killed and 20 injured.⁹³¹ This was a civilian apartment building in a residential neighborhood.⁹³² The only military target within the area was an air force base, but the nearest part of that base to the apartment building was an entrance gate, 700 meters away.⁹³³

The cruise missile used is designed primarily to target aircraft carriers and other naval vessels.⁹³⁴ It carries a 1,000 kg (2,200 lb) shaped charge warhead.⁹³⁵ It is quite accurate, with a circular error probability of 80 to 250 meters.⁹³⁶ The entrance to the air base was 700 meters away, well outside the circular error probability range.⁹³⁷ The missile strike was part of an escalating series of

⁹²⁶ Olena Harmash & Vitalii Hnydyi, *Russian Air Attack Kills 15 in Ukraine, Gas Infrastructure Targeted*, REUTERS (Feb. 1, 2025), <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-air-attack-kills-three-ukraine-kyiv-says-2025-02-01/>.

⁹²⁷ *Twelve Killed in Russian Missile, Drone Attack on Ukraine*, ALJAZEERA (Feb. 1, 2025), <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/2/1/twelve-killed-in-russian-missile-drone-attack-on-ukraine>.

⁹²⁸ *Ukraine: Escalating Russian Attacks on Civilians*, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May 22, 2025), <https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/05/22/ukraine-escalating-russian-attacks-civilians>.

⁹²⁹ RFE/RL's Ukraine Service, *Death Toll in Poltava Strike Rises to 14 as More Bodies Pulled From Rubble*, RFE/RL (Feb. 2, 2025), <https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-missile-strike-poltava-death-toll-14-children/33300261.html>.

⁹³⁰ RFE/RL's Ukraine Service, *Death Toll in Poltava Strike Rises to 14 as More Bodies Pulled From Rubble*, RFE/RL (Feb. 2, 2025), <https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-missile-strike-poltava-death-toll-14-children/33300261.html>.

⁹³¹ *Ukraine: Escalating Russian Attacks on Civilians*, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May 22, 2025), <https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/05/22/ukraine-escalating-russian-attacks-civilians>.

⁹³² Olena Harmash & Vitalii Hnydyi, *Russian Air Attack Kills 15 in Ukraine, Gas Infrastructure Targeted*, REUTERS (Feb. 1, 2025), <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-air-attack-kills-three-ukraine-kyiv-says-2025-02-01/>.

⁹³³ *Ukraine: Escalating Russian Attacks on Civilians*, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May 22, 2025), <https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/05/22/ukraine-escalating-russian-attacks-civilians>.

⁹³⁴ AirPra, *Let's Explore the Details of the Massive Kh-22 Missile*, AIRPRA (Nov. 13, 2023), <https://airpra.com/lets-explore-the-details-of-the-massive-kh-22-missile/>.

⁹³⁵ AirPra, *Let's Explore the Details of the Massive Kh-22 Missile*, AIRPRA (Nov. 13, 2023), <https://airpra.com/lets-explore-the-details-of-the-massive-kh-22-missile/>.

⁹³⁶ AirPra, *Let's Explore the Details of the Massive Kh-22 Missile*, AIRPRA (Nov. 13, 2023), <https://airpra.com/lets-explore-the-details-of-the-massive-kh-22-missile/>.

⁹³⁷ *Ukraine: Escalating Russian Attacks on Civilians*, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May 22, 2025), <https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/05/22/ukraine-escalating-russian-attacks-civilians>.

attacks on Ukrainian civilians by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and their failure, whether reckless or deliberate, to distinguish between civilian and military objectives.⁹³⁸

Parties Involved: The facts surrounding this missile strike, including that the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are the only operators of the Kh-22, implicate Russia.

Legal Analysis: These actions violate both Rome Statutes and Geneva Conventions, some of which are listed below.

Count 1: The War Crime of Willful Killing

Rome Statute **Articles 8(2)(a)(i)**⁹³⁹

Geneva Convention **Common Article 3(1)(a); IV Article 27**⁹⁴⁰

Elements:

1. The perpetrator killed one or more persons.
2. Such person or persons were protected under one or more of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
3. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that protected status.
4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.
5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Element 1: The perpetrator killed one or more persons.

By launching the missile, Russia killed at least 15 civilians.⁹⁴¹

Element 2: Such person or persons were protected under one or more of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

The victims of the attack were civilians.⁹⁴² Civilians are protected under Common Article 3 of

⁹³⁸ *Ukraine: Escalating Russian Attacks on Civilians*, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May 22, 2025), <https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/05/22/ukraine-escalating-russian-attacks-civilians>.

⁹³⁹ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 8(2)(a)(i), 8(2)(c)(i), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.

⁹⁴⁰ Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 3(1)(a), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 27, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.

⁹⁴¹ Olena Harmash & Vitalii Hnydyi, *Russian Air Attack Kills 15 in Ukraine, Gas Infrastructure Targeted*, REUTERS (Feb. 1, 2025), <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-air-attack-kills-three-ukraine-kyiv-says-2025-02-01/>.

⁹⁴² *Ukraine: Escalating Russian Attacks on Civilians*, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May 22, 2025), <https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/05/22/ukraine-escalating-russian-attacks-civilians>

the Geneva Conventions as “[p]ersons taking no active part in hostilities.”⁹⁴³

Element 3: The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that protected status.

The strike took place in a residential neighborhood.⁹⁴⁴ The closest military target was well outside the circular error probability of the munition deployed.⁹⁴⁵

Element 4: The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.

The attack was committed as part of a widespread drone and missile attack against multiple cities which was a part of the larger armed conflict that began with Russia invading Ukraine.⁹⁴⁶

Element 5: The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Russia’s military occupation of Ukraine necessarily brings with it awareness of the existence of an armed conflict.⁹⁴⁷

Count 2: The War Crime of Willfully Causing Great Suffering

Rome Statute **Articles 8(2)(a)(iii)**⁹⁴⁸

Geneva Conventions **Common Article 3(1)(a); IV Article 27**⁹⁴⁹

Elements:

1. The perpetrator caused great physical or mental pain or suffering to, or serious injury to body or health of, one or more persons.
2. Such person or persons were protected under one or more of the Geneva Conventions of

⁹⁴³ Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.

⁹⁴⁴ *Ukraine: Escalating Russian Attacks on Civilians*, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May 22, 2025), <https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/05/22/ukraine-escalating-russian-attacks-civilians>.

⁹⁴⁵ AirPra, *Let’s Explore the Details of the Massive Kh-22 Missile*, AIRPRA (Nov. 13, 2023), <https://airpra.com/lets-explore-the-details-of-the-massive-kh-22-missile/>.

⁹⁴⁶ Olena Harmash & Vitalii Hnydyi, *Russian Air Attack Kills 15 in Ukraine, Gas Infrastructure Targeted*, REUTERS (Feb. 1, 2025), <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-air-attack-kills-three-ukraine-kyiv-says-2025-02-01/>.

⁹⁴⁷ *Ukraine: Escalating Russian Attacks on Civilians*, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May 22, 2025), <https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/05/22/ukraine-escalating-russian-attacks-civilians>.

⁹⁴⁸ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 8(2)(a)(iii), 8(2)(c)(i), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.

⁹⁴⁹ Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 3(1)(a), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 27, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.

1949.

3. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that protected status.
4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.
5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Element 1: The perpetrator caused great physical or mental pain or suffering to, or serious injury to body or health of, one or more persons.

Russia's attack killed at least 15 people and at least 20 were injured.⁹⁵⁰ Much of the building was destroyed in the strike.⁹⁵¹ The strike occurred around 7:44 am. when most people would have yet to leave for the day, meaning that there was a very high likelihood many people would be inside the building when it was struck.⁹⁵²

Element 2: Such person or persons were protected under one or more of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

The victims of the attack were civilians.⁹⁵³ Civilians are protected under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions as “[p]ersons taking no active part in hostilities.”⁹⁵⁴

Element 3: The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that protected status.

The strike occurred in a residential neighborhood where a kindergarten was located as well.⁹⁵⁵ The nearest military target was outside the circular error probability range of the munition used.⁹⁵⁶

Element 4: The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international

⁹⁵⁰ Olena Harmash & Vitalii Hnydyi, *Russian Air Attack Kills 15 in Ukraine, Gas Infrastructure Targeted*, REUTERS (Feb. 1, 2025), <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-air-attack-kills-three-ukraine-kyiv-says-2025-02-01/>.

⁹⁵¹ *Twelve Killed in Russian Missile, Drone Attack on Ukraine*, ALJAZEERA (Feb. 1, 2025), <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/2/1/twelve-killed-in-russian-missile-drone-attack-on-ukraine>.

⁹⁵² *Ukraine: Escalating Russian Attacks on Civilians*, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May 22, 2025), <https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/05/22/ukraine-escalating-russian-attacks-civilians>.

⁹⁵³ RFE/RL's Ukraine Service, *Death Toll in Poltava Strike Rises to 14 as More Bodies Pulled From Rubble*, RFE/RL (Feb. 2, 2025), <https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-missile-strike-poltava-death-toll-14-children/33300261.html>.

⁹⁵⁴ Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.

⁹⁵⁵ *Twelve Killed in Russian Missile, Drone Attack on Ukraine*, ALJAZEERA (Feb. 1, 2025), <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/2/1/twelve-killed-in-russian-missile-drone-attack-on-ukraine>.

⁹⁵⁶ *Ukraine: Escalating Russian Attacks on Civilians*, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May 22, 2025), <https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/05/22/ukraine-escalating-russian-attacks-civilians>.

armed conflict.

The attack was committed as part of a wider missile and drone attack across the whole of Ukraine.⁹⁵⁷

Element 5: The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Russia's military occupation of Ukraine necessarily brings with it awareness of the existence of an armed conflict.⁹⁵⁸

Count 3: The War Crime of Attacking Undefended Places

Rome Statute **Article 8(2)(b)(v)**⁹⁵⁹

Geneva Convention **IV Article 53**; **API Article 52**⁹⁶⁰

Elements:

1. The perpetrator attacked one or more towns, villages, dwellings or buildings.
2. Such towns, villages, dwellings or buildings were open for unresisted occupation.
3. Such towns, villages, dwellings or buildings did not constitute military objectives.
4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.
5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Element 1: The perpetrator attacked one or more towns, villages, dwellings or buildings.

Russia attacked a residential neighborhood in the city of Poltava, Ukraine.⁹⁶¹

Element 2: Such towns, villages, dwellings or buildings were open for unresisted occupation.

There is no evidence that there was any resistance or persons taking an active part in hostilities

⁹⁵⁷ Olena Harmash & Vitalii Hnydyi, *Russian Air Attack Kills 15 in Ukraine, Gas Infrastructure Targeted*, REUTERS (Feb. 1, 2025), <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-air-attack-kills-three-ukraine-kyiv-says-2025-02-01/>.

⁹⁵⁸ *Ukraine: Escalating Russian Attacks on Civilians*, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May 22, 2025), <https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/05/22/ukraine-escalating-russian-attacks-civilians>.

⁹⁵⁹ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(b)(v), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.

⁹⁶⁰ Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 53, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 52, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.

⁹⁶¹ *Ukraine: Escalating Russian Attacks on Civilians*, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May 22, 2025), <https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/05/22/ukraine-escalating-russian-attacks-civilians>.

who were resisting occupation by Russian forces using the apartment building.⁹⁶²

Element 3: Such towns, villages, dwellings or buildings did not constitute military objectives.

There is no indication that the targeted apartment building was a military objective.⁹⁶³ The apartment building was in a residential neighborhood.⁹⁶⁴ A nearby kindergarten was damaged as well in the strike.⁹⁶⁵

Element 4: The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.

The airstrike was conducted by Russian military forces during a widespread drone and missile strike against the whole of Ukraine.⁹⁶⁶

Element 5: The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Performing an airstrike during Russia's ongoing campaign necessarily brings with it awareness of the existence of an armed conflict.⁹⁶⁷

Count 4: The War Crime of Attacking Protected Objects

Rome Statute **Article 8(2)(b)(ix)**⁹⁶⁸

Geneva Convention **IV Article 18; API Article 53**⁹⁶⁹

Elements:

1. The perpetrator directed an attack.
2. The object of the attack was one or more buildings dedicated to religion, education, art,

⁹⁶² *Ukraine: Escalating Russian Attacks on Civilians*, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May 22, 2025), <https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/05/22/ukraine-escalating-russian-attacks-civilians>.

⁹⁶³ *Ukraine: Escalating Russian Attacks on Civilians*, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May 22, 2025), <https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/05/22/ukraine-escalating-russian-attacks-civilians>.

⁹⁶⁴ Olena Harmash & Vitalii Hnydyi, *Russian Air Attack Kills 15 in Ukraine, Gas Infrastructure Targeted*, REUTERS (Feb. 1, 2025), <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-air-attack-kills-three-ukraine-kyiv-says-2025-02-01/>.

⁹⁶⁵ *Twelve Killed in Russian Missile, Drone Attack on Ukraine*, ALJAZEERA (Feb. 1, 2025), <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/2/1/twelve-killed-in-russian-missile-drone-attack-on-ukraine>.

⁹⁶⁶ RFE/RL's Ukraine Service, *Death Toll in Poltava Strike Rises to 14 as More Bodies Pulled From Rubble*, RFE/RL (Feb. 2, 2025), <https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-missile-strike-poltava-death-toll-14-children/33300261.html>.

⁹⁶⁷ Olena Harmash & Vitalii Hnydyi, *Russian Air Attack Kills 15 in Ukraine, Gas Infrastructure Targeted*, REUTERS (Feb. 1, 2025), <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-air-attack-kills-three-ukraine-kyiv-says-2025-02-01/>.

⁹⁶⁸ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(e)(iv), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.

⁹⁶⁹ Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 18, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 53, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.

science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals or places where the sick and wounded are collected, which were not military objectives.

3. The perpetrator intended such building or buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals or places where the sick and wounded are collected, which were not military objectives, to be the object of the attack.
4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.
5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Element 1: The perpetrator directed an attack.

Russia conducted a precision missile strike on an apartment building in the city of Poltava, Ukraine.⁹⁷⁰

Element 2: The object of the attack was one or more buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals or places where the sick and wounded are collected, which were not military objectives.

A kindergarten was damaged in the attack.⁹⁷¹ This is a building dedicated to education and is not a military objective.

Element 3: The perpetrator intended such building or buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals or places where the sick and wounded are collected, which were not military objectives, to be the object of the attack.

Russia conducted a direct and precise bombing of the apartment building; doing so indicates that the apartment building and the nearby neighborhood was the intended target.⁹⁷²

Element 4: The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.

The attack was committed as part of a widespread missile and drone attack against Ukraine.⁹⁷³

⁹⁷⁰ *Ukraine: Escalating Russian Attacks on Civilians*, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May 22, 2025), <https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/05/22/ukraine-escalating-russian-attacks-civilians>.

⁹⁷¹ *Twelve Killed in Russian Missile, Drone Attack on Ukraine*, ALJAZEERA (Feb. 1, 2025), <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/2/1/twelve-killed-in-russian-missile-drone-attack-on-ukraine>.

⁹⁷² *Ukraine: Escalating Russian Attacks on Civilians*, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May 22, 2025), <https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/05/22/ukraine-escalating-russian-attacks-civilians>.

⁹⁷³ Olena Harmash & Vitalii Hnydyi, *Russian Air Attack Kills 15 in Ukraine, Gas Infrastructure Targeted*, REUTERS (Feb. 1, 2025), <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-air-attack-kills-three-ukraine-kyiv-says-2025-02-01/>.

Element 5: The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Russia's military occupation of Ukraine necessarily brings with it awareness of the existence of an armed conflict.⁹⁷⁴

⁹⁷⁴ Olena Harmash & Vitalii Hnydyi, *Russian Air Attack Kills 15 in Ukraine, Gas Infrastructure Targeted*, REUTERS (Feb. 1, 2025), <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-air-attack-kills-three-ukraine-kyiv-says-2025-02-01/>.

Incident: 2 APR 2025 The Destruction of a Dam in the Village of Popovka of the Belgorod Region

Assessment: We assess with medium confidence that on 2 April 2025, the Russian Armed Forces breached a dam in the Village of Popovka, Belgorod Region, resulting in severe and long-term damage to the surrounding environment and neighboring communities.

Narrative: The dam, located on the Udava River in Popovka, a territory close to the border, is primarily used to create a reservoir that supplies water to the nearby communities.⁹⁷⁵ Ukrainian forces have recently taken positions near the dam and have also been using the dam to continue marching troops into the Sumy and Belgorod regions of Russia.⁹⁷⁶

On 2 April 2025, the dam was attacked with a FAB-3000 bomb, a three-ton bomb, creating a powerful explosion and contributing to the destruction of the dam.⁹⁷⁷ Water stored in the reservoir has since spilled over, flooding the area and surrounding farmlands.⁹⁷⁸

The destruction of the dam will have a long-term impact on the surrounding community and the environment, as the neighboring areas struggle to cope with the flooding and damage done to agricultural lands.⁹⁷⁹ This damage will persist for a long time.⁹⁸⁰

Parties Involved: Russian Armed Forces

Legal Analysis: These actions violate both the Rome Statutes and Geneva Conventions some of which are listed and analyzed below.⁹⁸¹

Count 1: The War Crime of Excessive Incidental Death, Injury, or Damage

⁹⁷⁵ Alice Scarsi, *Desperate Putin Gets Russian Thugs to Bomb their OWN Dam Causing Massive Explosion*. Express News (Apr. 2, 2025) <https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/2035745/vladimir-putin-russia-military-bombing-dam>

⁹⁷⁶ David Axe, *A Russian Jet Just Blew Up a Russian Dam with a Thermobaric Bomb*. Forbes (Apr. 2, 2025) <https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2025/04/02/a-russian-jet-just-bombed-a-russian-dam-with-a-thermobaric-munition/>.

⁹⁷⁷ David Axe, *A Russian Jet Just Blew Up a Russian Dam with a Thermobaric Bomb*. Forbes (Apr. 2, 2025) <https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2025/04/02/a-russian-jet-just-bombed-a-russian-dam-with-a-thermobaric-munition/>.

⁹⁷⁸ *Watch: Russia Drops 3-Ton Bomb on Belgorod Dam*. Kyiv Post (Apr. 2, 2025) <https://www.kyivpost.com/post/50062>.

⁹⁷⁹ David Axe, *A Russian Jet Just Blew Up a Russian Dam with a Thermobaric Bomb*. Forbes (Apr. 2, 2025) <https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2025/04/02/a-russian-jet-just-bombed-a-russian-dam-with-a-thermobaric-munition/>.

⁹⁸⁰ *Watch: Russia Drops 3-Ton Bomb on Belgorod Dam*. Kyiv Post (Apr. 2, 2025) <https://www.kyivpost.com/post/50062>.

⁹⁸¹ Geneva Convention IV, art. 53.; Additional Protocol I, Arts. 56(1), 85(3)(c), and 55(1); Rome Statute Arts. 8(2)(b)(iv), (xiii).

Rome Statute **Article 8(2)(b)(iv)**⁹⁸²

API **Article 55(1)**⁹⁸³

Elements:

1. The perpetrator launched an attack.
2. The attack was such that it would cause incidental death or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment and that such death, injury or damage would be of such an extent as to be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated.
3. The perpetrator knew that the attack would cause incidental death or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment and that such death, injury or damage would be of such an extent as to be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated.
4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.
5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Element 1: The perpetrator launched an attack.

Russia launched the attack, and claimed that the attack was meant to prevent the Ukrainian Armed Forces from advancing.⁹⁸⁴

Element 2: The attack was such that it would cause incidental death or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment and that such death, injury or damage would be of such an extent as to be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated.

The attack on the dam caused the release of massive amounts of water from the reservoir that the dam had been used to create.⁹⁸⁵ The release of water caused flooding and damaged agricultural

⁹⁸² Rome Statute, art. 8(2)(b)(iv).

⁹⁸³ Additional Protocol I, art. 55(1).

⁹⁸⁴ *Russian Military Drops Massive Bomb on Dam in Belgorod Region to Halt Ukrainian Offensive*, UAWire (Apr. 2, 2025)

<https://www.uawire.org/russian-military-drops-massive-bomb-on-dam-in-belgorod-region-to-halt-ukrainian-offensive>.

⁹⁸⁵ *Russian Military Drops Massive Bomb on Dam in Belgorod Region to Halt Ukrainian Offensive*, UAWire (Apr. 2, 2025)

<https://www.uawire.org/russian-military-drops-massive-bomb-on-dam-in-belgorod-region-to-halt-ukrainian-offensive>.

lands in neighboring areas.⁹⁸⁶ The uncontrolled release of the reservoir poses a long-term and severely damaging threat to the natural environment, as the sudden change significantly impacts water quality, wildlife, and ecosystems.⁹⁸⁷ Such long-term and severe damage is clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated by the attack.⁹⁸⁸ Although such a bombing may temporarily slow down Ukrainian forces, the attack will leave lasting damage in the region.⁹⁸⁹

Element 3: The perpetrator knew that the attack would cause incidental death or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment and that such death, injury or damage would be of such an extent as to be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated.

Attacking the dam was a strategic choice noted by Russia to prevent the advance of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.⁹⁹⁰ Attacking a dam comes with the knowledge that it would have a long-term and severe impact on the surrounding natural environment, which would be considered excessive in relation to the short-term military advantage gained by the attack.⁹⁹¹

Element 4: The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.

The attack took place in the context of the current Russo-Ukrainian conflict as a Russian bombing designed to target Ukrainian forces.⁹⁹²

Element 5: The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

⁹⁸⁶ *Watch: Russia Drops 3-Ton Bomb on Belgorod Dam*. Kyiv Post (Apr. 2, 2025)

<https://www.kyivpost.com/post/50062>.

⁹⁸⁷ *Living with Dams: Know Your Risks*. United States Department of Homeland Security FEMA (Feb. 2013)

https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-08/fema_living-with-dams_p-956.pdf.

⁹⁸⁸ *Russian Military Drops Massive Bomb on Dam in Belgorod Region to Halt Ukrainian Offensive*, UAWire (Apr. 2, 2025)

<https://www.uawire.org/russian-military-drops-massive-bomb-on-dam-in-belgorod-region-to-halt-ukrainian-offensive>.

⁹⁸⁹ *Watch: Russia Drops 3-Ton Bomb on Belgorod Dam*. Kyiv Post (Apr. 2, 2025)

<https://www.kyivpost.com/post/50062>.

⁹⁹⁰ *Russian Military Drops Massive Bomb on Dam in Belgorod Region to Halt Ukrainian Offensive*, UAWire (Apr. 2, 2025)

<https://www.uawire.org/russian-military-drops-massive-bomb-on-dam-in-belgorod-region-to-halt-ukrainian-offensive>.

⁹⁹¹ Aaron Dumont, A ‘Clear’ War Crime Against the Environment? Volkerrechtsblog (Jul. 28, 2023)

<https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/a-clear-war-crime-against-the-environment/>.

⁹⁹² *Watch: Russia Drops 3-Ton Bomb on Belgorod Dam*. Kyiv Post (Apr. 2, 2025)

<https://www.kyivpost.com/post/50062>.

Knowledge of the factual circumstances that establish the existence of an armed conflict is attributed to members of national armed forces who participate in such a conflict.⁹⁹³ Russian forces, having launched the attack, are thus knowledgeable of the factual circumstances.⁹⁹⁴

⁹⁹³ *Watch: Russia Drops 3-Ton Bomb on Belgorod Dam*. Kyiv Post (Apr. 2, 2025) <https://www.kyivpost.com/post/50062>.

⁹⁹⁴ *Watch: Russia Drops 3-Ton Bomb on Belgorod Dam*. Kyiv Post (Apr. 2, 2025) <https://www.kyivpost.com/post/50062>.

Incident: 4 APR 2025 Kryvyi Rih Playground Strike

Assessment: We assess with high confidence that on 4 APR 2025 the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation carried out a missile strike on the city of Kryvyi Rih, striking a playground, restaurant, and apartment building, killing at least 19 civilians, including at least nine children.

Narrative: On 4 APR 2025, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation struck the Ukrainian city of Kryvyi Rih with a ballistic missile.⁹⁹⁵ The city is approximately 40 miles from the front line.⁹⁹⁶ The missile was believed to be loaded with a cluster munition.⁹⁹⁷ The missile detonated near a playground on a Friday evening, leaving a large crater only a few yards from the playground.⁹⁹⁸ The playground was crowded with young people at the time.⁹⁹⁹ Young children, including toddlers were present with their parents and guardians, as were local teenagers using the public exercise equipment.¹⁰⁰⁰ At least nine children were killed in the attack with the youngest being seven years old.¹⁰⁰¹ At least 72 people were injured in the attack as well, among them was a baby who was only three months old.¹⁰⁰² This was the deadliest strike on children since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began.¹⁰⁰³

A nearby restaurant that was next to the playground was heavily damaged in the strike.¹⁰⁰⁴ Just prior to the strike, the restaurant was hosting a networking event for women involved in the

⁹⁹⁵ Mariya Knight, Max Saltman, Sophie Tanno, & Kosta Gak, *Russian Attack on Zelensky's Home City Kills 19 People, Including 9 Children, One of the Deadliest Strikes this Year*, CNN (Apr. 5, 2025), <https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/04/americas/ukraine-strike-zelensky-russia-latam-intl>.

⁹⁹⁶ Constant Méheut, Evelina Riabenko, & Daria Mitiuk, *Where Ukrainian Children Once Played, Piles of Toys Memorialize the Dead*, NEW YORK TIMES (Apr. 9, 2025), <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/09/world/europe/ukraine-kryvyi-ri-attack.html>.

⁹⁹⁷ Constant Méheut, Evelina Riabenko, & Daria Mitiuk, *Where Ukrainian Children Once Played, Piles of Toys Memorialize the Dead*, NEW YORK TIMES (Apr. 9, 2025), <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/09/world/europe/ukraine-kryvyi-ri-attack.html>.

⁹⁹⁸ Yehor Konovalov & Illia Novikov, *'Little Suns in the Classroom': Ukrainian City Mourns Children Killed by Russian Missile*, AP (Apr. 7, 2025), <https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-kryvyi-rih-missile-attack-63cf067166caebe68b163af6c2e1de5e>.

⁹⁹⁹ Constant Méheut, Evelina Riabenko, & Daria Mitiuk, *Where Ukrainian Children Once Played, Piles of Toys Memorialize the Dead*, NEW YORK TIMES (Apr. 9, 2025), <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/09/world/europe/ukraine-kryvyi-ri-attack.html>.

¹⁰⁰⁰ Constant Méheut, Evelina Riabenko, & Daria Mitiuk, *Where Ukrainian Children Once Played, Piles of Toys Memorialize the Dead*, NEW YORK TIMES (Apr. 9, 2025), <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/09/world/europe/ukraine-kryvyi-ri-attack.html>.

¹⁰⁰¹ Yehor Konovalov & Illia Novikov, *'Little Suns in the Classroom': Ukrainian City Mourns Children Killed by Russian Missile*, AP (Apr. 7, 2025), <https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-kryvyi-rih-missile-attack-63cf067166caebe68b163af6c2e1de5e>.

¹⁰⁰² Mariya Knight, Max Saltman, Sophie Tanno, & Kosta Gak, *Russian Attack on Zelensky's Home City Kills 19 People, Including 9 Children, One of the Deadliest Strikes this Year*, CNN (Apr. 5, 2025), <https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/04/americas/ukraine-strike-zelensky-russia-latam-intl>.

¹⁰⁰³ Statement from UNICEF Representative to Ukraine Munir Mammadzade (May 26, 2025), (on file with UNICEF).

¹⁰⁰⁴ Mariya Knight, Max Saltman, Sophie Tanno, & Kosta Gak, *Russian Attack on Zelensky's Home City Kills 19 People, Including 9 Children, One of the Deadliest Strikes this Year*, CNN (Apr. 5, 2025), <https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/04/americas/ukraine-strike-zelensky-russia-latam-intl>.

beauty industry.¹⁰⁰⁵ The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation said in a statement on Telegram that the strike was directed at the restaurant as there was a large meeting taking place between Ukrainian servicemembers and instructors from Western militaries.¹⁰⁰⁶ No evidence was offered to support this explanation.¹⁰⁰⁷ The ministry further claimed that up to 85 service members and officers from foreign countries and as many as 20 vehicles were destroyed in the strike.¹⁰⁰⁸ No evidence was offered to support this claim.¹⁰⁰⁹ Surveillance footage from inside the restaurant on 4 APR 2025 showed mostly women attending the networking event, followed by employees cleaning up as the event began to wrap up.¹⁰¹⁰ The surveillance footage does not indicate the presence of Ukrainian servicemembers and their Western counterparts at the restaurant.¹⁰¹¹

Parties Involved: The facts surrounding this missile strike, including that the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation claimed responsibility for the strike, implicate Russia and the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.¹⁰¹²

Legal Analysis: These actions violate both Rome Statutes and Geneva Conventions, some of which are listed below.

Count 1: The War Crime of Willful Killing

Rome Statute Articles 8(2)(a)(i)¹⁰¹³

¹⁰⁰⁵Constant Méheut, Evelina Riabenko, & Daria Mitiuk, *Where Ukrainian Children Once Played, Piles of Toys Memorialize the Dead*, NEW YORK TIMES (Apr. 9, 2025),

<https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/09/world/europe/ukraine-kryvyi-ri-attack.html>.

¹⁰⁰⁶Mariya Knight, Max Saltman, Sophie Tanno, & Kosta Gak, *Russian Attack on Zelensky's Home City Kills 19 People, Including 9 Children, One of the Deadliest Strikes this Year*, CNN (Apr. 5, 2025),

<https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/04/americas/ukraine-strike-zelensky-russia-latam-intl>.

¹⁰⁰⁷Mariya Knight, Max Saltman, Sophie Tanno, & Kosta Gak, *Russian Attack on Zelensky's Home City Kills 19 People, Including 9 Children, One of the Deadliest Strikes this Year*, CNN (Apr. 5, 2025),

<https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/04/americas/ukraine-strike-zelensky-russia-latam-intl>.

¹⁰⁰⁸Mariya Knight, Max Saltman, Sophie Tanno, & Kosta Gak, *Russian Attack on Zelensky's Home City Kills 19 People, Including 9 Children, One of the Deadliest Strikes this Year*, CNN (Apr. 5, 2025),

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¹⁰⁰⁹Mariya Knight, Max Saltman, Sophie Tanno, & Kosta Gak, *Russian Attack on Zelensky's Home City Kills 19 People, Including 9 Children, One of the Deadliest Strikes this Year*, CNN (Apr. 5, 2025),

<https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/04/americas/ukraine-strike-zelensky-russia-latam-intl>.

¹⁰¹⁰Constant Méheut, Evelina Riabenko, & Daria Mitiuk, *Where Ukrainian Children Once Played, Piles of Toys Memorialize the Dead*, NEW YORK TIMES (Apr. 9, 2025),

<https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/09/world/europe/ukraine-kryvyi-ri-attack.html>.

¹⁰¹¹Constant Méheut, Evelina Riabenko, & Daria Mitiuk, *Where Ukrainian Children Once Played, Piles of Toys Memorialize the Dead*, NEW YORK TIMES (Apr. 9, 2025),

<https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/09/world/europe/ukraine-kryvyi-ri-attack.html>.

¹⁰¹² Mariya Knight, Max Saltman, Sophie Tanno, & Kosta Gak, *Russian Attack on Zelensky's Home City Kills 19 People, Including 9 Children, One of the Deadliest Strikes this Year*, CNN (Apr. 5, 2025),

<https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/04/americas/ukraine-strike-zelensky-russia-latam-intl>.

¹⁰¹³ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 8(2)(a)(i), 8(2)(c)(i), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.

Elements:

1. The perpetrator killed one or more persons.
2. Such person or persons were protected under one or more of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
3. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that protected status.
4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.
5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Element 1: The perpetrator killed one or more persons.

At least 19 civilians were killed, including at least nine children as a result of Russia launching a ballistic missile into a civilian area.¹⁰¹⁵

Element 2: Such person or persons were protected under one or more of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

The victims of the attack were civilians.¹⁰¹⁶ Civilians are protected under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions as “[p]ersons taking no active part in hostilities.”¹⁰¹⁷

Element 3: The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that protected status.

The strike hit its intended target, a residential area, specifically where a playground and restaurant were located.¹⁰¹⁸ Though Russia claimed that this was the site of a large military

¹⁰¹⁴ Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 3(1)(a), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 27, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.

¹⁰¹⁵ Mariya Knight, Max Saltman, Sophie Tanno, & Kosta Gak, *Russian Attack on Zelensky's Home City Kills 19 People, Including 9 Children, One of the Deadliest Strikes this Year*, CNN (Apr. 5, 2025), <https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/04/americas/ukraine-strike-zelensky-russia-latam-intl>.

¹⁰¹⁶ Yehor Konovalov & Illia Novikov, *'Little Suns in the Classroom': Ukrainian City Mourns Children Killed by Russian Missile*, AP (Apr. 7, 2025), <https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-kryvyi-rih-missile-attack-63cf067166caebe68b163af6c2e1de5e>.

¹⁰¹⁷ Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.

¹⁰¹⁸ Yehor Konovalov & Illia Novikov, *'Little Suns in the Classroom': Ukrainian City Mourns Children Killed by Russian Missile*, AP (Apr. 7, 2025), <https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-kryvyi-rih-missile-attack-63cf067166caebe68b163af6c2e1de5e>.

meeting involving the Ukrainian Armed Forces, there is no evidence to support this claim.¹⁰¹⁹ The closest identifiable military target was a recruitment office, about 2.5 kilometers from the playground.¹⁰²⁰

Element 4: The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.

The attack was committed as part of the ongoing armed conflict that began with Russia invading Ukraine.¹⁰²¹

Element 5: The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Performing a missile strike during the ongoing campaign necessarily brings with it awareness of the existence of an armed conflict.¹⁰²²

Count 2: The War Crime of Intentionally Attacking Civilians

Rome Statute **8(2)(b)(i)**¹⁰²³

Geneva Convention **Common Article 3(1)(a); API Art. 51**¹⁰²⁴

Elements:

1. The perpetrator directed an attack.
2. The object of the attack was a civilian population as such or individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities.
3. The perpetrator intended the civilian population as such or individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities to be the object of the attack.
4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed

¹⁰¹⁹Mariya Knight, Max Saltman, Sophie Tanno, & Kosta Gak, *Russian Attack on Zelensky's Home City Kills 19 People, Including 9 Children, One of the Deadliest Strikes this Year*, CNN (Apr. 5, 2025), <https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/04/americas/ukraine-strike-zelensky-russia-latam-intl>.

¹⁰²⁰*Ukraine: Escalating Russian Attacks on Civilians*, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May 22, 2025), <https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/05/22/ukraine-escalating-russian-attacks-civilians>.

¹⁰²¹Mariya Knight, Max Saltman, Sophie Tanno, & Kosta Gak, *Russian Attack on Zelensky's Home City Kills 19 People, Including 9 Children, One of the Deadliest Strikes this Year*, CNN (Apr. 5, 2025), <https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/04/americas/ukraine-strike-zelensky-russia-latam-intl>.

¹⁰²²Mariya Knight, Max Saltman, Sophie Tanno, & Kosta Gak, *Russian Attack on Zelensky's Home City Kills 19 People, Including 9 Children, One of the Deadliest Strikes this Year*, CNN (Apr. 5, 2025), <https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/04/americas/ukraine-strike-zelensky-russia-latam-intl>.

¹⁰²³ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 8(2)(b)(i), 8(2)(e)(i), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.

¹⁰²⁴ Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 3(1)(a), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 51, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.

conflict.

5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Element 1: The perpetrator directed an attack.

The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation claimed responsibility for the strike.¹⁰²⁵

Element 2: The object of the attack was a civilian population as such or individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities.

The missile strike hit a playground in a residential area with a restaurant nearby.¹⁰²⁶ Per the Ministry of Defense, they intended to strike the restaurant.¹⁰²⁷

Element 3: The perpetrator intended the civilian population as such or individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities to be the object of the attack.

A playground and restaurant were struck in the attack.¹⁰²⁸ The missile strike occurred on a Friday evening when there would be civilians enjoying the start to their weekend.¹⁰²⁹ Though Russia claimed that this was the site of a large military meeting involving the Ukrainian Armed Forces, there is no evidence to support this claim.¹⁰³⁰

Element 4: The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.

The missile strike was part of the wider Russian Invasion of Ukraine that began in February

¹⁰²⁵Mariya Knight, Max Saltman, Sophie Tanno, & Kosta Gak, *Russian Attack on Zelensky's Home City Kills 19 People, Including 9 Children, One of the Deadliest Strikes this Year*, CNN (Apr. 5, 2025), <https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/04/americas/ukraine-strike-zelensky-russia-latam-intl>.

¹⁰²⁶Yehor Konovalov & Illia Novikov, *'Little Suns in the Classroom': Ukrainian City Mourns Children Killed by Russian Missile*, AP (Apr. 7, 2025), <https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-kryvyi-rih-missile-attack-63cf067166caebe68b163af6c2e1de5e>.

¹⁰²⁷Mariya Knight, Max Saltman, Sophie Tanno, & Kosta Gak, *Russian Attack on Zelensky's Home City Kills 19 People, Including 9 Children, One of the Deadliest Strikes this Year*, CNN (Apr. 5, 2025), <https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/04/americas/ukraine-strike-zelensky-russia-latam-intl>.

¹⁰²⁸Yehor Konovalov & Illia Novikov, *'Little Suns in the Classroom': Ukrainian City Mourns Children Killed by Russian Missile*, AP (Apr. 7, 2025), <https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-kryvyi-rih-missile-attack-63cf067166caebe68b163af6c2e1de5e>.

¹⁰²⁹Constant Méheut, Evelina Riabenko, & Daria Mitiuk, *Where Ukrainian Children Once Played, Piles of Toys Memorialize the Dead*, NEW YORK TIMES (Apr. 9, 2025), <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/09/world/europe/ukraine-kryvyi-ri-attack.html>.

¹⁰³⁰Mariya Knight, Max Saltman, Sophie Tanno, & Kosta Gak, *Russian Attack on Zelensky's Home City Kills 19 People, Including 9 Children, One of the Deadliest Strikes this Year*, CNN (Apr. 5, 2025), <https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/04/americas/ukraine-strike-zelensky-russia-latam-intl>.

2022.¹⁰³¹

Element 5: The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Russia's military occupation of Ukraine necessarily brings with it awareness of the existence of an armed conflict.¹⁰³²

Count 3: The War Crime of Willfully Causing Great Suffering

Rome Statute **Articles 8(2)(a)(iii)**¹⁰³³

Geneva Conventions **Common Article 3(1)(a); IV Article 27**¹⁰³⁴

Elements:

1. The perpetrator caused great physical or mental pain or suffering to, or serious injury to body or health of, one or more persons.
2. Such person or persons were protected under one or more of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
3. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that protected status.
4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.
5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Element 1: The perpetrator caused great physical or mental pain or suffering to, or serious injury to body or health of, one or more persons.

Due to Russia deliberately launching a ballistic missile at least 19 civilians were killed, including at least nine children.¹⁰³⁵ 72 other people were injured in the strike, among them a three month

¹⁰³¹Mariya Knight, Max Saltman, Sophie Tanno, & Kosta Gak, *Russian Attack on Zelensky's Home City Kills 19 People, Including 9 Children, One of the Deadliest Strikes this Year*, CNN (Apr. 5, 2025), <https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/04/americas/ukraine-strike-zelensky-russia-latam-intl>.

¹⁰³²Mariya Knight, Max Saltman, Sophie Tanno, & Kosta Gak, *Russian Attack on Zelensky's Home City Kills 19 People, Including 9 Children, One of the Deadliest Strikes this Year*, CNN (Apr. 5, 2025), <https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/04/americas/ukraine-strike-zelensky-russia-latam-intl>.

¹⁰³³ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 8(2)(a)(iii), 8(2)(c)(i), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.

¹⁰³⁴ Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 3(1)(a), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 27, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.

¹⁰³⁵Yehor Kononov & Illia Novikov, 'Little Suns in the Classroom': Ukrainian City Mourns Children Killed by Russian Missile, AP (Apr. 7, 2025), <https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-kryvyi-rih-missile-attack-63cf067166caebe68b163af6c2e1de5e>.

old baby.¹⁰³⁶

Element 2: Such person or persons were protected under one or more of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

The victims of the attack were civilians.¹⁰³⁷ Civilians are protected under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions as “[p]ersons taking no active part in hostilities.”¹⁰³⁸

Element 3: The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that protected status.

The strike occurred in a residential area where a restaurant and playground were located.¹⁰³⁹ The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation knew that a restaurant was there and intended to strike the restaurant.¹⁰⁴⁰ Though Russia claimed that this was the site of a large military meeting involving the Ukrainian Armed Forces, there is no evidence to support this claim.¹⁰⁴¹

Element 4: The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.

The attack was committed as part of Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine.¹⁰⁴²

Element 5: The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Performing an airstrike during Russia’s campaign necessarily brings with it awareness of the

¹⁰³⁶Mariya Knight, Max Saltman, Sophie Tanno, & Kosta Gak, *Russian Attack on Zelensky’s Home City Kills 19 People, Including 9 Children, One of the Deadliest Strikes this Year*, CNN (Apr. 5, 2025), <https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/04/americas/ukraine-strike-zelensky-russia-latam-intl>.

¹⁰³⁷Yehor Kononov & Illia Novikov, ‘Little Suns in the Classroom’: Ukrainian City Mourns Children Killed by Russian Missile, AP (Apr. 7, 2025), <https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-kryvyi-rih-missile-attack-63cf067166caeb68b163af6c2e1de5e>.

¹⁰³⁸ Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.

¹⁰³⁹ Yehor Kononov & Illia Novikov, ‘Little Suns in the Classroom’: Ukrainian City Mourns Children Killed by Russian Missile, AP (Apr. 7, 2025), <https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-kryvyi-rih-missile-attack-63cf067166caeb68b163af6c2e1de5e>.

¹⁰⁴⁰Mariya Knight, Max Saltman, Sophie Tanno, & Kosta Gak, *Russian Attack on Zelensky’s Home City Kills 19 People, Including 9 Children, One of the Deadliest Strikes this Year*, CNN (Apr. 5, 2025), <https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/04/americas/ukraine-strike-zelensky-russia-latam-intl>.

¹⁰⁴¹Mariya Knight, Max Saltman, Sophie Tanno, & Kosta Gak, *Russian Attack on Zelensky’s Home City Kills 19 People, Including 9 Children, One of the Deadliest Strikes this Year*, CNN (Apr. 5, 2025), <https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/04/americas/ukraine-strike-zelensky-russia-latam-intl>.

¹⁰⁴²Yehor Kononov & Illia Novikov, ‘Little Suns in the Classroom’: Ukrainian City Mourns Children Killed by Russian Missile, AP (Apr. 7, 2025), <https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-kryvyi-rih-missile-attack-63cf067166caeb68b163af6c2e1de5e>.

existence of an armed conflict.¹⁰⁴³

Count 4: The War Crime of Attacking Undefended Places

Rome Statute **Article 8(2)(b)(v)**¹⁰⁴⁴

Geneva Convention **IV Article 53; API Article 52**¹⁰⁴⁵

Elements:

1. The perpetrator attacked one or more towns, villages, dwellings or buildings.
2. Such towns, villages, dwellings or buildings were open for unresisted occupation.
3. Such towns, villages, dwellings or buildings did not constitute military objectives.
4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.
5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Element 1: The perpetrator attacked one or more towns, villages, dwellings or buildings.

Russia deliberately attacked a playground and restaurant in a residential neighborhood of Kryvyi Rih, Ukraine.¹⁰⁴⁶

Element 2: Such towns, villages, dwellings or buildings were open for unresisted occupation.

There is no evidence that there was any resistance or persons taking an active part in hostilities who were resisting occupation by Russian forces in the restaurant or at the playground.¹⁰⁴⁷

Element 3: Such towns, villages, dwellings or buildings did not constitute military objectives.

There is no indication that the target was a military objective.¹⁰⁴⁸ The playground was filled with

¹⁰⁴³Yehor Konovalov & Illia Novikov, 'Little Suns in the Classroom': Ukrainian City Mourns Children Killed by Russian Missile, AP (Apr. 7, 2025),

<https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-kryvyi-rih-missile-attack-63cf067166caebe68b163af6c2e1de5e>.

¹⁰⁴⁴ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(b)(v), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.

¹⁰⁴⁵ Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 53, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 52, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.

¹⁰⁴⁶Yehor Konovalov & Illia Novikov, 'Little Suns in the Classroom': Ukrainian City Mourns Children Killed by Russian Missile, AP (Apr. 7, 2025),

<https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-kryvyi-rih-missile-attack-63cf067166caebe68b163af6c2e1de5e>.

¹⁰⁴⁷Ukraine: Escalating Russian Attacks on Civilians, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May 22, 2025),

<https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/05/22/ukraine-escalating-russian-attacks-civilians>.

¹⁰⁴⁸Ukraine: Escalating Russian Attacks on Civilians, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May 22, 2025),

<https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/05/22/ukraine-escalating-russian-attacks-civilians>.

children and teenagers at the time.¹⁰⁴⁹ The restaurant was being used for a networking event.¹⁰⁵⁰ Though Russia claimed that this was the site of a large military meeting involving the Ukrainian Armed Forces, there is no evidence to support this claim.¹⁰⁵¹

Element 4: The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.

The airstrike was conducted by Russian military forces as part of their ongoing invasion of Ukraine.¹⁰⁵²

Element 5: The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Performing an airstrike during Russia's ongoing campaign necessarily brings with it awareness of the existence of an armed conflict.¹⁰⁵³

¹⁰⁴⁹Constant Méheut, Evelina Riabenko, & Daria Mitiuk, *Where Ukrainian Children Once Played, Piles of Toys Memorialize the Dead*, NEW YORK TIMES (Apr. 9, 2025), <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/09/world/europe/ukraine-kryvyi-ri-attack.html>.

¹⁰⁵⁰Constant Méheut, Evelina Riabenko, & Daria Mitiuk, *Where Ukrainian Children Once Played, Piles of Toys Memorialize the Dead*, NEW YORK TIMES (Apr. 9, 2025), <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/09/world/europe/ukraine-kryvyi-ri-attack.html>.

¹⁰⁵¹Mariya Knight, Max Saltman, Sophie Tanno, & Kosta Gak, *Russian Attack on Zelensky's Home City Kills 19 People, Including 9 Children, One of the Deadliest Strikes this Year*, CNN (Apr. 5, 2025), <https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/04/americas/ukraine-strike-zelensky-russia-latam-intl>.

¹⁰⁵²Yehor Kononov & Illia Novikov, *'Little Suns in the Classroom': Ukrainian City Mourns Children Killed by Russian Missile*, AP (Apr. 7, 2025), <https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-kryvyi-rih-missile-attack-63cf067166caebe68b163af6c2e1de5e>.

¹⁰⁵³Yehor Kononov & Illia Novikov, *'Little Suns in the Classroom': Ukrainian City Mourns Children Killed by Russian Missile*, AP (Apr. 7, 2025), <https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-kryvyi-rih-missile-attack-63cf067166caebe68b163af6c2e1de5e>.

Incident: 13 APR 2025 Missile Strike on Sumy

Assessment: We assess with medium confidence that on 13 April 2025, the Russian Armed Forces launched two missile strikes, damaging twenty buildings within the city of Sumy, killing thirty-five people and injuring over 100 more.¹⁰⁵⁴

Narrative: On 13 April 2025, parts of Sumy were struck by two Russian ballistic missiles. A total of twenty buildings were damaged or destroyed by the attacks.¹⁰⁵⁵ Among those were apartments, cafes, shops, and the District Court.¹⁰⁵⁶ In total, thirty-five people were killed and over 100 more were injured as a result of the missile strikes that struck the heart of the city.¹⁰⁵⁷ The attack took place on Palm Sunday and ultimately targeted civilian areas.¹⁰⁵⁸

The Sumy missile strikes were the second to take place in approximately a week that targeted civilians.¹⁰⁵⁹ The missile strikes on Palm Sunday were the worst singular attacks committed against the Ukrainian people since the 2023 attack on Kupiansk.¹⁰⁶⁰ The missiles also contained cluster munitions, according to Ukrainian officials.¹⁰⁶¹ The cluster munitions, being able to explode and release over a broader landscape, are exceptionally dangerous when fired near civilian populations, such as the attack on Sumy.¹⁰⁶²

Parties Involved: Russian Armed Forces

¹⁰⁵⁴ Svitlana Vlasova and Rosa Rahimi, *Russian Strikes on Ukrainian City of Sumy Kill 35, in Deadliest Attack this Year*, CNN (Apr. 14, 2025) <https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/13/europe/russian-strike-sumy-ukraine-intl>.

¹⁰⁵⁵ Svitlana Vlasova and Rosa Rahimi, *Russian Strikes on Ukrainian City of Sumy Kill 35, in Deadliest Attack this Year*, CNN (Apr. 14, 2025) <https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/13/europe/russian-strike-sumy-ukraine-intl>.

¹⁰⁵⁶ Svitlana Vlasova and Rosa Rahimi, *Russian Strikes on Ukrainian City of Sumy Kill 35, in Deadliest Attack this Year*, CNN (Apr. 14, 2025) <https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/13/europe/russian-strike-sumy-ukraine-intl>.

¹⁰⁵⁷ Vitalii Hnidy and Max Hunder, *Russian Missile Strike Kills 35 in Ukraine's Sumy, Kyiv Says*, Reuters (Apr. 14, 2025)

<https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/mayor-ukraines-sumy-says-over-20-dead-russian-missile-strike-2025-04-13/>.

¹⁰⁵⁸ Vitalii Hnidy and Max Hunder, *Russian Missile Strike Kills 35 in Ukraine's Sumy, Kyiv Says*, Reuters (Apr. 14, 2025)

<https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/mayor-ukraines-sumy-says-over-20-dead-russian-missile-strike-2025-04-13/>.

¹⁰⁵⁹ *More than 30 People Killed in Russian Missile Attack on Ukrainian City of Sumy*, NPR (Apr. 13, 2025)

<https://www.npr.org/2025/04/13/g-s1-60065/more-than-20-people-killed-in-russian-missile-attack-on-ukrainian-city-of-sumy>.

¹⁰⁶⁰ Svitlana Vlasova and Rosa Rahimi, *Russian Strikes on Ukrainian City of Sumy Kill 35, in Deadliest Attack this Year*, CNN (Apr. 14, 2025) <https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/13/europe/russian-strike-sumy-ukraine-intl>.

¹⁰⁶¹ Lucy Pakhnyuk, *Russia Used Cluster Munitions in Deadly Attack on Sumy, US Ambassador Says*, The Kyiv Independent (Apr. 13, 2025)

<https://kyivindependent.com/ambassador-brink-reacts-to-russian-attack-on-sumy-says-cluster-munitions-were-used/>.

¹⁰⁶² Lucy Pakhnyuk, *Russia Used Cluster Munitions in Deadly Attack on Sumy, US Ambassador Says*, The Kyiv Independent (Apr. 13, 2025)

<https://kyivindependent.com/ambassador-brink-reacts-to-russian-attack-on-sumy-says-cluster-munitions-were-used/>.

Legal Analysis: These actions may violate both the Rome Statutes and Geneva Conventions, some of which are listed and analyzed below.¹⁰⁶³

Count 1: The War Crime of Willful Killing

Rome Statute **Articles 8(2)(a)(i)**¹⁰⁶⁴

Geneva Convention **Common Article 3(1)(a); IV Article 27**¹⁰⁶⁵

Elements:

1. The perpetrator killed one or more persons.
2. Such person or persons were protected under one or more of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
3. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that protected status.
4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.
5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Element 1: The perpetrator killed one or more persons.

Russia killed thirty-five people during this attack.¹⁰⁶⁶

Element 2: Such person or persons were protected under one or more of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

Under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, “persons taking no active part in hostilities” are classified as protected.¹⁰⁶⁷ The victims of the missile attacks were civilians who fit this definition.¹⁰⁶⁸

¹⁰⁶³ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (July 17, 1998); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (Aug. 12, 1949); 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (Aug. 12, 1949); Geneva Convention, Art. 3(1)(a); Geneva Convention IV, Arts. 27 and 53; Art. 51 of the Additional Protocol I.

¹⁰⁶⁴ Rome Statute, arts. 8(2)(a)(i).

¹⁰⁶⁵ Geneva Conventions, art. 3(1)(a); Geneva Convention IV, art. 27.

¹⁰⁶⁶ Vitalii Hnidy and Max Hunder, *Russian Missile Strike Kills 35 in Ukraine's Sumy, Kyiv Says*, Reuters (Apr. 14, 2025)

<https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/mayor-ukraines-sumy-says-over-20-dead-russian-missile-strike-2025-04-13/>.

¹⁰⁶⁷ Geneva Conventions, Art. 3.

¹⁰⁶⁸ Lucy Pakhnyuk, *Russia Used Cluster Munitions in Deadly Attack on Sumy, US Ambassador Says*, The Kyiv Independent (Apr. 13, 2025)

<https://kyivindependent.com/ambassador-brink-reacts-to-russian-attack-on-sumy-says-cluster-munitions-were-used/>.

Element 3: The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that protected status.

The target of the attack was civilian infrastructure including a university building.¹⁰⁶⁹ The area targeted contained a concentrated population of civilians.¹⁰⁷⁰ Moreover, launching two missiles at Sumy during Palm Sunday celebrations, in a city, brings with it the knowledge that civilian death would likely occur in the ordinary course of events.¹⁰⁷¹

Element 4: The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.

This attack was committed in the context of the ongoing armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine.¹⁰⁷²

Element 5: The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Russia's military occupation of Ukraine necessarily brings with it awareness of the existence of an armed conflict.¹⁰⁷³

Count 2: The War Crime of Wilfully Causing Great Suffering

Rome Statute **Articles 8(2)(a)(iii)**¹⁰⁷⁴

Geneva Conventions **Common Article 3(1)(a); IV Article 27**¹⁰⁷⁵

Elements:

1. The perpetrator caused great physical or mental pain or suffering to, or serious injury to body or health of, one or more persons.
2. Such person or persons were protected under one or more of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
3. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that protected status.
4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.

¹⁰⁶⁹ Svitlana Vlasova and Rosa Rahimi, *Russian Strikes on Ukrainian City of Sumy Kill 35, in Deadliest Attack this Year*, CNN (Apr. 14, 2025) <https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/13/europe/russian-strike-sumy-ukraine-intl>.

¹⁰⁷⁰ Svitlana Vlasova and Rosa Rahimi, *Russian Strikes on Ukrainian City of Sumy Kill 35, in Deadliest Attack this Year*, CNN (Apr. 14, 2025) <https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/13/europe/russian-strike-sumy-ukraine-intl>.

¹⁰⁷¹ Vitalii Hnidy and Max Hunder, *Russian Missile Strike Kills 35 in Ukraine's Sumy, Kyiv Says*, Reuters (Apr. 14, 2025) <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/mayor-ukraines-sumy-says-over-20-dead-russian-missile-strike-2025-04-13/>.

¹⁰⁷² Svitlana Vlasova and Rosa Rahimi, *Russian Strikes on Ukrainian City of Sumy Kill 35, in Deadliest Attack this Year*, CNN (Apr. 14, 2025) <https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/13/europe/russian-strike-sumy-ukraine-intl>.

¹⁰⁷³ Svitlana Vlasova and Rosa Rahimi, *Russian Strikes on Ukrainian City of Sumy Kill 35, in Deadliest Attack this Year*, CNN (Apr. 14, 2025) <https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/13/europe/russian-strike-sumy-ukraine-intl>.

¹⁰⁷⁴ Rome Statute, arts. 8(2)(a)(iii).

¹⁰⁷⁵ Geneva Conventions, art. 3(1)(a); Geneva Convention IV, art. 27.

5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Element 1: The perpetrator caused great physical or mental pain or suffering to, or serious injury to body or health of, one or more persons.

Russia launched a missile into the city of Sumy which killed thirty-five people and more than 100 were wounded.¹⁰⁷⁶

Element 2: Such person or persons were protected under one or more of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

Under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, “persons taking no active part in hostilities” are classified as protected.¹⁰⁷⁷ The victims of the missile attacks were civilians who fit this definition.¹⁰⁷⁸

Element 3: The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that protected status.

The target of the attack was civilian infrastructure including a university building.¹⁰⁷⁹ The area targeted contained a concentrated population of civilians.¹⁰⁸⁰ Moreover, launching two missiles at Sumy during Palm Sunday celebrations, in a city, brings with it the knowledge that civilian death would likely occur in the ordinary course of events.¹⁰⁸¹

Element 4: The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.

This attack was committed in the context of the ongoing armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine.¹⁰⁸²

Element 5: The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

¹⁰⁷⁶ Vitalii Hnidy and Max Hunder, *Russian Missile Strike Kills 35 in Ukraine’s Sumy, Kyiv Says*, Reuters (Apr. 14, 2025)

<https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/mayor-ukraines-sumy-says-over-20-dead-russian-missile-strike-2025-04-13/>.

¹⁰⁷⁷ Geneva Conventions, Art. 3.

¹⁰⁷⁸ Lucy Pakhnyuk, *Russia Used Cluster Munitions in Deadly Attack on Sumy, US Ambassador Says*, The Kyiv Independent (Apr. 13, 2025)

<https://kyivindependent.com/ambassador-brink-reacts-to-russian-attack-on-sumy-says-cluster-munitions-were-used/>.

¹⁰⁷⁹ Svitlana Vlasova and Rosa Rahimi, *Russian Strikes on Ukrainian City of Sumy Kill 35, in Deadliest Attack this Year*, CNN (Apr. 14, 2025) <https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/13/europe/russian-strike-sumy-ukraine-intl>.

¹⁰⁸⁰ Svitlana Vlasova and Rosa Rahimi, *Russian Strikes on Ukrainian City of Sumy Kill 35, in Deadliest Attack this Year*, CNN (Apr. 14, 2025) <https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/13/europe/russian-strike-sumy-ukraine-intl>.

¹⁰⁸¹ Vitalii Hnidy and Max Hunder, *Russian Missile Strike Kills 35 in Ukraine’s Sumy, Kyiv Says*, Reuters (Apr. 14, 2025)

<https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/mayor-ukraines-sumy-says-over-20-dead-russian-missile-strike-2025-04-13/>.

¹⁰⁸² Vitalii Hnidy and Max Hunder, *Russian Missile Strike Kills 35 in Ukraine’s Sumy, Kyiv Says*, Reuters (Apr. 14, 2025)

<https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/mayor-ukraines-sumy-says-over-20-dead-russian-missile-strike-2025-04-13/>.

Russia's military occupation of Ukraine necessarily brings with it awareness of the existence of an armed conflict.¹⁰⁸³

Count 3: The War Crime of Attacking Civilians

Rome Statute **Article 8(2)(b)(i)**¹⁰⁸⁴

Geneva Convention **Common Article 3(1)(a); API Article 51**¹⁰⁸⁵

Elements:

1. The perpetrator directed an attack.
2. The object of the attack was a civilian population as such or individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities.
3. The perpetrator intended the civilian population as such or individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities to be the object of the attack.
4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.
5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Element 1: The perpetrator directed an attack.

Russia launched a missile into the city of Sumy which killed thirty-five people and more than 100 were wounded.¹⁰⁸⁶

Element 2: The object of the attack was a civilian population as such or individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities.

The target of the attack was civilian infrastructure including a university building.¹⁰⁸⁷ The area targeted contained a concentrated population of civilians.¹⁰⁸⁸ The attack killed thirty-five people and more than 100 were wounded, all of which were civilians.¹⁰⁸⁹

Element 3: The perpetrator intended the civilian population as such or individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities to be the object of the attack.

¹⁰⁸³ Svitlana Vlasova and Rosa Rahimi, *Russian Strikes on Ukrainian City of Sumy Kill 35, in Deadliest Attack this Year*, CNN (Apr. 14, 2025) <https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/13/europe/russian-strike-sumy-ukraine-intl>.

¹⁰⁸⁴ Rome Statute, art. 8(2)(b)(i).

¹⁰⁸⁵ Geneva Conventions 3(1)(a); Additional Protocol art. 51.

¹⁰⁸⁶ Vitalii Hnidy and Max Hunder, *Russian Missile Strike Kills 35 in Ukraine's Sumy, Kyiv Says*, Reuters (Apr. 14, 2025)

<https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/mayor-ukraines-sumy-says-over-20-dead-russian-missile-strike-2025-04-13/>.

¹⁰⁸⁷ Svitlana Vlasova and Rosa Rahimi, *Russian Strikes on Ukrainian City of Sumy Kill 35, in Deadliest Attack this Year*, CNN (Apr. 14, 2025) <https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/13/europe/russian-strike-sumy-ukraine-intl>.

¹⁰⁸⁸ Svitlana Vlasova and Rosa Rahimi, *Russian Strikes on Ukrainian City of Sumy Kill 35, in Deadliest Attack this Year*, CNN (Apr. 14, 2025) <https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/13/europe/russian-strike-sumy-ukraine-intl>.

¹⁰⁸⁹ Vitalii Hnidy and Max Hunder, *Russian Missile Strike Kills 35 in Ukraine's Sumy, Kyiv Says*, Reuters (Apr. 14, 2025)

<https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/mayor-ukraines-sumy-says-over-20-dead-russian-missile-strike-2025-04-13/>.

The missile attack was aimed at Sumy during Palm Sunday and only harmed civilians, showing that the civilian population was the central object of the attack despite Russian claims that sixty active Ukrainian military members were hurt in the attack.¹⁰⁹⁰

Element 4: The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.

This attack was committed in the context of the ongoing armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine.¹⁰⁹¹

Element 5: The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Russia's military occupation of Ukraine necessarily brings with it awareness of the existence of an armed conflict.¹⁰⁹²

Count 4: The War Crime of Attacking Undefended Places

Rome Statute **Article 8(2)(b)(v)**¹⁰⁹³

Geneva Convention **IV Article 53; API Article 52**¹⁰⁹⁴

Elements:

1. The perpetrator attacked one or more towns, villages, dwellings or buildings.
2. Such towns, villages, dwellings or buildings were open for unresisted occupation.
3. Such towns, villages, dwellings or buildings did not constitute military objectives.
4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.
5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Element 1: The perpetrator attacked one or more towns, villages, dwellings or buildings.

Russia attacked the city of Sumy in a missile strike.¹⁰⁹⁵

Element 2: Such towns, villages, dwellings or buildings were open for unresisted occupation.

¹⁰⁹⁰ Lorne Cook, *Russia Claims its Deadly Attack on Ukraine's Sumy Targeted Military Forces as Condemnation Grows*, Military.com (Apr. 14, 2025), <https://www.military.com/daily-news/2025/04/14/russia-claims-its-deadly-attack-ukraines-sumy-targeted-military-forces-condemnation-grows.html>.

¹⁰⁹¹ Svitlana Vlasova and Rosa Rahimi, *Russian Strikes on Ukrainian City of Sumy Kill 35, in Deadliest Attack this Year*, CNN (Apr. 14, 2025) <https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/13/europe/russian-strike-sumy-ukraine-intl>.

¹⁰⁹² Svitlana Vlasova and Rosa Rahimi, *Russian Strikes on Ukrainian City of Sumy Kill 35, in Deadliest Attack this Year*, CNN (Apr. 14, 2025) <https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/13/europe/russian-strike-sumy-ukraine-intl>.

¹⁰⁹³ Rome Statute, art. 8(2)(b)(v).

¹⁰⁹⁴ Geneva Convention IV art. 53; Additional Protocol art. 52.

¹⁰⁹⁵ Svitlana Vlasova and Rosa Rahimi, *Russian Strikes on Ukrainian City of Sumy Kill 35, in Deadliest Attack this Year*, CNN (Apr. 14, 2025) <https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/13/europe/russian-strike-sumy-ukraine-intl>.

There is no indication that any of the attacked buildings could have individually resisted occupation, being that they were civilian buildings.¹⁰⁹⁶

Element 3: Such towns, villages, dwellings or buildings did not constitute military objectives.

The target of the attack was civilian infrastructure including a university building.¹⁰⁹⁷ The missile attack was aimed at Sumy during Palm Sunday and only harmed civilians, showing that the civilian population was the central object of the attack despite Russian claims that sixty active Ukrainian military members were hurt in the attack.¹⁰⁹⁸ Without evidence that there were Ukrainian military members present or that the buildings were being used for military purposes, the buildings attacked did not constitute military objectives.¹⁰⁹⁹

Element 4: The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.

This attack was committed in the context of and is associated with the ongoing armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine.¹¹⁰⁰

Element 5: The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Russia's military occupation of Ukraine necessarily brings with it awareness of the existence of an armed conflict.¹¹⁰¹

Count 5: The War Crime of Destruction and Appropriation of Property

Rome Statute **Article 8(2)(a)(iv)**¹¹⁰²

Geneva Convention **IV Art. 53**¹¹⁰³

Elements:

¹⁰⁹⁶ Svitlana Vlasova and Rosa Rahimi, *Russian Strikes on Ukrainian City of Sumy Kill 35, in Deadliest Attack this Year*, CNN (Apr. 14, 2025) <https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/13/europe/russian-strike-sumy-ukraine-intl>.

¹⁰⁹⁷ Svitlana Vlasova and Rosa Rahimi, *Russian Strikes on Ukrainian City of Sumy Kill 35, in Deadliest Attack this Year*, CNN (Apr. 14, 2025) <https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/13/europe/russian-strike-sumy-ukraine-intl>.

¹⁰⁹⁸ Lorne Cook, *Russia Claims its Deadly Attack on Ukraine's Sumy Targeted Military Forces as Condemnation Grows*, Military.com (Apr. 14, 2025), <https://www.military.com/daily-news/2025/04/14/russia-claims-its-deadly-attack-ukraines-sumy-targeted-military-forces-condemnation-grows.html>.

¹⁰⁹⁹ Svitlana Vlasova and Rosa Rahimi, *Russian Strikes on Ukrainian City of Sumy Kill 35, in Deadliest Attack this Year*, CNN (Apr. 14, 2025) <https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/13/europe/russian-strike-sumy-ukraine-intl>.

¹¹⁰⁰ Svitlana Vlasova and Rosa Rahimi, *Russian Strikes on Ukrainian City of Sumy Kill 35, in Deadliest Attack this Year*, CNN (Apr. 14, 2025) <https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/13/europe/russian-strike-sumy-ukraine-intl>.

¹¹⁰¹ Svitlana Vlasova and Rosa Rahimi, *Russian Strikes on Ukrainian City of Sumy Kill 35, in Deadliest Attack this Year*, CNN (Apr. 14, 2025) <https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/13/europe/russian-strike-sumy-ukraine-intl>.

¹¹⁰² Rome Statute, art. 8(2)(a)(iv).

¹¹⁰³ Geneva Convention IV, art. 53.

1. The perpetrator destroyed or appropriated certain property.
2. The destruction or appropriation was not justified by military necessity.
3. The destruction or appropriation was extensive and carried out wantonly.
4. Such property was protected under one or more of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
5. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that protected status.
6. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.
7. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Element 1: The perpetrator destroyed or appropriated certain property.

A total of 20 buildings were damaged or destroyed by the attack launched by Russia, including apartments, cafes, shops, and the District Court.¹¹⁰⁴

Element 2: The destruction or appropriation was not justified by military necessity.

The target of the attack was civilian infrastructure including a university building.¹¹⁰⁵ There is no indication that attacking clear civilian areas of Sumy would be justified on the grounds of military necessity.¹¹⁰⁶ Despite Russian claims that sixty active Ukrainian military members were hurt in the attack, there is no evidence to support that claim.¹¹⁰⁷ Without evidence that there were Ukrainian military members present or that the buildings were being used for military purposes, the attacks were not justified by military necessity.¹¹⁰⁸

Element 3: The destruction or appropriation was extensive and carried out wantonly.

The missiles had cluster munitions which were released over a wide area and increased the amount of damage the missiles caused.¹¹⁰⁹ A total of 20 civilian buildings were damaged or destroyed by the attack launched by Russia, including apartments, cafes, shops, and the District Court.¹¹¹⁰

¹¹⁰⁴ Svitlana Vlasova and Rosa Rahimi, *Russian Strikes on Ukrainian City of Sumy Kill 35, in Deadliest Attack this Year*, CNN (Apr. 14, 2025) <https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/13/europe/russian-strike-sumy-ukraine-intl>.

¹¹⁰⁵ Svitlana Vlasova and Rosa Rahimi, *Russian Strikes on Ukrainian City of Sumy Kill 35, in Deadliest Attack this Year*, CNN (Apr. 14, 2025) <https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/13/europe/russian-strike-sumy-ukraine-intl>.

¹¹⁰⁶ Vitalii Hnidy and Max Hunder, *Russian Missile Strike Kills 35 in Ukraine's Sumy, Kyiv Says*, Reuters (Apr. 14, 2025) <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/mayor-ukraines-sumy-says-over-20-dead-russian-missile-strike-2025-04-13/>.

¹¹⁰⁷ Lorne Cook, *Russia Claims its Deadly Attack on Ukraine's Sumy Targeted Military Forces as Condemnation Grows*, Military.com (Apr. 14, 2025), <https://www.military.com/daily-news/2025/04/14/russia-claims-its-deadly-attack-ukraines-sumy-targeted-military-forces-condemnation-grows.html>.

¹¹⁰⁸ Svitlana Vlasova and Rosa Rahimi, *Russian Strikes on Ukrainian City of Sumy Kill 35, in Deadliest Attack this Year*, CNN (Apr. 14, 2025) <https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/13/europe/russian-strike-sumy-ukraine-intl>.

¹¹⁰⁹ Svitlana Vlasova and Rosa Rahimi, *Russian Strikes on Ukrainian City of Sumy Kill 35, in Deadliest Attack this Year*, CNN (Apr. 14, 2025) <https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/13/europe/russian-strike-sumy-ukraine-intl>.

¹¹¹⁰ Svitlana Vlasova and Rosa Rahimi, *Russian Strikes on Ukrainian City of Sumy Kill 35, in Deadliest Attack this Year*, CNN (Apr. 14, 2025) <https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/13/europe/russian-strike-sumy-ukraine-intl>.

Element 4: Such property was protected under one or more of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

Under Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, “[a]ny destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal property belonging individually or collectively to private persons, or to the State, or to other public authorities, or to social or cooperative organizations, is prohibited, except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations.”¹¹¹¹ The property damaged and destroyed in the attack was civilian infrastructure that fits this definition.¹¹¹²

Element 5: The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that protected status.

Russia claimed that sixty active Ukrainian military members were hurt in the attack.¹¹¹³ However, launching two missiles into the city of Sumy, during Palm Sunday, with weaponry that increased the area affected rather than keeping the impact to a contained area that only harmed civilians, demonstrates that the civilian population and infrastructure were the central object of the attack.¹¹¹⁴

Element 6: The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.

This attack was committed in the context of and is associated with the ongoing armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine.¹¹¹⁵

Element 7: The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Russia’s military occupation of Ukraine necessarily brings with it awareness of the existence of an armed conflict.¹¹¹⁶

¹¹¹¹ Geneva Convention IV, art. 53.

¹¹¹² Lucy Pakhnyuk, *Russia Used Cluster Munitions in Deadly Attack on Sumy, US Ambassador Says*, The Kyiv Independent (Apr. 13, 2025) <https://kyivindependent.com/ambassador-brink-reacts-to-russian-attack-on-sumy-says-cluster-munitions-were-used/>.

¹¹¹³ Lorne Cook, *Russia Claims its Deadly Attack on Ukraine’s Sumy Targeted Military Forces as Condemnation Grows*, Military.com (Apr. 14, 2025), <https://www.military.com/daily-news/2025/04/14/russia-claims-its-deadly-attack-ukraines-sumy-targeted-military-forces-condemnation-grows.html>.

¹¹¹⁴ Lorne Cook, *Russia Claims its Deadly Attack on Ukraine’s Sumy Targeted Military Forces as Condemnation Grows*, Military.com (Apr. 14, 2025), <https://www.military.com/daily-news/2025/04/14/russia-claims-its-deadly-attack-ukraines-sumy-targeted-military-forces-condemnation-grows.html>.

¹¹¹⁵ Svitlana Vlasova and Rosa Rahimi, *Russian Strikes on Ukrainian City of Sumy Kill 35, in Deadliest Attack this Year*, CNN (Apr. 14, 2025) <https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/13/europe/russian-strike-sumy-ukraine-intl>.

¹¹¹⁶ Svitlana Vlasova and Rosa Rahimi, *Russian Strikes on Ukrainian City of Sumy Kill 35, in Deadliest Attack this Year*, CNN (Apr. 14, 2025) <https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/13/europe/russian-strike-sumy-ukraine-intl>.

Incident: “The Human Safari” - Targeting of Civilians With Quadcopter Drones in Kherson

Assessment: We assess with high confidence that beginning in 2024 and continuing through August 2025, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are purposefully targeting civilians in Kherson, Ukraine with quadcopter drones.

Narrative: Beginning in 2024 and continuing through at least August 2025, Russian forces in and around the southern Ukrainian city of Kherson have been targeting civilians with quadcopter drones.¹¹¹⁷ As of 28 May 2025, nearly 150 civilians were killed in the city of Kherson and the surrounding areas.¹¹¹⁸ Most of the victims were men but women and children have been targeted as well.¹¹¹⁹ Civilians are usually targeted with quadcopter drones, laden with explosives.¹¹²⁰ These drones carry video cameras that transmit a real time feed back to their operators, showing the attacks on civilians.¹¹²¹ Often, these videos are modified and posted to social media outlets, such as Telegram with accompanying text saying the attacks shall continue.¹¹²²

An example of this came on 28 September 2024 involving 23 year old Anastasia Pavlenko.¹¹²³ Ms. Pavlenko was using her bicycle to travel to an appointment in the city of Kherson.¹¹²⁴ As she

¹¹¹⁷ *Hunted From Above: Russia’s Use of Drones to Attack Civilians in Kherson, Ukraine*, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, (Jun. 3, 2025) <https://www.hrw.org/report/2025/06/03/hunted-from-above/russias-use-of-drones-to-attack-civilians-in-kherson-ukraine>.

¹¹¹⁸ *Ukraine: Russia Using Drones to Attack Civilians, Russian Military Committing War Crimes in Kherson*, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, (Jun. 3, 2025) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/06/03/ukraine-russia-using-drones-attack-civilians>.

¹¹¹⁹ *Ukraine: Russia Using Drones to Attack Civilians, Russian Military Committing War Crimes in Kherson*, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, (Jun. 3, 2025) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/06/03/ukraine-russia-using-drones-attack-civilians>.

¹¹²⁰ Agnieszka Pikulicka-Wilczewska, ‘Russian in Kherson Train on Civilians’: Deadly Drones Stalk South Ukraine, ALJAZEERA (Jan. 16, 2025),

<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/1/16/russians-in-kherson-train-on-civilians-deadly-drones-stalk-south-ukraine>

¹¹²¹ *Hunted From Above: Russia’s Use of Drones to Attack Civilians in Kherson, Ukraine*, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, (Jun. 3, 2025)

<https://www.hrw.org/report/2025/06/03/hunted-from-above/russias-use-of-drones-to-attack-civilians-in-kherson-ukraine>.

¹¹²² *Hunted From Above: Russia’s Use of Drones to Attack Civilians in Kherson, Ukraine*, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, (Jun. 3, 2025)

<https://www.hrw.org/report/2025/06/03/hunted-from-above/russias-use-of-drones-to-attack-civilians-in-kherson-ukraine>.

¹¹²³ Ronny Reyes & Caitlin Doornbos, *Ukrainian Toddler Blown Up by Russian Drone as he Played Outside in Targeted Attack - As Moscow Turns Kherson into ‘Human Safari Zone’*, NEW YORK POST (Jul. 10, 2025)

<https://nypost.com/2025/07/10/world-news/ukrainian-toddler-murdered-in-evil-targeted-attack-by-russian-suicide-drone-in-kherson/>.

¹¹²⁴ *Hunted From Above: Russia’s Use of Drones to Attack Civilians in Kherson, Ukraine*, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, (Jun. 3, 2025)

<https://www.hrw.org/report/2025/06/03/hunted-from-above/russias-use-of-drones-to-attack-civilians-in-kherson-ukraine>.

was cycling, a drone took off from a nearby rooftop and followed her for about 300 meters.¹¹²⁵ The drone then proceeded to drop an unspecified munition, which struck the ground nearby and detonated.¹¹²⁶ She sustained injuries to the neck, leg, and rib.¹¹²⁷ Ms. Pavlenko fortunately survived the attack.¹¹²⁸ A video of the attack on Ms. Pavlenko from the drone's perspective was uploaded to Telegram.¹¹²⁹ In the video, Ms. Pavlenko is not conducting any action that could be construed as participating in the armed conflict and it is accompanied by sleek dance music.¹¹³⁰ The campaign targets civilians who are walking, driving, cycling, using public transport, and travelling to work, home, or the store.¹¹³¹ Healthcare facilities, ambulances, and grocery stores have been struck as well. A usual day in Kherson will see between 30 and 60 drones active in the city.¹¹³² This has led to the increased evacuation of residents and the closure of medical facilities, rescue services, and grocery stores in certain neighborhoods of Kherson.¹¹³³

The social media accounts on Telegram that post the videos of the quadcopter attacks on civilians include warnings that the individuals in the subject area were valid targets under their military doctrine.¹¹³⁴ Telegram accounts describe certain neighborhoods of Kherson as “red

¹¹²⁵ *Hunted From Above: Russia's Use of Drones to Attack Civilians in Kherson, Ukraine*, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, (Jun. 3, 2025)

<https://www.hrw.org/report/2025/06/03/hunted-from-above/russias-use-of-drones-to-attack-civilians-in-kherson-ukraine>.

¹¹²⁶ *Hunted From Above: Russia's Use of Drones to Attack Civilians in Kherson, Ukraine*, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, (Jun. 3, 2025)

<https://www.hrw.org/report/2025/06/03/hunted-from-above/russias-use-of-drones-to-attack-civilians-in-kherson-ukraine>.

¹¹²⁷ *Hunted From Above: Russia's Use of Drones to Attack Civilians in Kherson, Ukraine*, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, (Jun. 3, 2025)

<https://www.hrw.org/report/2025/06/03/hunted-from-above/russias-use-of-drones-to-attack-civilians-in-kherson-ukraine>.

¹¹²⁸ *Hunted From Above: Russia's Use of Drones to Attack Civilians in Kherson, Ukraine*, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, (Jun. 3, 2025)

<https://www.hrw.org/report/2025/06/03/hunted-from-above/russias-use-of-drones-to-attack-civilians-in-kherson-ukraine>.

¹¹²⁹ *Hunted From Above: Russia's Use of Drones to Attack Civilians in Kherson, Ukraine*, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, (Jun. 3, 2025)

<https://www.hrw.org/report/2025/06/03/hunted-from-above/russias-use-of-drones-to-attack-civilians-in-kherson-ukraine>.

¹¹³⁰ From Mariupol to the Carpathians (@osvedomitell_alex), TELEGRAM (Oct. 9, 2024)

https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/21472.

¹¹³¹ Agnieszka Pikulicka-Wilczewska, 'Russian in Kherson Train on Civilians': Deadly Drones Stalk South Ukraine, ALJAZEERA (Jan. 16, 2025),

<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/1/16/russians-in-kherson-train-on-civilians-deadly-drones-stalk-south-ukraine>

¹¹³² Agnieszka Pikulicka-Wilczewska, 'Russian in Kherson Train on Civilians': Deadly Drones Stalk South Ukraine, ALJAZEERA (Jan. 16, 2025),

<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/1/16/russians-in-kherson-train-on-civilians-deadly-drones-stalk-south-ukraine>

¹¹³³ *Hunted From Above: Russia's Use of Drones to Attack Civilians in Kherson, Ukraine*, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, (Jun. 3, 2025)

<https://www.hrw.org/report/2025/06/03/hunted-from-above/russias-use-of-drones-to-attack-civilians-in-kherson-ukraine>.

¹¹³⁴ *Hunted From Above: Russia's Use of Drones to Attack Civilians in Kherson, Ukraine*, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, (Jun. 3, 2025)

zones” and state Russian forces shall target any moving vehicle.¹¹³⁵ This does not distinguish between civilian vehicles and military vehicles.¹¹³⁶ The Telegram posts state that civilians should limit their movements in Kherson in order to avoid being targeted by drones.¹¹³⁷ The drones also target residents in their houses as well.¹¹³⁸ On 17 November 2024, Mr. and Mrs. Anastasia Rusol and Valeriy Sukhenko were in their single story home when a drone struck their roof and started a fire.¹¹³⁹ About 10 minutes after the first strike, a second drone struck the home wounding the husband and wife.¹¹⁴⁰ Mrs. Rusol was holding their chihuahua puppy at the time of the second strike that was killed when it was struck by a metal fragment.¹¹⁴¹

There is no indication that the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation have stopped this practice.¹¹⁴² On 9 July 2025, a one year old boy named Dmytryk was targeted in the yard of his

<https://www.hrw.org/report/2025/06/03/hunted-from-above/russias-use-of-drones-to-attack-civilians-in-kherson-ukraine>.

¹¹³⁵ *Hunted From Above: Russia’s Use of Drones to Attack Civilians in Kherson, Ukraine*, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, (Jun. 3, 2025)

<https://www.hrw.org/report/2025/06/03/hunted-from-above/russias-use-of-drones-to-attack-civilians-in-kherson-ukraine>.

¹¹³⁶ *Hunted From Above: Russia’s Use of Drones to Attack Civilians in Kherson, Ukraine*, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, (Jun. 3, 2025)

<https://www.hrw.org/report/2025/06/03/hunted-from-above/russias-use-of-drones-to-attack-civilians-in-kherson-ukraine>.

¹¹³⁷ *Hunted From Above: Russia’s Use of Drones to Attack Civilians in Kherson, Ukraine*, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, (Jun. 3, 2025)

<https://www.hrw.org/report/2025/06/03/hunted-from-above/russias-use-of-drones-to-attack-civilians-in-kherson-ukraine>.

¹¹³⁸ *Hunted From Above: Russia’s Use of Drones to Attack Civilians in Kherson, Ukraine*, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, (Jun. 3, 2025)

<https://www.hrw.org/report/2025/06/03/hunted-from-above/russias-use-of-drones-to-attack-civilians-in-kherson-ukraine>.

¹¹³⁹ *Hunted From Above: Russia’s Use of Drones to Attack Civilians in Kherson, Ukraine*, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, (Jun. 3, 2025)

<https://www.hrw.org/report/2025/06/03/hunted-from-above/russias-use-of-drones-to-attack-civilians-in-kherson-ukraine>.

¹¹⁴⁰ *Hunted From Above: Russia’s Use of Drones to Attack Civilians in Kherson, Ukraine*, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, (Jun. 3, 2025)

<https://www.hrw.org/report/2025/06/03/hunted-from-above/russias-use-of-drones-to-attack-civilians-in-kherson-ukraine>.

¹¹⁴¹ *Hunted From Above: Russia’s Use of Drones to Attack Civilians in Kherson, Ukraine*, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, (Jun. 3, 2025)

<https://www.hrw.org/report/2025/06/03/hunted-from-above/russias-use-of-drones-to-attack-civilians-in-kherson-ukraine>.

¹¹⁴² Ronny Reyes & Caitlin Doornbos, *Ukrainian Toddler Blown Up by Russian Drone as he Played Outside in Targeted Attack - As Moscow Turns Kherson into ‘Human Safari Zone’*, NEW YORK POST (Jul. 10, 2025)

<https://nypost.com/2025/07/10/world-news/ukrainian-toddler-murdered-in-evil-targeted-attack-by-russian-suicide-drone-in-kherson/>.

grandmother's home while playing with his father and grandmother.¹¹⁴³ Dmytryk was killed instantly.¹¹⁴⁴

Parties Involved: The facts surrounding these strikes including the numerous social media posts affiliated with the Russian military, implicate Russia and the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

Legal Analysis: These actions violate both Rome Statutes and Geneva Conventions, some of which are listed below.

Count 1: The War Crime of Willful Killing

Rome Statute **Articles 8(2)(a)(i)**¹¹⁴⁵

Geneva Convention **Common Article 3(1)(a); IV Article 27**¹¹⁴⁶

Elements:

1. The perpetrator killed one or more persons.
2. Such person or persons were protected under one or more of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
3. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that protected status.
4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.
5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Element 1: The perpetrator killed one or more persons.

Nearly 150 civilians have been killed by Russia as of MAY 2025 with additional killings

¹¹⁴³ Ronny Reyes & Caitlin Doornbos, *Ukrainian Toddler Blown Up by Russian Drone as he Played Outside in Targeted Attack - As Moscow Turns Kherson into 'Human Safari Zone'*, NEW YORK POST (Jul. 10, 2025) <https://nypost.com/2025/07/10/world-news/ukrainian-toddler-murdered-in-evil-targeted-attack-by-russian-suicide-drone-in-kherson/>.

¹¹⁴⁴ Ronny Reyes & Caitlin Doornbos, *Ukrainian Toddler Blown Up by Russian Drone as he Played Outside in Targeted Attack - As Moscow Turns Kherson into 'Human Safari Zone'*, NEW YORK POST (Jul. 10, 2025) <https://nypost.com/2025/07/10/world-news/ukrainian-toddler-murdered-in-evil-targeted-attack-by-russian-suicide-drone-in-kherson/>.

¹¹⁴⁵ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 8(2)(a)(i), 8(2)(c)(i), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.

¹¹⁴⁶ Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 3(1)(a), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 27, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.

ongoing.¹¹⁴⁷

Element 2: Such person or persons were protected under one or more of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

The victims of the attack were civilians.¹¹⁴⁸ Civilians are protected under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions as “[p]ersons taking no active part in hostilities.”¹¹⁴⁹

Element 3: The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that protected status.

Russia is targeting the strikes in residential neighborhoods and against civilian infrastructure.¹¹⁵⁰ The weapons used carry cameras that are sufficient to identify the targets as civilians.¹¹⁵¹

Element 4: The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.

The attack was committed as part of the ongoing armed conflict that began with Russia invading Ukraine and attacks against the frontline city of Kherson, Ukraine.¹¹⁵²

Element 5: The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Russia’s military occupation of Ukraine necessarily brings with it awareness of the existence of an armed conflict.¹¹⁵³

¹¹⁴⁷ Press Release from OHCHR, UN Commission Concludes That Russian Armed Forces’ Drone Attacks Against Civilians in Kherson Province Amount to Crimes Against Humanity of Murder (May 28, 2025), (on file with OHCHR).

¹¹⁴⁸ Ronny Reyes & Caitlin Doornbos, *Ukrainian Toddler Blown Up by Russian Drone as he Played Outside in Targeted Attack - As Moscow Turns Kherson into ‘Human Safari Zone’*, NEW YORK POST (Jul. 10, 2025) <https://nypost.com/2025/07/10/world-news/ukrainian-toddler-murdered-in-evil-targeted-attack-by-russian-suicide-drone-in-kherson/>.

¹¹⁴⁹ Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.

¹¹⁵⁰ *Ukraine: Russia Using Drones to Attack Civilians, Russian Military Committing War Crimes in Kherson*, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, (Jun. 3, 2025) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/06/03/ukraine-russia-using-drones-attack-civilians>.

¹¹⁵¹ *Hunted From Above: Russia’s Use of Drones to Attack Civilians in Kherson, Ukraine*, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, (Jun. 3, 2025) <https://www.hrw.org/report/2025/06/03/hunted-from-above/russias-use-of-drones-to-attack-civilians-in-kherson-ukraine>.

¹¹⁵² Agnieszka Pikulicka-Wilczewska, *‘Russian in Kherson Train on Civilians’: Deadly Drones Stalk South Ukraine*, ALJAZEERA (Jan. 16, 2025),

<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/1/16/russians-in-kherson-train-on-civilians-deadly-drones-stalk-south-ukraine>

¹¹⁵³ Agnieszka Pikulicka-Wilczewska, *‘Russian in Kherson Train on Civilians’: Deadly Drones Stalk South Ukraine*, ALJAZEERA (Jan. 16, 2025),

<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/1/16/russians-in-kherson-train-on-civilians-deadly-drones-stalk-south-ukraine>

Count 2: War Crime – Intentionally Attacking Civilians

Rome Statute **8(2)(b)(i)**¹¹⁵⁴

Geneva Convention **Common Article 3(1)(a); API Art. 51**¹¹⁵⁵

Elements:

1. The perpetrator directed an attack.
2. The object of the attack was a civilian population as such or individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities.
3. The perpetrator intended the civilian population as such or individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities to be the object of the attack.
4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.
5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Element 1: The perpetrator directed an attack.

Russian social media accounts claim responsibility for the attacks and publish videos of soldiers purposefully attacking civilians.¹¹⁵⁶

Element 2: The object of the attack was a civilian population as such or individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities.

Russian social media accounts indicate that the civilians being attacked are the intended target as a means to displace the civilian population and instill fear in the populace.¹¹⁵⁷

Element 3: The perpetrator intended the civilian population as such or individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities to be the object of the attack.

¹¹⁵⁴ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 8(2)(b)(i), 8(2)(e)(i), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.

¹¹⁵⁵ Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 3(1)(a), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 51, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.

¹¹⁵⁶ From Mariupol to the Carpathians (@osvedomitell_alex), TELEGRAM (Oct. 9, 2024) https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/21472.

¹¹⁵⁷ *Hunted From Above: Russia's Use of Drones to Attack Civilians in Kherson, Ukraine*, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, (Jun. 3, 2025) <https://www.hrw.org/report/2025/06/03/hunted-from-above/russias-use-of-drones-to-attack-civilians-in-kherson-ukraine>.

Russian has targeted hundreds of civilians.¹¹⁵⁸ The weapons used in the attacks contain cameras that are sufficient to identify the individuals as civilians.¹¹⁵⁹

Element 4: The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.

The ongoing drone strikes are part of the wider Russian invasion of Ukraine that began in FEB 2022 and their ongoing attacks against the frontline city of Kherson, Ukraine.¹¹⁶⁰

Element 5: The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Russia's military occupation of Ukraine necessarily brings with it awareness of the existence of an armed conflict.¹¹⁶¹

Count 3: The War Crime of Willfully Causing Great Suffering

Rome Statute **Articles 8(2)(a)(iii)**¹¹⁶²

Geneva Conventions **Common Article 3(1)(a); IV Article 27**¹¹⁶³

Elements:

1. The perpetrator caused great physical or mental pain or suffering to, or serious injury to body or health of, one or more persons.
2. Such person or persons were protected under one or more of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
3. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that protected status.

¹¹⁵⁸ Press Release from OHCHR, UN Commission Concludes That Russian Armed Forces' Drone Attacks Against Civilians in Kherson Province Amount to Crimes Against Humanity of Murder (May 28, 2025), (on file with OHCHR).

¹¹⁵⁹ *Hunted From Above: Russia's Use of Drones to Attack Civilians in Kherson, Ukraine*, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, (Jun. 3, 2025) <https://www.hrw.org/report/2025/06/03/hunted-from-above/russias-use-of-drones-to-attack-civilians-in-kherson-ukraine>.

¹¹⁶⁰ Reyes & Caitlin Doornbos, *Ukrainian Toddler Blown Up by Russian Drone as he Played Outside in Targeted Attack - As Moscow Turns Kherson into 'Human Safari Zone'*, NEW YORK POST (Jul. 10, 2025) <https://nypost.com/2025/07/10/world-news/ukrainian-toddler-murdered-in-evil-targeted-attack-by-russian-suicide-drone-in-kherson/>.

¹¹⁶¹ Agnieszka Pikulicka-Wilczewska, *'Russian in Kherson Train on Civilians': Deadly Drones Stalk South Ukraine*, ALJAZEERA (Jan. 16, 2025), <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/1/16/russians-in-kherson-train-on-civilians-deadly-drones-stalk-south-ukraine>

¹¹⁶² Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 8(2)(a)(iii), 8(2)(c)(i), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.

¹¹⁶³ Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 3(1)(a), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 27, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.

4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.
5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Element 1: The perpetrator caused great physical or mental pain or suffering to, or serious injury to body or health of, one or more persons.

Russia has targeted hundreds of civilians who were wounded and/or killed.¹¹⁶⁴ The publicized drone footage shows the wounding and killing of civilians.¹¹⁶⁵

Element 2: Such person or persons were protected under one or more of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

The victims of the attack were civilians.¹¹⁶⁶ Civilians are protected under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions as “[p]ersons taking no active part in hostilities.”¹¹⁶⁷

Element 3: The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that protected status.

The drones used in the strikes contain cameras that show the targeted individuals in clear detail.¹¹⁶⁸ Russian drone operators could see that these individuals are civilians prior to the weapons’ discharge.¹¹⁶⁹

Element 4: The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.

The attack was committed as part of Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine and their attacks

¹¹⁶⁴ Agnieszka Pikulicka-Wilczewska, ‘*Russian in Kherson Train on Civilians*’: *Deadly Drones Stalk South Ukraine*, ALJAZEERA (Jan. 16, 2025),

<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/1/16/russians-in-kherson-train-on-civilians-deadly-drones-stalk-south-ukraine>

¹¹⁶⁵ *Hunted From Above: Russia’s Use of Drones to Attack Civilians in Kherson, Ukraine*, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, (Jun. 3, 2025)

<https://www.hrw.org/report/2025/06/03/hunted-from-above/russias-use-of-drones-to-attack-civilians-in-kherson-ukraine>.

¹¹⁶⁶ Press Release from OHCHR, UN Commission Concludes That Russian Armed Forces’ Drone Attacks Against Civilians in Kherson Province Amount to Crimes Against Humanity of Murder (May 28, 2025), (on file with OHCHR).

¹¹⁶⁷ Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.

¹¹⁶⁸ From Mariupol to the Carpathians (@osvedomitell_alex), TELEGRAM (Oct. 9, 2024)

https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/21472.

¹¹⁶⁹ *Hunted From Above: Russia’s Use of Drones to Attack Civilians in Kherson, Ukraine*, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, (Jun. 3, 2025)

<https://www.hrw.org/report/2025/06/03/hunted-from-above/russias-use-of-drones-to-attack-civilians-in-kherson-ukraine>.

against the city of Kherson, Ukraine.¹¹⁷⁰

Element 5: The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Russia's military occupation of Ukraine necessarily brings with it awareness of the existence of an armed conflict.¹¹⁷¹

Count 4: The War Crime of Attacking Undefended Places

Rome Statute **Article 8(2)(b)(v)**¹¹⁷²

Geneva Convention **IV Article 53**; **API Article 52**¹¹⁷³

Elements:

1. The perpetrator attacked one or more towns, villages, dwellings or buildings.
2. Such towns, villages, dwellings or buildings were open for unresisted occupation.
3. Such towns, villages, dwellings or buildings did not constitute military objectives.
4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.
5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Element 1: The perpetrator attacked one or more towns, villages, dwellings or buildings.

Drone operators from the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation have targeted medical facilities, grocery stores, and civilian homes that were not being used to resist Russian occupation.¹¹⁷⁴

Element 2: Such towns, villages, dwellings or buildings were open for unresisted occupation.

¹¹⁷⁰ Agnieszka Pikulicka-Wilczewska, 'Russian in Kherson Train on Civilians': Deadly Drones Stalk South Ukraine, ALJAZEERA (Jan. 16, 2025),

<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/1/16/russians-in-kherson-train-on-civilians-deadly-drones-stalk-south-ukraine>

¹¹⁷¹ *Ukraine: Russia Using Drones to Attack Civilians, Russian Military Committing War Crimes in Kherson*, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, (Jun. 3, 2025)

<https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/06/03/ukraine-russia-using-drones-attack-civilians>.

¹¹⁷² Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(b)(v), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.

¹¹⁷³ Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 53, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 52, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.

¹¹⁷⁴ *Hunted From Above: Russia's Use of Drones to Attack Civilians in Kherson, Ukraine*, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, (Jun. 3, 2025)

<https://www.hrw.org/report/2025/06/03/hunted-from-above/russias-use-of-drones-to-attack-civilians-in-kherson-ukraine>.

There is no evidence that there was any resistance or persons taking an active part in hostilities who were resisting occupation by Russian forces in the medical facilities or civilian homes that were targeted.¹¹⁷⁵

Element 3: Such towns, villages, dwellings or buildings did not constitute military objectives.

There is no indication that the targets are a valid military objective.¹¹⁷⁶ There is no indication the homes, medical facilities, grocery stores, or other targeted buildings were being used to resist Russian military occupation.¹¹⁷⁷

Element 4: The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.

The drone strikes are being conducted by Russian military forces as part of their ongoing invasion of Ukraine and their attacks against the frontline city of Kherson, Ukraine.¹¹⁷⁸

Element 5: The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Russia's military occupation of Ukraine necessarily brings with it awareness of the existence of an armed conflict.¹¹⁷⁹

Count 5: The War Crime of Attacking Protected Objects

Rome Statute **Article 8(2)(b)(ix)**¹¹⁸⁰

¹¹⁷⁵ *Hunted From Above: Russia's Use of Drones to Attack Civilians in Kherson, Ukraine*, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, (Jun. 3, 2025)

<https://www.hrw.org/report/2025/06/03/hunted-from-above/russias-use-of-drones-to-attack-civilians-in-kherson-ukraine>.

¹¹⁷⁶ Ronny Reyes & Caitlin Doornbos, *Ukrainian Toddler Blown Up by Russian Drone as he Played Outside in Targeted Attack - As Moscow Turns Kherson into 'Human Safari Zone'*, NEW YORK POST (Jul. 10, 2025) <https://nypost.com/2025/07/10/world-news/ukrainian-toddler-murdered-in-evil-targeted-attack-by-russian-suicide-drone-in-kherson/>.

¹¹⁷⁷ *Hunted From Above: Russia's Use of Drones to Attack Civilians in Kherson, Ukraine*, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, (Jun. 3, 2025)

<https://www.hrw.org/report/2025/06/03/hunted-from-above/russias-use-of-drones-to-attack-civilians-in-kherson-ukraine>.

¹¹⁷⁸ Press Release from OHCHR, UN Commission Concludes That Russian Armed Forces' Drone Attacks Against Civilians in Kherson Province Amount to Crimes Against Humanity of Murder (May 28, 2025), (on file with OHCHR).

¹¹⁷⁹ Ronny Reyes & Caitlin Doornbos, *Ukrainian Toddler Blown Up by Russian Drone as he Played Outside in Targeted Attack - As Moscow Turns Kherson into 'Human Safari Zone'*, NEW YORK POST (Jul. 10, 2025) <https://nypost.com/2025/07/10/world-news/ukrainian-toddler-murdered-in-evil-targeted-attack-by-russian-suicide-drone-in-kherson/>.

¹¹⁸⁰ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(b)(ix), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.

Elements:

1. The perpetrator directed an attack.
2. The object of the attack was one or more buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals or places where the sick and wounded are collected, which were not military objectives.
3. The perpetrator intended such building or buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals or places where the sick and wounded are collected, which were not military objectives, to be the object of the attack.
4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.
5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Element 1: The perpetrator directed an attack.

Drone operators of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are purposefully launching drone strikes against civilians in Kherson, Ukraine.¹¹⁸²

Element 2: The object of the attack was one or more buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals or places where the sick and wounded are collected, which were not military objectives.

Medical facilities have been targeted by the drones as part of Russia's campaign against Kherson, Ukraine.¹¹⁸³

Element 3: The perpetrator intended such building or buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals or places where the sick and wounded are collected, which were not military objectives, to be the object of the attack.

The camera footage taken by the drones during the strikes are being uploaded to social media

¹¹⁸¹ Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 18, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 53, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.

¹¹⁸² *Hunted From Above: Russia's Use of Drones to Attack Civilians in Kherson, Ukraine*, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, (Jun. 3, 2025) <https://www.hrw.org/report/2025/06/03/hunted-from-above/russias-use-of-drones-to-attack-civilians-in-kherson-ukraine>.

¹¹⁸³ Agnieszka Pikulicka-Wilczewska, 'Russian in Kherson Train on Civilians': Deadly Drones Stalk South Ukraine, ALJAZEERA (Jan. 16, 2025), <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/1/16/russians-in-kherson-train-on-civilians-deadly-drones-stalk-south-ukraine>

with warnings that similar strikes will continue to be carried out, thus indicating the intent of the strikes.¹¹⁸⁴

Element 4: The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.

The attacks are being committed as part of Russia's ongoing invasion of Ukraine.¹¹⁸⁵

Element 5: The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Russia's military occupation of Ukraine necessarily brings with it awareness of the existence of an armed conflict.¹¹⁸⁶

¹¹⁸⁴ *Hunted From Above: Russia's Use of Drones to Attack Civilians in Kherson, Ukraine*, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, (Jun. 3, 2025) <https://www.hrw.org/report/2025/06/03/hunted-from-above/russias-use-of-drones-to-attack-civilians-in-kherson-ukraine>.

¹¹⁸⁵ Agnieszka Pikulicka-Wilczewska, *'Russian in Kherson Train on Civilians': Deadly Drones Stalk South Ukraine*, ALJAZEERA (Jan. 16, 2025),

<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/1/16/russians-in-kherson-train-on-civilians-deadly-drones-stalk-south-ukraine>

¹¹⁸⁶ Ronny Reyes & Caitlin Doornbos, *Ukrainian Toddler Blown Up by Russian Drone as he Played Outside in Targeted Attack - As Moscow Turns Kherson into 'Human Safari Zone'*, NEW YORK POST (Jul. 10, 2025) <https://nypost.com/2025/07/10/world-news/ukrainian-toddler-murdered-in-evil-targeted-attack-by-russian-suicide-drone-in-kherson/>.

Incident: 28 AUG 2025 Kyiv Missile and Drone Strike

Assessment: We assess with high confidence that on 28 August 2025, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation struck an apartment building in Kyiv, Ukraine, killing at least 23 people and damaging the nearby European Union Diplomatic Mission and the British Council.

Narrative: On 28 August 2025 the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation carried out a widespread missile and drone attack on the Ukrainian capital of Kyiv.¹¹⁸⁷ According to Ukrainian forces, nearly 600 drones and more than 30 ballistic and cruise missiles were fired at the city.¹¹⁸⁸ A residential block was targeted in the southeastern Kyiv neighborhood of Darnytskyi.¹¹⁸⁹ At 5:40 am a missile struck an apartment building and caused it to collapse.¹¹⁹⁰ At least 23 people were killed in this building, including three children, aged 2, 14, and 17.¹¹⁹¹

Around 50 meters away from the missile's point of impact was the EU diplomatic mission.¹¹⁹² The building was heavily damaged.¹¹⁹³ The British Council building was also damaged in the strike.¹¹⁹⁴ At the time, this was the second largest missile and drone strike to have been carried out on Kyiv.¹¹⁹⁵ At least 13 locations were struck in the city and at least 63 people were wounded in the strike.¹¹⁹⁶ Of the nearly 600 drones, 563 had been shot down by air defenses as were 26 of the 31 missiles.¹¹⁹⁷ The Russian Ministry of Defense stated that the targets were part of the

¹¹⁸⁷ Katy Watson & Paul Kirby, *European Leaders Outraged After Russian Strikes Kill 23 and Damage EU's HQ*, BBC (Aug. 29, 2025), <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvg3y7m2gz0o>.

¹¹⁸⁸ Taras Garanich & Anastasiia Malenko, *Russian Missiles Pound Ukraine, Damage EU and British Offices*, REUTERS (Aug. 28, 2025), <https://www.reuters.com/world/russian-missiles-pound-ukraine-damage-eu-british-offices-2025-08-28/>.

¹¹⁸⁹ Jorge Liboreiro, *EU Delegation in Kyiv Severely Damaged by Shock Wave of Russian Strike*, EURO NEWS (Aug. 28, 2025), <https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/08/28/eu-delegation-in-kyiv-severely-damaged-by-shock-wave-of-russian-strike>.

¹¹⁹⁰ Katy Watson & Paul Kirby, *European Leaders Outraged After Russian Strikes Kill 23 and Damage EU's HQ*, BBC (Aug. 29, 2025), <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvg3y7m2gz0o>.

¹¹⁹¹ Katy Watson & Paul Kirby, *European Leaders Outraged After Russian Strikes Kill 23 and Damage EU's HQ*, BBC (Aug. 29, 2025), <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvg3y7m2gz0o>.

¹¹⁹² Jorge Liboreiro, *EU Delegation in Kyiv Severely Damaged by Shock Wave of Russian Strike*, EURO NEWS (Aug. 28, 2025), <https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/08/28/eu-delegation-in-kyiv-severely-damaged-by-shock-wave-of-russian-strike>.

¹¹⁹³ Taras Garanich & Anastasiia Malenko, *Russian Missiles Pound Ukraine, Damage EU and British Offices*, REUTERS (Aug. 28, 2025), <https://www.reuters.com/world/russian-missiles-pound-ukraine-damage-eu-british-offices-2025-08-28/>.

¹¹⁹⁴ Callum Sutherland, *European Leaders Condemn Putin's 'Bloodshed' After Russia Strikes Kyiv's E.U. Mission and British Council Buildings*, TIME (Aug. 29, 2025), <https://time.com/7312918/russia-strikes-eu-british-council-buildings-kyiv-death-toll/>.

¹¹⁹⁵ Katy Watson & Paul Kirby, *European Leaders Outraged After Russian Strikes Kill 23 and Damage EU's HQ*, BBC (Aug. 29, 2025), <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvg3y7m2gz0o>.

¹¹⁹⁶ Taras Garanich & Anastasiia Malenko, *Russian Missiles Pound Ukraine, Damage EU and British Offices*, REUTERS (Aug. 28, 2025), <https://www.reuters.com/world/russian-missiles-pound-ukraine-damage-eu-british-offices-2025-08-28/>.

¹¹⁹⁷ Katy Watson & Paul Kirby, *European Leaders Outraged After Russian Strikes Kill 23 and Damage EU's HQ*, BBC (Aug. 29, 2025), <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvg3y7m2gz0o>.

“military industrial complex” of Ukraine and “all” targets were struck.¹¹⁹⁸ There is no indication the apartment building nor the diplomatic missions were legitimate targets or participating in hostilities.¹¹⁹⁹

Parties Involved: The facts surrounding this missile and strike, including admissions by the Russian Ministry of Defense, implicate Russia and the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

Legal Analysis: These actions violate both Rome Statute and the Geneva Conventions, some of which are analyzed below.

Count 1: The War Crime of Willful Killing

Rome Statute **Articles 8(2)(a)(i)**¹²⁰⁰

Geneva Convention **Common Article 3(1)(a); IV Article 27**¹²⁰¹

Elements:

1. The perpetrator killed one or more persons.
2. Such person or persons were protected under one or more of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
3. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that protected status.
4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.
5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Element 1: The perpetrator killed one or more persons.

Russia killed at least 23 civilians in the strikes.¹²⁰²

Element 2: Such person or persons were protected under one or more of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

¹¹⁹⁸ Callum Sutherland, *European Leaders Condemn Putin’s ‘Bloodshed’ After Russia Strikes Kyiv’s E.U. Mission and British Council Buildings*, TIME (Aug. 29, 2025), <https://time.com/7312918/russia-strikes-eu-british-council-buildings-kyiv-death-toll/>.

¹¹⁹⁹ Katy Watson & Paul Kirby, *European Leaders Outraged After Russian Strikes Kill 23 and Damage EU’s HQ*, BBC (Aug. 29, 2025), <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvg3y7m2gz0o>.

¹²⁰⁰ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 8(2)(a)(i), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.

¹²⁰¹ Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 3(1)(a), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 27, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.

¹²⁰² Katy Watson & Paul Kirby, *European Leaders Outraged After Russian Strikes Kill 23 and Damage EU’s HQ*, BBC (Aug. 29, 2025), <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvg3y7m2gz0o>.

The victims of the attack were civilians.¹²⁰³ Civilians are protected under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions as “[p]ersons taking no active part in hostilities.”¹²⁰⁴

Element 3: The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that protected status.

Russia struck a residential area that was surrounded by diplomatic facilities.¹²⁰⁵

Element 4: The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.

The attack was committed as part of the ongoing armed conflict that began with Russia invading Ukraine.¹²⁰⁶

Element 5: The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Russia’s military occupation of Ukraine necessarily brings with it awareness of the existence of an armed conflict.¹²⁰⁷

Count 2: War Crime – Intentionally Attacking Civilians

Rome Statute **8(2)(b)(i)**¹²⁰⁸

Geneva Convention **Common Article 3(1)(a); API Art. 51**¹²⁰⁹

Elements:

1. The perpetrator directed an attack.
2. The object of the attack was a civilian population as such or individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities.
3. The perpetrator intended the civilian population as such or individual civilians not taking

¹²⁰³ Katy Watson & Paul Kirby, *European Leaders Outraged After Russian Strikes Kill 23 and Damage EU’s HQ*, BBC (Aug. 29, 2025), <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvg3y7m2gz0o>.

¹²⁰⁴ Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.

¹²⁰⁵ Callum Sutherland, *European Leaders Condemn Putin’s ‘Bloodshed’ After Russia Strikes Kyiv’s E.U. Mission and British Council Buildings*, TIME (Aug. 29, 2025), <https://time.com/7312918/russia-strikes-eu-british-council-buildings-kyiv-death-toll/>.

¹²⁰⁶ Katy Watson & Paul Kirby, *European Leaders Outraged After Russian Strikes Kill 23 and Damage EU’s HQ*, BBC (Aug. 29, 2025), <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvg3y7m2gz0o>.

¹²⁰⁷ Katy Watson & Paul Kirby, *European Leaders Outraged After Russian Strikes Kill 23 and Damage EU’s HQ*, BBC (Aug. 29, 2025), <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvg3y7m2gz0o>.

¹²⁰⁸ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 8(2)(b)(i), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.

¹²⁰⁹ Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 3(1)(a), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 51, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.

direct part in hostilities to be the object of the attack.

4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.
5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Element 1: The perpetrator directed an attack.

The strike was carried out by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation as part of a larger drone and missile strike against the city of Kyiv.¹²¹⁰

Element 2: The object of the attack was a civilian population as such or individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities.

The missile struck an apartment building during a time when most would still be in their homes.¹²¹¹ There is no indication that the residents were actively participating in the armed conflict.¹²¹²

Element 3: The perpetrator intended the civilian population as such or individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities to be the object of the attack.

Russia destroyed an apartment building and multiple diplomatic facilities were heavily damaged in the strike.¹²¹³

Element 4: The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.

The missile strike was part of the wider Russian Invasion of Ukraine that began in February 2022.¹²¹⁴

Element 5: The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of

¹²¹⁰ Callum Sutherland, *European Leaders Condemn Putin's 'Bloodshed' After Russia Strikes Kyiv's E.U. Mission and British Council Buildings*, TIME (Aug. 29, 2025), <https://time.com/7312918/russia-strikes-eu-british-council-buildings-kyiv-death-toll/>.

¹²¹¹ Katy Watson & Paul Kirby, *European Leaders Outraged After Russian Strikes Kill 23 and Damage EU's HQ*, BBC (Aug. 29, 2025), <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvg3y7m2gz0o>.

¹²¹² Callum Sutherland, *European Leaders Condemn Putin's 'Bloodshed' After Russia Strikes Kyiv's E.U. Mission and British Council Buildings*, TIME (Aug. 29, 2025), <https://time.com/7312918/russia-strikes-eu-british-council-buildings-kyiv-death-toll/>.

¹²¹³ Jorge Liboreiro, *EU Delegation in Kyiv Severely Damaged by Shock Wave of Russian Strike*, EURO NEWS (Aug. 28, 2025), <https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/08/28/eu-delegation-in-kyiv-severely-damaged-by-shock-wave-of-russian-strike>.

¹²¹⁴ Callum Sutherland, *European Leaders Condemn Putin's 'Bloodshed' After Russia Strikes Kyiv's E.U. Mission and British Council Buildings*, TIME (Aug. 29, 2025), <https://time.com/7312918/russia-strikes-eu-british-council-buildings-kyiv-death-toll/>.

an armed conflict.

Russia's military occupation of Ukraine necessarily brings with it awareness of the existence of an armed conflict.¹²¹⁵

Count 3: The War Crime of Willfully Causing Great Suffering

Rome Statute **Articles 8(2)(a)(iii)**¹²¹⁶

Geneva Conventions **Common Article 3(1)(a); IV Article 27**¹²¹⁷

Elements:

1. The perpetrator caused great physical or mental pain or suffering to, or serious injury to body or health of, one or more persons.
2. Such person or persons were protected under one or more of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
3. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that protected status.
4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.
5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Element 1: The perpetrator caused great physical or mental pain or suffering to, or serious injury to body or health of, one or more persons.

Russia killed at least 23 civilians in the strikes, including multiple children.¹²¹⁸ Many others were injured as well.¹²¹⁹

Element 2: Such person or persons were protected under one or more of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

¹²¹⁵ Callum Sutherland, *European Leaders Condemn Putin's 'Bloodshed' After Russia Strikes Kyiv's E.U. Mission and British Council Buildings*, TIME (Aug. 29, 2025), <https://time.com/7312918/russia-strikes-eu-british-council-buildings-kyiv-death-toll/>.

¹²¹⁶ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 8(2)(a)(iii), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.

¹²¹⁷ Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 3(1)(a), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 27, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.

¹²¹⁸ Katy Watson & Paul Kirby, *European Leaders Outraged After Russian Strikes Kill 23 and Damage EU's HQ*, BBC (Aug. 29, 2025), <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvg3y7m2gz0o>.

¹²¹⁹ Katy Watson & Paul Kirby, *European Leaders Outraged After Russian Strikes Kill 23 and Damage EU's HQ*, BBC (Aug. 29, 2025), <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvg3y7m2gz0o>.

The victims of the attack were civilians.¹²²⁰ Civilians are protected under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions as “[p]ersons taking no active part in hostilities.”¹²²¹

Element 3: The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that protected status.

The strike hit a residential building where diplomatic facilities were located as well.¹²²²

Element 4: The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.

The attack was committed as part of Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine.¹²²³

Element 5: The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Russia’s military occupation of Ukraine necessarily brings with it awareness of the existence of an armed conflict.¹²²⁴

¹²²⁰ Callum Sutherland, *European Leaders Condemn Putin’s ‘Bloodshed’ After Russia Strikes Kyiv’s E.U. Mission and British Council Buildings*, TIME (Aug. 29, 2025), <https://time.com/7312918/russia-strikes-eu-british-council-buildings-kyiv-death-toll/>.

¹²²¹ Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.

¹²²² Callum Sutherland, *European Leaders Condemn Putin’s ‘Bloodshed’ After Russia Strikes Kyiv’s E.U. Mission and British Council Buildings*, TIME (Aug. 29, 2025), <https://time.com/7312918/russia-strikes-eu-british-council-buildings-kyiv-death-toll/>.

¹²²³ Jorge Liboreiro, *EU Delegation in Kyiv Severely Damaged by Shock Wave of Russian Strike*, EURO NEWS (Aug. 28, 2025), <https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/08/28/eu-delegation-in-kyiv-severely-damaged-by-shock-wave-of-russian-strike>.

¹²²⁴ Taras Garanich & Anastasiia Malenko, *Russian Missiles Pound Ukraine, Damage EU and British Offices*, REUTERS (Aug. 28, 2025), <https://www.reuters.com/world/russian-missiles-pound-ukraine-damage-eu-british-offices-2025-08-28/>.



B. MOST RESPONSIBLE PARTIES

I. Introduction and Scope

The purpose of this report is to provide an overview of the Russian Military and Senior Leadership who are the most responsible for the crimes committed in Ukraine. This includes their roles, responsibilities, and the crimes or events that they took part in. As previously stated throughout this publication the list of responsible parties is not exhaustive. The resources used to collect information on these parties are open source.

II. Key Areas

Key Political Areas

Russia's political power is distributed among its *oblasti* (regions), *kraya* (territories), *okruga* (autonomous district), and two Federal Cities.¹²²⁵

The Federal Cities are Moscow (Capital, located in Western Russia), and Saint Petersburg (often called the "Northern Capital").¹²²⁶

Russia is further divided into eight Federal Districts overseen by President-appointed plenipotentiaries, which monitor the consistency between federal and regional law.¹²²⁷ The districts are: Central, Far East, Northwest, Siberia, Southern, Urals, Volga, and North Caucasian.¹²²⁸

There are approximately 114 Foreign Embassies and 87 Consulates in Russian territory, and approximately 140 Russian Embassies and over 80 Consulates around the world.¹²²⁹ Russia, before the war, maintained one Embassy and three consulates in Ukraine. The Embassy was located in Kyiv, while the three consulates were located in Kharkiv, Lviv, and Odessa, respectively.¹²³⁰ It was reported that Russia evacuated the Embassy and Consulates in Ukraine on February 23, 2022.¹²³¹

¹²²⁵ *The Political System of the Russian Federation: President and Government*, THE STATE DUMA (9 Nov. 2018), <http://duma.gov.ru/en/news/28748/>.

¹²²⁶ *The Political System of the Russian Federation: President and Government*, THE STATE DUMA (9 Nov. 2018), <http://duma.gov.ru/en/news/28748/>.

¹²²⁷ *The Political System of the Russian Federation: President and Government*, THE STATE DUMA (9 Nov. 2018), <http://duma.gov.ru/en/news/28748/>.

¹²²⁸ *The Political System of the Russian Federation: President and Government*, THE STATE DUMA (9 Nov. 2018), <http://duma.gov.ru/en/news/28748/>.

¹²²⁹ *List of Diplomatic Missions in Russia & Russian Diplomatic Missions Abroad*, EMBASSY WORLDWIDE, <https://www.embassy-worldwide.com/country/russia/> (last visited 4 Sept. 2025); *Russia Embassies and Consulates*, EMBASSY.NET, <https://embassies.net/russia-embassy> (last visited 4 Sep. 2025).

¹²³⁰ *List of Diplomatic Missions in Russia & Russian Diplomatic Missions Abroad*, EMBASSY WORLDWIDE, <https://www.embassy-worldwide.com/country/russia/> (last visited 15 Apr. 2023).

¹²³¹ Dasha Litvinova & Yuras Karmanau, *Moscow Evacuating Embassy in Kyiv, Ukraine Urges Citizens to Leave Russia*, PBS NEWS (23 Feb. 2022),

Key Military Areas

Russia contains five OSKs (military districts): Western, Southern, Northern Fleet Joint Strategic Command, Central, and Eastern.¹²³²

Each military district command center houses Ground Forces, Air Force, Air Defense, and Navy outfits.¹²³³ Districts fall under the command of the district headquarters, headed by the district commander, and are subordinated to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.¹²³⁴

Russia maintains approximately twenty military bases outside its territory, primarily located in post-Soviet states and Syria (Center S, Khmeimim Air Base, and Tartus).¹²³⁵ Bases in Syria have been affected by the recent transfer of power within the country, leading to what appears as Russia's withdrawal from Tartus and reduced forces at Khmeimim.¹²³⁶ Bases are also located in Belarus (including nuclear submarine sites), Tajikistan, Kazakhstan (Baikonur Cosmodrome), Kyrgyzstan (Kant Air Base), and Armenia.¹²³⁷ Russia also maintains a military presence in Crimea and the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine.¹²³⁸

Russia also operates the Arctic Brigade that includes outposts, air bases, and special forces units.¹²³⁹ These agreements and operations are part of a multi-step strategy that involves stationing peacekeepers in frozen conflict zones and integrating aspects of the region's military forces through the CSTO and joint air defense agreements.¹²⁴⁰

<https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/moscow-evacuating-embassy-in-kyiv-ukraine-urges-citizens-to-leave-russia#:~:text=Moscow%20evacuating%20embassy%20in%20Kyiv,to%20leave%20Russia%20%7C%20PBS%20News.>

¹²³² TRADOC Deputy Chief of Staff, *Russian Military Quick Reference Guide*, US ARMY TRAINING & DOCTRINE COMMAND (Jan. 2020), <https://irp.fas.org/world/russia/tradoc-refguide.pdf>.

¹²³³ TRADOC Deputy Chief of Staff, *Russian Military Quick Reference Guide*, US ARMY TRAINING & DOCTRINE COMMAND (Jan. 2020), <https://irp.fas.org/world/russia/tradoc-refguide.pdf>.

¹²³⁴ TRADOC Deputy Chief of Staff, *Russian Military Quick Reference Guide*, US ARMY TRAINING & DOCTRINE COMMAND (Jan. 2020), <https://irp.fas.org/world/russia/tradoc-refguide.pdf>.

¹²³⁵ Anna Maria Dyer, *The Importance of Foreign Military Bases for Russia*, PISM (25 May 2020), https://pism.pl/publications/The_Importance_of_Foreign_Military_Bases_for_Russia.

¹²³⁶ Howard Altman, *Russia's Air Base in Syria Has Become Refuge from Fierce Sectarian Violence*, THE WAR ZONE (10 Mar 2025),

<https://www.twz.com/news-features/russias-air-base-in-syria-has-become-a-refuge-after-fierce-fighting-satellite-images-show>.

¹²³⁷ Jeff Hawn, *Russia's Extraterritorial Military Deployments*, NEWLINES INSTIT. (31 Mar. 2021), <https://newlinesinstitute.org/russia/russias-extraterritorial-military-deployments/>.

¹²³⁸ Anna Maria Dyer, *The Importance of Foreign Military Bases for Russia*, PISM (25 May 2020), https://pism.pl/publications/The_Importance_of_Foreign_Military_Bases_for_Russia.

¹²³⁹ Matthew Melino & Heather A. Conley, *The Ice Curtain: Russia's Military Presence in the Arctic*, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L STUDIES, <https://www.csis.org/features/ice-curtain-russias-arctic-military-presence> (last visited 19 Mar. 2022).

¹²⁴⁰ Dmitry Goreburg, *Russia's Foreign Military Basing Strategy*, PONARS EURASIA (20 Sept. 2021), <https://www.ponarseurasia.org/russias-foreign-military-basing-strategy/>.

In addition to China, a traditional ally of Russia, several states have shown support and maintain positive military relationships with Russia throughout the Ukraine conflict. These include Belarus, Myanmar, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and North Korea.¹²⁴¹

Relevant Areas of Operations

Russia has consistently offered conventional regime support to Syria, particularly during the Assad regime, and more covert support to the Central African Republic and Venezuela.¹²⁴² It also provides insurgent support to Libya and the rebel Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk.¹²⁴³

Russian troops currently carry out conventional peacekeeping operations in Georgia, and Moldova.¹²⁴⁴

Russia maintains a deployment in the Transnistria region of Moldova, known as the Operational Group of Russian Forces, for military exercises and training.¹²⁴⁵ This outpost has become especially active since the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

More than 30,000 troops were deployed in Belarus for alleged joint military exercises as of February 2022.¹²⁴⁶

The Russian invasion of Ukraine (official name is the “Special Operation in Ukraine”, sometimes referred to as an “Operation Z”) includes the use of Chechen special commando units, known as *kadyrovtsy*.¹²⁴⁷

III. Key Structures and Infrastructure

Importance of Belarusian Infrastructural Support in the Ukrainian Invasion

¹²⁴¹ *Where Do Russia's Allies Stand as Western powers slam Moscow*, ALJAZEERA (25 Feb. 2022), <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/25/where-do-russias-allies-stand-as-western-powers-slam-moscow>.

¹²⁴² Jeff Hawn, *Russia's Extraterritorial Military Deployments*, NEWLINES INSTITUTE (31 Mar. 2021), <https://newlinesinstitute.org/russia/russias-extraterritorial-military-deployments/>.

¹²⁴³ Jeff Hawn, *Russia's Extraterritorial Military Deployments*, NEWLINES INSTITUTE (31 Mar. 2021), <https://newlinesinstitute.org/russia/russias-extraterritorial-military-deployments/>.

¹²⁴⁴ Jeff Hawn, *Russia's Extraterritorial Military Deployments*, NEWLINES INSTITUTE (31 Mar. 2021), <https://newlinesinstitute.org/russia/russias-extraterritorial-military-deployments/>.

¹²⁴⁵ Tom Balmforth & Alexander Tanas, *Russian Forces Hold Military Drills in Breakaway Statelet Near Ukraine*, REUTERS (1 Feb. 2022), <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-forces-hold-military-drills-breakaway-statelet-near-ukraine-2022-02-01/>.

¹²⁴⁶ *NATO and the Ukraine-Russia crisis: Five key things to know*, AL JAZEERA (15 Feb. 2022), <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/15/explainer-nato-and-the-ukraine-russia-crisis>.

¹²⁴⁷ Alexey D. Muraviev, *How the Russian Military Remade Itself into a Modern, Efficient and Deadly Fighting Machine*, THE CONVERSATION (27 Feb. 2022, at 10:47 PM), <https://theconversation.com/how-the-russian-military-remade-itself-into-a-modern-efficient-and-deadly-fighting-machine-178014>.

In many ways, Belarus functions as an external organ of the Putin regime.¹²⁴⁸ Headed by a like-minded despotic and authoritarian ruler, Aleksandr Lukashenko is cut from the same post-Soviet anti-democratic cloth as Putin. Both have histories of cracking down on free speech, democratic processes, and both regimes are teeming with corruption. In recent years, Belarus has attracted negative international attention for the crackdown on the protests that sprang up in the wake of his reelection in 2020.¹²⁴⁹ Despite these hiccups, the Putin-Lukashenko partnership continued unabated, and the duo was seen enjoying a boat trip on the Black Sea in May 2022.¹²⁵⁰ By late 2021, Russia was positioning troops in Belarus. Few alarm bells sounded. In mid-February 2022, Russia announced joint military exercises in Belarus—the longest and most extensive exercises in recent memory.¹²⁵¹ By then, American intelligence knew that a Russian invasion of Ukraine was imminent.

Several international sources have claimed that Belarus was a “staging ground” for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.¹²⁵² This is partly true, but the statement can be broadened: Belarus is, in fact, more so Russia’s partner in the Ukraine invasion. In the ensuing weeks after the invasion, the EU and its partners sanctioned Belarus nearly as heavily as Russia. Without Belarus’ unwavering support of Russia and the Kremlin’s ability to use Belarus as an entry point into northern Ukraine, the invasion into Ukraine would have been difficult, if not impossible.

Belarus’ support makes the difference in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in the following ways:

- *Proximity to Kyiv.* From the Belarusian town of Gropol, it is nearly a straight, unobstructed shot to Kyiv. Newsweek posted a video of Russian tanks coming over the Belarusian border on the early morning of 24 FEB 2022.¹²⁵³ Essentially, Belarus serves as an extension of Russia’s border.
- *Additional troops if necessary.* Russia has sustained heavy losses in the conflict. Estimates vary, but most say about 40,000-60,000 soldiers have been killed.¹²⁵⁴ This helps make up the roughly 200,000 total casualties Russia has suffered, including those

¹²⁴⁸ Erin Cunningham & Maite Fernandez Simon, *What Role has Belarus Played in the Ukraine Crisis*, THE WASH. POST (28 Feb. 2022), <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/02/28/belarus-russia-ukraine-war/>.

¹²⁴⁹ *Belarus: Unprecedented Crackdown*, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (13 Jan. 2021), <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/01/13/belarus-unprecedented-crackdown#>.

¹²⁵⁰ Vladislav Davidzon, *Putin, Lukashenko Are Reluctant Authoritarian Bros*, FOREIGN POLICY (21 Jun. 2021), <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/06/21/putin-lukashenko-belarus-sanctions/>.

¹²⁵¹ *Ukraine tensions: Russia stages military drills with Belarus*, BBC (10 Feb. 2022), <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60327930>.

¹²⁵² Becky Sullivan, *Why Belarus is so involved in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine*, NPR (11 Mar. 2022), <https://www.npr.org/2022/03/11/1085548867/belarus-ukraine-russia-invasion-lukashenko-putin>.

¹²⁵³ Brendan Cole, *Belarus Joins Russia in Invading Ukraine as Video Shows Tanks Cross Border*, NEWSWEEK (24 Feb. 2022), <https://www.newsweek.com/russia-ukraine-belarus-putin-tanks-video-1682125>.

¹²⁵⁴ Matthew Luxmoore, *Russia’s Death Toll From Ukraine War Is as High as 60,000, UK Says*, WALL ST. J. (17 Feb. 2023), <https://www.wsj.com/articles/russias-death-toll-from-ukraine-war-is-as-high-as-60-000-u-k-says-14305ba5>.

wounded, missing, and captured.¹²⁵⁵ While Minsk has been careful about stepping in to help the invasion with more soldiers, it remains an option if Russia continues hemorrhaging personnel.¹²⁵⁶

Russia's Access to Chernobyl

Early in the conflict, Russia quickly surrounded and subsequently gained control of Chernobyl, the city that experienced the infamous nuclear disaster in 1986.¹²⁵⁷ While the radiation was too dangerous, the Russian army stationed itself in a city a safe distance away, as stationing near Chernobyl offers easy access to Kyiv, the seat of the Ukrainian government.¹²⁵⁸ It cannot be overstated how important it is to Russia's military endeavors that Russia retains control of the Belarusian border and the northern cities as Russia's army pushes toward Kyiv to bring the capital to its knees.

Conscription Situation

Russia has thousands of military conscripts that are rapidly losing morale as the invasion continues.¹²⁵⁹ The troops are badly trained and have little experience in combat.¹²⁶⁰ Despite hefty financial incentives and an original ambitious goal of attaining over 100,000 conscripts (now 160,000 for the Spring of 2025), Russia has had to resort to alternative measures.¹²⁶¹ This includes ordering conscripts with as little as electronic notification and having the Wagner Group recruit domestic prisoners with the enticement of freedom after serving.¹²⁶²

¹²⁵⁵ Matthew Luxmoore, *Russia's Death Toll From Ukraine War Is as High as 60,000, UK Says*, WALL ST. J. (17 Feb. 2023),

<https://www.wsj.com/articles/russias-death-toll-from-ukraine-war-is-as-high-as-60-000-u-k-says-14305ba5>.

¹²⁵⁶ Peter Beaumont, *Belarus may be about to send its troops into Ukraine, US official says*, THE GUARDIAN (28 Feb. 2022), <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/28/belarus-troops-ukraine-russia-invasion>.

¹²⁵⁷ Gul Tuysuz and Tamara Qiblawi, *Russian Forces Seize Control of Chernobyl Nuclear Plant and Hold Staff Hostage: Ukrainian Officials*, CNN (25 Feb. 2022),

<https://www.cnn.com/2022/02/24/europe/ukraine-chernobyl-russia-intl>.

¹²⁵⁸ Alex Seitz-Wald, *Why would Russia want to take Chernobyl?*, NBC NEWS (24 Feb. 2022),

<https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/russia-want-take-chernobyl-rcna17615>.

¹²⁵⁹ Matthew Luxmoore, *Russia's Death Toll From Ukraine War Is as High as 60,000, UK Says*, WALL ST. J. (17 Feb. 2023),

<https://www.wsj.com/articles/russias-death-toll-from-ukraine-war-is-as-high-as-60-000-u-k-says-14305ba5>.

¹²⁶⁰ Ellie Cook, *Russia's Ground Forces Poorly Trained and Using Antiquated Equipment: U.K.*, NEWSWEEK (14 May 2023),

<https://www.newsweek.com/russia-ground-forces-poorly-trained-antiquated-equipment-ukraine-counteroffensive-bakhmut-1800153>.

¹²⁶¹ Paul Kirby, *Putin Begins Biggest Russian Military Call-Up in Years*, BBC NEWS (1 Apr. 2025),

<https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c36718p52eyo>.

¹²⁶² *Putin Orders to Draft 147,000 Russian Conscripts by July 15*, BLOOMBERG NEWS (30 Mar. 2023),

<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-03-30/putin-orders-to-draft-147-000-conscripts-by-july-15-kremlin#xj4y7vzkg>. *Russian Federation: UN experts alarmed by recruitment of prisoners by "Wagner Group"*, OHCHR (10 Mar. 2023),

<https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/03/russian-federation-un-experts-alarmed-recruitment-prisoners-wagner-group>.

The situation is even worse on the ground than on paper. Many videos have surfaced on social media of abandoned tanks, and there are unconfirmed reports that conscripts are being told they are going for drill exercises when they are being sent to Ukraine.¹²⁶³ The now-famous UN speech during which a Russian soldier texts his mother moments before he was killed encapsulates the wide gulf between the soldiers' belief and reality.¹²⁶⁴ Instead of a quick and effective military campaign where "oppressed Russians" would greet them as liberating heroes, young, inexperienced soldiers are facing the horrors of war and a determined adversary.¹²⁶⁵

There has been another unexpected effect of attempting to conscript male Russians to serve. After Putin declared a partial mobilization on 24 September 2022, about 400,000 Russians fled the country in a matter of weeks.¹²⁶⁶ Nearly 200,000 fled to Kazakhstan: which has been seen as a "safe haven" for draft dodgers.¹²⁶⁷ Those fleeing are generally middle-class citizens who, broadly, tend to have specialized skill sets.¹²⁶⁸ The effect that these losses will have on the Russian economy is yet to be fully realized.¹²⁶⁹ However, they will likely be compounded by those of Putin's most recent draft order in March 2023.¹²⁷⁰

Military Hardware and Apparatuses Used in Ukraine Invasion

The military hardware that has been used thus far has been conventional weaponry and materiel typical of a ground invasion.¹²⁷¹ These weapons have been confirmed in their use in the Ukraine invasion. This list is not exhaustive.

- TOS-1 flamethrower system
- T-72 tanks
- BM-21 "Grad" multiple launch rocket system
- Smerch and Urugan rocket launchers (suspected)

¹²⁶³ Julie Coleman, *Videos of Apparently Abandoned Russian Military Vehicles in Ukraine are Popping Up as Russia's Invasion Suffers Setbacks*, BUSINESS INSIDER (1 Mar. 2022),

<https://www.businessinsider.com/videos-emerge-of-apparent-russian-military-vehicles-abandoned-in-ukraine-2022-3>
¹²⁶⁴ GUARDIAN NEWS, *Ukraine's UN ambassador reads texts from Russian soldier to mother before he was killed*, YOUTUBE (28 Feb. 2022), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qhQ5P_u4g-M.

¹²⁶⁵ Neil MacFarquhar and Milana Mazaeva, *Russia's Youngest Conscripts Unexpectedly See Combat Against Ukraine's Invasion*, THE NEW YORK TIMES (31 Aug. 2024), <https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/31/world/europe/russia-ukraine-conscripts-kursk.html>.

¹²⁶⁶ Isabel van Brugen, *Putin's Mobilization Backfires as 370,000 Flee Russia in Two Weeks*, NEWSWEEK (4 Oct. 2022), <https://www.newsweek.com/putin-mobilization-backfires-russians-flee-kazakhstan-georgia-eu-1748771>.

¹²⁶⁷ Trevor Filseth, *Kazakhstan to Accept Russian Draft Dodgers*, NAT'L INTEREST (29 Sept. 2022), <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/kazakhstan-accept-russian-draft-dodgers-205096>.

¹²⁶⁸ Michael Laff, *Russia's Top Talent Fleeing to Other Countries*, US Embassy in Georgia (3 Aug. 2023), <https://ge.usembassy.gov/russias-top-talent-fleeing-to-other-countries/>.

¹²⁶⁹ Michael Laff, *Russia's Top Talent Fleeing to Other Countries*, US Embassy in Georgia (3 Aug. 2023), <https://ge.usembassy.gov/russias-top-talent-fleeing-to-other-countries/>.

¹²⁷⁰ BLOOMBERG NEWS, *supra* note 35.

¹²⁷¹ Peter Beaumont, *Analysis: what weapons is Russia deploying in Ukraine invasion?*, THE GUARDIAN (27 Feb. 2022), <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/27/analysis-what-weapons-is-russia-deploying-in-ukraine-invasion>.

- BTR3 Tanks
- T80BVM Tanks
- Small-range and medium range ballistic missiles¹²⁷²

Planes

- Su-25 fighter jet
- Su-25SM fighter jet
- Su-34 fighter jet

Helicopters

- Mi-8 helicopter
- Mi-24 helicopter

IV. Key Capabilities: Military Capabilities

On 21 February 2022, President Vladimir Putin ordered military units to invade Ukraine, fully equipped to assault the nation by land, air, and sea.¹²⁷³ By 25 February 2022, between 169,000 and 190,000 Russian personnel had been reported along the Russian-Ukrainian border, in Belarus, and in occupied Crimea.¹²⁷⁴ The personnel are composed of the Russian National Guard and other internal security units.¹²⁷⁵

Land Forces

The Russian Ground Forces have been arriving from Russia and traveling as far as 4,000 miles from the Russian Far East. Russia has 1.3 million active-duty troops with 2 million reserve troops, 16,678 artillery, 131,527 armored vehicles, 5,750 tanks, and 3,005 mobile rocket projectors at their disposal.¹²⁷⁶

Much of the armor is being brought in by rail, passing through Kursk, approximately 80 miles from the Ukrainian border.¹²⁷⁷ Russian vehicles have also been arriving by road via Karachev in

¹²⁷² Alex Horton, *The Russian weaponry being used to attack Ukraine*, THE WASH. POST (24 Feb. 2022), <https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/02/24/ukraine-russia-weapons/>.

¹²⁷³ David Brown, *Ukraine conflict: Where are Russia's troops?*, BBC NEWS (23 Feb. 2022), <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60158694>.

¹²⁷⁴ David Brown, *Ukraine conflict: Where are Russia's troops?*, BBC NEWS (23 Feb. 2022), <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60158694>.

¹²⁷⁵ David Brown, *Ukraine conflict: Where are Russia's troops?*, BBC NEWS (23 Feb. 2022), <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60158694>.

¹²⁷⁶ *Russia Military Strength (2025)*, GLOBAL FIREPOWER, https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.php?country_id=russia (last visited 13 Apr. 2025).

¹²⁷⁷ David Brown, *Ukraine conflict: Where are Russia's troops?*, BBC NEWS (23 Feb. 2022), <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60158694>.

the Bryansk region.¹²⁷⁸ 9K720 Iskander short-range ballistic missile launchers, replacing the obsolete OTR-21 Tochka systems, are speculated to have been deployed as well.¹²⁷⁹ The Iskander, a road-mobile short-range ballistic missile, has a range of up to 200 miles, using a common transporter erector launcher and support vehicles. The Iskander system can also fire the 9M728 (R-500, SSC-7) and 9M729 (SSC-8) cruise missiles.¹²⁸⁰ As troops continue to accumulate on the border of Ukraine, they are put on the highest level of readiness to invade.¹²⁸¹

Air Forces

The Russian Aerospace Forces have been deploying missile strikes, targeting key cities throughout Ukraine.¹²⁸² After failing to capture major cities by land, Aerospace forces have intensified their targeting of civilian areas by air, striking residential buildings, schools, and hospitals.¹²⁸³ The Russian military currently has 557 attack helicopters and 833 fighter aircraft in its inventory.¹²⁸⁴ Russian warplanes are also being used to target Ukrainian military bases.¹²⁸⁵

Russia is doing what it can to hinder Ukraine from being able to locate its missiles. Barrages of ballistic missiles being shot into Ukraine contain decoys that “trick air defense radars and fool heat-seeking missiles.”¹²⁸⁶ The devices, spanning about a foot in length, are shaped like a dart and are released by the Iskander-M short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM).¹²⁸⁷ Each device contains electronics and produces radio signals to hinder enemy radars from locating the Iskander-M.¹²⁸⁸ These decoys may cause Ukrainian air-defense weapons to have difficulty intercepting Russia’s missiles.¹²⁸⁹ As of 30 November 2024, Russia has fired over 11,000 missiles since it began its

¹²⁷⁸ David Brown, *Ukraine conflict: Where are Russia’s troops?*, BBC NEWS (23 Feb. 2022), <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60158694>.

¹²⁷⁹ David Brown, *Ukraine conflict: Where are Russia’s troops?*, BBC NEWS (23 Feb. 2022), <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60158694>.

¹²⁸⁰ 9K720 Iskander (SS-26), MISSILE THREAT: CSIS MISSILE DEF. PROJECT (updated 2 Aug. 2021), <https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/ss-26-2/>.

¹²⁸¹ David Brown, *Ukraine conflict: Where are Russia’s troops?*, BBC NEWS (23 Feb. 2022), <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60158694>.

¹²⁸² *Maps: Tracking the Russian Invasion of Ukraine*, N.Y. TIMES (updated 25 Jan. 2023), <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/world/europe/ukraine-maps.html>.

¹²⁸³ *Maps: Tracking the Russian Invasion of Ukraine*, N.Y. TIMES (updated 25 Jan. 2023), <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/world/europe/ukraine-maps.html>.

¹²⁸⁴ *Russia Military Strength (2025)*, GLOBAL FIREPOWER, https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.php?country_id=russia (last visited 13 Apr. 2025).

¹²⁸⁵ *Maps: Tracking the Russian Invasion of Ukraine*, N.Y. TIMES (updated 25 Jan. 2023), <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/world/europe/ukraine-maps.html>.

¹²⁸⁶ John Ismay, *Russia Deploys a Mystery Munition in Ukraine*, N.Y. TIMES (14 Mar. 2022), <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/14/us/russia-ukraine-weapons-decoy.html>.

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¹²⁸⁸ John Ismay, *Russia Deploys a Mystery Munition in Ukraine*, N.Y. TIMES (14 Mar. 2022), <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/14/us/russia-ukraine-weapons-decoy.html>.

¹²⁸⁹ John Ismay, *Russia Deploys a Mystery Munition in Ukraine*, N.Y. TIMES (14 Mar. 2022), <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/14/us/russia-ukraine-weapons-decoy.html>.

invasion of Ukraine.¹²⁹⁰

Naval Forces

In the lead up to the FEB 2022 invasion, Russia held worldwide naval drills involving about 140 ships and support vessels, 60 aircraft, and 10,000 personnel.¹²⁹¹ The Russian Navy stationed vessels capable of landing main battle tanks, personnel, and armored vehicles in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov including six that passed through the English Channel in JAN 2022.¹²⁹² Thirteen of these vessels are equipped with cruise missiles, nine of which are in the Black Sea, and the remaining four are stationed in the Caspian Sea.¹²⁹³

The Russian Navy is currently equipped with a fleet of approximately 419 vessels: including 63 submarines, 83 corvettes, 123 patrol vessels, 47 mine/countermine warfare ships, 10 destroyers, 12 frigates, and one aircraft carrier.¹²⁹⁴

Special Operations Forces

The *Spetsnaz*, or “of special purpose/special designation,” remain the primary elite forces of the Russian military.¹²⁹⁵ As part of the military intelligence, *Spetsnaz* is a strategic asset lent to territorial commands for operational deployment in times of war, subject to the final authority of the General Staff.¹²⁹⁶ Russia has placed the *Spetsnaz* at the core of Ukraine with a heavy emphasis on Kyiv.¹²⁹⁷ Within the *Spetsnaz* is the *Zaslou* unit, considered to be the “alpha unit” used for covert missions and specializing in war against terrorism in extreme conditions that can operate far beyond Russia’s borders.¹²⁹⁸ The *Zaslou* are often regarded as the best fighters within

¹²⁹⁰ *Russia Firepower Strike Tracker: Analyzing Missile Attacks in Ukraine*, Center For Strategic and International Studies. (30 Nov. 2024), <https://www.csis.org/programs/futures-lab/projects/russian-firepower-strike-tracker-analyzing-missile-attacks-ukraine>.

¹²⁹¹ David Brown, *Ukraine conflict: Where are Russia’s troops?*, BBC NEWS (23 Feb. 2022), <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60158694>.

¹²⁹² David Brown, *Ukraine conflict: Where are Russia’s troops?*, BBC NEWS (23 Feb. 2022), <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60158694>.

¹²⁹³ David Brown, *Ukraine conflict: Where are Russia’s troops?*, BBC NEWS (23 Feb. 2022), <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60158694>.

¹²⁹⁴ *Russia Military Strength (2025)*, GLOBAL FIREPOWER, https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.php?country_id=russia (last visited 13 Apr. 2025).

¹²⁹⁵ Mark Galeotti, *Spetsnaz: Operational Intelligence, Political Warfare, and Battlefield Role*, GEORGE C. MARSHALL EUR.

CTR. FOR SEC. STUD. (Feb. 2020), <https://www.marshallcenter.org/de/node/1380>.

¹²⁹⁶ Mark Galeotti, *Spetsnaz: Operational Intelligence, Political Warfare, and Battlefield Role*, GEORGE C. MARSHALL EUR.

CTR. FOR SEC. STUD. (Feb. 2020), <https://www.marshallcenter.org/de/node/1380>.

¹²⁹⁷ Amir Bohbot/Walla, *Putin’s elite unit’s goal: Spetsnaz seeks to eliminate Ukraine’s leaders*, THE JERUSALEM POST (3 Mar. 2022), <https://www.jpost.com/international/article-699165>.

¹²⁹⁸ Amir Bohbot/Walla, *Putin’s elite unit’s goal: Spetsnaz seeks to eliminate Ukraine’s leaders*, THE JERUSALEM POST (3 Mar. 2022), <https://www.jpost.com/international/article-699165>.

the Russian army, specifically selected by the high command.¹²⁹⁹ The Zaslons assimilate into Ukrainian civilian populations with the aim of penetrating any weak spots in Ukraine's political and military echelon.¹³⁰⁰ These cover assailants dress in civilian clothing, cause alarm, and cause fear in communities, resulting in neighbors accusing neighbors of being a part of the Spetsnaz.¹³⁰¹ As warfare continues, it can be predicted that more chaos will ensue.¹³⁰²

Paramilitary Forces

The use of mercenaries is regarded as a key feature of the Kremlin's military strategy around the world.¹³⁰³ Russian mercenaries have a history of fighting in both Syria and Libya.¹³⁰⁴ The principal mercenary group, Wagner, covertly snuck into territories of Ukraine to lay the groundwork for the invasion.¹³⁰⁵ Wagner's fighters fought in wars in the Middle East and served as security advisers to various governments, including in the Central African Republic, Sudan, and Mali.¹³⁰⁶ While loosely tied to the Russian military, it has allowed the Kremlin to deny the use of mercenaries, and instead refer to them as "volunteers."¹³⁰⁷

As of 23 JAN 2023, there were about 50,000 members in Wagner that had arrived in Ukraine, including the separatist enclaves of Donetsk and Luhansk, according to the UK Ministry of Defense.¹³⁰⁸ Like the special forces group Zaslons, Wagner arrived in these territories dressed in civilian clothing to remain discreet.¹³⁰⁹ The purpose of mercenaries is debated. One official claimed that mercenaries were placed in rebel territories to engage in the conflict to make it appear as if Ukrainian forces were attacking civilian targets.¹³¹⁰ Another official with the Ukrainian military stated that mercenaries arrived two months prior and were used to fill out the

¹²⁹⁹ Amir Bohbot/Walla, *Putin's elite unit's goal: Spetsnaz seeks to eliminate Ukraine's leaders*, THE JERUSALEM POST (3 Mar. 2022), <https://www.jpost.com/international/article-699165>.

¹³⁰⁰ Amir Bohbot/Walla, *Putin's elite unit's goal: Spetsnaz seeks to eliminate Ukraine's leaders*, THE JERUSALEM POST (3 Mar. 2022), <https://www.jpost.com/international/article-699165>.

¹³⁰¹ Amir Bohbot/Walla, *Putin's elite unit's goal: Spetsnaz seeks to eliminate Ukraine's leaders*, THE JERUSALEM POST (3 Mar. 2022), <https://www.jpost.com/international/article-699165>.

¹³⁰² Amir Bohbot/Walla, *Putin's elite unit's goal: Spetsnaz seeks to eliminate Ukraine's leaders*, THE JERUSALEM POST (3 Mar. 2022), <https://www.jpost.com/international/article-699165>.

¹³⁰³ Michael Schwartz & Eric Schmitt, *Russian Mercenaries Have Covertly Entered Separatist Enclaves in Ukraine*, N.Y. TIMES (23 Feb. 2022), <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/23/world/europe/russian-ukraine-mercenaries.html>.

¹³⁰⁴ Michael Schwartz & Eric Schmitt, *Russian Mercenaries Have Covertly Entered Separatist Enclaves in Ukraine*, N.Y. TIMES (23 Feb. 2022), <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/23/world/europe/russian-ukraine-mercenaries.html>.

¹³⁰⁵ Michael Schwartz & Eric Schmitt, *Russian Mercenaries Have Covertly Entered Separatist Enclaves in Ukraine*, N.Y. TIMES (23 Feb. 2022), <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/23/world/europe/russian-ukraine-mercenaries.html>.

¹³⁰⁶ Michael Schwartz & Eric Schmitt, *Russian Mercenaries Have Covertly Entered Separatist Enclaves in Ukraine*, N.Y. TIMES (23 Feb. 2022), <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/23/world/europe/russian-ukraine-mercenaries.html>.

¹³⁰⁷ Michael Schwartz & Eric Schmitt, *Russian Mercenaries Have Covertly Entered Separatist Enclaves in Ukraine*, N.Y. TIMES (23 Feb. 2022), <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/23/world/europe/russian-ukraine-mercenaries.html>.

¹³⁰⁸ *What is Russia's Wagner Group of mercenaries in Ukraine?*, BBC NEWS (23 Jan. 2023), <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-60947877>.

¹³⁰⁹ Michael Schwartz & Eric Schmitt, *Russian Mercenaries Have Covertly Entered Separatist Enclaves in Ukraine*, N.Y. TIMES (23 Feb. 2022), <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/23/world/europe/russian-ukraine-mercenaries.html>.

¹³¹⁰ Michael Schwartz & Eric Schmitt, *Russian Mercenaries Have Covertly Entered Separatist Enclaves in Ukraine*, N.Y. TIMES (23 Feb. 2022), <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/23/world/europe/russian-ukraine-mercenaries.html>.

ranks of the separatist forces to make it seem like local fighters were leading the charge.¹³¹¹ In AUG 2023, the Wagner Group faced major changes with the death of their leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin.¹³¹² The group has been effectively dismantled, being dispersed throughout the Russian State Forces with some units being taken in by the Rosgvardia, or National Guard.¹³¹³ Other units have ended up joining the Wagner group's former mission in Africa.¹³¹⁴ Ultimately, most of the remnants of the Wagner group have fallen under greater, more direct control by the Russian state.¹³¹⁵

Political Capabilities

President Putin warned that those who interfered with his plans to invade Ukraine would face consequences like never-before.¹³¹⁶ So far, Russia's government is making sure that these words become true. On 03 MAR 2022, the Duma Committee on Security and Anti- Corruption Action approved a draft law that would imprison anyone for spreading false information regarding Russian military operations for up to 15 years.¹³¹⁷ This is an effort to control the narrative of the war and to promote a Soviet-style national unanimity.¹³¹⁸

The international community has been taking matters into its own hands. Both the UN and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have taken steps to urge Russia to cease their operations. The UN had three emergency sessions of the Security Council and a meeting of the 193-member General Assembly, all of which called for the de-escalation of the conflict.¹³¹⁹ The General Assembly voted on a resolution that would command Russia to cease its invasion of Ukraine.¹³²⁰ The resolution had widespread support with only five votes in opposition coming

¹³¹¹ Michael Schwartz & Eric Schmitt, *Russian Mercenaries Have Covertly Entered Separatist Enclaves in Ukraine*, N.Y. TIMES (23 Feb. 2022), <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/23/world/europe/russian-ukraine-mercenaries.html>.

¹³¹² Matt Murphy, *A Year After Mutiny, Kremlin Controls Wagner Remnants*, BBC NEWS (23 Jun. 2024), <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c4nn1p81q59o>.

¹³¹³ Matt Murphy, *A Year After Mutiny, Kremlin Controls Wagner Remnants*, BBC NEWS (23 Jun. 2024), <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c4nn1p81q59o>.

¹³¹⁴ Matt Murphy, *A Year After Mutiny, Kremlin Controls Wagner Remnants*, BBC NEWS (23 Jun. 2024), <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c4nn1p81q59o>.

¹³¹⁵ Matt Murphy, *A Year After Mutiny, Kremlin Controls Wagner Remnants*, BBC NEWS (23 Jun. 2024), <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c4nn1p81q59o>.

¹³¹⁶ *Russia attacks Ukraine as Putin warns countries who interfere will face 'consequences you have never seen,'* PBS (24 Feb. 2022), <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/russia-launches-attacks-ukraine-as-putin-warns-countries-who-interfere-consequences-you-have-never-seen>.

¹³¹⁷ Robert Coalson, *Putin's War At Home: Russian Government Pushes Hard To Enforce Total Unanimity On Ukraine War*, RADIO FREE EUROPE RADIO LIBERTY (Mar. 3, 2022), <https://www.rferl.org/a/putin-ukraine-war-russian-public-opinion/31734536.html>.

¹³¹⁸ Robert Coalson, *Putin's War At Home: Russian Government Pushes Hard To Enforce Total Unanimity On Ukraine War*, RADIO FREE EUROPE RADIO LIBERTY (Mar. 3, 2022), <https://www.rferl.org/a/putin-ukraine-war-russian-public-opinion/31734536.html>.

¹³¹⁹ *Russia blocks Security Council action on Ukraine*, UN NEWS (26 Feb. 2022), <https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/02/1112802>.

¹³²⁰ Peter Granitz & Joe Hernandez, *The UN approves a resolution demanding that Russia end the invasion of Ukraine*, NPR (updated 2 Mar. 2022), <https://www.npr.org/2022/03/02/1083872077/u-n-set-to-hold-vote-that-would-demand-russia-end-war-in-ukraine>.

from Russia, Belarus, Syria, North Korea, and Eritrea.¹³²¹ Following Russia's veto of the resolution, Secretary General António Guterres, stated to the press that "we must never give up" and assured that the UN is scaling up on life-saving support on both sides of the line of contact.¹³²²

President Putin reached out to a few countries asking for additional support including Syria, China, and the Central African Republic.¹³²³

Additionally, NATO allies have engaged in restrictive measures including sanctions against Russia.¹³²⁴ NATO urged Russia to stop its invasion and asked to "respect international humanitarian law and to allow for the safe and unhindered humanitarian access and assistance to all persons in need."¹³²⁵

NATO has held regular consultations with Ukraine in the NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC) and has enhanced existing programs while developing substantial new programs targeted at developing practical support to Ukraine.¹³²⁶ This includes NATO's assistance in coordinating the delivery of humanitarian and non-lethal aid while individual member nations are sending Ukraine weapons, ammunition, medical supplies, and other vital military equipment.¹³²⁷ In addition to physical resources, many allied countries are opening their borders to Ukrainian refugees seeking refuge from the turmoil.¹³²⁸

Since the invasion, both Sweden and Finland began to take the steps to join, and thus expand, NATO: something President Putin hoped the invasion would deter.¹³²⁹ Finland saw itself as especially vulnerable given their 830 mile/1,335 kilometer border with Russia.¹³³⁰

On 04 APR 2023, Finland officially joined NATO as a member state.¹³³¹ Sweden approved ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty on 23 MAR 2023, although Turkey and Hungary showed

¹³²¹ Peter Granitz & Joe Hernandez, *The UN approves a resolution demanding that Russia end the invasion of Ukraine*, NPR (updated 2 Mar. 2022), <https://www.npr.org/2022/03/02/1083872077/u-n-set-to-hold-vote-that-would-demand-russia-end-war-in-ukraine>.

¹³²² *Russia blocks Security Council action on Ukraine*, supra note 80.

¹³²³ Robert Coalson, *Putin's War At Home: Russian Government Pushes Hard To Enforce Total Unanimity On Ukraine War*, RADIO FREE EUROPE RADIO LIBERTY (Mar. 3, 2022), <https://www.rferl.org/a/putin-ukraine-war-russian-public-opinion/31734536.html>.

¹³²⁴ *Relations with Ukraine*, NATO (updated 4 Apr. 2023), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_37750.htm.

¹³²⁵ *Relations with Ukraine*, NATO (updated 4 Apr. 2023), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_37750.htm.

¹³²⁶ *Relations with Ukraine*, NATO (updated 4 Apr. 2023), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_37750.htm.

¹³²⁷ *Relations with Ukraine*, NATO (updated 4 Apr. 2023), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_37750.htm.

¹³²⁸ *Relations with Ukraine*, NATO (updated 4 Apr. 2023), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_37750.htm.

¹³²⁹ Tara John, *Finland joins NATO, doubling military alliance's border with Russia in a blow for Putin*, CNN (4 Apr. 2023), <https://www.cnn.com/2023/04/04/europe/finland-joins-nato-intl/index.html>.

¹³³⁰ Tara John, *Finland joins NATO, doubling military alliance's border with Russia in a blow for Putin*, CNN (4 Apr. 2023), <https://www.cnn.com/2023/04/04/europe/finland-joins-nato-intl/index.html>.

¹³³¹ Tara John, *Finland joins NATO, doubling military alliance's border with Russia in a blow for Putin*, CNN (4 Apr. 2023), <https://www.cnn.com/2023/04/04/europe/finland-joins-nato-intl/index.html>.

hostility towards Swedish membership.¹³³² Turkey and Hungary finally agreed to Sweden's NATO membership in 2024.

Economic Capabilities

Russia's economy has been impacted since the start of the formal invasion in FEB 2022, due to the Russian ruble's value taking a drastic hit from economic sanctions.¹³³³ The Russian Bank initially spiked interest rates from 9.5% to 30% and then slowly decreased to 20%.¹³³⁴ As the currency's value diminishes, this poses especially severe threats to the financial security of ordinary Russian citizens.¹³³⁵ President Putin's response to the sanctions and the long lines at banks prohibited Russian citizens from transferring any of their funds to outside of Russia in order to ride out the consequences of the sanctions.¹³³⁶ Russia's stock market took a heavy loss when it officially closed on 25 FEB 2022.¹³³⁷ Russia has about \$630bn in reserves built up from soaring oil and gas prices. But due to the money being stored in foreign currencies, the Western ban on dealing with Russia's central bank has restricted access to this cash.¹³³⁸ Furthermore, following the Wagner rebellion on 23 and 24 JUNE 2023, the Russian ruble saw another sharp decline in value: reaching its lowest exchange rate since 29 MAR 2022 when the immediate financial aftermath of the invasion was resonating.¹³³⁹

Additionally, Western Europe has effectively severed ties with Russian energy, as natural resources are one of Russia's largest exports, to hinder President Putin's ability to fund the war. Both the EU and UK banned imports of Russian crude oil on 05 DEC 2022.¹³⁴⁰ While Russia decided to cut natural gas exports to the EU in an attempt to cause economic havoc in the West, Germany suspended participation with the Nord Stream 2 pipeline: preventing natural gas

¹³³² Tara John, *Finland joins NATO, doubling military alliance's border with Russia in a blow for Putin*, CNN (4 Apr. 2023), <https://www.cnn.com/2023/04/04/europe/finland-joins-nato-intl/index.html>.

¹³³³ Russell Hotten, *Ukraine conflict: Russia doubles interest rate after rouble slumps*, BBC NEWS (28 Feb. 2022), <https://www.bbc.com/news/business-60550992>.

¹³³⁴ Russell Hotten, *Ukraine conflict: Russia doubles interest rate after rouble slumps*, BBC NEWS (28 Feb. 2022), <https://www.bbc.com/news/business-60550992>.

¹³³⁵ Russell Hotten, *Ukraine conflict: Russia doubles interest rate after rouble slumps*, BBC NEWS (28 Feb. 2022), <https://www.bbc.com/news/business-60550992>.

¹³³⁶ Russell Hotten, *Ukraine conflict: Russia doubles interest rate after rouble slumps*, BBC NEWS (28 Feb. 2022), <https://www.bbc.com/news/business-60550992>.

¹³³⁷ *Russia's stock market to remain closed for another week*, MARKETWATCH (12 Mar. 2022), <https://www.marketwatch.com/story/russias-stock-market-to-remain-closed-for-another-week-11647108749>.

¹³³⁸ Russell Hotten, *Ukraine conflict: Russia doubles interest rate after rouble slumps*, BBC NEWS (28 Feb. 2022), <https://www.bbc.com/news/business-60550992>.

¹³³⁹ Alexander Marrow, *Russia's rouble tumbles past 89 vs dollar to over 15-month low*, REUTERS (30 June, 2023), <https://www.reuters.com/markets/currencies/rouble-sinks-over-15-month-low-vs-dollar-political-risk-concerns-2023-06-30/>.

¹³⁴⁰ Lauri Myllyvirta, *EU ban on Russian oil: Why it matters and what's next*, CTR. FOR RES. ON ENERGY & CLEAN AIR (5 Dec. 2022), <https://energyandcleanair.org/eu-ban-on-russian-oil-why-it-matters-and-whats-next/>.

imports into the EU¹³⁴¹ Russia has had to become increasingly reliant on other corners of the world to fill this void, notably China and India have emerged to buy Russian energy at reduced prices.¹³⁴² On 24 MAR 2023, it was reported that Russia would temporarily stop exporting wheat and sunflower exports due to a drop in global prices.¹³⁴³

Russian citizens are not only lining up at the ATMs to take out their cash, but also lining up at grocery stores, fearful that some items may become scarce due to trade limitations or price increases.¹³⁴⁴ These sanctions are causing a lot more apprehension than previous ones. While citizens are stockpiling supplies, companies started to reduce their working hours or halt production altogether because of their inability to access the West.¹³⁴⁵

Approximately 900,000 Russians had fled Russia by OCT 2022, just eight months after the invasion was launched.¹³⁴⁶ This is due to a variety of reasons: including economic effects, political refugees, conscientious objection, and fear of domestic safety.¹³⁴⁷ The largest surges occurred after the initial invasion and President Putin's instituting a draft on 22 SEP 2022.¹³⁴⁸ This is still of course significantly less than the number of Ukrainians who have fled Ukraine.¹³⁴⁹

Media/Information Capabilities

Russian authorities have taken strides to shut down any anti-nationalist sentiments and the spread of "false information" of the invasion in Ukraine.¹³⁵⁰ Ekho Moskvyy radio station liquidated its channel and website after receiving pressure from the government over its coverage of the

¹³⁴¹ Sarah Marsh & Madeline Chambers, *Germany freezes Nord Stream 2 gas project as Ukraine crisis deepens*, REUTERS (22 Feb. 2022), <https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/germanys-scholz-halts-nord-stream-2-certification-2022-02-22/>.

¹³⁴² Erin Hale, *How China and India's appetite for oil and gas kept Russia afloat*, AL JAZEERA (24 Feb. 2023), <https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2023/2/24/how-china-and-indias-appetite-for-oil-and-gas-kept-russia-afloat>.

¹³⁴³ *Russian export wheat prices continue to fall amid growing supply*, REUTERS (27 Mar. 2023), <https://www.reuters.com/article/russia-grains-exports/russian-wheat-export-prices-continue-to-fall-amid-growing-supply-idUKL8N35Z3UQ>.

¹³⁴⁴ Russell Hotten, *Ukraine conflict: Russia doubles interest rate after rouble slumps*, BBC NEWS (28 Feb. 2022), <https://www.bbc.com/news/business-60550992>.

¹³⁴⁵ Russell Hotten, *Ukraine conflict: Russia doubles interest rate after rouble slumps*, BBC NEWS (28 Feb. 2022), <https://www.bbc.com/news/business-60550992>.

¹³⁴⁶ Noah Carl, *Ukraine's brain drain is 17 times worse than Russia's*, UNHERD (3 Mar. 2023), <https://unherd.com/thepost/ukraines-brain-drain-is-17-times-worse-than-russias/>.

¹³⁴⁷ Noah Carl, *Ukraine's brain drain is 17 times worse than Russia's*, UNHERD (3 Mar. 2023), <https://unherd.com/thepost/ukraines-brain-drain-is-17-times-worse-than-russias/>.

¹³⁴⁸ Noah Carl, *Ukraine's brain drain is 17 times worse than Russia's*, UNHERD (3 Mar. 2023), <https://unherd.com/thepost/ukraines-brain-drain-is-17-times-worse-than-russias/>.

¹³⁴⁹ Noah Carl, *Ukraine's brain drain is 17 times worse than Russia's*, UNHERD (3 Mar. 2023), <https://unherd.com/thepost/ukraines-brain-drain-is-17-times-worse-than-russias/>.

¹³⁵⁰ Robert Coalson, *Putin's War At Home: Russian Government Pushes Hard To Enforce Total Unanimity On Ukraine War*, RADIO FREE EUROPE RADIO LIBERTY (Mar. 3, 2022), <https://www.rferl.org/a/putin-ukraine-war-russian-public-opinion/31734536.html>.

invasion.¹³⁵¹ Roskomnadzor, the state media and communications regulator, issued threats and warnings to put pressure on stations such as Ekho Moskvyy to take down their reports on Ukraine claiming the information that refers to the events as “an attack,” “invasion,” or “declaration of war” instead of a “special operation” are spreading “false information.”¹³⁵² Ekho Moskvyy and similar stations considered to report liberal opinions were taken off the air and blocked from being accessed.¹³⁵³

People in Russia have been blocked from accessing Facebook while authorities are looking to restrict the use of Instagram as well.¹³⁵⁴ The app’s parent company, Meta, is being accused of being an “extremist organization” by Roskomnadzor and other Russian authorities.¹³⁵⁵ This accusation followed after Meta temporarily allowed some posts calling for violence against Russian soldiers.¹³⁵⁶ Twitter is becoming more difficult to use, and TikTok is not allowing people in Russia to upload new material.¹³⁵⁷ These bans and restrictions are a result of the country passing a law that criminalizes the spread of “false information” regarding the invasion.¹³⁵⁸ Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and other platforms blocked RT (formerly Russia Today) and Sputnik in Europe in compliance with EU sanctions and at the request of other countries supporting Ukraine.¹³⁵⁹ The EU’s sanction also extends to traditional broadcast media organizations in Europe.¹³⁶⁰ Roskomnadzor stated these restrictions are discriminatory and moved to block these platforms as a response.¹³⁶¹ The ban on Twitter falls under a federal law regulating calls for riots, extremism, protests, and the spread of “false information.”¹³⁶²

¹³⁵¹ Robert Coalson, *Putin’s War At Home: Russian Government Pushes Hard To Enforce Total Unanimity On Ukraine War*, RADIO FREE EUROPE RADIO LIBERTY (Mar. 3, 2022), <https://www.rferl.org/a/putin-ukraine-war-russian-public-opinion/31734536.html>.

¹³⁵² *Russia: With War, Censorship Reaches New Heights*, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (28 Feb. 2022), <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/02/28/russia-war-censorship-reaches-new-heights>.

¹³⁵³ Robert Coalson, *Putin’s War At Home: Russian Government Pushes Hard To Enforce Total Unanimity On Ukraine War*, RADIO FREE EUROPE RADIO LIBERTY (Mar. 3, 2022), <https://www.rferl.org/a/putin-ukraine-war-russian-public-opinion/31734536.html>.

¹³⁵⁴ Shannon Bond & Bobby Allyn, *Russia is restricting social media. Here’s what we know*, NPR (updated 21 Mar. 2022), <https://www.npr.org/2022/03/07/1085025672/russia-social-media-ban>.

¹³⁵⁵ Shannon Bond & Bobby Allyn, *Russia is restricting social media. Here’s what we know*, NPR (updated 21 Mar. 2022), <https://www.npr.org/2022/03/07/1085025672/russia-social-media-ban>.

¹³⁵⁶ Shannon Bond & Bobby Allyn, *Russia is restricting social media. Here’s what we know*, NPR (updated 21 Mar. 2022), <https://www.npr.org/2022/03/07/1085025672/russia-social-media-ban>.

¹³⁵⁷ Shannon Bond & Bobby Allyn, *Russia is restricting social media. Here’s what we know*, NPR (updated 21 Mar. 2022), <https://www.npr.org/2022/03/07/1085025672/russia-social-media-ban>.

¹³⁵⁸ Shannon Bond & Bobby Allyn, *Russia is restricting social media. Here’s what we know*, NPR (updated 21 Mar. 2022), <https://www.npr.org/2022/03/07/1085025672/russia-social-media-ban>.

¹³⁵⁹ Shannon Bond & Bobby Allyn, *Russia is restricting social media. Here’s what we know*, NPR (updated 21 Mar. 2022), <https://www.npr.org/2022/03/07/1085025672/russia-social-media-ban>.

¹³⁶⁰ Shannon Bond & Bobby Allyn, *Russia is restricting social media. Here’s what we know*, NPR (updated 21 Mar. 2022), <https://www.npr.org/2022/03/07/1085025672/russia-social-media-ban>.

¹³⁶¹ Shannon Bond & Bobby Allyn, *Russia is restricting social media. Here’s what we know*, NPR (updated 21 Mar. 2022), <https://www.npr.org/2022/03/07/1085025672/russia-social-media-ban>.

¹³⁶² Shannon Bond & Bobby Allyn, *Russia is restricting social media. Here’s what we know*, NPR (updated 21 Mar. 2022), <https://www.npr.org/2022/03/07/1085025672/russia-social-media-ban>.

Russia's Education Ministry has also been involved online and held an "online lesson" for schoolchildren and educators regarding "why the liberation mission in Ukraine was necessary."¹³⁶³ The department, also referred to as the Ministry of Enlightenment, hosted the "All-Russian Open Lesson" that would teach the "danger NATO represents to [Russia]" and "why Russia stood up for the protection of the civilians of the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics."¹³⁶⁴ The lesson also aims at teaching children how to "distinguish the truth from lies in the huge stream of information, photos, and videos" flooding the internet.¹³⁶⁵

Russian citizens are attempting to outwit authorities by purchasing virtual private networks (VPNs) to access the blocked platforms and other news sites.¹³⁶⁶ The demand for VPNs rose 668% on 3 MAR 2022 in just one week since the invasion.¹³⁶⁷

V. Key Organizations Political Organizations

United Russia

United Russia is the dominant political party in the Russian Federation. United Russia holds 459 of the 628 in Russia's Federal Assembly.¹³⁶⁸ Specifically, 136 of the 178 seats in the Assembly's upper house, and 323 of the 450 seats in the Assembly's lower house.¹³⁶⁹ United Russia is described as a conservative and nationalist party.¹³⁷⁰ The party strongly supports the policies of President Putin.¹³⁷¹ The Current Chairman is former president Dmitry Medvedev.¹³⁷² Medvedev

¹³⁶³ Robert Coalson, *Putin's War At Home: Russian Government Pushes Hard To Enforce Total Unanimity On Ukraine War*, RADIO FREE EUROPE RADIO LIBERTY (Mar. 3, 2022), <https://www.rferl.org/a/putin-ukraine-war-russian-public-opinion/31734536.html>.

¹³⁶⁴ Gerrard Kaonga, *Russia's Ministry of Enlightenment Gives Lesson to School Children Saying War 'Necessary'*, NEWSWEEK (3 Mar. 2022), <https://www.newsweek.com/russia-broadcast-lesson-school-children-ukraine-war-invasion-1684436>.

¹³⁶⁵ Gerrard Kaonga, *Russia's Ministry of Enlightenment Gives Lesson to School Children Saying War 'Necessary'*, NEWSWEEK (3 Mar. 2022), <https://www.newsweek.com/russia-broadcast-lesson-school-children-ukraine-war-invasion-1684436>.

¹³⁶⁶ Shannon Bond & Bobby Allyn, *Russia is restricting social media. Here's what we know*, NPR (updated 21 Mar. 2022), <https://www.npr.org/2022/03/07/1085025672/russia-social-media-ban>.

¹³⁶⁷ Shannon Bond & Bobby Allyn, *Russia is restricting social media. Here's what we know*, NPR (updated 21 Mar. 2022), <https://www.npr.org/2022/03/07/1085025672/russia-social-media-ban>.

¹³⁶⁸ FORUM OF FEDERATIONS, The Russian Federation, <https://www.forumfed.org/document/the-russian-federation/> (last visited 5 Sep. 2025).

¹³⁶⁹ STATISTA, *Number of Seats in the State Duma of Russia as of November 2024, by Faction*, (1 Nov 2024), <https://www.statista.com/statistics/1196615/state-duma-composition-in-russia/>; FORUM OF FEDERATIONS, The Russian Federation, <https://www.forumfed.org/document/the-russian-federation/> (last visited 5 Sep. 2025).

¹³⁷⁰ Vusala Abbasova, *United Russia Party Unanimously Backs Putin for 2024 Presidential Election*, CASPIAN NEWS (18 Dec. 2023), <https://caspiannews.com/news-detail/united-russia-party-unanimously-backs-putin-for-2024-presidential-election-2023-12-18-35/>.

¹³⁷¹ Vusala Abbasova, *United Russia Party Unanimously Backs Putin for 2024 Presidential Election*, CASPIAN NEWS (18 Dec. 2023), <https://caspiannews.com/news-detail/united-russia-party-unanimously-backs-putin-for-2024-presidential-election-2023-12-18-35/>.

¹³⁷² CNN, *Dmitry Medvedev Fast Facts*, (updated 2 Sep. 2025), <https://www.cnn.com/world/europe/dmitry-medvedev-fast-facts>.

also serves as Deputy Chairman of the Security Council under the Chairman and current President Vladimir Putin.¹³⁷³

Military Organizations: Armed Forces of the Russian Federation

The military forces of the Russian Federation. Branches include the Russian Ground Forces, Russian Aerospace Forces, Russian Navy, Russian Airborne Forces, Russian Strategic Missile Forces, and the Russian Special Operations Forces.

Economic Organizations

Bank of Russia

The Bank of Russia is the central bank of the Russian Federation.¹³⁷⁴ It serves as the primary regulator of financial markets in Russia and the Russian Ruble.¹³⁷⁵ The Bank of Russia has served as a financial source for the Russian Federation during the Invasion.¹³⁷⁶ The Bank of Russia has been the target of numerous sanctions by the United States and other countries in efforts to disrupt the funding of the invasion.¹³⁷⁷ The Bank of Russia has been responsible for stabilizing the Russian economy during the sanctions targeted at the bank and other Russian financial markets.¹³⁷⁸

Gazprom

Gazprom is a Russian energy corporation and one of the largest natural gas companies in the

¹³⁷³ CNN, *Dmitry Medvedev Fast Facts*, (updated 2 Sep. 2025), <https://www.cnn.com/world/europe/dmitry-medvedev-fast-facts>.

¹³⁷⁴ BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, *Russia*, https://www.bis.org/mc/currency_areas/ru.htm (last visited 6 Sep. 2025).

¹³⁷⁵ BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, *Russia*, https://www.bis.org/mc/currency_areas/ru.htm (last visited 6 Sept. 2025).

¹³⁷⁶ STOCKHOLM INSTITUTE OF TRANSITION ECONOMICS, *Financing the Russian War Economy*, (Apr. 2025), <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/d4zd40wd/financing-the-russian-war-economy-stockholm-institute-of-transition-economics.pdf#:~:text=Domestic%20Debt%20and%20Hidden%20War%20Financing.&text=A%20substantial%20rise%20in%20corporate%20credit%2C%20primarily,military%20expenditures%20compared%20with%20reported%20budget%20numbers>.

¹³⁷⁷ US TREASURY DEPARTMENT, *Treasury Sanctions Gazprombank and Takes Additional Steps to Curtail Russia's Use of the International Financial System*, (21 Nov. 2024), <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2725>.

¹³⁷⁸ Timothy Ash, *The 'Fortress Russia' Economy Has Adapted Well to Pressure. But Stagflation Presents an Opportunity for the West*, CHATHAM HOUSE (12 Aug. 2025), <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/09/fortress-russia-economy-has-adapted-well-pressure-stagflation-presents-opportunity-west>.

world.¹³⁷⁹ The Russian Federation owns a majority stake in Gazprom.¹³⁸⁰ Gazprom is a primary partner in the Nord Stream gas pipeline that runs from Russia through Europe.¹³⁸¹

¹³⁷⁹ Tatiana Mitrova, *Gazprom's Perspective on International Markets*, RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST, <https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/RAD-41-2-6.pdf> (last visited 6 Sep. 2025).

¹³⁸⁰ Tatiana Mitrova, *Gazprom's Perspective on International Markets*, RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST, <https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/RAD-41-2-6.pdf> (last visited 6 Sep. 2025).

¹³⁸¹ REUTERS, *Nord Stream's Role in Russia's Gas Supply to Europe*, (27 Sep. 2022), [https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/nord-streams-role-russias-gas-supply-europe-2022-07-18/#:~:text=The%20Switzerland%2Dbased%20Nord%20Stream,firm%20Gasterra%20and%20Shell%20\(SHEL](https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/nord-streams-role-russias-gas-supply-europe-2022-07-18/#:~:text=The%20Switzerland%2Dbased%20Nord%20Stream,firm%20Gasterra%20and%20Shell%20(SHEL).

Most Responsible Parties

Please note that while every attempt has been made to ensure the accurate documentation of changes in the Russian military and government hierarchies, these are ever-changing bodies. Accordingly, these offices may have new leaders at any given moment due to both the relative secrecy which senior members of the Russian state operate within, as well as the continual modifications made necessary by the realities of war.

I. Military

A. Commander of Russian forces in Ukraine

1. In April 2022, Aleksandr Dvornikov was appointed the Commander of Russian forces in Ukraine.¹³⁸² Dvornikov is known as the “Butcher of Syria.”¹³⁸³
2. In June 2022, Gennady Zhidko was appointed Commander of Russian forces in Ukraine, replacing Aleksandr Dvornikov.¹³⁸⁴
3. On 8 October 2022, Sergey Surovikin was appointed Commander of Russian forces in Ukraine, replacing Gennady Zhidko.¹³⁸⁵ Surovikin is known as the “General Armageddon.”¹³⁸⁶
4. On 11 January 2023, Valery Gerasimov was appointed Commander of Russian forces in Ukraine, replacing Sergey Surovikin.¹³⁸⁷

B. Deputy Minister of Defense

1. Dmitry Bulgakov, former Deputy Minister of Defense, was dismissed and replaced by Colonel General Mikhail Mizintsev on 24 September 2022, due to the Russian army’s widespread logistical problems in the invasion of Ukraine.¹³⁸⁸ Colonel General Mikhail Mizintsev, was previously head of the National Defense Control Center of Russia and held the role of Deputy Minister of Defense until he

¹³⁸² *Russia names air force general to lead its forces in Ukraine*, REUTERS (8 Oct. 2022), <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-names-air-force-general-lead-its-forces-ukraine-2022-10-08/>.

¹³⁸³ Doha Madani et al., *Russia appoints general with cruel history to oversee Ukraine offensive*, NBC NEWS (10 Apr. 2022), <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/russia-appoints-general-cruel-history-oversee-ukraine-offensive-rcna23784>.

¹³⁸⁴ James Beardsworth, *Russia’s Military ‘Reshuffle’ Hints at Frustration With Slow Ukraine Advance*, MOSCOW TIMES (29 Jun. 2022), <https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/06/29/russias-military-reshuffle-hints-at-frustration-with-slow-ukraine-advance-a78143>.

¹³⁸⁵ Andrew Roth, *Russia Appoints Notorious General to Lead Ukraine Offensive*, THE GUARDIAN (8 Oct. 2022), <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/08/russia-appoints-notorious-general-sergei-surovikin-ukraine>.

¹³⁸⁶ Piotr Sauer, *Sergei Surovikin: the ‘General Armageddon’ now in charge of Russia’s war*, THE GUARDIAN (10 Oct. 2022), <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/10/sergei-surovikin-the-general-armageddon-now-in-charge-of-russias-war>.

¹³⁸⁷ Peter Beaumont & Sauer, *Russia replaces general in charge of Ukraine war in latest military shake-up*, THE GUARDIAN (11 Jan. 2023), <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jan/11/russia-replaces-general-in-charge-of-ukraine-war-in-latest-military-shake-up>.

¹³⁸⁸ *Russian Deputy Defense Minister Removed From Office*, RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY (24 Sep. 2022), <https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-minister-bulgakov-removed/32049316.html>.

was removed from the post on 28 April 2023.¹³⁸⁹ Mizintsev led the siege of the Ukrainian Sea of Azov port of Mariupol and is known as the “Butcher of Mariupol.”¹³⁹⁰

2. Nikolay Aleksandrovich Pankov (Deputy Minister of Defense) is frequently confused with, especially in photo usage, Nikolay Vasilyevich Pankov (Deputy of the State Duma).¹³⁹¹ Nikolay Aleksandrovich Pankov was dismissed from his role on 17 June 2024 as part of a wider presidential decree that displaced several other Deputy Ministers of Defense.¹³⁹² Among the purged were Deputy Ministers Ruslan Tsalikov, Tatiana Shevtsova, and Pavel Popov.¹³⁹³
3. Following the purge, Anna Tsivileva, Leonid Gornin, Oleg Savelyev and Pavel Fradkov were appointed Deputy Ministers of Defence.¹³⁹⁴ Anna Tsivileva is a cousin of President Vladimir Putin.¹³⁹⁵

C. Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Aerospace Forces

1. The first edition included Andrey Yudin in its MRP dossier as a presently serving Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Aerospace Forces, but Sergei Dronov was appointed to this role in 2019, replacing Yudin.¹³⁹⁶
2. Sergei Dronov was replaced on 25 July 2024 with Lieutenant General Sergey

¹³⁸⁹ *Russian Deputy Defense Minister Removed From Office*, RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY (24 Sep. 2022), <https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-minister-bulgakov-removed/32049316.html>; REUTERS, *Russia Sacks Deputy Defence Minister Sanctioned by West Over Mariupol, Reports Say*, (28 Apr. 2023), <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-sacks-deputy-defence-minister-sanctioned-by-west-over-mariupol-reports-2023-04-28/>.

¹³⁹⁰ *Russian Deputy Defense Minister Removed From Office*, RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY (24 Sep. 2022), <https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-minister-bulgakov-removed/32049316.html>.

¹³⁹¹ *Compare e.g., Nikolay Aleksandrovich Pankov*, WAR & SANCTIONS (last visited 17 Apr. 2023), <https://sanctions.nazk.gov.ua/en/sanction-person/513/>; *with Nikolay Vasilyevich Pankov*, WAR & SANCTIONS (last visited 17 Apr. 2023), <https://sanctions.nazk.gov.ua/en/sanction-person/524/>.

¹³⁹² REUTERS, *Putin Extends Defence Ministry Purge, Hands Job to a Relative*, (17 Jun. 2024), <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-clears-out-deputy-defence-ministers-appoints-his-relative-2024-06-17/#:~:text=The%20reshuffle%20marked%20the%20latest,last%20month%20to%20replace%20Shoigu.>

¹³⁹³ REUTERS, *Putin Extends Defence Ministry Purge, Hands Job to a Relative*, (17 Jun. 2024), <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-clears-out-deputy-defence-ministers-appoints-his-relative-2024-06-17/#:~:text=The%20reshuffle%20marked%20the%20latest,last%20month%20to%20replace%20Shoigu.>

¹³⁹⁴ REUTERS, *Putin Extends Defence Ministry Purge, Hands Job to a Relative*, (17 Jun. 2024), <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-clears-out-deputy-defence-ministers-appoints-his-relative-2024-06-17/#:~:text=The%20reshuffle%20marked%20the%20latest,last%20month%20to%20replace%20Shoigu.>

¹³⁹⁵ REUTERS, *Putin Extends Defence Ministry Purge, Hands Job to a Relative*, (17 Jun. 2024), <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-clears-out-deputy-defence-ministers-appoints-his-relative-2024-06-17/#:~:text=The%20reshuffle%20marked%20the%20latest,last%20month%20to%20replace%20Shoigu.>

¹³⁹⁶ NOVAYA GAZETA EUROPE, *Russia Appoints New Air Force Commander Wanted by International Criminal Court*, (25 Jul. 2024), <https://novayagazeta.eu/articles/2024/07/25/russia-appoints-new-air-force-commander-wanted-by-international-criminal-court-en-news#:~:text=NewsSociety-,Russia%20appoints%20new%20Air%20Force%20commander%20wanted%20by%20International%20Criminal,of%20the%20International%20Criminal%20Court%20%E2%80%A6>

Kobylash.¹³⁹⁷

D. Eastern Military District

1. On 5 October 2022, Rustam Muradov was appointed Commander in Chief of the Eastern Military District.¹³⁹⁸ Muradov officially replaced Alexandr Chaiko, after major Russian losses in northeast Ukraine in September 2022 and Ukraine's recapture of Lyman, in the Donetsk region.¹³⁹⁹ However, Gennady Zhidko might have been serving as the *de facto* Commander in Chief at the time.
2. Muradov himself was dismissed on 27 March 2023 after a failed battle for Vuhledar saw dozens of armored vehicles lost as well as incidents of Russian tanks running over their own troops.¹⁴⁰⁰
3. It is not confirmed who has replaced Muradov; however, media speculation cites Lt. General Andrei Kuzmenko as Muradov's likely replacement.¹⁴⁰¹

E. Southern Military District

1. In January 2023, Sergey Kuzovlev (who temporarily served as Commander in Chief of the Western Military District) was replaced by Aleksandr Dvornikov as the Commander in Chief of the Southern Military District.¹⁴⁰² Aleksandr Sanchik is the most recent acting Commander of the Southern Military District, having assumed the role following the dismissal of Gennady Anashkin on 26 November 2024.¹⁴⁰³

F. Western Military District

1. In September 2022, Roman Berdnikov was appointed Commander in Chief of the Western Military District, according to Russian state media, replacing Alexander

¹³⁹⁷ NOVAYA GAZETA EUROPE, *Russia Appoints New Air Force Commander Wanted by International Criminal Court*, (25 Jul. 2024),

<https://novayagazeta.eu/articles/2024/07/25/russia-appoints-new-air-force-commander-wanted-by-international-criminal-court-en-news#:~:text=NewsSociety-,Russia%20appoints%20new%20Air%20Force%20commander%20wanted%20by%20International%20Criminal,of%20the%20International%20Criminal%20Court%20%E2%80%A6>.

¹³⁹⁸ Giulia Carbonaro, *Russian Commander Called 'Crazy Idiot' for Sending Troops to Certain Death*, NEWSWEEK (4 Apr. 2023), <https://www.newsweek.com/russian-commander-called-crazy-idiot-sending-troops-certain-death-1792415>.

¹³⁹⁹ Mary Ilyushina & Natalia Abbakumova, *Kremlin, shifting blame for war failures, axes military commanders*, THE WASH. POST (7 Oct. 2022), <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/10/07/russia-military-commanders-dismissed-war/>.

¹⁴⁰⁰ Giulia Carbonaro, *Russian Commander Called 'Crazy Idiot' for Sending Troops to Certain Death*, NEWSWEEK (4 Apr. 2023), <https://www.newsweek.com/russian-commander-called-crazy-idiot-sending-troops-certain-death-1792415>.

¹⁴⁰¹ Arpan Rai, *Rustam Muradov: Putin 'sacks one of the Russia's most senior commanders in Ukraine'*, THE INDEPENDENT (6 Apr. 2023), <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/rustam-muradov-putin-ukraine-war-russia-b2315219.html>.

¹⁴⁰² Tessaron News, *Russian Western and Southern Military District Commanders Replaced*, ATLAS NEWS (23 Jan. 2023), <https://theatlasnews.co/conflict/2023/01/23/russian-western-and-southern-military-commanders-replaced/>.

¹⁴⁰³ Stanislav Pohorilov, *Russians Replace Commander of Southern Military District, Which Leads Offensive on Kurakhove Front - Russian Media*, UKRAINSKA PRAVDA (26 Nov. 2024), <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/11/26/7486387/>.

Zhuravlyov.¹⁴⁰⁴ However, it is alleged that from June to September 2022, Andrei Sychevoi held this position until he was allegedly captured by Ukrainian forces.¹⁴⁰⁵

2. In December 2022, Sergey Kuzovlev also held the position of Commander in Chief of the Western Military District. Though reports conflict on when exactly Kuzovlev held this title, and if it was in conjunction with Berdnikov, both had been removed from the role by 26 December 2022.¹⁴⁰⁶
3. On 26 December 2022, Yevgeny Nikiforov was appointed Commander in Chief of the Western Military District. He continues to hold this role as of 14 July 2023.¹⁴⁰⁷

G. Central Military District

1. On 29 October 2022, Aleksandr Lapin was dismissed as Commander of the Central Military District.¹⁴⁰⁸ On 3 November, Aleksander Linkov was appointed Acting Commander of Russia's Central Military District.¹⁴⁰⁹
2. On 17 February 2023, Andrey Mordvichev was appointed as the Commander of Russia's Central Military District.¹⁴¹⁰

H. Naval Forces

1. On 17 August 2022, Viktor Sokolov was appointed Russian Black Sea Fleet acting commander, replacing Igor Vladimirovich Osipov.¹⁴¹¹ This was most likely due to Osipov losing the fleet's flagship, the cruiser *Moskva*, which sank in April

¹⁴⁰⁴ *Russia Sacks Commander of Western Military District - Reports*, US NEWS & WORLD REP. (3 Oct. 2022), <https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2022-10-03/russia-sacks-commander-of-its-western-district-forces-rbc>

¹⁴⁰⁵ @CITeam_en, Twitter (Jun. 27, 2022), https://twitter.com/CITeam_en/status/1541503442048393217?s=20&t=8bIhBWM_ZdcVpwiCprTo0g; Brendan Cole, *Top Russian Commander of Invading Army Captured by Ukraine—Report*, NEWSWEEK (9 Sep. 2022), <https://www.newsweek.com/russia-ukraine-sychevoi-capture-commander-1741356>.

¹⁴⁰⁶ Pavel Luzin, *The Political Considerations Behind Russia's Military Command Chaos*, EURASIA DAILY MONITOR: Vol. 20 Iss. 16 (26 Jan. 2023), <https://jamestown.org/program/the-political-considerations-behind-russias-military-command-chaos/>.

¹⁴⁰⁷ Pavel Luzin, *The Political Considerations Behind Russia's Military Command Chaos*, EURASIA DAILY MONITOR: Vol. 20 Iss. 16 (26 Jan. 2023), <https://jamestown.org/program/the-political-considerations-behind-russias-military-command-chaos/>.

¹⁴⁰⁸ Alona Mazurenko, *Russia replaces Commander of Russia's Centre army group in war on Ukraine*, UKRAINSKA PRAVDA (3 Nov. 2022), <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/11/3/7374844/>.

¹⁴⁰⁹ Alona Mazurenko, *Russia replaces Commander of Russia's Centre army group in war on Ukraine*, UKRAINSKA PRAVDA (3 Nov. 2022), <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/11/3/7374844/>.

¹⁴¹⁰ The Odessa Journal, General Mordvichev officially replaced General Lapin as commander of the Central Military District of the Russian Federation, THE ODESSA JOURNAL (17 Feb. 2023), <https://odessa-journal.com/public/general-mordvichev-officially-replaced-general-lapin-as-commander-of-the-central-military-district-of-the-russian-federation>.

¹⁴¹¹ *Naval Academy chief Viktor Sokolov appointed as Russian Black Sea Fleet acting commander*, TASS (19 Aug. 2022), <https://tass.com/defense/1495733>.

2022.¹⁴¹² Sergei Pinchuk replaced Viktor Sokolov on 2 April 2024.¹⁴¹³

II. Political

A. Deputy Prime Minister

1. On 15 July 2022, Yury Ivanovich Borisov transitioned from Deputy Prime Minister, where he was in charge of weapons industries, to Chief of Russia's space agency Roscosmos.¹⁴¹⁴ Denis Valentinovich Manturov, the Minister of Industry and Trade, replaced Borisov as Deputy Prime Minister.¹⁴¹⁵

B. Council of Ministers

1. On 25 May 2022, Aleksandr Vyacheslavovich Kurenkov was appointed Minister of Emergency Situations, replacing Aleksandr Petrovich Chupriyan, who served as Acting Minister since September 2021.¹⁴¹⁶
2. On 17 May 2024, Andrei Belousav replaced Sergei Shoigu as Defense Minister.¹⁴¹⁷

C. Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy to the Ural Federal District

1. Nikolay Nikolayevich Tsukanov was Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy to the Ural Federal District from 26 June 2018 to 9 November 2020.¹⁴¹⁸ On 9 November 2020, Vladimir Vladimirovich Yakushev replaced Tsukanov.¹⁴¹⁹ Artem Zhoga replaced Vladimir Vladimirovich Yakushev on 2 October 2024.¹⁴²⁰

¹⁴¹² Matthew Mpoke Bigg, *Russian commanders are relieved of duties over failures in Ukraine, a report says*, N.Y. TIMES (19 May 2022), <https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/05/19/world/russia-ukraine-war?smid=url-share#russian-commanders-are-relieved-of-duties-over-failures-in-ukraine-a-report-says>.

¹⁴¹³ Jake Epstein, *Russia Replaced Black Sea Fleet Leader After Ukraine Battered Warships*, BUSINESS INSIDER (2 Apr. 2024), <https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-replaced-black-sea-fleet-commander-after-ukraine-battered-warships-2024-4.d>

¹⁴¹⁴ Jeffrey Kluger, *The US and Russia Signal Continued Cooperation—In Space, At Least*, TIME (7 Oct. 2022), <https://time.com/6220640/us-russian-space-station-collaboration/>.

¹⁴¹⁵ *Putin reshuffles top officials, names new head of state space corporation*, CNBC (15 Jul. 2022), <https://www.cnn.com/2022/07/15/putin-reshuffles-top-officials.html>.

¹⁴¹⁶ *Putin appoints Alexander Kurenkov as Emergency Situations Minister*, TASS (25 May 2022), <https://tass.com/politics/1455683>.

¹⁴¹⁷ Angela Stent, *Putin's Cabinet Reshuffle: The Quartermaster Takes Over*, BROOKINGS (17 May 2024), <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/putins-cabinet-reshuffle-the-quartermaster-takes-over/>.

¹⁴¹⁸ *Putin Announces Changes In Russian Government*, THE INDEPENDENT (10 Nov. 2020), <https://independent.ng/putin-announces-changes-in-russian-government/>.

¹⁴¹⁹ *Putin Announces Changes In Russian Government*, THE INDEPENDENT (10 Nov. 2020), <https://independent.ng/putin-announces-changes-in-russian-government/>.

¹⁴²⁰ PRESIDENT OF RUSSIA PRESS RELEASE, *Artem Zhoga Appointed Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy to the Urals Federal District*, (2 Oct. 2024), <http://en.kremlin.ru/acts/news/75252>.

I. VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVICH PUTIN

Title(s):

President of the Russian Federation Supreme Commander-in-Chief
Chairman of the Russian Security Council

Role(s):

Commanded Russian armed forces to assemble along the Ukrainian-Russian border and gave the order to launch a war of aggression upon the State of Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin (“Putin”) was born on 07 OCT 1952 in Leningrad, Russian SFSR, USSR (now Saint Petersburg, Russia). . In 1975, Putin began his service as a foreign intelligence officer for the Committee for State Security (“KGB”). In total, Putin served as a foreign intelligence officer for the KGB for a period of fifteen years. Putin retired from the KGB in 1990 as a lieutenant colonel.

In JUL 1998, President Boris Yeltsin appointed Putin to the post of director of the Federal Security Service (“FSB”) (the domestic successor of the KGB). Soon thereafter, Putin became the secretary of the Security Council. . As a result of Putin’s quick rise, Yeltsin appointed Putin Prime Minister of Russia in 1999.

When he was appointed Prime Minister, Putin was virtually unknown amongst Russian society. However, this quickly changed after he launched a military operation against secessionist groups in Chechnya. The Chechnya operation catapulted Putin’s public-approval ratings and ensured his electoral bloc, Unity, a victory in parliamentary elections.

Yeltsin announced his resignation on 31 DEC 1999 and named Putin the acting president. Putin won the MAR 2000 elections with about fifty-three percent of the vote in what was the first election where the electoral process was utilized to determine who sat in the Kremlin.

In 2004, Putin was reelected. However, the Russian constitution, at that time, limited the president to serving two consecutive terms. So, from 2008 to 2012, Putin served as prime minister under Dmitry Medvedev. As prime minister under Medvedev, Putin oversaw large-scale military and police reform, as well as the Russo-Georgian War.

Putin was reelected to the presidency in 2012, and again in 2018. In APR 2021, Putin signed a constitutional amendment into law that allowed him to run for reelection two more times.

Putin initiated Russia's invasion of Ukraine at dawn on 24 FEB 2022, with fighting having begun in Luhansk Oblast near Milove village by the Russian border at 0340 local time.

On 17 MAR 2023 the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for Putin, as well as Maria Lvova-Belova, for forcibly taking Ukrainian children across state lines during Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

On 23 and 24 JUN 2023, Putin faced a potential overthrow of his government after Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin called for an armed conflict against the Ministry of Defense. The situation ended after Putin's inner circle, but not Putin himself, negotiated a deal that in part saw Prigozhin safely exile himself in Belarus where Wagner troops could return to their bases with the guarantee of personal safety. The incident had led to much speculation about Putin's ability to continue to control his nation for the long-term.

On 16 FEB 2024, at 11:19 GMT, it was announced that Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny had died while being held as a political prisoner serving a 19 year sentence. Navalny was only 47 years old. Western officials have publicly accused Putin of being responsible for Navalny's death. However, US intelligence has concluded that it is unlikely Putin personally ordered Navalny's death. Navalny was imprisoned on false charges of embezzlement, contempt of court, and "extremism." These charges were denounced as a "sham" by Amnesty International. Navalny was generally viewed as Putin's only serious political opponent in Russia.

On 17 MAR 2024, Putin was re-elected to a fifth term in office against token opposition.

Summary of Role(s): The situation in Ukraine is complex and Putin's involvement in such is widespread being at the top of the chain of command. There are little to no checks and balances in Russian politics or the Russian military. In effect, Putin operates a totalitarian regime. This includes commanding Russian armed forces to assemble along the Ukrainian-Russian border and giving the order to launch a war of aggression upon the State of Ukraine. He is responsible for all military action taken by Russia against Ukraine.

On 24 FEB 2022, Putin announced that Russian armed forces were launching a "special military operation" in eastern Ukraine. In his speech announcing such an operation, Putin falsely claimed that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's government was a Nazi government and that it

was committing genocide against Russian speaking Ukrainians in eastern Ukraine. Within minutes of Putin's speech, explosions were reported across Ukraine, including in locations such as Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odessa, and the Donbas region.

Organizational Membership: Putin is *de jure* a former member of the United Russia political party, the largest party in Russia holding 326 of the 450 in the State Duma, as he became a political "independent" in 2012. United Russia came into existence in 2001 following a merger of the political parties Unity and Fatherland. While Putin is not the official leader or even member of the United Russia party, he is the *de facto* leader of it and the party fully supports his policies.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 5 SEP 2025, Putin attended an Eastern Economic Forum panel event and stated that NATO troops in Ukraine would be viewed as "legitimate targets" for Russian forces. This came after pledges by France and the UK to deploy troops to Ukraine as part of post-war security guarantees. Putin expressed his view that the "drawing [of] Ukraine into NATO" was one of the causes of the root causes of the conflict, and then stated, "Therefore, if any troops appear there, especially now during the course of hostilities, we proceed from the assumption that they will be legitimate targets for destruction."

On 15 AUG 2025, Putin met with US President Donald Trump at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson in Anchorage, Alaska, in a summit to discuss the war. The meeting lasted for almost three hours, followed by a press conference in which neither President took any question from the world press. Despite expressions by both presidents of their desire to find a way to end the war, and Putin's hinting that agreements had been reached, the summit ended inconclusively with no details of any purported agreements announced, or any evident steps taken to find a solution to the conflict. However, it was reported that during the summit, Putin assigned as a condition for ending the war the withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.

On 20 JUL 2025, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated that Putin had "repeatedly spoken of his desire to bring the Ukrainian settlement to a peaceful conclusion as soon as possible", but that the main thing for Russian leadership "is to achieve [their] goals", and that "[their] goals are clear." These goals include the withdrawal of Ukrainian forces and control from the four regions claimed by Russia in its September 2022 annexation, as well as a renunciation of Ukraine's NATO bid and limits on Ukrainian militarization.

On 26 JUN 2025, Putin arrived in Minsk, Belarus, and attended the plenary session of the Eurasian Economic Union summit. On 27 JUN 2025, Putin attended the meeting of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council, after which he indicated to reporters the state of constant contact between Russian and Ukrainian negotiators, Russian readiness for new talks with Ukraine, the potential return of the bodies of 3000 Ukrainian soldiers to Ukraine.

On 20 JUN 2025, Putin attended the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, in which he expressed his view that Russians and Ukrainians are one people, and that, “in that sense the whole of Ukraine is ours.” Putin also indicated the possibility of a Russian occupation of the Ukrainian city of Sumy to create a buffer zone.

On 10 MAY 2025, Putin responded to a call by the leadership of Britain, France, Germany, Poland and Ukraine for a 30-day unconditional ceasefire or face new sanctions. Putin rejected the proposal and instead proposed direct negotiations in Istanbul on 15 MAY 2025 between Ukraine and Russia, without preconditions. “We don’t exclude that during these negotiations we will be able to agree on new ceasefires,” Putin stated.

On March 28, 2025, Putin called for a "transitional administration" to be put in place in Ukraine and vowed his army would "finish off" Ukrainian troops.¹⁴²¹

On December 1, 2025, Putin approved a substantial increase in Russia's defense budget for 2025, allocating approximately 32.5% of the national budget over 13.5 trillion rubles (more than \$145 billion) to national defense.¹⁴²²

On November 21, 2024, Putin stated Russia carried out a strike with a ballistic missile with a non-nuclear hypersonic warhead on the Ukrainian city of Dnipro.¹⁴²³ He warned that Moscow could use it for more strikes on Ukraine and also potentially to hit military facilities of NATO countries giving military support to Ukraine.¹⁴²⁴

On November 19, 2024, During the same period, Putin signed a decree updating Russia's nuclear deterrence policy.¹⁴²⁵ The revised doctrine expands the scenarios under which Russia might consider the use of nuclear weapons, including responses to actions by military alliances approaching Russia's borders or attempts to isolate Russian territory.

During the week of October 24, 2024, Putin held a three-day summit of the BRICS bloc stating its role was to counterbalance the West’s “perverse methods.”¹⁴²⁶ Putin confirmed that on

¹⁴²¹ CBS 19 News, Putin Calls to remove Zelensky, ‘finish off’ Ukrainian troops, March 28, 2025, https://www.cbs19news.com/putin-calls-to-remove-zelensky-finish-off-ukrainian-troops/article_fa6d45fe-a03f-5a84-b96e-584e716c3570.html

¹⁴²² The Associated Press, *Putin signs record Russian defense spending as top EU officials visit Kyiv*, December 1, 2024, <https://www.clickondetroit.com/news/world/2024/12/01/putin-signs-off-record-russian-defense-spending-as-top-eu-officials-visit-kyiv/>.

¹⁴²³ Aditi Sangal, *Putin says Russia struck Ukrainian City with new mid-range ballistic missile*, November 21, 2024, <https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/ukraine-russia-war-11-21-24/index.html>

¹⁴²⁴ Aditi Sangal, *Putin says Russia struck Ukrainian City with new mid-range ballistic missile*, November 21, 2024, <https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/ukraine-russia-war-11-21-24/index.html>

¹⁴²⁵ Institute for the War Study of War, *Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment*, November 19, 2024, <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-19-2024>

¹⁴²⁶ The Associated Press, *Putin ends BRICS summit that sought to expand Russia’s global clout but was shadowed by Ukraine*, October 24, 2024, <https://apnews.com/article/russia-putin-brics-summit-china-india-31a4a4af22e9475aee322f2045701fc6>

October 23, 2024, Moscow ratified a pact with North Korea on mutual military assistance as part of a “strategic partnership” with Pyongyang.¹⁴²⁷

On October 23, 2024, 3,000 North Korean troops were dispatched to Russia and were sent to train at several locations.¹⁴²⁸

On 09 JUL 2024, Putin hosted Indian Prime Minister Modi in Moscow stating “[o]ur relationship is one of a particularly privileged strategic partnership.” India has become a key ally of Putin’s following his invasion of Ukraine. It is one of few democracies willing to engage with Russia in diplomacy.

On 05 JUL 2024, Hungarian President Viktor Orban visited Putin in Moscow, in a meeting widely condemned by other European heads of state. Orban stated his intention was to bring about peace in Ukraine, citing “[t]he number of countries that can talk to both warring sides is diminishing [and] “Hungary is slowly becoming the only country in Europe that can speak to everyone.”

On 20 JUN 2024, for the first time since 2000, Putin visited North Korea where he and Kim Jong Un signed a joint mutual security assistance provision. North Korea had already sent Russia nearly 5 million artillery shells. Putin promised to help Kim evade western sanctions.

On 14 JUN 2024, Putin laid out terms for which he would agree to a ceasefire. This included Ukraine’s withdrawal from regions of Eastern Ukraine that Russian troops had occupied since the invasion. This proposal was widely rejected by Western leaders. Notably, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni rejected it stating “[i]t doesn't seem particularly effective to me as a negotiation proposal to tell Ukraine that it must withdraw from Ukraine.” Additionally, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz dismissed it as a “dictatorial peace”, and UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak dismissed it as “spinning a phoney narrative about [Putin’s] willingness to negotiate.”

On 06 JUN 2024, Putin warned Russia could use long-range weapons to strike Western nations. This came days after the US and Germany authorized Ukraine to strike Russian territory with long-range weapons. Putin also reaffirmed Moscow’s readiness to use nuclear weapons if it sees a threat to its sovereignty. Putin stated: “[t]hat would mark their direct involvement in the war against the Russian Federation, and we reserve the right to act the same way.” “If [the West] considers it possible to deliver such weapons to the combat zone to launch strikes on our territory and create problems for us, why don’t we have the right to supply weapons of the same type to some regions of the world where they can be used to launch strikes on sensitive facilities of the countries that do it to Russia?” Putin added.

¹⁴²⁷ The Associated Press, *Putin ends BRICS summit that sought to expand Russia’s global clout but was shadowed by Ukraine*, October 24, 2024,

<https://apnews.com/article/russia-putin-brics-summit-china-india-31a4a4af22e9475aee322f2045701fc6>.

¹⁴²⁸ The Associated Press, *U.S. says North Korea has sent troops to Russia for training*, October 24, 2024, <https://www.npr.org/2024/10/24/g-s1-29659/us-north-korea-troops-russia-ukraine>.

On 15 MAY 2024, Putin began a two day visit to China to meet with President Xi Jinping. Putin described the pending state visit as “a dialogue between old friends” and a “fruitful exchange of views on the most topical issues on the bilateral and international agenda.”

On 13 MAY 2024, Putin dismissed Sergei Shoigu as Defense Minister. Shoigu had served in the role since 2012, and was generally seen as a constant and stalwart figure in the Russian military and government. He was replaced by Deputy Prime Minister Andrei Belousov, who has little military experience.

On 14 APR 2024, Putin rejected Swiss peace talks attempting to end the invasion. Putin stated “[t]hey aren’t inviting us...they think there is nothing for us to do there, but at the same time they say that it’s impossible to decide anything without us. It would have been funny if it weren’t so sad.” After speaking with Bellarussian President Lukashenko in Moscow, Putin stated he would not accept “any schemes that have nothing to do with reality.”

On 22 MAR 2024, members of the Islamic State staged a coordinated terrorist attack on the Crocus City Hall in Moscow, killing 145 people and injuring at least 551 more. Despite the Islamic State claiming responsibility for the attack, Putin falsely alleged that there were links between the gunmen and Ukraine.

On 18 MAR 2024, one week after French President Emmanuel Macron said he would not rule out the possibility of sending French troops into Ukraine if the invasion continued, Putin threatened this would bring the world “one step away from a full-scale World War III.”

On 17 MAR 2024, Putin was re-elected to a fifth term in office against token opposition.

On 29 FEB 2024, Putin issued a threat against NATO with nuclear strikes if they sent troops into Ukraine. Putin stated “[t]here has been talk of sending NATO contingents to Ukraine. But we remember the fate of those who sent contingents [in the past]. Now the consequences for the interventionists will be much more tragic, [as the Russian military] have weapons that can hit targets on their territory. This really threatens a conflict with nuclear weapons, and thus the destruction of civilization.”

On 06 DEC 2023, Putin announced he was running for re-election for a fifth term as President of Russia.

On 27 JUN 2023, Putin confirmed that the paramilitary Wagner Group was “fully financed” by the Russian government. He also admitted that this included over 86 billion RUB (940 million USD) just from MAY 2022 to MAY 2023.

On 23 and 24 JUN 2023, Putin faced a near overthrow of his government by Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin. Putin stated, addressing the nation, that the actions of Wagner members were “treason” while offering some level of leeway in that members may have been lured into joining Wagner by “deceit or threats”. Although Putin was allegedly not the target of the march according to Prigozhin (who claims he wanted to see senior members of the Russian military

removed due to their ineffectiveness), there was a very real possibility felt not just in the West but even within Russia that Putin might be overthrown in a bloody confrontation. This was best seen through the stay-at-home orders issued in and around Moscow to protect the public from whatever sort of violent firefight might ensue.

On 24 JUN 2023, Putin refused to engage in talks with Prigozhin to cease Wagner's advancement towards Moscow. All negotiations with Wagner were conducted by senior Kremlin officials and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko.

On 16 JUN 2023, Putin claimed to have deployed tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus. He also indicated that this was not the first time he had done so. He added that he intends to continue sending short-range nuclear weapons throughout the rest of the summer. He also threatened Western-made armory stating that "F-16s [supplied to Ukraine] will also be burning, there is no doubt."

On 09 MAY 2023, Putin continued to reiterate false propaganda about there being a "cult of Nazism" in Ukraine during a speech at the Red Square during Victory Day celebrations.

On 14 APR 2023, Putin signed into law a tougher military draft than the one used in the partial mobilization on 21 SEP 2022. This allows the Kremlin to give electronic notice to draftees and reservists ordering mobilization.

From 20-22 MAR 2023, Putin met in Moscow with Chinese President Xi Jinping. This was their first in-person meeting since SEP 2022 at a regional summit in Uzbekistan. This was Putin's first meeting with a fellow head of state since being indicted as an international fugitive.

On 19 MAR 2023, Putin made a surprise visit to Crimea to mark the nine-year anniversary of Russia's illegal invasion before visiting Mariupol. This was his first visit to Mariupol, and first visit to the Donbas since the 2022 invasion. During his visit to Crimea, Putin visited a children's center. This came two days after the ICC issued an arrest warrant in connection to his role in transporting Ukrainian children.

On 17 MAR 2023, Putin was declared an international fugitive with the ICC issuing a warrant for his arrest for the unlawful deportation and transfer of children.

On 09 MAR 2023, Putin ordered the launching of 81 missiles at Ukraine. These principally targeted Dnipro, Odessa, Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhya; and according to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy hit "critical infrastructure and residential buildings."

On 23 FEB 2023, Putin said the RS-28 Sarmat liquid-fueled missile (dubbed "Satan 2" by Western analysts) will be deployed this calendar year. US intelligence reported it was supposed to be deployed in 2022, but the missiles failed in testing.

On 21 FEB 2023, Putin addressed a joint session of Russian parliament where he falsely claimed

that Ukraine was responsible for genocide.

On 30 JAN 2023, former UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson stated that Putin threatened him with a missile attack on the UK during a phone call in FEB 2022.

On 04 JAN 2023, Putin deployed Zircon hypersonic cruise missiles across the Atlantic. A US Congressional report said they are designed to be used as nuclear warheads, most likely against Ukraine.

On 29 DEC 2022, the Russian military launched a 69-missile attack on Ukraine. Ukraine's Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces Valery Zaluzhnyi stated that 54 were shot down, including all that were fired at Kyiv. The other 15 struck a total of 10 of Ukraine's oblasts.

On 25 DEC 2022, Putin declared in an interview that the goal of the invasion was to "unite the Russian people", rejecting not just Ukrainian sovereignty, but also concepts of Ukrainian ethnicity, identity, and culture.

On 22 DEC 2022, while addressing the Security Council, Putin used the term "war" for the first time instead of referring to the invasion as a "special military operation" as he customarily did.

On 19 DEC 2022, Putin traveled to Minsk to meet with Belarus President and key ally Alexander Lukashenko.

On 15 NOV 2022, the Russian military fired 85 missiles at the Ukrainian power grid system, which caused widespread outages, particularly in Kiev.

On 04 NOV 2022, Putin urged residents of Kherson to evacuate from the Russian controlled region.

On 19 OCT 2022, Putin declared martial law in the four oblasts of Ukraine that Moscow had annexed to that point: Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhya.

On 10 OCT 2022, Putin ordered missile strikes across Ukraine in response to the Crimean bridge explosion. Putin claimed that Russia targeted military, energy, and communications assets, but instead missiles landed in 15 Ukrainian cities.

On 30 SEP 2022, Putin signed decrees which annexed Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson Oblasts of Ukraine into the Russian Federation. The annexations are not recognized by the international community and are illegal under international law.

On 21 SEP 2022, Putin announced a partial mobilization and the forthcoming annexation referendums in Russian-occupied Ukraine. On the same day, Putin also threatened to use nuclear weapons if Russia's territorial sovereignty was threatened.

On 06 SEP 2022, Ukraine sanctioned Putin.

On 18 MAR 2022, Putin attended a concert at the Luzhniki stadium in Moscow to commemorate the eighth anniversary of Russia's annexation of Crimea. At that rally, Putin reiterated his false claims that Ukraine was committing genocide against Russian speaking individuals in the Donbas and stated that it was the main reason for the invasion. He also stated that "[f]or a world without Nazism," Russia "will definitely implement all [of its] plans" in Ukraine.

On 24 FEB 2022, Putin announced that Russian armed forces were launching a "special military operation" in eastern Ukraine.

On 21 FEB 2022, Putin gave a speech in which he recognized the Donetsk People's Republic and Luhansk People's Republic, two breakaway regions of Ukraine, as sovereign and independent states.

On 25 JAN 2022, the Russian military conducted exercises that involved 6,000 troops and sixty jets near Ukraine and Crimea. Later, on 10 FEB 2022, Russia, and Belarus both began to conduct military maneuvers that lasted for ten days.

On 10 NOV 2021, the US reported that Russian troops were moving in an unusual fashion near the Ukrainian border. Ukraine reported 92,000 Russian troops had assembled by 28 NOV 2021.

In 2014, Russia annexed the Crimean Peninsula of Ukraine after "little green men," later identified as Russian actors, seized key facilities and checkpoints in Crimea.

II. VALERY VASILYEVICH GERASIMOV

Title(s):

Commander of Russian forces in Ukraine, Chief of the General Staff, General of the Army

Role(s):

Top uniformed member of the Russian military and commands the entirety of Russia's armed forces.



Biographical Summary: Valery Vasilyevich Gerasimov (“Gerasimov”) was born on 08 SEP 1955, in Kazan, Tatar ASSR, USSR. On 06 NOV 2012, Gerasimov was appointed Chief of the General Staff.

In FEB 2013, Gerasimov published an article titled “The Value of Science Is in the Foresight” in the Russian trade-paper *Military-Industrial Kurier*. In this article, Gerasimov laid out a new theory of modern warfare. ” Gerasimov wrote: “The very ‘rules of war’ have changed. The role of nonmilitary means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness... [a]ll this is supplemented by military means of a concealed character.”

On 11 JAN 2023, Gerasimov replaced Sergey Surovikin as the Commander of Russian forces in Ukraine. Surovikin, Oleg Salyukov, and Alexei Kim currently serve as his deputies.

Summary of Role(s): As the Chief of the General Staff, Gerasimov is the highest-ranking officer of the Russian Armed Forces and the senior-most uniformed military officer. This position is comparable to the US chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Gerasimov is responsible

for the massive deployment of Russian troops along the border with Ukraine, the invasion, and lack of de-escalation of the persistent situation.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 18 DEC 2024, Gerasimov declared that Cold War-era arms control is "a thing of the past," accusing the US of dismantling key treaties including the 1972 ABM Treaty and 1987 INF Treaty. He pledged stronger ties with China, India, Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela while condemning US military actions and NATO expansion.

On 27 NOV 2024, Valery Gerasimov called Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Brown of the United States and announced Russia's plans to conduct large-scale exercises in the Mediterranean Sea. One week later on 03 DEC 2024, Russia fired hypersonic Zircon missiles, while the submarine *Novorossiysk* launched a Kalibr cruise missile at a maritime target. Additionally, a Bastion coastal missile system fired an Onyx cruise missile, likely from Russia's Tarsus base in Syria.

On 6 AUG 2024, Valery Gerasimov inspected forces in Ukraine's combat zone. Gerasimov received reports from commanders and "set tasks for further actions."

On 24 JUN 2024, ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II issued arrest warrants for Sergei Shoigu and Valery Gerasimov over alleged international crimes in Ukraine from 10 OCT 2022 to 9 MAR 2023.

On 12 JUL 2023, the recently dismissed Major General Ivan Popov claimed Gerasimov dismissed him for criticizing his strategies regarding undersupplied troops on the battlefield. Popov stated that he had been concerned about "the lack of counter-battery combat, the absence of artillery reconnaissance stations and the mass deaths and injuries of [Russian soldiers] from enemy artillery."

On 09 JUN 2023, Gerasimov appeared in a videoconference with his Chinese counterpart Liu Zhenli. Gerasimov invited Liu to Moscow and told Liu "[t]he coordination of Russian and Chinese efforts on the international stage has a stabilizing effect on the global situation," and was "convinced today's meetings will help us continue to strengthen the strategic Russia-China defense partnership."

On 19 MAR 2023, after Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Mariupol, he then went to meet with Gerasimov and other leaders and troops at a command post in Rustov-on-Don, Russia.

On 15 MAR 2023, US Joint Chiefs Chair Gen. Mark Milley spoke again with Gerasimov by telephone. They discussed "several security-related issues of concern" according to a statement

from the US Department of Defense.

On 11 JAN 2023, Gerasimov replaced Sergey Surovikin as the Commander of Russian forces in Ukraine. Surovikin, Oleg Salyukov, and Alexei Kim currently serve as his deputies.

In JAN 2023, Gerasimov instructed Russian political/military bloggers to reduce their coverage of the Wagner Group: which is believed to have a decreasing amount of influence in Russia.

On 24 OCT 2022, Gerasimov spoke separately by phone with the US Joint Chiefs Chair Gen. Mark Milley for the first time since May and Admiral Sir Tony Radakin, the British Chief of the Defense Staff, about the situation in Ukraine.

On 07 SEP 2022, Ukraine sanctioned Gerasimov.

On 01 MAY 2022, according to Ukraine officials, Gerasimov suffered a shrapnel wound when visiting the frontlines in Donbas. This could not be confirmed by US intelligence.

On 25 FEB 2022, the US sanctioned Gerasimov.

On 09 DEC 2021, Gerasimov issued a warning to the government of Ukraine against trying to settle the war in the Donbas through the utilization of force. He said that “information about Russia’s alleged impending invasion of Ukraine is a lie.” Gerasimov went on to say “Kyiv is not fulfilling the Minsk Agreements. The Ukrainian armed forces are touting that they have started to employ US-supplied Javelin anti-tank missile systems in [Donbas] and are also using Turkish reconnaissance/strike drones. As a result, the already tense situation in the east of that country is further deteriorating.”

On 14 MAR 2022, the EU sanctioned Gerasimov.

III. NIKOLAY VASILYEVICH/VASELYEVICH BOGDANOVSKY/BOGDANOVSKIY

Title(s):

First Deputy of the General Staff

Role(s):

Second top uniformed member of the Russian military.



Biographical Summary: Nikolay Vasilyevich Bogdanovsky (“Bogdanovsky”) was born on 17 JAN 1957 in Predgorny, Biysk District, Altai Krai, Russia, USSR.

Between 24 MAR 2009 and 09 JAN 2011, Bogdanovsky was the Commander of the Leningrad Military District. On 09 JAN 2011, Putin issued a decree that appointed Bogdanovsky to the post of Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces for combat training.

On 13 DEC 2012, Bogdanovsky was promoted to the rank of Colonel General. Following this promotion, he became the commander of the Central Military District. Then, on 12 JUN 2014, Putin once again promoted Bogdanovsky by Decree of the President, this time to the position of First Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia.

It must be noted that Bogdanovsky may not be alive as his direct movements, actions, and communications are unknown since NOV 2015.

Summary of Role(s): Disseminates the Commander-in-Chief’s policies, transmits his orders, and oversees the execution of such orders in Ukraine. Responsibilities also include developing military doctrine, force development and training concepts, ensuring combat readiness, and ensuring force mobilization. Additionally, Bogdanovsky is considered to have been in direct control and/or in a position to influence the deployment of troops participating in the invasion of

Ukraine by Russian troops.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note:

On 12 NOV 2015, Bogdanovsky signed a bilateral agreement in Pyongyang with the North Korean Vice Chief of the Korean People's Army O Kum-Chol on the prevention of dangerous military activities.

Between 29 SEP and 01 OCT 2015, Bogdanovsky took part in negotiations on coordination of actions with the Israel Defense Forces during Russia's military intervention in Syria. This included Moscow affirming that they were not planning to establish an air base in Syria.

On 17 SEP 2014, Canada sanctioned Bogdanovsky for his involvement in Russia's annexation of Crimea.

IV. IGOR OLEGOVICH KOSTYUKOV

Title(s):

Director of Russian Military Intelligence

Role(s):

Heads the main intelligence department of the Russian General Staff and provides the military actively engaged in hostilities in Ukraine with intelligence.



Biographical Summary: Igor Olegovich Kostyukov (“Kostyukov”) was born on 21 FEB 1961 in Amur Oblast, RSFSR, USSR. On 22 NOV 2018, he was appointed the acting Director of the Russian General Staff’s Main Intelligence Department (GRU) following the death of Igor Korobov, who had held the role prior. The GRU is the foreign intelligence arm of the Russian Ministry of Defense, and has been accused of interfering in past U.S. elections. Additionally the GRU has also been accused of poisonings in England, commanding foreign sleeper agents, and hacking campaign targeting in Ukraine. The GRU has denied all of these allegations. In 2019, Kostyukov was promoted to the rank of Admiral. Kostyukov is the first naval officer to hold the office of the Director of the GRU. While not much information is available on Kostyukov, it has been noted that he is a hardliner.

Kostyukov’s children: Alena Solomonova and Oleg Kostyukov each own real estate worth millions of dollars/hundreds of millions of rubles, far beyond their annual incomes, in addition to high-end luxury cars and jewelry. Kostyukov’s daughter Alena purchased a plot of land in the village of Lipka in November 2019. However, the name on the deed is not cited as Alena, but rather “Russian Federation.” The neighboring plot of land was then purchased by Kostyukov’s son Oleg in NOV 2019. Oleg’s plot of land was re-registered under the name of “Russian

Federation.” It is therefore likely that both of Kostyukov’s children are hiding their identity under the “Russian Federation” moniker. The siblings' plots of land are estimated to have a combined worth of 2.2 million RUB. How they came to possess these assets is not yet clear.

Summary of Role(s): Senior official of the authority that is directly involved in hostilities against Ukraine. Additionally, military command of the Wagner Group is believed to be directly exercised by the GRU and Kostyukov. The Wagner Group is a group of paramilitary mercenaries, mostly populated by current and former GRU operatives, and is used when direct GRU involvement is considered undesirable.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 07 JUN 2024, Yevkurov attended a meeting in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, to work out negotiations for Russian paramilitary contractors to be deployed to Equatorial Guinea. Yevkurov secured an agreement for a “limited force deployment.”

On 20 OCT 2022, the EU sanctioned Kostyukov for allegedly stealing Angela Merkel’s emails in a 2015 hacking attack on the German parliament.

On 19 OCT 2022, Ukraine sanctioned Kostyukov.

On 07 APR 2022, the UK sanctioned Kostyukov for his senior leadership role when the toxic nerve agent “Novichok” was used by officers from the GRU in the UK and also for cyberattacks where data was stolen and e-mail accounts of several MPs as well as Chancellor Angela Merkel were affected.

On MAR 2022, the EU placed Kostyukov on its “blacklist.”

V. OLEG LEONIDOVICH/LEONYDOVYCH SALYUKOV

Title(s):

Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Ground Forces

Role(s):

Heads and commands the entirety of the Russian ground forces which are engaged in Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Oleg Leonidovich Salyukov (“Salyukov”) was born on 21 MAY 1955 in Saratov, Russian SFSR, USSR. From MAY 2014 to the present, Salyukov holds the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army. In MAY 2014, Salyukov was appointed to the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Ground Forces. In 2019, he was promoted to the rank of General of the Army.

Salyukov and his family have financially benefited from his position. His son, Dmitri, and his daughter-in-law: Dina Salykova, have opened the Avangard military and patriotic education center for youth. The center has received 2 billion RUB in funding, and millions by organizing events for the military using their connections with the Ministry of Defense. As of information provided in 2021, Dmitri and his wife Dina have four residential buildings with an area of more than a thousand square meters and two apartments in Moscow. A year before the invasion of Ukraine, Dimitri and Dina together declared more than 20 million RUB. How they came to possess these assets is not yet clear.

Summary of Role(s): Commanded the entirety of Russia’s ground forces during the invasion of Ukraine. He has direct responsibility for all military operations and actions carried out by Russian Forces. He also ensures soldiers follow all orders sent out and planned by President

Putin and the General Staff.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 17 JUNE 2024, Salyukov met with Russian Defense Minister Andrew Belousov. During the meeting he updated the minister on various aspects of combat operations including communications with defense industry enterprises. Salyukov also presented a plan for infrastructure development at the Saratov Higher Artillery Command School.

On 13 OCT 2023, Salyukov stated that its tank forces were equipped with the 3VOF128 “Telnik” projectile, and that it was being deployed in Ukraine. The 125mm 3VOF128 is a fragmentation warhead that can be set to explode in different ways. This includes being precisely timed to detonate above its target. On detonation the warhead projects 5.4 kg of fragments in a cone-shaped pattern that covers the target area. This is reportedly up to eight times more effective than a standard high-explosive round against infantry. The Telnik round provides a significantly more effective counter-fire against anti-tank teams, crew served weapons, and troops in defilade.

On 21 AUG 2023, Salyukov met with Brigadier-General Kioumars Heydari, Commander of the Ground Force of the Iranian Army in Tehran, Iran. The commanders agreed to increase military cooperation between the ground forces of Iran and Russia and execute projects that will enhance their combat readiness. Salyukov also added during the meeting that Moscow and Tehran are currently engaged in deep political discussions to further strengthen bilateral relationships.

On 15 MAY 2023, Salyukov met with his South African counterpart: Lt. Gen. Lawrence Mbatha in Moscow. The two discussed “military cooperation” and “the implementation of projects geared to enhance the combat readiness of the two countries’ armies” according to a statement from the Russian Defense Ministry.

On 12 JAN 2023, Salyukov arrived in Belarus to evaluate the readiness of the Belarusian-Russian regional military forces to carry out missions for matters of Belarus and Russian military security.

On 10 MAY 2022, Salyukov commanded a victory day parade marking the 77th anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany where Putin, when discussing Russia’s war in Ukraine, said to his military “You are fighting for the motherland, for her future, and so that nobody forgets the lessons of World War II, so that there is no place in the world for executioners, killing squads and Nazis.”

On 23 FEB 2022, the EU sanctioned Salyukov for being “responsible for actively supporting and

implementing actions and policies that undermine and threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine as well as the stability or security in Ukraine.”

In JUNE 2021, The Royal Cambodian Army (RCA) and the Russian Ground Forces have signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to boost cooperative ties between the armies of the two countries with mutual respect and assistance

On 21 JUN 2018, Ukraine sanctioned Salyukov.

VI. ALEKSANDR PAVLOVICH LAPIN

Title(s):

Chief of Staff of Russian Ground Forces (JAN 2023 – PRES)

Former Commander in Chief of the Central Military District (NOV 2017 – OCT 2022)

Role(s):

Advises and assists Oleg Salyukov, the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Ground Forces, in military decisions and tactics in Ukraine. Former top official responsible for one of the five military districts in Russia.



Biographical Summary: Aleksandr Pavlovich Lapin (“Lapin”) was born 01 JAN 1964 in Kazan.

In 2017, Lapin became the chief of staff of the groups of the Russian troops and forces in Syria. On 22 NOV 2017, Lapin was appointed commander of the Central Military District. The Central Military District is one of the five military districts in Russia and is the largest military district in Russia by geographic size and population at 54.9 million people.

In JUNE 2022, it was revealed that Lapin was the commander of the Army Group “Center” of the Russian Army Forces in the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

On 29 OCT 2022, Lapin was dismissed as Commander of the Central Military District. Alexander Linkov was reportedly appointed acting commander of Russia’s Central Military District.

On 10 JAN 2023, Lapin was appointed to be Chief of Staff of the Russian Ground forces, taking over from Vasily Tonkoshkurov, where he advises and assists Commander-in-Chief Oleg Salyukov in decisions and tactics in Ukraine.

Summary of Role(s): Advises and assists the commander-in-chief of the Russian Ground Forces in military decisions and tactics in Ukraine. Former top official responsible for one of the five military districts in Russia. He was the commander of the Army Group “Center” of the Russian Army Forces during the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Lapin’s Family: Lapin is married and has a son that was identified by BBC Russia as Lt. Colonel Denis Aleksandrovich Lapin. He was the commanding officer of the 1st Guards Tank Regiment v/ch 58198, and took direct part in the open military invasion of Ukraine. In MAY 2022, Lapin awarded his son the Medal of Zhukov, a state decoration awarded for bravery, selflessness and personal courage. Denis Lapin was killed on 3 MAY 2024 in a HIMARS strike.

Incidents and Events of Note:

On 24 AUG 2024, it was reported that Lapin had dismantled the interagency council responsible for overseeing security in Russia’s Kursk Oblast. This decision significantly weakened the region’s defenses just months before Ukraine’s incursion into the area. This decision has been highly criticized by prominent leaders in Russia as leading to heightened disorganization.

On 15 MAY 2024, Lapin was named by President Putin as the new commander of Leningrad Military District, one of five military districts of the Russian Armed Forces. The Leningrad Military District covers all of Northwest Russia, including St.Petersburg and Murmansk and Arkhangelsk regions. It also includes the Northern Fleet, which until the 26th of February this year had status as a separate military district.

On 23 MAY 2023, video footage appears to show Lapin leading an operation of possible Spetnaz special forces in and around Belgorod along the Russian- Ukrainian border. Though it cannot be confirmed to be authentic, this would indicate a clear lack of border control by the Russian military and would support Russian concerns of a possible counter-offensive by the Ukrainian military.

On 10 JAN 2023, Lapin took over the position of Chief of Staff from Vasily Tonkoshkurov,

On 29 OCT 2022, Lapin was dismissed as Commander of the Central Military District. Alexander Linkov was reportedly appointed acting commander of Russia’s Central Military District.

In OCT 2022, Lapin was highly scrutinized due to the recapture of Lyman by Ukraine forces.

In late MAR 2022, Lapin visited the front line and awarded a medal to his son, the commander fighting in Sumy and Chernihiv, just before the Russian army withdrew.

VII. VASILY/VASILII PETROVICH TONKOSHKUROV

Title(s):

Former First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Ground Forces

Role(s):

Advised and assisted Oleg Salyukov, the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Ground Forces, in military decisions and tactics in Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Vasily Petrovich Tonkoshkurov (“Tonkoshkurov”) was born on 27 JAN 1960 in Karaganda, Kazakh SSR, USSR.

Between OCT 2013 and MAY 2018, Tonkoshkurov was the deputy commander of the General Staff of the Armed Forces. In MAY 2018, Tonkoshkurov was appointed to the post of deputy commander-in-chief of the Russian Ground Forces.

On 10 JAN 2023, Col. Aleksandr Lapin took over as First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Ground Forces from Tonkoshkurov. It is unclear why this occurred or what Tonkoshkurov’s next role will be.

Summary of Role(s): Formerly advised and assisted the commander-in-chief of the Russian Ground Forces in military decisions and tactics in Ukraine.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: In NOV 2024, Tonkoshkurov stated that the Oreshnik missile was developed rapidly using entirely Russian technologies. The Oreshnik, meaning “hazelnut

tree”, was debuted by launching the new missile into Ukraine.

On 10 JAN 2023, Tonkoshkurov was replaced in his position by Col. Aleksandr Lapin. It is unclear why this occurred or what Tonkoshkurov’s next role will be.

On 09 APR 2021, Tonkoshkurov announced that Russia aimed to establish its first experimental army unit equipped with combat UGVs.

In MAR 2019, Tonkoshkurov accompanied and led 100 Russian soldiers in an envoy to Venezuela to discuss equipment maintenance, training, and strategy with the Maduro regime. Media reports that this was done amid strengthening ties between Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro and Russia.

On 30 SEP 2014, Tonkoshkurov told reporters that the first Russian military drafts in Crimea and Sevastopol would begin in 2015.

VIII. ALEKSANDR/ALEXANDER ANATOLYEVICH MATOVNIKOV

Title(s):

Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Ground Forces

Role(s):

Advises and assists the commander-in-chief and first deputy commander-in-chief of the Russian Ground Forces in military decisions and tactics in Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Aleksandr Anatolyevich Matovnikov (“Matovnikov”) was born on 19 SEP 1965 in Moscow. In 1982, he began attending the Higher Border Military-Political School of the KGB and graduated in 1986. His service to the KGB began immediately after his schooling, as he was appointed to the elite stand-alone unit of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation known as Group “A” of the 7th Directorate of the KGB. This was better known as the “Alpha Anti-Terror Unit,” which responded internationally and domestically to terrorist attacks and hostage situations. He served in the final years of the Soviet War in Afghanistan, carrying out special operations for the KGB.

During his KGB service, Matovnikov was a member of a motorized group operating under the cover of operational units of border troops during the Soviet-Afghan war.

In 2013, Matovnikov was transferred to the Ministry of Defense and then appointed to the post of Deputy Commander of the Special Operations Forces of the Main (Intelligence) Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces. In 2015, he became Commander of the MTR and Deputy Chief of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces.

It has been reported that Matovnikov was a special assignment officer under Putin and led secret military operations abroad. Such operations included coordinating the actions of personnel in Ukraine during Russia’s annexation of Crimea. He was also reported to be in command posts

during Russia's military intervention in Syria's civil war.

On 22 JAN 2020, he was transferred to the post of Deputy Commander-in-chief of the Ground Forces. On 03 FEB 2020, he was removed from the Security Council.

Summary of Role(s): Advises and assists Oleg Salyukov, the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Ground Forces, and Vasily Tonkoshkurov, the First Deputy Commander-in-Chief, in military decisions and tactics in Ukraine.

Organizational Membership: Matovnikov is a member of the Association of Veterans of the Anti-Terror Unit "Alpha."

Incidents and Events of Note: On 10 DEC 2024, a video of Matovnikov nude wearing an open bathrobe was leaked. He invited a mystery woman to join him in a steam bath. He also tells the woman "The boy is waiting for you very much. He misses you very much." This is not the first time nudes of Matovnikov have leaked to the press.¹⁴²⁹

In AUG 2024, Matovnikov attended a meeting with senior officers of Myanmar Armed Forces concerning the Myanmar-Russia Joint Anti-Terrorism Committee.

On 27 FEB 2023, a Russian aircraft under the command of Matovnikov was shot down over Belarus. The following day, a sexually explicit 44 second video of Matovnikov was leaked to the public, . As the leak came from the Telegram channel VChK-OGPU, which is allegedly fed by the Wagner Group, it might have been leaked from within Russia from possible tensions between Matovnikov and Yevgeny Prigozhin.

¹⁴²⁹ Will Stewart & Patrick Harrington, *Lust for War: Putin's 'Naked General' Caught Sending X-rated Vids Again to Women While Letting Thousands of Troops to Die on Frontline*, The U.S. Sun (last updated Dec. 11, 2024, 6:40 PM), <https://www.the-sun.com/news/13066184/putins-naked-general-sending-explicit-videos-second-time/>.

IX. SERGEY/SERGEI VLADIMIROVICH SUROVIKIN

Title(s):

Head of the Coordinating Committee for Air Defense for the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

Former General of the Army

Former Commander of the Aerospace Forces (NOV 2017 – AUG 2023)

Former Commander of Russian forces in Ukraine

Role(s):

Supervisor of the unified air defence system of the CIS member States.

Former Second in Command for all Russian Forces in Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Sergey Vladimirovich Surovikin (“Surovikin”) was born on 11 OCT 1966 in Novosibirsk, RSFSR, USSR.

On 09 JUN 2017, Surovikin was introduced to media representatives as the Commander of the Russian armed forces deployed to Syria. On 22 NOV 2017, Surovikin was appointed to the post of Commander of the Aerospace Forces by presidential decree. On 28 DEC 2017, Surovikin once again commanded the contingent of Russian military forces in Syria from JAN 2019 to APR 2019. In 2021, Surovikin was promoted to General of the Army.

On 08 NOV 2022, Putin appointed Sergey Surovikin the Commander of Russian forces in Ukraine, replacing Gennady Zhidko. Surovikin is known as the “General Armageddon.”

On 11 JAN 2023, Surovikin was replaced by General Valery Gerasimov as Commander of Russian forces in Ukraine, and Surovikin now serves as Gerasimov's deputy.

Surovikin is believed to have been a supporter of Yevgeny Prigozhin's rebellion in JUN 2023, with anonymous US officials claiming he had prior knowledge of the planned attack. He has not been seen since 24 JUN when a video was released of him making an address to Wagner soldiers instructing them to stop the rebellion. He is potentially imprisoned, as anonymous defense ministry members reported that he was arrested. The official response of the Russian government is that Surovikin is "resting."

On 22 AUG 2023, Surovikin was released from his position as Commander-in-Chief of the Aerospace Forces, and was replaced by Viktor Afzalov.

On 10 SEP 2023, Surovikin was elected by the CIS as the Head of the Coordinating Committee for Air Defence.

Summary of Role(s): Supervises the unified air defence system for all CIS member States. Formerly responsible for all Russian forces in Ukraine.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 29 MAR 2025, the New York Times released a report that included statements made by Surovikin that were intercepted by U.S. intelligence. The statements suggested the possibility of Russian forces using tactical nuclear strikes to prevent Ukraine forces from crossing Dnipro. They were made in 2022 while Surovikin was the commander of Russian forces in Ukraine.

On 15 SEP 2023, Surovikin was seen in Algeria as part of a Defence Ministry Delegation from Russia. It was reported that he was serving as an informal ambassador to Algeria from SEP 2023 into early 2024, but this has not been confirmed.

On 10 SEP 2023, Surovikin was elected by the CIS as Head of the Coordinating Committee for Air Defence.

On 4 SEP 2023, a picture of Surovikin and his wife surfaced on social media with a caption stating that Surovikin was at home with his family in Moscow. Prominent Russian journalists claim that he was "resting" in the previous months and that he is now "on leave and at the disposal of the Defense Ministry."

On 12 JUL 2023, Andrey Kartapolov of the State Duma stated Surovikin's absence has been caused by his "resting" though it is also confirmed his deputy, Andrei Yudin, was fired from the Army on 29 JUN 2023. According to Surovikin's daughter "everything is fine" with her father but claimed "he's at work" which would contradict the Duma's position.

With Lieutenant General Vladimir Alekseyev, Surovikin appeared in a video on 24 JUN 2023 urging Wagner soldiers to stop their rebellion, some observers noted the video had a "hostage-style" likeness. Surovikin has not been seen since.

On 09 NOV 2022, Surovikin appeared on Russian State television with Sergey Shoigu approving of Russia's military withdrawal from Ukraine's Kherson City.

On 08 NOV 2022, Putin appointed Surovikin the overall commander of Russian forces in Ukraine.

On 19 OCT 2022, Ukraine sanctioned Surovikin for his involvement in Ukraine.

On 18 OCT 2022, Surovikin told reporters that "The situation in the area of the 'Special Military Operation' can be described as tense."

On 14 MAR 2022, Ukraine's Prosecutor General Irina Venediktova announced that she filed a criminal case against Surovikin and other Russian officials.

Surovikin

On 23 FEB 2022, the EU added Surovikin to its sanctions list for his involvement in the Russian invasion of Ukraine "for actively supporting and implementing actions and policies that undermine and threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine as well as the stability or security in Ukraine."

In OCT 2020, a Human Rights Watch report listed Surovikin as one of the commanders "who may bear command responsibility for violations" during the 2019–2020 offensive in Idlib, Syria.

X. VIKTOR MUSAVIROVICH AFZALOV

Title(s):

Commander-in-Chief of the Aerospace Forces (OCT 2023 – PRES)

Former First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Aerospace Forces

Chief of the Main Staff

Role(s):

Commander of all Russian aerial combat and missile defense.

Advised and assisted the commander-in-chief of the Russian Aerospace Forces in aerial military decisions and tactics in Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Viktor Musavirovich Afzalov (“Afzalov”) was born 09 JUN 1968. From JUL 2017 to AUG 2018, Afzalov served as the Commander of the Eastern Military District Air Force and Air Defense Army.

From JUL 2023 to OCT 2023, Afzalov served as the Acting Commander-in-Chief of the Aerospace Forces in Sergey Surovikin’s absence.

On 20 OCT 2023, Afzalov was officially appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Aerospace Forces, replacing Sergey Surovikin.

Summary of Role(s): Commands all aerial forces for the Russian Military as well as all missile defense systems.

Advised and assisted the commander-in-chief of the Russian Aerospace Forces in aerial military decisions and tactics in Ukraine.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 21 FEB 2024, Afzalov was presented with the Orthodox religious icon of the Holy Mandylion by President Putin. This took place at an award ceremony in Moscow honoring military units and commanders for actions taken in the “special military operation” in Ukraine.

On 18 DEC 2023, the EU sanctioned Afzalov for his involvement in Ukraine.

On 20 OCT 2023, Afzalov was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Aerospace Forces, replacing Sergey Surovikin.

On 09 JUL 2023, Afzalov was seen briefing a report to Chief of General Staff Valery Gerasimov during a military meeting. Normally, this task would be done by Afzalov’s superior Sergei Surovikin, but Surovikin had not been seen since the Wagner rebellion on 23 and 24 JUN 2023.

On 07 DEC 2022, Afzalov was promoted to the rank of colonel general by Vladimir Putin.

XI. SERGEY/SERGEI VLADIMIROVICH DRONOV

Title(s):

Former Commander of the Air Force,
Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Aerospace Forces

Role(s):

Commanded the entirety of the Russian Air Force and therefore its operations in Ukraine. Advised and assisted the commander-in-chief and first deputy commander-in-chief of the Russian Aerospace Forces in aerial military decisions and tactics in Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Sergei Vladimirovich Dronov (“Dronov”) was born on 11 AUG 1962 in Almazovka, Voroshilovograd region, Ukraine USSR.

In SEP 2015, Dronov was appointed head of the aviation group for the Russian air force base in Syria. During this post, Dronov planned and conducted military operations on the orders of the Supreme Commander. He returned to Russia in 2017. In 2019, Dronov was appointed commander-in-chief of the Air Force of the Russian Federation and the deputy commander of the Aerospace Forces.

On 25 JUL 2024, Dronov was replaced as Commander of the Air force by Sergey Kobylash. His whereabouts and current position since this replacement are unknown.

Summary of Role(s): Commanded the entirety of the Russian Air Force. Advised and assisted the commander-in-chief and first deputy commander-in-chief of the Russian Aerospace Forces in aerial military decisions and tactics in Ukraine.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 23 JAN 2025, it was reported that Dronov was served *in absentia* by the Ukrainian Security Service with a suspicion notice for his involvement in the air strikes that took place in Ukraine in MAY 2022.

On 25 JUL 2024, Dronov was removed from his position as the Commander of the Russian Air force and replaced by Sergey Kobylash.

In JAN 2023, it is reported that Dronov cooperated with Belarusian Air Force Officers in creating joint tactical flight exercises for the two militaries. He was also reported to have attended the exercises in Belarus.¹⁴³⁰

On 12 AUG 2022, Dronov announced the latest MiG-31I fighter jet, and some unmanned aerial vehicles will be on display at the Russian Army 2022 international arms show. Dronov stated “[t]he static exposition will demonstrate three types of training aircraft: Yak-130, DA-42T and L-410UVP-E20 while the broadest range of 10 models will involve operational-tactical aircraft” referring to Su-24M, Su-25SM3, Su-35S, Su-30SM, Su-34, Su-57, MiG-29SMT, MiG-31BM, MiG-31I and MiG-35S.

On 23 FEB 2022, the EU sanctioned Dronov “for actively supporting and implementing actions and policies that undermine and threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine as well as the stability or security in Ukraine.”

¹⁴³⁰ Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 31, 2023, Institute for the Study of War (Jan. 31, 2023, 8:15 PM), <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-31-2023>.

XII. NIKOLAI/NIKOLAY ANATOLYEVICH YEVMENOV

Title(s):

Director of the Kuznetsov Naval Academy
Former Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy

Role(s):

Commanded the entirety of Russian naval forces (MAY 2019 - MAR 2024). Responsible for any maritime operation of the Russian navy, including in or to Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Nikolai Anatolyevich Yevmenov (“Yevmenov”) was born on 02 APR 1962 in Moscow.

In 2012, Yevmenov was named deputy commander of the Northern Fleet. In 2016, he became commander of the Northern Fleet. In 2017, he was promoted to the rank of Admiral. On 03 MAY 2019, he was appointed commander-in-chief of the Russian Navy.

In MAR 2024, Yevmenov was forced to resign from his position as Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy, and he was reportedly appointed as the Director of the Kuznetsov Naval Academy in MAY 2024.

Summary of Role(s): Headed and commanded the entirety of Russia’s naval forces, including in Ukraine.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 14 MAY 2024, Yevmenov was appointed as the Director of the Kuznetsov Naval Academy.¹⁴³¹

¹⁴³¹ Admiral Yevmenov Appointed Head of Naval Academy - Source, TASS (May 14, 2024), <https://tass.com/defense/1787723>.

In MAR 2024, Yevmenov was dismissed from his post as Commander of the Russian Navy after a Ukraine drone strike sunk the Russian patrol ship, Sergey Kotov, off the coast of occupied Crimea. Following this dismissal, Admiral Aleksandr Moiseyev was appointed acting Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy.

On 03 JUL 2023, Yevmenov traveled to Beijing to meet with China's defense minister Li Shangfu. The meeting came just days before two Cold War-era Russian frigates ported in Shanghai: the first visit of its kind in about three years.

On 14 APR 2023, Yevmenov led exercises in Vladivostok that Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said were "to evaluate the state and increase the readiness of military command, troops, and forces to undertake missions in all strategic directions" and included practicing searching and destroying submarines, repelling large-scale rocket and aviation attacks. The location of these exercises in the Northern Pacific raised some concerns, and Shoigu emphasized "the operationally important region of the Pacific Ocean -- the southern part of the Sea of Okhotsk", the Kuril Islands (Japan's "Northern Territories") and Sakhalin Island.

On 22 FEB 2023, Yevmenov spoke at the opening ceremony of a trilateral naval exercises in South Africa with South African President Cyril Ramaphosa about affirming Russia, China, and South Africa's "deep interest in strengthening naval cooperation aimed at ensuring security in the world's oceans and countering new threats at sea."

On 12 JUN 2022, Yevmenov told reporters that the Russian Navy will receive 46 warships and support vessels in 2022.

On 23 FEB 2022, the EU sanctioned Yevmenov for his involvement in the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

XIII. ALEKSANDR MIKHAILOVICH NOSATOV

Title(s):

Former First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy

Former Chief of the Navy Main Staff

Role(s):

Advised and assisted the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian navy in the implementation of naval policies in Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Aleksandr Mikhailovich Nosatov (“Nosatov”) was born on 27 MAR 1963 in Sevastopol, Ukrainian SSR, USSR.

In 2009, Nosatov was appointed commander of the naval base at Baltiysk. On 27 JAN 2012, he was appointed deputy commander of the Black Sea Fleet. In 2013, he became the chief of staff of the Black Sea Fleet. Beginning on 17 MAY 2016, he was the head of the Naval Academy, but did not hold the position for long. On 30 JUN 2016, he was appointed acting commander of the Baltic Fleet. On 12 DEC 2018, he was promoted to Admiral. . On 05 OCT 2021, Nosatov was appointed to the post of Chief of Staff and First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy.

On 8 JUL 2024, Nosatov retired from the military, and was replaced in his position by Vladimir Kasatonov.

Summary of Role(s): Advises and assists the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian navy in the

implementation of naval policies in Ukraine.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 8 FEB 2024, the Ukrainian court ruled to schedule a court hearing of the criminal proceedings against Nosatov for encroachment on the territorial integrity and integrity of Ukraine, incitement of Ukrainian officers to treason, and conducting aggressive military actions.

On 12 MAR 2022, the EU sanctioned Nosatov for his role in Russian's invasion of Ukraine.

In DEC 2020, Nosatov gave a statement to the Russian army's *Red Star* newspaper that Russia would beef up its forces in the Kaliningrad exclave. He cited the need to respond to a so-called buildup of NATO forces nearby.

On 21 JUN 2018, Ukraine sanctioned Nosatov.

On 21 MAR 2014, Nosatov was added to the EU sanctions list in response to Russia's annexation of Crimea.

XIV. VLADIMIR LVOVICH KASATONOV

Title(s):

First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy
Chief of the Navy Main Staff

Role(s):

Advises and assists the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian navy in the implementation of naval policies in Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Vladimir Lvovich Kasatonov (“Kasatonov”) was born on 17 JUN 1962 in Moscow, Russian SFSR, USSR.

In DEC 2019, he was appointed Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.

On 08 JUL 2024, he was appointed to the post of Chief of the Navy Main Staff and First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy.

Summary of Role(s): Advises and assists the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian navy in the implementation of naval policies in Ukraine.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: In JUN 2024, in his article for the Russian journal “Military opinion”, Kasatonov called the US deployment of the Typhon missile system with Tomahawk cruise missiles on the Danish island of Bornholm in the Baltic Sea a threat to the Baltic and

Northern Fleet.

On 19 OCT 2022, Ukraine sanctioned Kasatonov.

On 23 FEB 2022, the EU sanctioned Kasatonov for his involvement in the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

XV. IGOR VLADIMIROVICH OSIPOV

Title(s):

Former Commander-in-Chief of the Black Sea Fleet (MAY 2019 – AUG 2022)

Role(s):

Commanded the entirety of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Navy: positioned in the Black Sea within the territorial waters of Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Igor Vladimirovich Osipov (“Osipov”) was born on 06 MAR 1973 in Novoshumnoye, Fyodorov District, Kostanay Region, Kasazkh SSR, USSR.

Between SEP 2016 and AUG 2018, he served as the chief of staff and first deputy commander of the Pacific Fleet. Between AUG 2018 and MAY 2019, Osipov was the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. During this post, he was promoted to vice-admiral in 2018. On 08 MAY 2019, Osipov was appointed commander of the Black Sea Fleet (this appointment was backdated to 03 MAY 2019). On 11 JUN 2021, Osipov was promoted to the rank of admiral.

Some sources reported he was arrested shortly after sinking of the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s flagship, the Moskva. On 19 JUN 2022, Osipov appeared in Sevastopol at the graduation ceremony from the Admiral Nakhimov Naval School.

In 2024, Osipov was appointed as the head of the Military Institute in N. G. Kuznetsov Naval Academy.

Summary of Role(s): Commanded the entirety of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Navy—the fleet positioned in the Black Sea within the territorial waters of Ukraine from MAY 2019 to AUG 2022.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 3 JAN 2023, the Security Service of Ukraine announced the issuance of the notice of suspicion to Osipov for shelling of civilian objects.

On 19 OCT 2022, Ukraine sanctioned Osipov.

In AUG 2022, Viktor Sokolov was appointed Russian Black Sea Fleet acting commander, replacing Osipov. Osipov was allegedly suspended following the APR sinking of the fleet's flagship, the cruiser Moskva. Although it remains inconclusive how Osipov lost his job (whether via suspension, arrest, or death) it is confirmed he was no longer the commander of the Black Sea Fleet by AUG 2022.

On 14 APR 2022, Ukraine sank the Russian Black Sea Fleet's flagship, the cruiser Moskva.

On 15 MAR 2022, satellite imagery showed at least fourteen Russian Navy vessels approaching the Ukrainian coast from the Black Sea. The imagery showed the following groupings of vessels: (i) northern group: line-astern formation led by a tug boat or minesweeper appearing to tow a mine clearing device, followed by two *Ropucha*-class landing ships, another tug boat, and a trailing *Ropucha*; (ii) second group in a square formation made up of smaller warships, including missile corvettes; (iii) a southern group led by the *Slava*-class cruiser Moskva, two *Alligator*-class landing ships, the *Ivan Gren*-class landing ship *Pyotr Morgunov*, and a smaller warship, possibly identified as a *Buyan-M*-class missile corvette. The PM-138 vessel was observed in Lake Donuzlav, which has immediate access to the sea and is viewed as a safe harbor to perform emergency battle repairs. Another vessel, the PM-56, was positioned similarly near Feodosia, which is to the east of Crimea. Since its initial placement near Feodosia, the PM-56 has subsequently been moved further east, possibly to support vessels stationed in the Sea of Azov.

On 23 FEB 2022, the EU sanctioned Osipov for his involvement in the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

In FEB 2022, six amphibious landing ships, that are normally based in the Arctic and Baltic Seas, were moved to the Black Sea to bolster the Black Sea Fleet. These were further bolstered by amphibious landing ships and combatants from the Arctic, Baltic, Pacific, and Caspian.

Other units, including missile corvettes, were moved to the Sea of Azov (a restricted and shallow body of water), placing them adjacent to the city of Mariupol in Donetsk. On 17 FEB 2022, reports showed that Russia appeared to have pre-positioned two repair ships on either side of the Crimean Peninsula. The vessels appeared to be Project 304 Amur Class repair and depot ships that are used to perform urgent repairs on the high seas.

XVI. VIKTOR VASILYEVICH ZOLOTOV

Title(s):

Director of the National Guard of Russia
Non-permanent Member of the Security Council of Russia

Role(s):

Commands the National Guard of Russia which is used within Russia and occupied areas of Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Viktor Vasilyevich Zolotov (“Zolotov”) was born on 27 JAN 1954 in Sasovo, Ryazan Oblast, Russian SFSR, USSR. In 1975, Zolotov began his career with the KGB Border Troops. Upon the dissolution of the Soviet Union, he became part of the newly created Federal Protective Service, which is the Russian equivalent of the US Secret Service.

In the later 1990s, Zolotov was hired as a bodyguard for the Mayor of Saint Petersburg, Anatoly Sobchak. During this position, Zolotov became acquainted with then-Vice Mayor, Vladimir Putin. His friendship with Putin blossomed as Zolotov became Putin’s sparring partner in boxing and judo. Additionally, Zolotov walked directly behind Putin anytime Putin appeared in public. Zolotov also served in Roman Tsepov’s private guard Baltik-Eskort, before Tsepov was poisoned by an unknown radioactive substance.

According to Yuri Felshtinsky and Vladimir Pribylovsky, in 1992, based on Zolotov’s advice, the agency was created, with Zolotov allegedly overseeing it later as a member of the active reserve. Baltik-Eskort provided protection to high-ranking Saint Petersburg officials, including Sobchak and Putin. The agency also served as a mechanism for the collection of tribute and *chorniu nal* (“black cash”) for Putin’s purposes.

From 2000 to 2013, Zolotov was the Chief of the Security of the Prime Minister of Russia and President of Russia Vladimir Putin. During this time, he commanded security officers, known in Russia as “Men in Black,” as they wore black sunglasses and dressed in all-black suits. It has been reported that Zolotov has friendly relations with Chechen strongman Ramzan Kadyrov.

On 12 MAY 2014, Zolotov was appointed Minister of Internal Affairs of Russia and Commander of the Internal Troops of Russia. On 05 APR 2016, he was appointed commander- in-chief of the National Guard of Russia and, by separate presidential decree, was also named a non-permanent member of the Security Council.

According to the Alexei Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation project, as of 2018, Zolotov’s family owned property worth a total of 3.5 billion RUB which did not correspond to the family’s incomes. According to the anti-corruption declaration submitted by Zolotov in 2021, his income in 2021 constituted 6,826,859 RUB and the total area of real estate owned by his family was 23,367 sq. metres: including several land plots, houses and apartments.

Zolotov played a crucial role as a key ally of Putin during the Wagner Group rebellion on 23 and 24 JUN 2023.

Summary of Role(s): Commands and controls the entirety of the Russian National Guard, which is used within Russia and occupied areas of Ukraine.

Organizational Membership: Zolotov has been a career government officer. During the era of the Soviet Union, he served in the KGB Border Guard. Upon the dissolution of the Soviet Union, he served the Russian Federation in the (i) Federal Protective Service, (ii) Internal Troops, and (iii) National Guard.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 27 FEB 2025, Zolotov held a meeting on the results of the work of the National Guard of Russia in 2024. During the meeting, Zolotov mentioned the participation of the National Guard in the counter-terrorist activities outside the country and during the counter-terrorist operation in the Kursk region. He emphasised the increase in the scope of National Guard’s combat tasks within the special military operation. On behalf of the Russian Government, Denis Manturov, First Deputy Prime Minister, thanked the leadership and personnel of the National Guard for their responsible work in ensuring state and public security, including in the special military operation zone.

On 24 SEP 2024, the State Bureau of Investigation together with the Security Service of Ukraine and the Prosecutor General’s Office completed a pre-trial investigation against Zolotov and sent

the indictment to court and to the email of the Russian Federal Security Service to bring its contents to Zolotov's attention. Zolotov is accused of incitement and inducement to intentional actions aimed at changing the Ukrainian state border in 2013-2014.

On 27 JUN 2023, Zolotov stated he was in constant contact with Putin during the Wagner Group rebellion, and since has sought the cache of military hardware for the National Guard of Russia that the Wagner Group once held. Speaking for the National Guard, he stated "[w]e have no tanks or long-range heavy weapons. We will supply our forces with those depending on funding."

Also on 27 JUN 2023, Zolotov made the unsubstantiated comment that the Wagner Group's rebellion was "inspired by Western intelligence agencies" who knew about it "a few weeks before it began."

Also on 27 JUN 2023, Zolotov, along with other senior commanders, officers, and troops: appeared before Putin in a speech where Putin thanked them for their efforts in stopping the Wagner Group rebellion claiming "[y]ou saved the Motherland from turmoil, and effectively stopped a civil war."

On 25 AUG 2022, the Mikhail Khodorkovsky's Dossier project published results of their investigation. The investigation alleged that from 2017 to 2019, Zolotov together with his son (Roman Zolotov), the key food supplier for the National Guard of Russia (Boris Vaninaky), and two subordinates (Roman Gavrillov and Ivan Shmelyov) have frequently travelled to the Seychelles. The approximate travel costs constituted 160,000-170,000 EUR, while Zolotov's reported yearly remuneration constituted approximately just 100,000 EUR.

In AUG 2022, Zolotov told Putin "I would like to emphasize that we can feel that the population of the liberated areas is supporting us. They realize that we are defending their right to a peaceful life and their children's happiness" and further provided "National Guard troops are accomplishing a wide range of objectives to maintain law, order, and security, and to resume peaceful life in the liberated territories of the Donetsk and Lugansk republics, as well as in the Zaporozhye and Kherson regions."

On 24 JUN 2022, Zolotov was reported to attend the occupied territory of the Kherson region.

In MAR 2022, the National Guard of Russia became the key force in the occupation of Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.

On 15 MAR 2022, the US sanctioned Zolotov pursuant to E.O. 14024 Section 1(a)(i), as a person who operates or has operated in the defense and related material sector of the Russian economy.

On 14 MAR 2022, Zolotov said in comments on the National Guard's website that “I would like to say that yes, not everything is going as fast as we would like, but we are going towards our goal step by step, and victory will be for us.”

On 25 FEB 2022, the US Treasury announced that it had imposed sanctions on Zolotov in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

On 21 FEB 2022, at a meeting of the Russian Security Council, Zolotov said that Russia “doesn’t border with Ukraine, it is the border with Americans because they are the masters of this country, and [Ukrainians] are their vassals.” He supported the need for official recognition of illegal armed groups “Donetsk People Republic” and “Luhansk People Republic” as independent republics.

On 02 MAR 2021, the EU imposed restrictive measures on Zolotov saying he was “responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including arbitrary arrests and detentions and systematic and widespread violations of freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, in particular by violently repressing protests and demonstrations,” as it relates to the quashing of pro-Navalny protests in 2021.

In AUG 2018, Zolotov became a target of an Anti-Corruption Foundation investigation. Alexei Navalny alleged a theft of over 29 million USD in procurement contacts for the National Guard of Russia. Navalny was soon thereafter imprisoned.

On 06 APR 2018, the US imposed sanctions on Zolotov and twenty-three other Russian nationals for being an official of the Russian Federation government, pursuant to E.O. 13661.

XVII. VALENTINA MATVIYENKO

Title(s):

Chairwoman of the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly
Permanent Member of the Security Council of Russia

Role(s):

Allowed Putin to start a war in Ukraine. Signed off on use of military force on 22 FEB 2022.



Biographical Summary: Valentina Matviyenko was born in Ukraine on 07 APR 1949. .

On 31 AUG 2011, she took her seat on the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation as a representative of the executive authority of the city of St Petersburg. On 21 SEP 2011, she was unanimously elected Speaker of the Federation Council, and re-elected to this office in 2014, 2019, and 2024. Matviyenko has served as a permanent member of the Security Council of the Russian Federation since SEP 2011. In NOV 2011, she was elected Chair of the Council of the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly of the Member Nations of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

As Chairwoman of the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly, Valentina Matviyenko is the presiding officer of the Upper House of the Russian Parliament. It is the third highest position, after the President and the Prime Minister, in the government of Russia. In the case of incapacity of the President and Prime Minister, the Chairman of the Federation Council becomes Acting President of Russia.

In FEB 2022, Matviyenko's family real estate was estimated to be worth approximately 1 billion RUB.

Summary of Role(s): Allowed Putin to start a war in Ukraine. She signed off on use of the military on 22 FEB 2022.

Organizational Membership: United Russia.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 24 MAY 2024, Security Service of Ukraine served a notice of suspicion to Matviyenko for the encroachment on the territorial integrity of Ukraine and her legitimization, justification, and glorification of the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine and its aggressors. These charges are in addition to her charges for inciting and conducting an aggressive war.

On 10 JUL 2023, Matviyenko met with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing to “promote the building of a prosperous, stable, fair and just world” according to Xi. Xi also added that choosing “[t]o develop China-Russia relations is a strategic choice made by both countries based on the fundamental interests of their respective countries and peoples,” and that “[t]hanks to the joint efforts of the two sides, China-Russia relations have maintained a healthy and stable momentum of development. Cooperation in various fields has been steadily advancing, and the social and public opinion base of friendship between the two countries has become stronger for generations.” Matviyenko added that China offered Russia a “firm and reliable friendly shoulder” and the two nations had reached the “highest level [of ties] in history.”

On 16 MAY 2023, when meeting with Belarusian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Aleinik in Moscow, Matviyenko stated “[f]or Russia (and you know this very well, but it bears repeating) the Republic of Belarus is the closest ally, its strategic partner. We highly appreciate our brotherly relations. We are building the Union State together, and together we face new challenges and threats.” Adding that “[o]ur presidents are in constant contact; they set the tone for the development of Russian-Belarusian relations and determine the agenda for our cooperation. The visit of Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko to Russia to participate in the celebrations in honor of our common victory was a landmark event.”

On 06 OCT 2022, at the G20 Parliamentary Speakers’ Summit in Indonesia, Matviyenko proposed to Ukraine’s delegation that the two countries begin peace negotiations “today” and said: “Let’s sit down at the negotiating table today, at the G20 venue. The Russian parliament and the Ukrainian parliament. Let’s try to understand each other, find an agreement”. The Ukrainian parliament rejected the offer. Speaking to journalists after the session, Matvienko said that the negotiations she was proposing could not be about Russia’s annexation of Ukraine’s occupied territories. She said, “We’re willing to put an end to further military action in Ukraine, but on the terms offered by Russia.”

On 04 OCT 2022, Matviyenko and the Federation Council unanimously voted for the ratification of the agreements between Russia and so called “Donetsk People Republic”, “Luhansk People Republic”, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions regarding them joining Russia.

On 21 SEP 2022, Putin announced a mobilization of military reservists and Matviyenko, as well as other top political officials, addressed the outrage within the country in the following days. Matviyenko said that she was aware of reports that some men, who were ineligible for the draft, had been called up to fight. In a message to Russia’s regional governors, who Matviyenko said had “full responsibility” for implementing the mobilization, Matviyenko wrote: “Ensure the implementation of partial mobilization is carried out in full and absolute compliance with the outlined criteria.”

On 06 APR 2022, the US again sanctioned Matviyenko.

On 30 MAR 2022, Matviyenko called Kyiv’s position “inconsistent” because of Zelensky’s lack of freedom to make decisions and statements. She claimed that there was a merger of the Nazi regime with the Ukrainian Government and criticised Zelensky for the lack of reaction to tortures and violence of nationalistic battalions towards Ukrainians and captured Russian military personnel.

On 18 MAR 2022, on her official Telegram channel, Matviyenko congratulated residents of Crimea and Sevastopol on the eighth anniversary of Crimea’s reunion with Russia as a result of their choice of peace and freedom.

On 25 FEB 2022, Matviyenko claimed that “Russia has started a special military operation to induce peace, to stop the active militarisation of Ukraine, we were simply left with no other choice.”

On 25 FEB 2022, the US Treasury announced that it had imposed sanctions on Matviyenko in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

On 17 MAR 2014, the US sanctioned Matviyenko.

On 01 MAR 2014, Matviyenko publicly supported, in the Federation Council, the deployment of Russian forces in Ukraine.

XVIII. SERGEY/SERGEI KUZHUGETOVICH SHOIGU

Title(s):

Former Minister of Defense

Former Secretary of Security Council of the Russian Federation

Role(s):

Under Shoigu's command and orders, Russian troops have held military drills in the illegally annexed Crimea and positioned at the border with Ukraine. Shoigu is ultimately responsible for any military action against Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Sergey Shoigu ("Shoigu") was born 21 MAY 1955 in Chadan, Tuvan Autonomous Oblast. Shoigu was born to an ethnic Tuvan father and Ukrainian born mother. Shoigu has served as Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Defense of the Commonwealth of Independent States since 2012. Shoigu has no military background but has served as Minister of Defense for nearly a decade. Shoigu has also been reported to have a close relationship with President Putin and having spent numerous weekends in the Siberian countryside alongside each other.

Shoigu's approach to his position as Minister of Defence has been described as 'modern' especially following the Special Operations Forces Command which reformed the objectives of the old Russian Armed Forces. This modernisation included the goals of increasing the percentage of specialised contract servicemen in the Russian Armed Forces over the former dependence on conscription.

In JUL 2014, Ukraine opened a criminal case against Shoigu for aiding unsanctioned military groups and supporting commander Igor Girkin's actions in the fight against the Ukrainian army

and related propaganda.

Summary of Role(s): Under Shoigu's command and orders Russian troops have held military drills in the illegally annexed Crimea and have been positioned at the border with Ukraine. Shoigu is ultimately responsible for any military action against Ukraine.

Organizational Membership: United Russia.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 05 AUG 2024, Shoigu visited Tehran for meetings involving the new Iranian government.

In SEP 2024, Shoigu was spotted in Beijing engaging in diplomatic efforts with President Xi Jinping. The China-Russia relationship has been long standing in the Russian war on Ukraine thus, indicating a further and deepened support of China in the Russian-Ukraine war.

In MAY 2024, Shoigu is reported to be replaced as Defense Minister by Andrey Belousov and appointed to be the Secretary of Russia's security council.

On 05 MAR 2024, the ICC issued arrest warrants for crimes alleged during the period of 19 OCT 2022 to 03 MAR 2023 for the bombing of Ukrainian electricity infrastructure and a resultant loss of civilian life.

On 13 JUL 2023, Shoigu was accused of treason by the recently fired Major General Ivan Popov. Without explicitly naming Shoigu, Popov challenged Shoigu's loyalties and leadership stating "[t]he armed forces of Ukraine couldn't break through our army on the frontline; we were hit from behind by our highest boss, treacherously and vilely." Popov added that in contrast with Shoigu "I, in your name, in the name of our dead friends, our fighters, couldn't lie. So, I identified all the problems which exist."

On 26 JUN 2023, the Russian Defense Ministry published a video allegedly showing Shoigu meeting with Russian officers in Ukraine. This came after his strange absence following the Wagner rebellion.

During the Wagner rebellion on 23 JUN 2023, Shoigu's dismissal was a key demand sought by Prigozhin from Putin. This demand was not assented to.

On 22 MAR 2023, Shoigu declared Russia would complete its modernization of its missile defense system by the end of the year. This would include a new air defense division, air defense brigade, a regiment equipped with S-350 missile systems, and space monitoring.

On 07 MAR 2023, Shoigu spoke on Russian State television about the ongoing fighting in

Bakmut. Referring to Bakmut by its Soviet name, he said “[t]he liberation of Artyomovsk continues,” and “[t]aking it under control will allow further offensive actions to be conducted deep into Ukraine's defensive lines.”

On 04 MAR 2023, Shoigu visited Russian troops in Ukraine. The Russian Defense Ministry stated he “inspected the forward command post of one of the formations of the Vostok [Eastern] forces in the South Donetsk direction.”

On 11 JAN 2023, Shoigu ordered Gen. Sergei Surovikin be demoted from his position as the commander of Russian forces in Ukraine and replaced with Gen. Valery Gerasimov. This was approved by Putin, and Surovikin then became Gerasimov’s deputy.

On 31 DEC 2022, Shoigu made a video message for New Year’s stating that Russian victory in 2023 was “inevitable” as Russian troops fought “neo-Nazism and terrorism.”

On 21 DEC 2022, Shoigu stated new military bases would be created and troops would be located closer to the borders of its Nordic neighbors. This is in retaliation for Finland and Sweden preparing to join NATO. Shoigu stated “[g]iven NATO’s desire to build up military potential near the Russian borders, as well as to expand the North Atlantic Alliance at the expense of Finland and Sweden, retaliatory measures are required to create an appropriate grouping of troops in Northwest Russia.”

On 09 NOV 2022, Shoigu appeared on Russian State television with Sergey Surovikin approving of Russia’s military withdrawal from the city of Kherson.

On 01 NOV 2022, Shoigu admitted in a conference call with the defense ministry that Ukraine’s infrastructure (both military and domestic) is a target the Russian military is pursuing. He stated “[w]ith precision-guided strikes, we continue to effectively hit military infrastructure facilities, as well as facilities that affect the reduction of Ukraine’s military potential.”

On 23 OCT 2022, Shoigu said, without providing evidence, that Ukraine could escalate the war with a dirty bomb—or an explosive that contains radioactive waste material. The UK, US, French, and other governments rejected this pretext for escalation.

On 21 SEP 2022, Shoigu said “I cannot but emphasize the fact that today, we are at war not so much with Ukraine and the Ukrainian army as with the collective West, at this point, we are really at war with the collective West, with NATO.” On the same day, Putin announced the annexation of portions of Ukraine as Russian territory and threatened to use nuclear weapons to protect Russian territory.

On 25 FEB 2022, the US and Switzerland sanctioned Shoigu.

On 23 FEB 2022, the EU sanctioned Shoigu “for actively supporting and implementing actions and policies that undermine and threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine as well as the stability or security in Ukraine.”

On 21 FEB 2022, Shoigu spoke in favor of a proposal to recognize Donetsk and Luhansk as independent republics.

On 11 FEB 2022, Shoigu met UK Defense Secretary Ben Wallace. Shoigu denied that Russia was planning an invasion of Ukraine.

On 29 AUG 2021, Shoigu said “Russia doesn't consider Ukraine as a threat.”

XIX. RUSLAN KHADZHISMELOVICH TSALIKOV

Title(s):

Former First Deputy Minister of Defense

Role(s):

Ranked fourth in the overall hierarchy of the Russian military leadership and is responsible for the Russian war effort at large.



Biographical Summary: Ruslan Tsalikov (“Tsalikov”) was born on 31 JUL 1956 in Ordzhonikidze (now Vladikavkaz), North Ossetian ASSR.

From MAY to NOV 2012 Tsalikov was the Vice Governor of the Moscow Region. He was made Acting Governor of Moscow Region on 06 NOV 2012 and served until 08 NOV 2012, when he was replaced by current Governor Andrei Vorobyov. On 15 NOV 2012, Tsalikov was promoted to Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation.

In DEC 2015, by decree of the Russian President, Tsalikov was appointed the First Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation. He was dismissed on 14 JUN 2024.

Summary of Role(s): Ranks fourth in the overall hierarchy of the Russian military leadership and is responsible for the Russian war effort at large. In his various public appearances, such as his participation in an “anti-fascist” conference organized by the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, he has expressed support for Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 14 JUN 2024, Tsalikov was dismissed as Deputy Minister of Defence by President Putin in a massive reshuffle prior to his re-election.

On 01 MAY 2024, the Defence Intelligence of the United Kingdom reported that Tsalikov was investigated by the FSB for alleged corruption while in the Ministry.

On 19 OCT 2022, Ukraine sanctioned Tsalikov.

On 06 OCT 2022, the EU sanctioned Tsalikov.

On 21 SEP 2022, Tsalikov was present at a meeting where Putin announced a partial mobilization in Russia, announced it was annexing portions of Ukraine via sham referendums and would consider such areas Russian territory, and Putin threatened to use nuclear weapons to defend Russian territory.

On 15 MAR 2022, US sanctioned Tsalikov, pursuant to E.O. 14024 Section 1(a)(i), as a person who operates or has operated in the defense and related material sector of the Russian economy. On the same day, the UK also sanctioned Tsalikov.

XX. DMITRY VITALYEVICH BULGAKOV

Title(s):

Former Deputy Minister of Defense (2015 – SEP 2022)

Role(s):

Responsible for any military actions against Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Dmitry Vitalyevich Bulgakov (“Bulgakov”) was born 20 OCT 1954 in Verkhneye Gurovo, RSFSR, USSR.

From 2015-2017, Bulgakov was in charge of issues relating to a railway that would bypass Ukraine and since 2015 he was in charge of supplying Russian troops in Syria. In MAY 2016 Bulgakov was awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation for the organization of an operation that took place in Syria. Bulgakov (along with General Gerasimov) became the highest-ranking military officer that Vladimir Putin awarded a high rank for the operation in Syria. Sanctions were placed on Bulgakov due to his role in the military actions against Ukraine by the EU, USA, Switzerland, Japan, New Zealand, UK, Canada, Australia, and Ukraine.

Bulgakov was dismissed and replaced by Colonel General Mikhail Mizintsev in SEP 2022, due to the Russian army’s widespread logistical problems in the invasion of Ukraine.

Summary of Role(s): Responsible for any military actions against Ukraine. From 2015 to 2017, Bulgakov was in charge of issues relating to a railway that would bypass Ukraine.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 16 JUL 2024, Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) announced that Bulgakov had been arrested and charged with corruption and subsequently placed in Lefortovo prison in Moscow.

In SEP 2022, Bulgakov was dismissed as deputy defense minister due to large logistical issues that resulted in the war with Ukraine.

On 06 OCT 2022, the EU sanctioned Bulgakov.

In SEP 2022, Bulgakov was dismissed and replaced by Colonel General Mikhail Mizintsev due to the Russian army's widespread logistical problems in the invasion of Ukraine. At the time of his dismissal, it was reported he would be transferred into a new role.

On 15 MAR 2022, the US sanctioned Bulgakov, pursuant to E.O. 14024 Section 1(a)(i), as a person who operates or has operated in the defense and related material sector of the Russian economy.

On 21 JUN 2018, Ukraine sanctioned Bulgakov

XXI. PAVEL ANATOLYEVICH/ANATOLEVICH POPOV

Title(s):

Former Deputy Minister of Defense

Role(s):

Responsible for any military actions against Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Pavel Anatolyevich Popov (“Popov”) was born 01 JAN 1957, in Krasnoyarsk, RSFSR, USSR.

On 07 NOV 2013, Popov was appointed Deputy Minister of Defense and became a member of the Russian Ministry Defense. Popov oversaw the creation of the National Center for Defense Management of Russia. In this position he is responsible for research activities such as the oversight and development of the Ministry’s scientific and technical capabilities, such as the modernization of existing weapons and equipment.

In DEC 2015, Popov was promoted to General of the Army.

Summary of Role(s): Responsible for any military actions against Ukraine.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 27 MAY 2024, Popov’s application for house arrest was declined by the Russian Military court.

On 21 MAY 2024, Popov was arrested for fraud after an investigation by the Russian Investigative Committee.

In JUN 2023, Popov was dismissed as deputy defense minister due to suspicions of fraud and other illegal activities.

On 20 MAR 2023, it was announced that Popov was awarded by the ministry with an apartment in Moscow at the Smolenskaya Zastava housing complex. It is valued at approximately 909,300 USD (over 70 million RUB).

On 02 MAR 2021, the US sanctioned Popov.

On 15 OCT 2020, the EU sanctioned Popov for connection to the poisoning of Alexei Navalny. These sanctions included a ban on entry into the EU in addition to an asset freeze.

XXII. TATIANA/TATYANA VIKTOROVNA SHEVTSOVA

Title(s):

Former Deputy Minister of Defense
(04 AUG 2010 - 2024, replaced by Anna Yevgenyeva Tsivilyeva)

Role(s):

Until 2024, Shevtsova was a senior official of the body, organization, institution responsible for the destabilization of Ukraine and Russian military aggression, which undermines the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. Shevtsova was also responsible for organizing financial support to the Russian army.



Biographical Summary: Tatiana Viktorovna Shevtsova (“Shevtsova”) was born on 22 JUL 1969 in Kozelsk, USSR. S

On 04 AUG 2010, she was appointed Deputy Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation, with responsibility for finances, under a Presidential Decree. Shevtsova was entrusted with supervising the military-economic bloc and the financing of armed forces. Russia included Shevtsova on a list of the top richest *siloviki* (state and military administration officials) of Russia (13th place in 2013). In NOV 2012 it was reported that Shevtsova willingly wrote a resignation letter however it was not accepted by Sergey Shoygu. In MAY 2024, it was reported that Shevtsova had resigned from her position, and in JUN 2024, the office of the President of Russia released a statement announcing Shevtsova’s dismissal as Deputy Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation.

Shevtsova is married to Anatoly Shevtsov.

Summary of Role(s): Official of the body, organization, institution responsible for the destabilization of Ukraine and Russian military aggression, which undermines the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. Promulgating information to mobilized Russian military members about payments.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 17 JUN 2024, Shevtsova was dismissed from her position as Deputy Minister of Defence, and replaced by Anna Tsivilyeva, the daughter of Vladimir Putin's cousin, Yevgeny Mikhailovich Putin, and wife of Minister of Energy, Sergei Yevgenyevich Tsilyev.

On 23 JUN 2023, the European Union sanctioned Shevtsova.

On 19 OCT 2022, Ukraine sanctioned Shevtsova.

XXIII. YURI/YURIY EDUARDOVICH SADOVENKO

Title(s):

Colonel General of the Russian Armed Forces
Former Deputy Minister of Defense, Head of the Apparatus of the Minister of Defense of the
Russian Federation

(13 JAN 2013 - 20 MAY 2024, replaced by Oleg Genrikhovich Savelyev)

Role(s):

Responsible for the Russian war effort at large, Sadovenko was involved at the highest level of the invasion of Ukraine as a Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, and heading the office of the Ministry of Defense.



Biographical Summary: Yuri Eduardovich Sadovenko (“Sadovenko”) was born on 11 SEP 1969, in Zhytomyr, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. In JAN 2013 Sadovenko was appointed a Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, Supervisor of the Apparatus of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. Sadovenko is a Colonel General. Sadovenko was a close associate of former Minister of Defense Sergey Shoigu. Sadovenko was dismissed from his role as Deputy Minister of Defense in MAY 2024, a week after Shoigu’s dismissal. Sadovenko was replaced by Oleg Genrikhovich Savelyev.

Sadovenko shares three children with Maria Vladimirovna Kitaeva from an extramarital relationship understood to be an informal marriage which had ended by 2022. Kitaeva was formerly an advisor to the Defense Ministry from 2012. Her family holds millions of dollars in real estate, some of which was purchased from the Ministry of Defense at a deep discount. As of 2024, Kitaeva was reported to have informally married Timur Vadimovich Ivanov, Deputy Minister of Defense since 2016, who was dismissed and arrested on corruption charges on 23

APR 2024, and is coincidentally reported to have been godfather to Kitaeva and Sadovenko's second daughter, born in July 2016.

Summary of Role(s): Ranked seventh in the overall hierarchy of the Russian military leadership, Sadovenko was responsible for the Russian war effort at large. Involved in the deployment of troops to Ukraine and has openly supported and justified Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine in his public appearances.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 9 APR 2025, the UK further sanctioned Sadovenko as a Disqualified Director via its Insolvency Service, prohibiting him from becoming director of a UK registered company.

On 17 MAR 2023, it was reported Sadovenko & Kitaeva's family had worked in housing development, buying land which was sold at an undervalued price by the Ministry of Defense. Sadovenko has utilized many properties and assets, which are in the names of Maria Kitaeva and her brother, that are thought to really be his. This includes at least four luxury apartments worth over \$10 million combined, and at least three collectively worth \$8.7 million in the Kitaeva family's name, as well as a Porsche owned in the name of his brother-in-law, Denis Kitaev. Since Sadovenko's dismissal and Kitaeva's marriage to his successor, Ivanov, it is unclear whether he still has access to these assets.

On 06 OCT 2022, the E.U. sanctioned Sadovenko.

On 15 MAR 2022, the U.S. sanctioned Sadovenko, pursuant to E.O. 14024 Section 1(a)(i), as a person who operates or has operated in the defense and related material sector of the Russian economy. The UK sanctioned Sadovenko the same day.

On 21 JUN 2018, Ukraine sanctioned Sadovenko.

XXIV. ALEXANDER/ALEKSANDR VASILYEVICH FOMIN

Title(s):

Deputy Minister of Defense

Role(s):

Senior official of the body, organization, institution responsible for the destabilization of Ukraine and Russian military aggression, which undermines the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Alexander Vasilyevich Fomin (“Fomin”) was born on 25 MAY 1959 e. He has been serving as Deputy Minister of Defense since 2017.

Summary of Role(s): Senior official of the body, organization, institution responsible for the destabilization of Ukraine and Russian military aggression, which undermines the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. Reported by Russian state media to be one of the members of the Russian-imposed administration in the occupied Kherson Oblast.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 14 MAY 2025, Fomin was announced as part of the Russian delegation to Ukraine-Russia talks in Istanbul.

On 09 MAY 2025, Fomin met with Union Minister of State for Defence Sanjay Seth of India, where it was agreed to deepen cooperation and Russian support in combating terrorism.

On 09 APR 2025, the UK further sanctioned Fomin as a Disqualified Director via its Insolvency Service, prohibiting him from becoming director of a UK registered company.

In SEP 2024, Fomin attended the Beijing Xiangshan Forum on security, and criticized the United States and NATO as working against global peace and risking nuclear conflict.

On 16 JAN 2024, Fomin along with fellow Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov met with the Defense Minister of Niger, Salifu Modi, and agreed to increase military involvement and cooperation in the region and to help improve the combat readiness of Niger's military.

In NOV 2023, Fomin attended the 10th Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Defense Ministers' meeting.

On 30 OCT 2024, the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Asset Control applied further sanctions on Fomin.

In JAN 2023, Fomin announced that Russia would pull back forces from Kyiv and Chernihiv as an attempt to "increase mutual trust."

On 03 DEC 2022, Fomin traveled to Tehran to allegedly discuss how to execute smaller size shipments of military equipment in order to not violate the UN Security Council resolution.

In NOV 2022, when Ukraine re-took Kherson City, Fomin, reported by Russian state media to be one of the members of the Russian-imposed administration in occupied Kherson Oblast, said Henichesk has been declared the temporary administrative capital of Kherson Oblast (the region Russia claims to have annexed). He said: "All the main authorities are concentrated there."

On 19 OCT 2022, Ukraine sanctioned Fomin.

On 16 OCT 2022, Fomin met with U.N. aid chief, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator Martin Griffiths, to discuss the improvement of the implementation of the Black Sea Grain Initiative, which expired 17 JUL 2023.

In AUG 2022, Fomin met with the Minister of Defense of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Gilbert Kabanda Kurhenga, in Moscow for the 10th Conference on National Security. Kurhenga thanked Russia saying "[t]he Russian Federation, as a good friend, has always refrained from blackmailing us, blaming us or imposing subjective sanctions." Leaked documents revealed in FEB 2021, Russia sent the DRC, without ever receiving payment, a cache of about 10,000 Kalashnikov rifles and about 3 million cartridges of ammunition. Also in AUG 2022, Fomin held talks with Major General Nidal Abu Dukhan from the Palestinian Authority (PA) security forces to discuss military and intelligence cooperation.

On 27 MAR 2021, Formin attended Myanmar's Armed Forces Day as an honored guest, just after Myanmar military's 01 FEB 2021 coup.

XXV. TIMUR VADIMOVICH IVANOV

Title(s):

Former Deputy Minister of Defense
(23 MAY 2016 - 23 APR 2024, replacement unknown)

Role(s):

Responsible for the Russian war effort at large. Responsible for the procurement of military goods and the construction of military facilities, including in Russian occupied Ukrainian territories.



Biographical Summary: Timur Vadimovich Ivanov (“Ivanov”) was born on 15 AUG 1975 in Moscow. His father is Vadim Gennadyevich, the general director of Crystal Development LLC since 2004. Russia. Hon01. . an On 23 MAY 2016, by decree of the President of Russia, Ivanov was appointed Deputy Minister of Defense of Russia, replacing Aleksey Gennadyevich Dyumin, who had served since 24 DEC 2015 upon the promotion of Deputy Minister of Defence Ruslan Khadzhismelovich Tsalikov to the position of First Deputy Minister of Defence. During the COVID-19 pandemic in Russia in 2020, Ivanov supervised the construction of 16 multifunctional medical centers of the Ministry of Defense for the treatment of patients with COVID-19. On 23 APR 2024, Russian Federal Security Services arrested Ivanov on charges of bribery and corruption, and he was dismissed from his position. His dismissal and arrest were related to Ivanov’s involvement with Olimpsitstroy, a subcontractor to the Military Construction Company (VSK), which is the main construction company of the Russian Ministry of Defense. Ivanov was accused of taking bribes from the company’s co-founder, Alexander Fomin (no relation to Deputy Defense Minister Alexander Fomin). On 1 JUL 2025, IVanov was convicted for the charges of embezzlement and money laundering, and was sentenced to 13 years in prison.

Summary of Role(s): In his position in the Ministry of Defense, Ivanov oversaw issues related to property management and quartering of troops, housing and medical support of the Russian Armed Forces, and was responsible for the construction, reconstruction and overhaul of facilities of the Russian Ministry of Defense and military mortgages.

Organizational Membership: Responsible for the procurement of military goods and the construction of military facilities, including in Russian occupied Ukrainian territories. Ranks tenth in the overall hierarchy of the Russian military leadership. Given his key position in the Russian Federation's military enterprise, he is responsible for the Russian war effort at large. He has made various visits to Luhansk and Donetsk to inspect facilities under construction by Russian occupying forces. Additionally, he has handed various state awards to Russian military personnel wounded in Russia's war. Actively supports and defends the war against Ukraine.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 07 OCT 2024, Ivanov faced new charges of embezzlement of more than 3.2 billion rubles in his position, including instances of transfers of this wealth to accounts of companies in Cyprus and in Hong Kong.

In 2024, it was reported that Ivanov had entered a relationship with Maria Vladimirovna Kitaeva as early as 2022, a year after his divorce from Svetlana Ivanovna (formerly Maniovich, née Zakharova). Kitaeva had a de-facto marriage to former Deputy Minister of Defence, Yuri Eduardovich Sadovenko, and Ivanov is reported to have also been the godfather to Kitaeva and Sadovenko's second daughter, born in 2016.

On 22 DEC 2022, it is reported by the Anti-Corruption Foundation (founded by Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny) that Ivanov and his wife are profiting off the reconstruction efforts in Mariupol. In the summer of 2022, Ivanov and his wife Svitlana filed for divorce, but journalists perceive this is simply to protect their extensive assets held in Svitlana's name from Timur's E.U. sanctions.

On 06 OCT 2022, the E.U. sanctioned Ivanov.

On 01 JUL 2022, Ivanov visited occupied Mariupol to inspect construction of fortifications in the residential neighborhoods.

On 15 MAR 2022, the U.S. sanctioned Ivanov, pursuant to E.O. 14024 Section 1(a)(i), as a person who operates or has operated in the defense and related material sector of the Russian economy.

XXVI. YUNUS-BEK BAMATGIREYEVICH YEVKUROV/EVKUROV

Title(s):

Deputy Minister of Defense
Member of the Supreme Council of the “United Russia” party

Role(s):

Responsible for the Russian war effort at large.



Biographical Summary: Yunus-Bek Bamatgireyevich Yevkurov/Evkurov (“Yevkurov”), an ethnic Ingush, was born on 23 JUL 1963 in Tarskoye village, Prigorodny District, North Ossetian ASSR, USSR, into a peasant family of 12 children.

Yevkurov was appointed a deputy defense minister of Russia by President Vladimir Putin on 08 JUL 2019. In this decree, Putin also promoted Yevkurov from major general to lieutenant general. On 08 DEC 2021, he was further promoted to colonel general.

Summary of Role(s): Responsible for the Russian war effort at large. Senior official of the body, organization, institution responsible for the destabilization of Ukraine and Russian military aggression, which undermines the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. Actively supported and implemented actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilized Ukraine. In his public appearances, he openly justifies Russia’s war against Ukraine. By means of his public appearances and participation in reward and medal ceremonies, he rallies domestic support for the war.

Yevkurov is also in charge of gathering military intelligence and the military capabilities of Ukrainian forces as well as the possible military interventions of Western nations.

Yevkurov has also played a central role in expanding Russian military relations in other regions of the world, especially in Africa, notably in the political relations between certain African states' security forces and Russian security forces such as the Africa Corps.

As Ukraine's defense measures have increasingly crossed into Russian territory, Yevkurov has assumed a direct role in border defense on Russia's frontier with Ukraine. On 05 JAN 2025, Yevkurov was sent to Kursk Oblast to take control of the Russian defensive efforts there, which had been ongoing since the Armed Forces of Ukraine first launched their incursion on 06 AUG 2024.

Organizational Membership: Member of the Supreme Council of the United Russia party.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 02 MAR 2025, Yevkurov met with Faustin-Archange Touadera, President of the Central African Republic, to discuss continued military and economic support from the Russian Federation to the Touadera's government in the Central African Republic.

On 05 JAN 2025, Yevkurov was sent to Kursk Oblast on the Ukrainian Border to manage the response to renewed Ukrainian incursions.

In DEC 2024, Yevkurov accompanied Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation and former Minister of Energy, Alexander Novak, to Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso.

On 26 NOV 2024, Yevkurov met with Khalifa Haftar, Supreme Commander of the Libyan National Army (LNA), at the LNA headquarters in Rajma, east of Benghazi. This meeting included a number of top Libyan military officials, including the Chief of Staff of Security Units of the LNA, Khaled Khalifa Haftar, and the Director of Military Intelligence, Fawzi Al-Mansouri.

On 31 MAY 2024, Yevkurov arrived in Libya for the fifth time since AUG 2023 and met in Benghazi with Khalifa Haftar. The meeting focused on further development of economic and security relations between the Russian Federation and the Government of National Stability which controls eastern Libya. This came soon after reports that Russia had been unloading military equipment through the Port of Tobruk, controlled by the Government of National Stability.

In late JAN 2024, Yevkurov arrived in Libya and met in Benghazi with Khalifa Haftar. In this meeting, a Russian naval base in Tobruk was reportedly discussed, which Italian security experts believe may have been planned to have nuclear naval capabilities.

On 18 DEC 2023, Yevkurov met in Niamey, Niger, with General Abdourahmane Tchiane, President of Niger, and General Salifou Mody, the Minister of Defense. The meeting resulted in signed commitments to further military and defense cooperation between Russia and Niger.

On 30 NOV 2023, Yevkurov met for a third time in Benghazi, Libya, with Khalifa Haftar and, according to the Information Office of the General Command of the Libyan National Army, discussed joint cooperation between the two militaries.

On 17 SEP 2023, Yevkurov met for a second time in Libya, with Khalifa Haftar. This coincided with Russian participation in emergency disaster relief operations in response to the Derna flooding disaster that ensued after the 10 SEP 2023- 11 SEP 2023 failures of the Derna and Mansour dams in Derna District of Libya.

In SEP 2023, Yevkurov led Russian delegations on visits to multiple countries on the African continent, including to Mali, Libya, and Niger.

In early SEP 2023, Yevkurov led a Russian delegation to Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, where he held talks with interim president, Ibrahim Traore, on matters of military cooperation.

On 22 AUG 2023, Yevkurov led a Russian delegation to Benghazi to meet with Khalifa Haftar. In their meeting, they discussed areas of joint cooperation such as counterterrorism and security issues.

On 5 APR 2023, Yevkurov visited the Perevalne military camp in Simferopol district, Crimea, where the so-called “Bear Brigade” paramilitary organization trained, which was formed in MAR 2023 and was incorporated into the Ministry of Defense in MAY 2023 as the 81st Specialized Volunteer Brigade. The Bear Brigade or Medvedi, as they are known in Russian, is formed by volunteers signed under contracts with Russia’s Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, commonly known as the GRU, which reports to the Minister of Defence and the Chief of the General Staff.

On 22 FEB 2023, Yevkurov, along with Deputy Defense Minister Colonel-General Viktor Goremykin, presented medals to Russian soldiers piloting attack aircrafts.

On 06 OCT 2022, the E.U. sanctioned Yevkurov.

On 21 May 2022, Yevkurov's nephew Captain Adam Khamkhoev, a commander of an airborne assault company, was killed by Ukrainian forces.

On 15 MAR 2022, the U.S. sanctioned Yevkurov, pursuant to E.O. 14024 Section 1(a)(i), as a person who operates or has operated in the defense and related material sector of the Russian economy. The UK sanctioned Yevkurov the same day.

XXVII. NIKOLAY ALEKSANDROVICH PANKOV

Title(s):

Former Deputy Minister of Defense

Role(s):

Responsible for any military actions against Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Nikolay Aleksandrovich Pankov (“Pankov”) was born on 02 DEC 1954 in the village of Maryino, Kady district of the Kostroma Oblast region, RSFSR, USSR, and has been the Secretary of State - Deputy Minister of the Defense of the Russian Federation since 13 SEP 2005.

On 30 MAR 2009, Pankov was dismissed from reserve military service and transferred to the category of federal civil servant, while retaining the position of Secretary of State - Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation. On 17 JUN 2011, he was awarded the highest-class rank of a state federal employee - Active State Councilor of the Russian Federation, 1st class, a promotion from Acting State Councilor of the Russian Federation, 2nd class which he received 30 APR 2010.

In DEC 2010, the Ministry of Defense entered into an agreement with Neviss-Komplekt LLC for the transfer of funds and expositions of the Central Naval Museum in Saint Petersburg from the Stock Exchange building on the Spit of Vasilievsky Island to the Kryukov barracks on Labor Square. The museum's move to the new building was supervised by State Secretary Pankov. In

DEC 2012, the Main Military Investigation Department found out that a majority of the payment was made on the basis of fictitious reporting documents. Pankov signed the work acceptance certificate for the building, although the work was barely half completed. Without Pankov's signature the criminals could not have access to the money. At that stage of the investigation, it was revealed that those actions caused damage to the state in the amount of more than 400 million RUB. Many involved in the scam received real prison terms, yet Pankov was not convicted, despite the fact that the defendants called him a key participant in the scam. Pankov was however obliged to reimburse about 600 million RUB through court proceedings.

Nikolai Pankov is one of the few who has retained the post of Deputy Minister of Defense after the dismissal of Anatoly Serdyukov and the appointment of Sergey Shoigu to the post of Russian Defense Minister in NOV 2012. Pankov also played a key role in Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov's dacha scandal near Anapa. Pankov went to Anapa and convinced city deputies to transfer a site within the Krasnodar Territory to the Ministry of Defense, allegedly for the construction of a radar station, claiming without which "the country's defense will fall." The deputies allocated the land, but instead of the radar station, a 600 square metre residential building with a swimming pool and a boathouse for yachts was built. Retired Russian military Col. Viktor Baranets claimed "[a] whole railway troops battalion or two were used to build the road to that dacha. Hundreds of spruce and fir trees and thousands of lawn rolls were flown there from Moscow as hundreds of ordinary conscript soldiers were used as slave labor to plant all that. A whole defense ministry plane full of Spanish-made furniture was flown from Spain to equip that dacha."

Since 15 APR 2015 Pankov has been the head of the Supervisory Board of the Central Sports Club of the Army. From 2015 to 2018, he oversaw the All-Russian Military Patriotic Public Movement.

On 01 JUL 2021, President Vladimir Putin appointed State Secretary - Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation Nikolai Pankov as his official representative at the ratification by the State Duma and the Federation Council of the agreement on the establishment of a logistics point for the Russian Navy in Sudan. On 01 JUN 2021, Sudan announced the revision of the agreement with the Russian Federation on the establishment of a base on the Red Sea.

On 17 JUN 2024, Anna Evgenievna Tsivileva, a relative of President Vladimir Putin, was appointed as Deputy Minister of Defense, succeeding Pankov.

Summary of Role(s): Previously responsible for Human Resources and personnel support matters. Provided support for, and had oversight over, Russian armed forces involved in the invasion of Ukraine, responsible for any military actions against Ukraine.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 10 JUN 2023, Pankov announced that “volunteer formations” would be required to sign contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense by 01 JUL. Pankov stated “[t]he order grants the right to all volunteers to sign individual contracts with volunteer formations or the Defense Ministry as contract service members,” and “these measures will make it possible to boost combat capabilities and effectiveness of the [Russian] armed forces and volunteer units included in them.”

Though the announcement did not specifically reference the Wagner Group, this was widely seen as an attempt to bring more state-control to the Wagner Group and its soldiers which have been operating fairly independently of the Russian military since the start of the invasion. Prigozhin for his part, directly rejected these compliance orders. Prigozhin stated that Wagner is “is fully compliant with interests of Russia and the commander-in-chief” and “coordinates all its actions with Army General [Sergey] Surovikin and completes the tasks he sets out.” These tensions likely played some impact in Prigozhin’s decision to initiate the Wagner Group rebellion.

It is not clear what (if any) impact the Wagner Group rebellion on 23 and 24 JUN has had on the Russian military’s objectives of getting these Wagner soldiers more “in line” with the hierarchy and regulation of the Russian military.

On 20 MAR 2023, it was reported Pankov had been awarded by the Kremlin with a luxury apartment: a four-room suite in the “House of the Presidential Property Management Directorate” worth about \$900,000/70 million rubles. Registered in his daughter Maria’s name, it is one of many Pankov has signed over to his children.

On 19 OCT 2022, Ukraine sanctioned Pankov.

On 06 OCT 2022, the EU sanctioned Pankov.

On 10 JUN 2022, France sanctioned Pankov given his position as fifth rank in the Russian military command, his involvement in the deployment of troop in Ukraine, and presenting of awards to airborne troops for their participation in the war of aggression waged by Russia in Ukraine.

On 15 MAR 2022, the US sanctioned Pankov, pursuant to E.O. 14024 Section 1(a)(i), as a person who operates or has operated in the defense and related material sector of the Russian economy.

On 24 FEB 2022, New Zealand’s Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs announced a

targeted travel ban against Russian Government Officials and other individuals associated with the Russian invasion of Ukraine which included Pankov.

XXVIII. ALEKSEY/ALEXEY/ALEXEI YURIEVICH KRIVORUCHKO

Title(s):

Deputy Minister of Defense

Role(s):

Responsible for any military actions against Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Aleksey Yurievich Krivoruchko (“Krivoruchko”) was born on 17 JUL 1975 in Stavropol.. On 13 JUN 2018, he was appointed Deputy Minister in the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation with the overall responsibility for armaments. He is responsible for logistics, technical support and arms purchases for the Russian Armed Forces.

Since 2012, he has been a member of the board of directors of the engineering company Transmashholding. According to a U.S. Department of Treasury press release from SEP 2023, Russian officials engaged Transmashholding in 2022 to produce parts for infantry combat vehicles. Previously, in MAY 2023, the U.S. Department of State noted the involvement of a Transmashholding subsidiary (Metrovagonmash Joint Stock Company) in the production of military equipment, including chassis affixed to Russian surface-to-air radar, weapons systems, and multiple variants of armored tracked vehicles.

From February 2013 to March 2018, Krivoruchko served as a Chairman of the Board of Directors of OJSC Central Suburban Passenger Company (CPPK; the largest suburban railway carrier in Russia, operating in eleven regions). Currently, he is a member of the board of directors of the CPPK.

From 2014 to 2018, Krivoruchko held the positions of CEO at JSC Kalashnikov Concern and Izhevsk Mechanical Plant JSC. During this time, he was interviewed in an episode of *Dirty Dollars* (Episode 3, “Arms Trafficking”), where he stated that despite growth over the last decade, Russia’s international sanctions on arms sales after Crimea are “economically, [...] a real shortfall for the company.” He also noted: “obviously the main civilian firearms market is the American market which unfortunately is closed to us at the moment. But we are currently developing other markets and have been able to improve ourselves in the last few years.”

In 2017 he again held the position of CEO at Aeroexpress. In May of 2018 Krivoruchko left his positions at Aeroexpress and Kalashnikov in connection with his appointment by decree of the President of the Russian Federation and took his position as Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation.

Summary of Role(s): Responsible for any military actions against Ukraine. Krivoruchko has overall responsibility for armaments, including oversight of the Ministry’s stocks of weapons and military equipment. Krivoruchko is also responsible for their elimination within the framework of the implementation of international treaties assigned to the Ministry of Defense. The Russian Ministry of Defense took on the responsibility for the chemical weapons stocks inherited from the Soviet Union and their safe storage until their destruction could be completed.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 19 JUL 2024, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un received Krivoruchko and discussed the importance of the two countries’ militaries to unite more firmly to defend world peace and justice. No further details were provided regarding Krivoruchko's delegation or the purpose of the visit to North Korea.

On 23 FEB 2024, the EU sanctioned Krivoruchko, including him on the list of persons and entities responsible for actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.

On 14 SEP 2023, the US sanctioned Krivoruchko for being or having been a leader, official, senior executive officer, or member of the board of directors of the Government of the Russian Federation.

On 16 AUG 2022, after the Army-2022 Forum, Russian state media reported that Krivoruchko Russian Armed Forces will receive more than 3,700 new equipment pieces as a result of performance of contracts signed at the conference and more than 100 materiel and special equipment units will be repaired and upgraded.

On 15 MAR 2022, sanctioned by the US, pursuant to E.O. 14024 Section 1(a)(i). On 26 FEB 2022, Krivoruchko reportedly signed a document, that was later published, on behalf of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation which ordered the destruction of the bodies of Russian soldiers who died in Ukraine.

On 24 FEB 2022, New Zealand's Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs announced a targeted travel ban against Russian Government Officials and other individuals associated with the Russian invasion of Ukraine which includes Krivoruchko.

On 04 SEP 2021, Vietnamese Defense Minister General Phan Van Giang received Krivoruchko in Hanoi on the occasion of his attending the closing ceremony of the "Sniper Frontier" and "Emergency Area" contests of the Army Games 2021 in Vietnam. At the reception, General Giang highlighted the time-honored friendship between the two countries and emphasized that Vietnam always attaches much importance to strengthening the comprehensive strategic partnership with Russia and considers it a top priority in the country's foreign policy. The Vietnamese defense minister said that over the past time, leaders of the two countries have paid attention to fostering defense cooperation, thus creating a momentum to expand the bilateral cooperation in other fields. Since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, the two defense ministries have actively supported each other in their pandemic fight.

On 02 MAR 2021, the US sanctioned Krivoruchko in relation to the war crimes in Ukraine.

On 05 JAN 2021, the UK sanctioned Krivoruchko suggesting that he was responsible for the preparation and use of chemical weapons in the attempted assassination of Alexey Navalny.

On 15 OCT 2020, the EU sanctioned Krivoruchko in relation to chemical attacks on Alexey Navalny.

On 14 OCT 2020, France sanctioned Krivoruchko, in response to the attempted assassination of Alexey Navalny. Since the Ministry of Defense has overall responsibility for the safe storage and destruction of chemical weapons and with Krivoruchko's senior position he is therefore responsible for having helped people who committed the poisoning of Alexey Navalny.

XXIX. DMITRY EVGENYEVICH SHUGAEV/SCHUGAEV

Title(s):

Director of Federal Service of Military-Technical Cooperation

Role(s):

Responsible for control and supervision in the field of military-technical cooperation, as well as the development of state policy in the field of military-technical cooperation, thus making him responsible for the Russian war effort at large.



Biographical Summary: Dmitry Evgenyevich Shugaev (“Shugaev”) was born 11 AUG 1965 in Moscow. Shugaev has served as an Executive Director of CJSC “Legal Profile.” He also worked as Consultant to the Deputy Director General of Rosoboronexport; Assistant to the First Deputy Director General of Rosoboronexport; and the Chief of Staff to the Director General of Rosoboronexport. Schugaev was also the Head of the Office of the General Director of the State Corporation “Rostekhnologii” (Rostec).

Shugaev was the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Transport and Exhibition Complex “Russia” and the company “Marketing Investment Projects”. He was also the Deputy Chairman of the Board of Directors of Inter RAO UES (a diversified energy holding company) and Rampion Aero OJSC (an international aviation holding company).

Organizational Membership: Member of the Board of Directors of Russian Corporation for Instrumentation and Information Systems (RKS OJSC), Ramenskoye International Airport OJSC and Rosoboronexport JSC.

Summary of Role(s): The Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation (FSVTS) is a federal executive body responsible for control and oversight in the field of military-technical

cooperation between the Russian Federation and foreign countries. The service reports to the President and is in the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense. The Director of the FSVTS is under direct authority of the Russian Ministry of Defense. Responsible for control and supervision in the field of military-technical cooperation, as well as the development of state policy in the field of military-technical cooperation, thus making him responsible for the Russian war effort at large.

Organizational Membership: Shugaev is Deputy Chairman of the Supervisory Board of “National Center for Aircraft Construction.”

Incidents and Events of Note: In an effort to prevent countries from supplying Soviet and Russian-made weapons to Ukraine, Russia has implemented various measures to disrupt these transactions. On 13 AUG 2024, Shugaev announced that Russia is revoking repair licenses for foreign facilities and halting the supply of spare parts necessary for maintaining its military equipment. As an example, he cited Russia’s 2022 decision to revoke licenses from several enterprises in Bulgaria and the Czech Republic that were authorized to repair Mi-series helicopters. Shugaev also claimed that Russia was receiving requests from foreign countries for the purchase of the fifth-generation Su-57 fighter multi-role fighter jet. Shugaev’s statements were made during the 2024 "Army" or "Armiya" International Military-Technical Forum, an annual arms industry trade show organised by the Russian Ministry of Defence.

On 27 MAY 2024, Shugaev announced that Russia and Uzbekistan intend to sign an agreement on a program of arms modernization, including aviation, air defense, and ground forces.

On 13 NOV 2023, during the 2023 Dubai Airshow, Shugaev announced that successful military-related transactions have positioned Russia’s portfolio of armament orders on a steady scale of 50-55 billion dollars, despite sanctions. He also highlighted that UAE and Russia are presently in dialogue about potential new supplies and the prospect of industrial collaboration.

On 18 OCT 2023, Shugaev accompanied Putin to China for the Third Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation (BRF) held in Beijing. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), sometimes referred to as the New Silk Road, is a geopolitical and geoeconomic project aiming to develop global infrastructure for trade flows.

In JUL 2023, Shugaev confirmed Nigeria’s interest in various types of Russian aviation equipment, including the Su-75 Checkmate fighter jet, at the Russia-Africa Economic and Humanitarian Forum.

On 08 JUN 2023, Shugaev met with Algerian Army Chief of Staff Said Chengriha in Algiers. Shugaev had previously visited Algeria in NOV and MAR of 2022.

In MAR 2023, Shugaev gave an interview where he claimed Russia has exported 13 billion dollars' worth of weapons to India over the last five years, with a portfolio of orders of about \$10 billion in India, and \$50 billion globally. This comes as Iran has also purchased large numbers of weapons, especially Su-35 planes, from Russia. In the interview, Schugaev referred to Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine as "Russia's special operation in Ukraine."

On 19 OCT 2022, Ukraine sanctioned Shugaev.

On 06 OCT 2022, the EU sanctioned Shugaev.

On 18 MAR 2022, Japan sanctioned Shugaev. On 15 MAR 2022, the US sanctioned Shugaev, pursuant to E.O. 14024 Section 1(a)(i), as a person who operates or has operated in the defense and related material sector of the Russian economy.

XXX. ALEKSANDR/ALEXANDER ALEKSANDROVICH MIKHEEV

Title(s):

Director General of Rosoboronexport

Role(s):

Weapons Exporter



Biographical Summary: Alexander Aleksandrovich Mikheev (“Mikheev”) was born on 18 NOV 1961 in Moscow, Russia. He was formerly the CEO of the Russian Helicopter Federation from 2013 to 2017. In 2013 to present he held the position of CEO at JSC Kumertau Aviation Production Enterprise. Since 2016, Mikheev has served as vice-chairman for the All-Russian NGO Union of Mechanical Engineers of Russia. In 2017 he became the CEO of the government owned Rosoboronexport, a corporation who is the only intermediary weapons importer/exporter for the Russian Federation. As of 2022, many reports guarantee that Mikheev’s complete and total assets are assessed at \$5 million. Mikheev has served at Concern Radio Electronic Technologies JSC as a board member and as the head of the JSC 419 Aircraft Repair Plant.

Summary of Role(s): Assists in the exportation of weapons worldwide: Rosoboronexport sells everything from helicopters, to tanks, to missile systems, to submarines. Conducts commercial activities in sectors of the economy that provide a significant source of income for the Russian government.

Organizational Membership: Rosoboronexport Organization.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 10 FEB 2025, Mikheev told Interfax that the first foreign client for the Su-57 fifth generation fighter will receive and begin operating its first aircraft in 2025. While the buyer has not been named, some reports speculate it could be Algeria.

On 07 FEB 2025, in the run-up to the 15th Aero India 2025 international aerospace and defense exhibition, Mikheev stated: "India is a major Russian strategic partner in the Asia-Pacific region and one of Rosoboronexport's key partners in the world. In the past 20 years alone, from 2005 to 2025, Rosoboronexport has signed contracts worth \$50 billion with India and the total deliveries of Russian military products to that country amount to about \$80 billion". Moreover, Mikheev shared that Russia has officially offered its Su-57 fifth-generation fighter jets to India, including options for joint production and the development of an indigenous variant. "Rosoboronexport offers comprehensive development cooperation on the Su-57E project. "Our proposals include the supply of finished aircraft, the organization of their joint production in India, and assistance in the development of an Indian fifth-generation fighter," said Mikheev.

On 10 JUN 2024, Mikheev announced that Russia had exported weapons to 17 countries since the beginning of the year, with its order book reaching \$55 billion. The orders include military, dual-use, and civilian products for 45 countries. He noted that military helicopters account for approximately 10% of Rosoboronexport's total order portfolio, which includes contracts for the supply of Mi-28NE and Ka-52E combat helicopters, Mi-35 transport and combat helicopters, Mi-17/Mi-171 military transport helicopters, and others. "Today we see great interest from foreign partners in helicopters that have shown high performance results during a special military operation. First of all, these are the Ka-52E and Mi-171Sh, as well as other modern Russian helicopters," Mikheev said. These remarks were made during the "HeliRussia" International Helicopter Industry Exhibition in Moscow.

In a letter dated 21 SEP 2023, Mikheev extended his congratulations to Samdech Hun Manet for his appointment as the Prime Minister of Cambodia. He expressed his deep appreciation and gratitude for Samdech Hun Manet's personal contribution to strengthening the Russian-Cambodian military-technical cooperation. "I hope that under Your Excellency's leadership the relationship between the Russian Federation and the Kingdom of Cambodia in the sphere of military-technical cooperation will reach a new level. For my part, I wish to assure Your Excellency that JSC Rosoboronexport is ready to extend its full cooperation in the development and enhancement of the defensive potential of the Cambodian Armed Forces," Mikheev said.

On 17 AUG 2023, Mikheev announced that Rosoboronexport had signed several export contracts worth about \$600 million at the Army-2023 International Military-Technical Forum.

In anticipation of the IMDS-2023 expo in St Petersburg from 21 to 25 JUN 2023, Mikheev confirmed Rosoboronexport would also showcase their Project 677E diesel-electric submarine (Amur-1650), Project 636 "Black hole" large diesel-electric submarine, Project 22800E "Karakurt-E" corvette, Project 11356 multipurpose frigate, and Project 20382 "Tigr" small escort ship corvette at the event. He stated "[f]or many years, the Naval Salon (IMDS) has been

successfully serving to strengthen friendly ties and an open, mutually beneficial exchange of experience between representatives of the leading enterprises in the shipbuilding industry and customers of their products,” and that “Rosoboronexport is a traditional participant and sponsor of the Salon, and every time we are proud of the Russian industry, we present to our foreign partners the latest domestic shipbuilding, coastal complexes, weapons for the navy.” For 2023, Mikheev stated “Rosoboronexport and Russian enterprises participating in the Salon will demonstrate to visitors the surface ships and submarines in service with the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Border Service of the Federal Security Service of Russia, the Zaslon (passive electronically scanned array) and Mineral-ME shipborne radar systems.”

On 19 OCT 2022, Ukraine sanctioned Mikheev.

On 19 SEP 2022, Mikheev stated that “Sub-Saharan Africa is now among the growth leaders in the level and quality of military-technical cooperation with Russia.”

On 15 MAR 2022, the US sanctioned Mikheev, pursuant to E.O. 14024 Section 1(a)(i), as a person who operates or has operated in the defense and related material sector of the Russian economy. The EU and UK sanctioned Mikheev the same day.

XXXI. VLADIMIR ALEXANDROVICH KOLOKOLTSEV

Title(s):

Minister of Internal Affairs

Role(s):

Responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Vladimir Alexandrovich Kolokoltsev (“Kolokoltsev”) was born on 11 MAY 1961 in Nizhny Lomov, Penza, RSFSR, USSR.

During the 1990’s, Kolokoltsev worked in many Organized Crime Departments in different police stations throughout Moscow. In 1997, he started working in the ministry of Interior of the Russian Federation and the Department of Organized Crime Prevention of the Ministry of Interior of Russia in Moscow. Roughly two years later he was appointed chief of the Regional Operational Search Bureau of the Department on Organized Crime Prevention of the Ministry of Interior of Russia. In 2010 he was given the rank of Militsiya Lieutenants-general and after re-attestation in 2011, was appointed by Presidential decree to the position of the Chief of Moscow Police as lieutenant-general.

In 2012, Kolokoltsev was appointed as Minister of Interior, replacing Rashid Nurgaliyev. In 2020 he resigned for two days before being reinstated (as part of constitutional amendments).

Summary of Role(s): Responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine.

Organizational Membership: Russian Security Council.

Incidents and Events of Note: According to a presidential decree published on 20 MAR 2025,

Ukrainians without “legal grounds to stay or reside in Russia” must leave unless they “settle their legal status” within the next six months and 10 days. The order appears to apply to Ukrainian passport holders from Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, as well as from Crimea. On 4 MAR 2025, Putin announced that Russia had completed the issuance of passports to Ukrainians residing in the illegally occupied territory of Ukraine. Kolokoltsev stated that 3.5 million Russian passports had been issued to Ukrainians in the occupied territory, exceeding the 2.8 million reported in MAR 2024.

On 17 MAR 2025, several new agreements were signed between Russia and Tajikistan, aimed at enhancing cooperation across various sectors, including the industrial sector and the military sphere. On the same day, Kolokoltsev announced the launch of multi-service equipment for sharing information about criminals between Russia and Tajikistan, aimed at preventing serious criminals from entering Russia.

On 9 MAR 2025, Kolokoltsev stated in an interview with Rossiya TV channel journalist Pavel Zarubin that at least 685,000 foreigners have been included in the “registry of controlled persons” of the Ministry of Interior Affairs. Kolokoltsev noted that the purpose of the register is to limit the number of foreigners illegally staying in Russia and to oblige them to legalize their stay. He stressed that foreigners have to legalize their stay by 30 APR 2025.

According to Human Rights Watch, in summer 2024, the Duma adopted, and Putin signed, amendments to the Code of Administrative Offences, expanding the powers of police officers and other Ministry of Interior Affairs workers, including the power to carry out the expulsion of migrants without judicial oversight. The amendments also targeted the Law on the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens, introducing a new “expulsion regime” for foreigners who find themselves on a special “registry of controlled persons.” Law enforcement, without judicial oversight, has the power to designate a migrant a “controlled person” and add them to the new registry. The amendments entered into force on 5 FEB 2025.

On 18 NOV 2024, a joint board meeting of the Ministries of Interior Affairs of Russia and Tajikistan was held in Moscow. Representatives discussed issues such as combating international crime, ensuring security, and strengthening law enforcement cooperation. During the meeting, Kolokoltsev highlighted the importance of close partnerships and noted that joint efforts have established the necessary legal framework for effective collaboration between Russia and Tajikistan. Kolokoltsev and the Tajik Interior Minister, Rahimzoda Ramazon Hamro, approved a 2025 cooperation plan. The agreement includes measures to combat transnational crime, enhance collaboration between investigative units, share intelligence, and address drug trafficking.

On 26 JUN 2024, Kolokoltsev arrived in New York to participate in a UN summit of police chiefs (UNCOPS-2024). According to a UN press release, UNCOPS-2024 aims "to engage in

strengthening international peace, security, and development for all through the unifying power and enabling role of national and UN policing." Despite being sanctioned, Kolokoltsev does not appear on the US Treasury's list of individuals barred from entering the US. Irina Volk, Spokesperson for Russia's Ministry of Interior Affairs, said that Kolokoltsev held bilateral meetings, including with Jean-Pierre Lacroix, the UN's Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations. Volk said that Kolokoltsev had spoken with Lacroix about the reported Ukrainian strike earlier in June on Sevastopol, occupied Crimea, and called for a UN assessment. Kolokoltsev also reportedly discussed the rise in "Russophobic sentiments" around the world. Russia's Ministry of Interior Affairs is "open to cooperation on the entire range of peacekeeping issues," Volk concluded.

On 25 JUN 2024, Kolokoltsev was received in Uzbekistan by President Shavkat Mirziyoyev. The discussions focused on cooperation in combating terrorism, extremism, drug trafficking and organized crime, as well as cybersecurity and digital forensics. Particular attention was paid to enhancing collaboration mechanisms in the field of migration.

On 27 MAY 2024, Kolokoltsev arrived in Tajikistan on a working visit and was received by the President of Tajikistan, Emomali Rahmon. The two reportedly discussed the state and prospects of cooperation between the law enforcement agencies of Tajikistan and Russia, as well as cooperation in the fields of labor migration and security.

On 14 MAY 2024, Kolokoltsev said that Russia's Ministry of Interior Affairs is understaffed, lacking 152,000 police officers.

On 23 APR 2024, Kolokoltsev and Lázaro Alberto Álvarez Casas, Minister of the Interior of Cuba, signed a cooperation plan between Russia and Cuba. According to Prensa Latina, the official state news agency of Cuba, the document signed in Moscow aims to strengthen the fight against crime, the exchange of experiences and the training of personnel, and is a sign of the effective cooperation between the agencies of the two countries in the difficult international environment. "We are forced by life itself to work in very close contact, by all the interacting structures, because the West has never and will never calm down in its desire to somehow limit the development of our states", Kolokoltsev stressed. He noted that Cuba continues being a reliable partner of Russia, and that cooperation has already yielded great results.

On 5 DEC 2023, Kolokoltsev visited Beijing, meeting Chinese State Councilor and Minister of Public Security Wang Xiaohong. Kolokoltsev expressed the willingness to deepen bilateral exchanges and cooperation to safeguard the security and stability of the two countries.

On 31 OCT 2023, Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh of Vietnam hosted a reception in Hanoi for a delegation from Russia's Ministry of Interior Affairs, led by Kolokoltsev. Kolokoltsev stated

that Vietnam is always a priority in his Russia's foreign policy, and that Russia wishes to continue to further deepen the Russia-Vietnam comprehensive strategic partnership, especially in politics, economics, trade, people-to-people exchanges, tourism, experience sharing and training human resources.

On 25 SEP 2023, Kolokoltsev was received by Nikol Pashinyan, the Prime Minister of Armenia. Nikol Pashinyan emphasized the close cooperation and consistent work between the Ministries of Internal Affairs of the two countries in the fight against crime and in other areas. Kolokoltsev referred to the results of discussions with Armenian partners and joint programs.

On 10 AUG 2023, Kolokoltsev stated that 5,000 employees left Russia's internal affairs organizations in July.

On 23 MAY 2023, Kolokoltsev arrived in Riyadh to meet with his Saudi Arabian counterpart Prince Abdulaziz bin Saud. According to the state-run Saudi Press Agency "[d]uring the session, they discussed ways to enhance security cooperation paths between the two countries' ministries of interior, in addition to discussing a number of issues of common interest." Notably, this visit came just days after Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy addressed an Arab League summit in Jeddah on 19 MAY.

On 03 APR 2023, following a meeting between Kolokoltsev and Armenian Interior Minister Vahe Ghazaryan in Moscow that day, the press center for Kolokoltsev's office stated "Vladimir Kolokoltsev expressed confidence that any attempt by unfriendly countries to create a divide in the relations between Russia and Armenia will be futile, and the cooperation between the ministries of internal affairs [of the two countries] will systematically develop for the benefit of the peoples of both countries."

On 25 JAN 2023, after German chancellor Olaf Scholz announced Germany would send fourteen Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine. Kolokoltsev commented that "[t]hey perfectly preserve the picture of Tigers and Panthers burning on Russian soil in the memory of the modern generation. They will remember burning modern Leopards as well."

On 16 NOV 2022, according to Russian state media Kolokoltsev said, when discussing Russian regions bordering Ukraine and Russian occupied territories, "I can say right off the bat that the situation is difficult but under control. We have deployed 15 joint police task forces to the regions, particularly from other regions of the country, including officers who underwent teamwork cohesion as part of a temporary operational group in the North Caucasus regions."

On 09 JUN 2022, Ukraine sanctioned Kolokoltsev for his position at the National Security Council.

On 06 APR 2022, the US sanctioned Kolokoltsev.

On 25 FEB 2022, the EU sanctioned Kolokoltsev.

On 02 AUG 2019, the Commissioner for Human Rights, Dunja Mijatović, wrote a letter to the Kolokoltsev, regarding the action taken by law enforcement agencies to disperse the largely peaceful protests in Moscow on 27 JUL 2019, and recommended that the Russian authorities ensure that human rights are respected in the context of policing of assemblies.

On 06 APR 2018, the US sanctioned Kolokoltsev pursuant to E.O. 13661.

XXXII. SERGEY VIKTOROVICH LAVROV

Title(s):

Minister of Foreign Affairs

Role(s):

Responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine. Multitudinous propagandizer.



Biographical Summary: Sergey Viktorovich Lavrov (“Lavrov”) was born on 21 MAR 1950 in Moscow.

In 1981, he served as Senior Advisor at the United Nations in New York, returning in 1988 to Moscow becoming Deputy Chief of the Section of the International Economic Relations of the USSR.

Between 1990-1992 Lavrov served as Director of the International Organization of the Soviet Foreign Ministry. During this time, he was tasked to watch over activities concerning Human Rights and International Cultural Cooperation. In 1994, he returned to work with the United Nations, as Permanent Representative of Russia. The following years he served as President of the UN Security Council: DEC 1995, JUN 1997, JUL 1998, OCT 1999, APR 2002, and JUN 2003. In 1994, in his role as Permanent Representative of Russia with the UN, he signed the Budapest Memorandum - where Russia guaranteed the security of the borders of Ukraine.

In MAR 2004, President Putin appointed Lavrov as Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Summary of Role(s): Responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine. Multitudinous propagandizer.

Organizational Membership: United Russia. The Security Council of the Russian Federation as a board member since APR 2004.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 16 MAR 2025 Lavrov and U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio held a call discussing a ceasefire in Ukraine. According to a press release published on the web-site of the U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Rubio and Foreign Minister Lavrov also discussed next steps to follow up on recent meetings in Saudi Arabia and agreed to continue working towards restoring communication between the United States and Russia”.

On 27 FEB 2025, the second meeting of representatives of the USA and Russia took place in Istanbul, Turkey. The U.S. delegation was led by Sonata Coulter, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Russia and Central Europe, and the Russian delegation was led by Ministry of Foreign Affairs North Atlantic Department Director Ambassador Aleksandr Darchiyev. According to a press release published on the web-site of the U.S. Department of State, this meeting was based on the agreement between Secretary Rubio and Lavrov to discuss operations of US diplomatic missions.

On 12 FEB 2025, Donald Trump spoke by phone with Vladimir Putin. After the conversation, Trump announced that the United States and Russia would begin negotiations aimed to end the Russian-Ukrainian war. On 18 FEB 2025, the first meeting of representatives of the USA and Russia took place in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. They discussed restoration of operation of respective diplomatic missions and “ending the conflict in Ukraine”. Lavrov and the Russian Aide to the President Yuri Ushakov were representatives from the Russian side. No representatives from Ukraine.

On 18-19 NOV 2024, Lavrov attended the G20 summit in Brazil.

On 30 NOV 2023, Lavrov participated in the summit of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Skopje, North Macedonia. Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland do not participate in the OSCE meeting in protest against the participation of Lavrov.

On 17 APR 2023, Lavrov arrived in Brasilia to meet with Brazil’s President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. Though not outwardly supporting Russia, Brazil has notably not provided any military to Ukraine since the invasion. Lavrov stated “[a]s for the process in Ukraine, we are grateful to our Brazilian friends for their excellent understanding of this situation’s genesis.” After his stay in Brazil, Lavrov is scheduled to travel to Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua.

On 02 APR 2023, US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken called Lavrov on the phone calling for the immediate release of Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich, who was arrested in Yekaterinburg on 29 MAR 2023 on groundless charges of espionage. According to the Kremlin,

Lavrov told Blinken it was unacceptable for Western media to be “whipping up excitement” and politicizing his detention. They gravely stated “[h]is further fate will be determined by the court.”

On 02 MAR 2023, Lavrov met briefly at the G20 Foreign Ministers meeting in New Delhi with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken. Blinken asked for Russia to participate in the New Start Treaty, the last remaining nuclear arms control agreement between Russia and the US. Blinken stated he called on Russia to “end this war of aggression” and “engage in meaningful diplomacy that can produce a just and durable peace.” Blinken also called for Russia to release Paul Whelan, a former US Marine who holds US, British, Canadian, and Irish citizenship. Whelan was detained at a Moscow hotel in DEC 2018 by Russian Authorities on allegations that Whelan was engaged in an intelligence operation. He was convicted in JUN 2020 and sentenced to 16 years in prison.

On 22 SEP 2022, Lavrov addressed the United Nations at the 9135th meeting and High-Level Debate in New York. Here he further propagandized the conflict on the world stage to justify actions and policies that compromise or threaten the territorial sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.

Between JUL and AUG 2022, Lavrov traveled to Egypt, Ethiopia, Uganda, the Republic of Congo, Myanmar, and Cambodia, in a showing of Russia’s continued shift in foreign policy.

On 09 JUN 2022, Ukraine sanctioned Lavrov.

On 25 FEB 2022, the EU, UK, and the US sanctioned Lavrov.

XXXIII. MARIA VLADIMIROVNA ZAKHAROVA

Title(s):

Director of the Information

Role(s):

Promoted the deployment of Russian forces in Ukraine. Central figure of government propaganda.



Biographical Summary: Maria Vladimirovna Zakharova (“Zakharova”) was born on 24 DEC 1975 in Moscow, RSFSR, USSR. In 1981 she moved with her family to Beijing when her father, Vladimir Zakharov was appointed to the Soviet embassy there. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, her family left Beijing in 1991 and moved back to Russia in 1993.

From 2003 to 2005, Zakharova worked at the Information and Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. From 2005 to 2008, she was the press secretary of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations in New York City. She returned to the Information and Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation from 2008 to 2011.

From 2011 to 2015, Zakharova served as associate director of the Department of Information and Press of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and on 10 AUG 2015, Zakharova was appointed Director of the Information and Press Department by order of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Zakharova is the first woman to have held the position.

Summary of Role(s): Promoted the deployment of Russian forces in Ukraine. Central figure of government propaganda.

The Director of the Information and Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (MFA Russia) and Member of Council on the Foreign Defense Policy of Russia.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 09 MAR 2025, Zakharova stated that Russia "does not rule out the possibility" that Iran will agree to limit its nuclear program and increase transparency in exchange for the lifting of Western sanctions. With U.S.-Russia relations are improving, there is a desire to collaborate to address Middle East issues.

On 27 FEB 2025, the first meeting of representatives of the USA and Russia took place in Istanbul aimed to discuss operations of US diplomatic missions. Zakharova commented on the results of the meeting and stated that Russia proposed to restore direct air traffic and the return of six real estate properties located in the USA, seized in 2016–2018.

On 23 JAN 2025, Zakharova declared that “the possible deployment of Western peacekeeping forces in Ukraine is "categorically unacceptable" for Russia”.

On 21 NOV 2024, Zakharova threatened Poland with “potential defeat” over the opening of the US Aegis Ashore missile defense base on the territory of Poland.

Also on 21 NOV 2024, Russia launched an intercontinental ballistic missile “Oreshnik” over the city of Dnipro. Zakharova received a call instructing her not to comment on the attack during her press conference.

On 06 JUN 2023, Russian occupiers blew up the dam of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Station. Due to this destruction, more than 80 settlements were flooded. Zakharova falsely stated that Ukraine allegedly plans to destroy the dams of the Kyiv Hydroelectric Power Station and the Kaniv Reservoir.

On 06 JUL 2023, Zakharova falsely stated that “weapons delivered to Kiev [by the West, NATO, and France] end up in the hands of protesters and are used against police in France.”

On 11 JUN 2023, Zakharova falsely stated “[t]here is now an obvious desire of Poland to invade the western part of Ukraine. This is why Ukraine is not invited to NATO.”

Following the Wagner Group rebellion, Zakharova made a bizarre statement on her Telegram

account. She accused that “they are tempting us all, testing our strength and determination. Don’t get carried away! Together with our president! May God bless us, [...] [w]e have one commander-in-chief. Not two, not three. Only one. And he called on all of us to unite. That is the most important thing now, [...] [o]nly unity. Unity under the banner of our commander in chief.” It is not clear whether the “they” Zakharova stated refers to Wagner, Ukraine, or the West.

On 23 MAR 2023, Zakharova, at a press briefing released a statement, threatened retaliatory measures against Moldova if they choose to impose sanctions against Russia. “As you know, in due time such steps by the EU have not gone without a response from us. If and when official Chisinau joins these sanctions, we will be compelled to take appropriate retaliatory measures against the Moldovan side. I would like to emphasize that this will not be our choice, but rather it will be a response to unfriendly actions,” she said.

On 18 MAR 2023, Zakharova appeared in a press conference dismissing the arrest warrants issued by the International Criminal Court on 17 MAR 2023, Zakharova stated, “Russia didn’t recognize the ICC, so the warrant was “null and void,” and “Russia is not a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and does not bear obligations under it.”

On 19 OCT 2022, Ukraine sanctioned Zaharova.

On 14 SEP 2022, France sanctioned Zakharova. This was because as the Director of the Information and Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, she serves as a central figure in government propaganda, she promoted the deployment of Russian forces in Ukraine.

On 23 FEB 2022, the EU sanctioned Zakharova because she “supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.”

XXXIV. MIKHAIL VLADIMIROVICH MISHUSTIN

Title(s):

Prime Minister

Role(s):

Responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Mikhail Vladimirovich Mishustin (“Mishustin”) was born on 03 MAR 1966 in Moscow. From 1998 to 1999, Mishustin served as the Deputy Head of the State Tax Service of Russia, and from 1999 to 2004 as the Deputy Minister for Taxes and Levies of the Russian Federation. From 2004 to 2006 Mishustin served as Head of the Federal Agency for Real Estate Cadaster, as Head of the Federal Agency for the Management of Special Economic Zones from 2007 to 2008, and as President of the UFG Group (OFG Invest) from 2008 to 2010. From 2010 to 2020, Mishustin served as Head of the Federal Taxation Service of the Russian Federation.

On 16 JAN 2020, Mishustin was appointed Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, replacing ex-president Dmitry Medvedev.

Summary of Role(s): Responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine. As Prime Minister, Mishustin is the head of the Russian government, the chief executive of the Russian Cabinet, and the second-most powerful figure in the Russian Federation. In general, the prime minister serves more of an administrative role, nominating members of the Cabinet and taking the lead in fully implementing domestic and foreign policy as formulated by the president. In case of the president’s death, resignation, or impeachment, the prime minister becomes a temporary president until new presidential elections which must take place within three months.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 06 DEC 2024, Mishustin, together with President Putin, arrived in Minsk to participate in a meeting of the Supreme State Council of the Union State to discuss the provisions of the Treaty on the Creation of the Union State for 2024-2026 and the prepared Security Concept of the Union State.

On 29 SEP 2024, Mishustin met Iran's President Masoud Pezeshkian. "Special attention" was paid to implementation of large-scale joint projects in the sphere of transport, energy, industry, agriculture and other areas

On 10 MAY 2024, Mishustin was re-appointed Prime Minister of Russia.

On 26 JUN 2023, following the Wagner Group rebellion, Mishustin stated the Russian Federation faced “a challenge to its stability” but advocated for unity behind Vladimir Putin.

On 24 MAY 2023, Mishustin met with Chinese President Xi Jinping in China, returning the favor of Jinping’s visit to Russia in MAR 2023. The main focus of this meeting was in regard to a series of potential infrastructure and trade deals between the two nations.

On 28 MAR 2023, Mishustin joined the Prime Minister of the Republic of Belarus, Roman Golovchenko in Moscow where they signed 13 documents regarding bilateral cooperation in space exploration, microelectronic technologies, border security, and customs. Mishustin stated “[t]ogether we are stronger and able to jointly cope with the most complex challenges, with the tasks we face in a variety of areas, from ensuring security to improving the well-being of our citizens and resisting external pressure.”

On 21 MAR 2023, after meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Moscow, Mishustin gave a press conference to reassure the Russian people that Russia is strong and with their alliance with China stood as a united front against western countries and his priorities were to “give our soldiers all the help they need” and to “improve the welfare of citizens.”

On 21 OCT 2022, Putin appointed Mishustin as head of a “coordination council” to strengthen the coordination of federal and regional authorities in ensuring that the Russian military has adequate supplies in Russia's war against Ukraine. The council is expected to report to Putin weekly.

On 09 JUN 2022, Ukraine sanctioned Mishustin. On 10 MAY 2022, Japan sanctioned Mishustin. On 06 APR 2022, the US sanctioned Mishustin.

On 14 MAR 2022, Mishustin met with the Prime Minister of the Republic of Belarus, Roman

Golovchenko. Two agreements were signed by the Finance Minister of the Republic of Belarus, Yury Seliverstov and Deputy Finance Minister of the Russian Federation, Timur Maksimov after the talks. First was an agreement on amending provisions of certain Russian-Belarusian intergovernmental agreements. The other addressed amendments to the 06 OCT 2021 agreement on providing a state financial loan to the Government of the Republic of Belarus.

On 25 FEB 2022, the EU sanctioned Mishustin. The same day, and the day after Russia invaded Ukraine, Mishustin met with the Prime Minister of the Republic of Belarus, Roman Golovchenko.

XXXV. ANDREI/ANDREY REMOVICH BELOUSOV

Title(s):

Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation

Former First Deputy Prime Minister

Role(s):

Implementing the Russian Government's economic policy and is responsible for Russia's economic growth and the stabilization of the Russian markets.



Biographical Summary: Andrey Removich Belousov (“Belousov”) was born on 17 MAR 1959 in Moscow, RSFSR, USSR. From 2000 through 2006 he held the position of General Director at the Center for Macroeconomic Analyses and Short-Term Prognostication.

Belousov shifted into politics in 2000, when he became an External Advisor to the Prime Minister, a position he held until 2006. From 2006 to 2008, he was the Deputy Minister of Economic Development and Trade, Deputy Minister of Economic Development. From 2008 until MAY 2012, he was a Director at the Government Department of Economy and Finance

On 21 MAY 2012, Belousov took office as First Deputy Prime Minister and was appointed Minister of Economic Development by Presidential Executive Order. From 24 JUN 2013, he became a Presidential Aide, appointed again by Presidential Executive Order.

On 21 JAN 2020 Belousov became the First Deputy Prime Minister of Russia in Mikhail Mishustin's cabinet. In MAR 2020, Belousov was elected to be the Chairman of the Board of

Directors for Russian Railways.

On 29 JAN 2020, Politico named Belousov as a possible replacement for Vladimir Putin. From 30 APR to 19 MAY, President Putin appointed Belousov to serve as acting Prime Minister of Russia as a temporary replacement while Mikhail Mishustin had coronavirus.

On 14 MAY 2024, Belousov was appointed as Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, replacing Sergey Shoigu.

Summary of Role(s): Implementing the Russian Government's economic policy and is responsible for Russia's economic growth and the stabilization of the Russian markets. Coordinates the work of federal executive bodies and issues instructions. Coordinates activities of some federal agencies.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 16 DEC 2024, Belousov said that Russia had set the goal of capturing the entire territory of four Ukrainian regions by 2025: Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporozhye. Belousov said that the country should be ready for a possible military conflict with NATO in Europe "in the next decade."

On 14 OCT 2024, Belousov held talks with the military and military-political leadership of China.

On 14 MAY 2024, Belousov was appointed as Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation.

On 01 MAR 2023, Belousov met with Kazem Jalali, the Iranian Ambassador to Russia, for bilateral discussions on, among other things, "developing the fleets and ports...in the Caspian region."

First announced on or around 08 FEB 2023, Belousov has been a leading supporter of proposed one-off windfall tax on Russian oligarchs that could increase state revenues by up to 300 billion RUB (or about \$3.6 billion USD). According to Belousov, this is because the oligarchs "understand that they had huge windfall profits for 2021 and 2022, simply massive, bigger than the budget," and that "[m]any of them are true patriots, no matter what people say about them. They identify very closely with the country." Of course, the underlying reality regarding this proposed tax is that the Russian economy has been hammered by declining trade revenue, poor currency exchanges, and such a high commitment to military expenditures that the government is now having to turn to the oligarchs who made billions under Putin for financial support.

On 27 DEC 2022, Belousov announced Russia's 2023 budget would impose financial challenges

amid a deficit and that the state's borrowing agreement with the Bank of Russia was a "rigid format [that] anticipates strict prioritization of expenses and projects." This comes as the Institute for International Finance projected Russia's economy shrank 15 percent over 2022 and will shrink an additional 3 percent in 2023.

On 18 NOV 2022, Belousov attended the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Bangkok in Putin's place.

On 30 SEP 2022, the US sanctioned Belousov.

On 22 JUL 2022, Belousov signed a memorandum of understanding that serves as a side deal to the Black Sea Initiative. The agreement is between Russia and the UN and looks to place Russian food products and fertilizers back into the commercial markets.

On 21 JUL 2022, the EU sanctioned Belousov.

XXXVI. DMITRY YURYEVICH GRIGORENKO

Title(s):

Deputy Prime Minister Chief of the Government Staff

Role(s):

Directly involved in the coordination of military supplies in Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Dmitry Yuryevich Grigorenko (“Grigorenko”) was born in 1978 in the Tyumen Region.

In 2012 he became Head of Department of Income Tax and Special Tax Modes. In 2014 he became Head of Department of Taxation in the Federal Tax Service and later in the same year became Deputy Manager of Federal Tax Service. Grigorenko was responsible for setting up new local tax legislation for the territory of Crimea following its annexation in 2014.

Grigorenko was elected as deputy Prime Minister and Chief of Government staff in JAN 2020. In MAY 2020, he joined the supervisory board of VTB Bank, the second biggest Russian bank, replacing Anton Siluanov.

Summary of Role(s): Directly involved in the coordination of military supplies in Ukraine as a member of the “coordination council”. In his previous position as Deputy Director of the Federal Tax Service of the Russian Federation, Grigorenko was responsible for the creation of new local tax legislation on the territory of Crimea after its annexation in 2014.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 10 DEC 2024, Grigorenko met with the UN Secretariat delegation and suggested hosting the 20th UN Internet Governance Forum 2025 in Russia. They did not reach an agreement and the meeting is scheduled for 23-27 June 2025 in Lillestrom, Norway.

On 24 MAY 2023, Grigorenko was among the Russian representatives in Beijing for the Sino-Russian business forum along with Dmitry Chernyshenko, Denis Manturov, and several ministers including Minister of Transport Vitaly Savelyev, and Minister of Agriculture Dmitry Patrushev.

Although Chinese Prime Minister Li Qiang was in attendance (who stated: “[a]mid today’s global economic recovery we are facing numerous challenges, as uncertainty and instability are mounting. China is committed to high-quality development and top-level openness. We are ready to strengthen our mutually beneficial cooperation with all countries, including Russia”, there was a notable lack of Chinese businessmen in comparison to their Russian counterparts. According to an anonymous attendant, this was because “[t]he Chinese are warmly welcomed, but they are very afraid of sanctions. Even those big businessmen who wanted and were ready to speak publicly were not allowed to the meeting by the official authorities – they do not want to take even the smallest risk. No offence – their position is clear.”

On 21 OCT 2022, Putin appointed Grigorenko as one of Mishustin's deputies to a “coordination council” to strengthen the coordination of federal and regional authorities in ensuring that the Russian military has adequate supplies in Russia's war against Ukraine. Grigorenko is tasked with handling regulatory and financial issues on the council. The council is expected to report to Putin weekly.

On 15-17 OCT 2022, Grigorenko and Marat Khusnullin visited the islands of Iturup and Shikotan in order to “inspect them in preparation for establishing a Russian special economic zone covering the Northern Territories.” The Japanese government requested that the trip be canceled, however, this was ignored. The islands international status is disputed, falling under Russia administration while being claimed by Japan.

In JUL 2022, Grigorenko was asked by Deputy General Prosecutor, Anatoly Razinkin, to investigate Igor Moiseenko, the head of State Air Traffic Management Corporation in a corruption case. Alexander Vishnyakov, the director of the Cadre department, was put in charge of the investigation.

On 02 JUN 2022, the US again sanctioned Grigorenko.

On 15 MAR 2022, the US sanctioned Grigorenko, pursuant to E.O. 14024 Section 1(a)(i), as a

person who operates or has operated in the defense and related material sector of the Russian economy.

On 23 FEB 2022, the EU sanctioned Grigorenko “for actions and policies which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, or stability or security in Ukraine” and “for providing financial and material support and benefiting from Russian decision-makers responsible for the annexation of Crimea or the destabilization of Eastern Ukraine.”

XXXVII. YURY PETROVICH TRUTNEV

Title(s):

Deputy Prime Minister

Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy to the Far Eastern Federal District

Role(s):

Responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Yury Petrovich Trutnev (“Trutnev”) was born 01 MAR 1956 in Perm, Perm Krai, RSFSR, USSR.

In 1990, Trutnev, was CEO of EKS Limited Co. Then in 1996, CEO of shareholding company E.K.S. International Compromising EKS Group Enterprises.

Trutnev has been the Chairman of the Committee on Economic Policy and Taxes of the Regional Legislative Assembly and Deputy of the Perm City Duma since 1996.

In 1996, Trutnev began his political career, being elected mayor of Perm and Governor of the Perm Region in 2000. In 2004, he was appointed Natural Resources Minister.

Internal figures from the Russian government indicate Trutnev was one of the highest paid members of the government in 2008 and 2009. He reported an income of approximately \$5.3 million USD, or 155 million RUB, in 2010.

In 2013 he was appointed Deputy Prime Minister of Russia and Presidential Envoy to the Far Eastern Federal District in the First Medvedev Cabinet. He was again re-appointed in 2018 with the Second Medvedev Cabinet and once again in 2020 with the Mishutin Cabinet. In this role, he is a non-permanent member of the Security Council of the Russian Federation (SCRF), where he “provides advice on and coordinates national security affairs, [and] he was involved in shaping the policy of the Russian government, which threatens the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.” The ACF describes this position as “assist[ing] in organizing and implementing actions and policies that undermine and threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.”

Trutnev is on the board of directors for the hydroelectric company PJSC RusHydro. He is also the Chairman of the State Commission for Arctic Development.

Summary of Role(s): Responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine. Coordinates the work of federal executive bodies and issues instructions. Coordinates the work of the Ministry for the Development of the Russian Far East and Arctic.

Organizational Membership: United Russia (member of the Supreme Council and the Bureau of the Supreme Council of the United Russia party), PJSC RusHydro.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 28 JAN 2025 Trutnev met with a team of volunteers - staff of the Chief of Staff of DFO, Ministry of Development of Russia, Corporation for the Development of the Far East and the Arctic, as well as with soldiers of the 155th Marine Guards Brigade.

On 29 AUG 2024, Trutnev took part in a meeting of the Far Eastern Federal District Council as its chair. The meeting was to discuss preparations for the 2024 Eastern Economic Forum.

On 04 JUL 2024, Trutnev handed over the “Khabarovsk” buggies to russian fighters and assessed the reconstruction of the occupied Donbass region.

On 19 MAR 2023, Trutnev called the Russian submarine forces “the guarantor of the territorial integrity and independence of [Russia, their] nuclear shield, giving Russia the right to vote, ensuring the safety of millions of [Russian] citizens.” In this statement he also compared the current situation to “Soviet times.”

On 16 MAR 2023, Trutnev visited factories that make products for the military-industrial complex, citing that the factories’ work is “now important in order to protect our country.”

On 15 MAR 2023, Trutnev announced the re-opening of the Ozerny mining project which is

supposed to begin in the summer.

On 3 MAR 2023, Trutnev announced Prime Minister Mikhail Vladimirovich Mishustin's 11 initiative plan to further develop in the Far East, including increased mobilization, housing construction, and the training of personnel.

On 9 DEC 2022, Trutnev announced that a pilot program for youth military training centers in ten Russian and Ukrainian regions will see about 45,000 schoolchildren enroll in 2023. The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) stated these were "to provide children from [ages] 14 to 18 with 'military sports training' and 'patriotic education.'" Trutnev added these centers would exist so that every Russian child can "be able to defend their Motherland" and ensure Russian soldiers who fight in Ukraine "return home alive."

In NOV 2022, at the fourth meeting of the Russia-China Intergovernmental Commission on Cooperation and Development of the Far East and Baikal Region of Russia and of Northeast China, which took place via videoconference, Trutnev said "Russian-Chinese relations of all-round partnership and strategic interaction continue to develop dynamically in all areas. China is Russia's main economic partner in the Far East. In 2021, trade between Far Eastern regions and the PRC increased by almost 30 percent. In JAN-AUG 2022, it rose by 45.5 percent, to reach \$12.1 billion." Further, Trutnev said "I believe that we have the opportunity to develop our cooperation even further. There are currently 2,760 projects with a total investment of \$107.6 billion being implemented in the Far East using state support measures." Also, Trutnev explained "The development of cross-border infrastructure is very important for us. Two cross-border bridges between Russia and China have been put into service, and now we need to increase traffic volumes on them."

On 07 JUL 2022, Trutnev said that the oil output at Sakhalin 01 had plummeted to just 10,000 barrels per day from 220,000 barrels per day due to "restrictions."

On 06 APR 2022, the US sanctioned Trutnev.

In MAR 2022, Trutnev notified Japan of Russia's unilateral suspension of negotiations on a bilateral peace treaty.

XXXVIII. VIKTORIA/VICTORIA VALERIEVNA ABRAMCHENKO

Title(s):

Deputy Prime Minister

Role(s):

Extensively involved in promulgating food related import/export information from Russia as well as answering questions regarding grain exports from Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Viktoria Valerievna Abramchenko was born on 22 MAY 1975 in Chernogorsk, Khakass Autonomous Okrug, Krasnoyarsk Territory, RSFSR, USSR.

From 2005 through 2011, Abramchenko worked at the Russian Ministry of Economic Development and was the Deputy Director of the Ministry's Department of Real Estate. From 2011 to 2012, she was the Deputy Head of the Federal Service for State Registration. From 2012 through 2015, she held the position of Director, Department of Land Policy, Property Relations, and State Property at the Ministry of Agriculture of the Russian Federation. Then from 2015 to 2016, she held the position of State Secretary, Deputy Minister of Agriculture of the Russian Federation. From 2016 until 2020, she again held the position of Deputy Minister of Economic Development of the Russian Federation, Head of the Federal Service for State Registration, Cadastre and Cartography.

On 21 JAN 2020, she Abramchenko appointed Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation by a Presidential Executive Order. As a Deputy Prime Minister, Abramchenko is responsible for Russia's Agro-Industrial Complex, Natural Resources, and Ecology. This includes agricultural production, and she oversees helping to oppose sanctions imposed against Russia. The EU found that "she has overseen efforts to divert grain from Ukraine, without Ukraine's agreement, and is responsible for organizing events with the direct participation of representatives of illegally

annexed Crimea.”

Summary of Role(s): Extensively involved in promulgating food related import/export information as well as answering questions regarding grain exports from Ukraine. Coordinates the work of federal executive bodies and issues instructions. Coordinates activities of some federal agencies.

Organizational Membership: United Russia.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 15 MAY 2024, Abramchenko met with Vladimir Putin to discuss environmental decisions within the Russian state.

On 7 DEC 2023, Abramchenko toured forestry facilities while visiting Belarus.

On 11 NOV 2023, Abramchenko announced China would commence importing pork from Russia in 2024.

On 24 OCT 2023, Abramchenko met with the President of Mongolia, Ukhnaagiin Khurelsukh.

On 15 JUN 2023, Abramchenko stated that “Russia is securing a 'green [safe] corridor' for grains and any other foodstuff such as oilseeds...so it can be exported from Ukraine without hurdles” through the Azov Sea. She states Russia is expecting to harvest 130 million tons of grain in 2023, and expects to export to 11 countries including Serbia, Turkey, Israel, and Egypt: which have not joined the Western sanctions in an attempt to protect food security.

Ukraine, meanwhile, has accused Russia of using its military to steal and then profit off of the sale of their grain. They state their domestic production has dropped from about 86 million tons before the 2022 invasion to about 48.5 million tonnes a year.

On 24 MAR 2023, Abramchenko announced that Russia would be considering increasing their “grain purchases by the state intervention fund to 10 million tonnes” from the 3 million tonnes bought in 2022.

On 16 DEC 2022, the EU sanctioned Abramchenko for her part in undermining “the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.”

On 16 JUN 2022, Abramchenko announced that Russia was creating a “‘green [safe] corridor’” for foodstuffs to be exported from Ukraine. Also on 16 JUN 2022, Abramchenko blamed COVID-19 and the sanctions against Russia for the global food crisis.

On 09 JUN 2022, Ukraine sanctioned Abramchenko.

On 14 MAR 2022, Russia temporarily banned the exportation of grains and a lot of sugar exports to ex-Soviet countries. Abramchenko specified that it would still be allowed to “export grain within the quota under individual licenses.”

XXXIX. YURY IVANOVICH BORISOV

Title(s):

Former Chief of Russia's space agency Roscosmos

Former Deputy Prime Minister

Role(s):

Former top manager of the company that develops and manufactures military products that have been used by Russia in its war in Ukraine. Formerly, as Deputy Prime Minister, was in charge of weapons industries.



Biographical Summary: Yury Ivanovich Borisov (“Borisov”) was born on 31 DEC 1956 in Vyshny Volochek, Tver Region.

In MAR 2011, he was appointed First Deputy Chairman of the Military Industrial Commission of the Government of the Russian Federation. On 15 NOV 2012 he was appointed Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation by Presidential Executive Order.

On 18 MAY 2018 he was appointed Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation. In JUL 2022, Borisov transitioned from Deputy Prime Minister, where he was in charge of weapons industries, to Chief of Russia's space agency Roscosmos. Also in JUL 2022, Borisov announced that Russia will pull out of the International Space Station (ISS) after 2024.

However, in JUN and JUL 2023, Borisov became a key figure in Russia's pursuit diplomatic relations with foreign nations concerning space-related funding and information. Borisov also recanted Russia's intention to pull out of the ISS after 2024 stating the Russian government approved an extension for participation through 2028.

On 06 FEB 2025, Borisov was removed from his position.

Summary of Role(s): Former top manager of the company that develops and manufactures military products that have been used by Russia in its war in Ukraine. Formerly, as Deputy Prime Minister, was in charge of weapons industries, including technological and nuclear engineering supervision, military-technical cooperation with foreign countries and equipping the Russian state border. He coordinated the work of federal executive bodies and issued instructions.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 17 DEC 2024, Borisov proposed creating a Belarusian module on a new Russian Space Station.

On 5 MAR 2024, Borisov stated that Russia and China were considering putting a nuclear power plant on the moon.

On 05 JUL 2023, following meetings in Kuala Lumpur, Borisov stated the Russian and Malaysian governments “have agreed to set up working groups for a detailed discussion of every area of cooperation between Roscosmos and the Malaysian Space Agency. I have no doubt that the agreements reached at the meeting will serve as a basis for further fruitful cooperation between our countries in the peaceful use of outer space.”

On 30 JUN 2023, Borisov had a one-on-one meeting with Vladimir Putin, where Borisov stated in part: “Mr President, concerning public-private partnership, on June 27, in addition to the Meteor, we launched 39 small satellites designed by our private companies and universities. This was a serious step. Also, there were three satellites designed for Malaysia, the Republic of South Africa and Belarus – we continue to provide launch services for friendly nations.” Borisov began meeting with these “friendly nations” the next week.

On 25 JUN 2023, Borisov visited Egypt where he met with Dr. Sherif Sedky: the head of the Egyptian Space Agency. Their discussions centered on satellite production, manned program development, and surface space-related infrastructure.

On 13 FEB 2023, Borisov announced the delay of the relief ship being sent to the MS-23 space station.

On 9 FEB 2023, Borisov announced Russia's intentions of wanting a joint development of their SU-75 Checkmate fighter program with India.

On JAN 25, 2023, Borisov announced Roscosmos plan to launch around one thousand satellites into orbit by 2030.

In JAN 2023, Borisov announced Roscosmos new deal with Iran companies to manufacture space parts, as well as a discussion of collaborating with the UAE Space Agency.

In DEC 2022, Borisov told the Russian newspaper *Vedomosti* that Roscosmos planned to borrow as much as 660 million USD, or 50 billion RUB, through bond sales to fund two new plants to

produce satellites.

On 09 JUN 2022, Ukraine sanctioned Borisov.

XL. DMITRY NIKOLAEVICH CHERNYSHENKO

Title(s):

Deputy Prime Minister for Tourism, Sport, Culture and Communications Board Member,
Russian Railways

Role(s):

Responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Dmitry Nikolaevich Chernyshenko (“Chernyshenko”) was born on 20 SEP 1968 in Saratov.

From 2005 to 2007, Chernyshenko held the position of General Director of the Sochi 2014 Bid Committee. From 2007 to 2014 he was the President of the Sochi 2014 Olympic Organizing Committee and the Sochi 2014 Paralympic Organizing Committee. Chernyshenko served as the President and Executive Board Chairman of the Kontinental Hockey League from 2014 until 2020. During this time, he was also the Chief Executive Officer of Gazprom-Media Holdings.

On 01 JAN 2020, he was appointed Deputy Prime Minister by Presidential Executive Order.

Summary of Role(s): Coordinates the work of federal executive bodies and issues instructions. Coordinates activities of some federal agencies.

Organizational Membership: President of Kontinental Hockey League, Board Chairman of Gazprom-Media, Member of the Supervisory Board of Sberbank of Russia.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 5 APR 2025, Chernyshenko met with the President of Cuba to discuss continued cooperation between the countries. This comes after Chernyshenko's trip to the Cuban province of Santiago where Chernyshenko met with the Governor on 3 APR 2025.

On 13 JAN 2025, Chernyshenko visited Vietnam to discuss bilateral cooperation in various economic sectors, including agriculture, science, and sports.

On 8 NOV 2024, Chernyshenko arrived in Havana, Cuba, to participate in the meeting of the co-chairs of the Russian-Cuban Intergovernmental Commission for Commercial, Economic, Scientific, and Technical Cooperation. On 13 NOV 2024, Putin approved 80,000 tons of fuel for Cuba as a result of the meeting. On 8 NOV 2024, Russia also announced intelligence and energy cooperation plans with Venezuela after talks between the Venezuelan Vice President and Chernyshenko.

On 14 JUL 2023, Chernyshenko stated that prospective Russian Olympic athletes for the 2024 Paris Summer Olympics will not agree to condemn Russia's invasion of Ukraine. This came as the International Olympic Committee (IOC) was deciding whether to allow Russian and Belarusian athletes to compete as "neutrals" at the upcoming games. Chernyshenko said of the IOC: "[o]f course, we always hope to receive an invitation, we ourselves do not refuse anything and are very happy if our athletes are given the opportunity to compete," but then argued this sort of prerequisite would "not suit us. To those humiliations that the Anglo-Saxons come up with when they say: 'Speak under a neutral flag and without an anthem,' they now add that you must publicly condemn our decision. Of course, with this we do not agree."

On 01 JUL 2023, Chernyshenko stated that Russia would resume "regular aviation service with Cuba" effective immediately as "Cuba is Russia's key partner in Central America, and it is absolutely logical for economic relations to expand in all spheres." This comes one month after Chernyshenko was in Cuba where Russian and Cuban officials signed trade deals regarding sugar and rum output while supplying Cuba with wheat and crude oil.

On 20 MAR 2023, Chernyshenko greeted Chinese President Xi Jinping during Jinping's visit to Russia just days after the ICC issued an arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin.

On 01 MAR 2023, Chernyshenko spoke out against the International Olympic Committee (IOC) whose president, Thomas Bach has been considering a framework to allow Russian and Belarusian athletes to participate in the Paris 2024 Summer Games. He stated, "We saw how, at the behest of the Anglo-Saxons, all international organizations, starting with the IOC, began to

put obstacles for the participation of our athletes in international sports competitions, and they continue to do so.”

On 15 DEC 2022, the US sanctioned Chernyshenko.

In NOV 2022, Chernyshenko co-chaired the 19th meeting of Russian-Cuban Intergovernmental Commission with Deputy Prime Minister of Cuba, Ricardo Cabrisas.

On 24 OCT 2022, Chernyshenko met with Putin at the Kremlin.

On 09 JUN 2022, Ukraine sanctioned Chernyshenko.

On 28 FEB 2022, the EU sanctioned Chernyshenko.

Chernyshenko was removed from the IOC Coordination Commission Beijing 2022 by the International Olympic Committee, due to his involvement in the Russian doping scandal.

XLI. TATYANA ALEKSEEVNA GOLIKOVA

Title(s):

Deputy Prime Minister

Role(s):

Deputy Head of the state body, responsible for destabilization of Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Tatyana Alekseevna Golikova (“Golikova”) was born on 09 FEB 1966, in Mytishchi, Moscow Region.

From JUN 1999 through JUN 2002, Golikova held the position of Deputy Finance Minister and held the position of First Deputy Finance Minister from AUG 2002 until APR 2004. In APR 2004, Golikova again served as the Deputy Finance Minister. On 24 SEP 2007, she was appointed Healthcare and Social Development Minister. On 18 MAY 2018 she took office as Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation.

Since 2003, Golikova has been married to Viktor Khristenko: who served as First Deputy Prime Minister for Russia under Putin from 1999 to 2000, Minister of Industry from 2004 to 2012, and Chairman of the Board of the Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC) from 2012 to 2016.

Summary of Role(s): Deputy Head of the state body, responsible for destabilization of Ukraine. Coordinates the work of federal executive bodies and issues instructions. Coordinates activities of some federal agencies.

Organizational Membership: United Russia.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 19 AUG 2024, Golikova chaired the 25th meeting of the Russian-Chinese Commission for Humanitarian Cooperation. At the meeting, Chinese and Russian officials discussed cooperative programs including educational exchanges of students.

On 5 DEC 2023, Golikova announced a mandatory program for working citizens that requires workers to undergo medical examinations. The program was designed to encompass a study of reproductive function.

On 3 JUL 2023, Golikova announced a growing, and unmet need in healthcare for specialist doctors. She also announced that medical device imports decreased by 4.5 percent. She further noted that over sixty percent of the medicines sold in Russia were now produced domestically.

On 19 APR 2023, Golikova was involved in a minor spat with Vladimir Putin where Putin made clear his dislike of the name of the patriotic youth organization “Movement of the First” preferring instead his idea “Pioneers.” Approximately 5,000 Russian children were initiated as members in MAY 2022, one month before the group was recognized by the State Duma. These children, as part of their initiation, took the "Pioneer oath", pledging to love Russia and promising to "always live, learn and fight for the good of the Fatherland" and abide by the “Laws of the Pioneers.” Putin, as President of Russia, directly controls all three of the group’s governing bodies.

On 27 MAR 2023, Golikova met with President of the Senate of Zimbabwe Mabel Chinomona in Moscow. Topics involved bilateral cooperation on healthcare and education, with Golikova seeking to deepen “development of trade, economic, humanitarian and cultural contacts between our peoples.”

On 24 FEB 2023, the US, Australia, and New Zealand sanctioned Golikova.

On 16 DEC 2022, the EU sanctioned Golikova.

On 05 DEC 2022, Golikova met with First Lady of the Republic of Zimbabwe Auxillia Mnangagwa at the We Are Together international forum in Saint Petersburg. Golikova claimed “[t]oday, Russian-Zimbabwean relations are rapidly gaining momentum. They are based on strong traditions of friendship and solidarity and mutual respect for each other's interests.”

On 28 OCT 2022, Alexei Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation reported that Golikova used \$830 million of stolen vaccine money to buy 5 villas and golf clubs throughout Western Europe.

In AUG 2022, Golikova said that 236,000 Russian workers were either on furlough or reduced

hours as of the end of JUL, and that they are not part of officially 03 million people registered as unemployed in Russia.

On 30 SEP 2022, Golikova attended a ceremony celebrating Putin's attempted annexation of several Ukrainian territories.

On 09 JUN 2022, Ukraine sanctioned Golikova.

XLII. MARAT SHAKIRZYANOVICH KHUSNULLIN

Title(s):

Deputy Prime Minister for Construction and Regional Development

Role(s):

Responsible for Russian governmental policies about occupied Crimea, including providing water to Crimea and Sevastopol.



Biographical Summary: Marat Shakirzyanovich Khusnullin (“Khusnullin”), born 09 AUG 1966, in Kazan, Tatar ASSR, RSFSR, USSR.

From 2001 to 2010, Khusnullin served as Minister of Construction Architecture, Housing and Utilities of the Republic of Tatarstan. The program at the time was focused on development of large cities, bringing in a large number of federal investments.

On 21 JAN 2020, Khusnullin was appointed Deputy Prime Minister of Russia for construction and regional development under the Mishustin cabinet.

Summary of Role(s): Coordinates the work of federal executive bodies and issues instructions. Coordinates activities of some federal agencies. As Deputy Prime Minister of Russia for Construction and Regional Development, Khusnullin is responsible for Russian governmental policies about occupied Crimea, including providing water to Crimea and Sevastopol.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 19 MAR 2025, a meeting of the Supervisory Board of the National Cultural Heritage Social and Cultural Projects Fund, headed by Deputy Prime Minister

Marat Khusnullin, was held, which resulted in the statement on creating large-scale cultural and educational complexes in four regions, including the occupied Sevastopol.

On 19 MAR 2025, Khusnullin spoke about the role of Muslims in the SMO at the evening of the Republic of Tatarstan, organized in the Ramadan Tent in Moscow. "Today, the world is in a difficult situation. Muslims of Russia, together with all the Russian people, show fortitude and dedication during the SMO. They make an invaluable contribution to our common cause. This is a clear confirmation that our strength lies in unity," Khusnullin wrote in his Telegram channel.

On 18 MAR 2025, Khusnullin commented on Russia's reconstruction projects in Crimea, "Since the reunification of Crimea with Russia in 2014, a large-scale comprehensive work on infrastructure development has been carried out on the peninsula, aimed at creating comfortable living conditions for people and sustainable socio-economic development of the regions. Modern housing, roads, social institutions, housing and communal services facilities are being built, and public spaces are being improved."

On 15 MAR 2025, Khusnullin held a working meeting with the occupied Kherson Region Governor Volodymyr Saldo. He reported this on his Telegram channel. During the meeting, they discussed current issues related to the implementation of the region's socio-economic development program. Particular attention was paid to the integration of this program's activities into the new national project "Infrastructure for Life". They also touched on the topic of housing construction.

On 13 MAR 2025, Khusnullin announced the start of repairs on the western bypass of Donetsk, which was damaged in hostilities. "Now road workers are starting work on a strategically important facility - the western bypass of Donetsk, which was heavily damaged by shelling by the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The project involves upgrading more than 30 km of the federal highway R-150, 11 km of the regional road leading to Gorlivka, as well as a 6-kilometer section of the Yasynuvata highway to the Donetsk airport," the Deputy Prime Minister wrote on his Telegram channel. According to him, after major repairs, the highway will relieve the traffic in Donetsk, and also connect Donetsk with Belgorod, Lugansk and Mariupol.

On 05 FEB 2025, mass media reported of a 'crusade' against Tarar agrarians. The company "Elevator Teka Tau" filed a number of lawsuits against Tatarstan agricultural firms with the aim of bankrupting them. All lawsuits were filed at the end of DEC 2024. However, on 9 JAN 2025, the movement started. The plaintiff's company is managed by the Chistopolye holding, which is associated with the son of Russian Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin, Albert. In 2023, Elevator Teka Tau earned 584.7 million rubles, and losses exceeded 5.9 million rubles. The company has been producing finished feed for more than five years. It employed 186 people - the data is relevant as of the end of 2023.

On 01 FEB 2025, it was reported that Ukrainian troops launched an attack on the town of Lysychansk, which is under Tatarstan's patronage. The settlement was shelled before the visit of the Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation Marat Khusnullin.

On 25 DEC 2024, in Mariupol, Khusnullin visited School No. 9, which had been restored after severe damage, and handed over keys to compensation apartments to 14 families in a new residential complex on the left bank of the city.

On 20 NOV 2024,f Council Chairperson Valentina Matviyenko suggested that Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin set an example for others and pay taxes retroactively for the eight years during which he lived in the house without official registration.

On 04 OCT 2024, TASS reported that speaking at the 20th session of the Russia-Tajikistan Intergovernmental Commission for Trade and Economic Cooperation, Tajik PM Rasoulzoda has highlighted the increasing issues Tajik migrants face, despite the growing demand for Tajik labor in Russia. Rasoulzoda reportedly emphasized that there has been a rise in instances of denied entry, deportations, and travel bans imposed on Tajik citizens under the broad justification of “ensuring security.” A similar statement was made by Kyrgyz authorities. Khusnullin clarified that while Russia needs labor resources, these must be managed through legal channels. He also highlighted the importance of ensuring security for both nations and proposed a detailed plan for managing labor migration efficiently, including strengthening information exchange.

On 14-18 MAY 2024, during the forum “Russia - Islamic World”, Khusnullin made the following statement, “Today we are meeting at a difficult time, in the conditions of confronting hostile actions of Western countries. At the same time, the Islamic world is undergoing severe trials in the Middle East. The existence of fundamental norms of international interaction, which the West is actively trying to replace with some kind of order based on democratic principles, is being jeopardized. Principles that aim to divide friendly countries and prevent the creation of a sustainable, just, multipolar world, which we are working hard to build. In this way, traditional norms of morality and high moral guidelines, which are the basis of sacred scriptures, are being erased. These processes are unacceptable for Russia. In these conditions, it is especially important to convey what the Russian people are, who have always been on the side of truth and justice, who have always stood for unity between nations, for peaceful coexistence.”

On 18 MAY 2023, Khusnullin headlined the 14th International Economic Summit in Tartarstan. He stated “[o]ur slogan is trust and cooperation that has become the pivotal factor in the development of relations between Russia and Muslim countries not only in the economic sphere but also in the diversity of all cooperation projects that truly manifest our strategic partnership,” and cited a thirty percent increase in trade between Russia and member nations of the

Organization of Islamic Cooperation over the last three years.

On 05 MAY 2023, Khusnullin announced that full service had re-started on the second track of the Crimean bridge just seven months after being severely damaged by a massive explosion.

On 28 APR 2023, it was announced Khusnullin visited the Ukrainian city of Bakhmut, a city of key strategic importance to the Russian military. Surveying the damage, Khusnullin: referring to Bakhmut by its Russian name, said it “is damaged, but it can be restored. We’ve done it before. As soon as the operational situation allows, we’ll start going in there and working on it.”

On 18 MAR 2023, Khusnullin accompanied Russian President Vladimir Putin on his surprise visit to Mariupol. Khusnullin discussed reconstruction efforts, particularly in residential areas.

On 14 OCT 2022, Khusnullin announced the Russian retreat from Kherson City. The same day, Khusnullin stated “several thousand” children from Kherson Oblast are “already in other regions of Russia, resting in rest homes and children’s camps.”

On 09 OCT 2022, just one day after a bomb severely damaged it, Khusnullin stated that “rail traffic on the Crimean bridge has been completely restored” and “all the scheduled trains” both passenger and freight “will pass in full,” and “[w]e have the technical skills for that.”

On 01 SEP 2022, Khusnullin announced that North Korean workers have offered to help rebuild war torn sections of Ukraine. Discussions about what role North Korea will play in the aftermath of Russia’s invasion has been an ongoing topic between officials of the two countries.

In MAY 2022, Khusnullin also visited Kherson City and inspected the local port, a cargo railway station, and a factory.

On 08 MAY 2022, Khusnullin visited Mariupol and the eastern Ukrainian town of Volnovakha among other territories.

On 23 FEB 2022, the EU sanctioned Khusnullin “for actions and policies which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, or stability or security in Ukraine.

XLIII. ALEXANDER VALENTINOVICH NOVAK

Title(s):

Deputy Prime Minister

Role(s):

Deputy Head of the state body, responsible for destabilization of Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Alexander Valentinovich Novak (“Novak”) was born on 23 AUG 1971 in the town of Avdeyevka in Ukraine, USSR.

From 2000 to 2002, he served as Norilsk Deputy Mayor for economics and finance, Norilsk First Deputy Mayor. From 2002 through 2007, Novak held the position of Deputy Governor of the Krasnoyarsk Territory in charge of the Central Finance Board of the territorial administration, and from 2007 through 2008, Novak was the First Deputy Governor and Prime Minister of the Krasnoyarsk territory. From 2008 until MAY 2012, he served as the Deputy Minister of Finance. On 21 MAY 2012, Novak was appointed Minister of Energy by Presidential Executive Order.

On 10 NOV 2020, Novak was appointed Deputy Prime Minister by Presidential Executive Order and took office as Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation the same day.

Summary of Role(s): Deputy Head of the state body, responsible for destabilization of Ukraine.

Organizational Membership: United Russia.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 20 MAR 2025, Novak held the seventh meeting of the subcommittee on increasing the stability of the financial sector and individual sectors of the

economy.

On 18 MAR 2025, Russia's Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak said that Russia's oil output is expected to be 515-520 million metric tonnes in 2025.

On 14 MAR 2025, information appeared on the news that Russia does not anticipate a swift resolution regarding the resumption of its gas exports to Europe through the Nord Stream pipelines, according to Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak. "It's off the agenda for now," the deputy premier stated in News.Az reports, citing TASS. The Bild newspaper wrote on March 4 citing sources that the German cabinet was exploring options to prevent the commissioning of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline as a result of potential agreements between Russia and the US.

On 12 FEB 2025, Novak said that Russia was not considering the possibility of transporting Azerbaijani natural gas to the European Union (EU) via the Ukrainian transit system. "It is not up for discussion," Novak said laconically. Earlier, there were reports that Ukraine was looking into the possibility of transporting Azerbaijani natural gas to the EU via its territory after the expiration of its transit agreement with Russia's Gazprom company. For such a route to be implemented, this natural gas will have to come via Russia.

On 25 DEC 2024, Novak stated that Russia is ready to continue gas exports to Europe through several routes just as a contract to transit the fuel via Ukraine is expected to end. It is up to authorities in Kyiv and the European Union to agree on the future of gas transportation, Novak said in an interview with state-run Rossiya 24 TV channel. "We, in turn, have always stated that we are ready to continue supplying gas not only via the existing link" through Ukraine, he said.

On 02 DEC 2024, Novak held a working meeting with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations of Hungary Peter Szijjarto. The parties discussed the development of bilateral trade and economic relations, as well as the conditions for the supply of energy resources from Russia to Hungary. "Hungary remains an important European trade and economic partner of Russia. Despite external pressure, Hungarian companies not only continue to work on the Russian market, but also come up with new project initiatives".

On 06 NOV 2024, Novak stated that Russia will stick to its commitments to the OPEC+ group of leading oil producers and has reached its promised oil output level of 9 million barrels per day. Under the deal, Russia's oil output quota from June to the end of 2024 was 8.98 million bpd.

On 09 OCT 2024, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak said that there are proposals from European Union partners to continue Russian gas purchases after the end of the year, but that the ball is in the court of Ukraine and the EU.

On 15 JUL 2024, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak said the global oil market will be balanced in the second half of the year and thereafter, thanks to the OPEC deal on production supply.

On 06 JUN 2024, in an exclusive interview with Al Arabiya English's Hadley Gamble, Russia's Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak played down the impact of Western sanctions on his country's bottom line, pointing to the IMF's 3.2 percent growth projections for 2024 and pointing out that Western countries are still importing Russian goods.

On 28 FEB 2024, Novak said that Russia is not considering a ban on diesel exports, and that a ban on gasoline exports may be lifted at any moment if the market becomes saturated. During a visit to Iran, the Kremlin point man for Russia's energy sector said: "The situation on the domestic petroleum products market is stable. This measure is preventive, that is, today we do not have a shortage. We look forward and ensure the balance of supply and demand for the future."

On 27 DEC 2023, Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak told Russian state broadcaster Rossiya-24 that oil exports to the two most populous countries on the planet, India and China, have made up 90% of all Russia's crude exports that year. Novak, whose portfolio includes control of the country's energy sector, said Moscow had successfully circumvented the effects of Western sanctions amid its invasion of Ukraine by rerouting supplies primarily to the two Asian giants.

On 04 JUN 2023, Novak: as co-chair of OPEC and OPEC+ stated following their ministerial meeting to agree to oil production of 40.46 million barrels per day (bpd) for the 2024 calendar year that "Russia will adjust its oil production level to 9.828 million barrels per day (according to independent sources) and will additionally extend its voluntary reduction by 500,000 barrels per day until the end of December 2024 as a precaution in coordination with the OPEC+ member states, which announced a voluntary oil output cut in April. This is a voluntary step, but it will also depend on the required production level coordinated" by the other nations and that the "overall oil production cut by the OPEC+ countries until the end of 2024 will amount to 3.66 million barrels per day from the October 2022 level."

On 16 MAY 2023, Novak arrived in Tehran for a two-day visit touring plants making Iranian oil and gas equipment and meeting with his fellow co-chair of the Permanent Russian Iranian Commission on Trade: Iranian Oil Minister Javad Owji. There Novak stated the importance Iran serves to Russia's energy, transportation, and infrastructure interests as "[t]he oil-and-gas industry is vital to our respective countries' economies. Strengthening bilateral cooperation in this industry will certainly help Russia and Iran improve economic stability. We see great potential for exchanging experience in implementing projects in the production, transport and refining of hydrocarbons."

On 01 APR 2023, Novak announced Russia will extend a 500,000-bpd oil production cut until the end of this calendar year.

On 28 MAR 2023, Novak had a phone call with Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs Péter Szijjártó, after which Szijjártó confirmed his opposition to possible nuclear energy sanctions against Russia, promising Hungary would veto any attempts by the EU.

On 15 DEC 2022, Novak met with Venezuelan Minister of Petroleum and Minister of Industries and National Production Tareck El Aissaimi in Caracas. In addition to oil and gas, they discussed Russian exports of wheat, meat, and dairy products to Venezuela and Russian imports of coffee and cocoa.

On 17 MAR 2023, Novak stated Russia needs to secure additional resources for new liquified natural gas projects to reach its medium-term export target of 100 million tons per year.

On 13 FEB 2023, Novak announced the country's plans to sell more than 80% of its crude oil exports to "friendly" countries this year. These "friendly" countries include countries such as China and India, which haven't participated in product bans, sanctions against Russia, and oil and oil product price capping—as well as Sri Lanka, which is in the throes of an economic crisis.

On 12 FEB 2023, Novak issued a new warning of a possible cut in the country's oil production, with his prepared remarks being emailed to the media in Moscow. Novak said the country's oil production may fall by 500,000 bpd in MAR, with the goal of "restoring market relations following the introduction of price caps on Russian oil and products by some countries". The minister also remarked that Russia considers price caps on its oil and oil products as "interference in market relations and the continuation of the destructive energy policy conducted [against Russia] by the countries of the collective West."

On 15 DEC 2023, Novak chaired the 16th meeting of the Russian-Venezuelan Intergovernmental Commission.

On 22 NOV 2022, Novak said "[Russia does] not plan to supply oil and petroleum products to countries that will apply the principle of a price cap with the subsequent reorientation of supplies to market-oriented partners or with a production reduction."

On 30 SEP 2022, the US sanctioned Novak.

XLIV. ALEXEI/ALEXEY LOGVINOVICH OVERCHUK

Title(s):

Deputy Prime Minister

Role(s):

Deputy Head of the state body, responsible for destabilization of Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Alexei Logvinovich Overchuk (“Overchuk”) was born on 09 DEC 1964 in Korostyshev, Zhitomir Region, Ukraine.

In AUG of 2000, Overchuk was appointed deputy head of the Russian Federal Cadastre Service. In APR 2004, he became the acting deputy head, before becoming the official Deputy Head of the Federal Real Estate Cadastre Agency in JUL 2004. From 2007 through 2008, Overchuk held the position of deputy head of the Federal Agency on Special Economic Zones Management. From 2008 through 2010, Overchuk held senior positions at UFG Asset Management Group. In 2010, Overchuk became the advisor to the head of the Federal Taxation Service and was appointed deputy head of the Federal Taxation Service in 2011. On 21 JAN 2020, Overchuk was appointed Deputy Prime Minister of Russia by a Presidential Executive Order.

Summary of Role(s): Deputy Head of the state body, responsible for destabilization of Ukraine. His responsibilities in government include Eurasian integration, cooperation with international organizations (CIS, BRICS, G20, etc.) and planning and organizing international events with the Prime Minister. Coordinates the work of federal executive bodies and issues instructions.

Overchuk is believed to be heavily involved with the Eurasian integration project.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 18 MAR 2025, Overchuk mentioned “As for the trilateral working group of deputy prime ministers [of Armenia, Russia, and Azerbaijan], it was established within the framework of the [trilateral] statement of November 9-10, 2020, respectively, by the joint statement of the leaders of the Russian Federation, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Now it is in a kind of ‘sleeping’ state; this can be stated. But we know that contacts are being held between partners on this topic”.

On 15 JAN 2025, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexey Overchuk weighed in on Armenia’s recent political move. Armenia’s decision to advance a bill that would officially begin the process of joining the European Union was described by Overchuk as a “legally significant step.”

On 09 JAN 2025, following Armenia’s announcement of its intentions to join the European Union, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk reacted swiftly, saying that the Armenian government’s decision signaled Yerevan’s desire to withdraw from the EEU, which Armenia chaired last year. Commenting on the Armenian government’s decision earlier, Overchuk said that the EU and the EAEU are incompatible, in particular, because “both unions assume the absence of customs borders and the free movement of goods, services, capital and workforce.” “We view the start of Armenia’s discussion on the bill launching the process of joining the European Union as the commencement of Armenia’s withdrawal from the EAEU,” the Russian government’s press service quoted Overchuk as saying in a statement.

In DEC 2024, Russian Deputy Prime Ministers Vitaly Savelyev and Alexei Overchuk visited the Islamic Republic of Iran, where they met with President Masoud Pezeshkian, First Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref, and Minister of Roads and Urban Development Farzaneh Sadegh. On December 23, during a meeting in Tehran with Russian Deputy Prime Minister Savelyev, Pezeshkian affirmed that Iran is determined to fulfill its agreement with Russia for the construction of the Rasht-Astara railroad, a crucial part of the International North-South Transport Corridor.

On 18 SEP 2024, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk said on Thursday that Moscow would support Pakistan's inclusion in BRICS.

On 19 MAY 2023, Overchuk spoke in favor of Asian and Islamic nations shifting away from dollar trade (USD), or: “de-dollarization.” Overchuk stated: “Of course, our relations with [the Islamic world] cannot but be influenced by the global shifts that are taking place and the global trends. We are talking about processes of de-dollarization and the creation of an independent financial system” and encouraged nations who are undergoing de-dollarization to accelerate the

pace they're doing so.

On 04 APR 2023, Overchuk was received in Armenia by Prime Minister of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan and Deputy Prime Minister of Armenia Mher Grigoryan.

On 17 FEB 2023, Overchuk met with Turkmen President Serdar Berdimuhamedow and his father: former President of Turkmenistan Gurbananguly Berdimuhamedow, in Turkmenistan to discuss “promising areas of developing bilateral cooperation” and said Russia was “interested in developing cooperation in various areas, including in economy, trade, energy and transport.”

On 24 DEC 2022, the 21st session of the Intergovernmental Commission for Economic Cooperation between the Republic of Armenia and the Russian Federation was held in Moscow under the co-chairmanship of Deputy Prime Minister of Armenia Mher Grigoryan and Overchuk. Grigoryan noted a 3.8 billion USD trade turnover between Armenia and Russia in the first ten months of 2022.

On 16 DEC 2022, the EU sanctioned Overchuk. On 09 JUN 2022, Ukraine sanctioned Overchuk.

On 19 SEP 2022, Overchuk and Deputy Prime Minister Mghar Grigoryan of Armenia signed a program of economic cooperation between Russia and Armenia until 2025.

In SEP 2022, Overchuk participated in the Russian-Armenian interregional forum in Yerevan.

XLV. DMITRY ANATOLYEVICH MEDVEDEV

Title(s):

Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of Russia

Former President of Russia

Former Prime Minister of Russia

Role(s):

Responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine. Multitudinous propagandizer.



Biographical Summary: Dmitry Anatolyevich Medvedev (“Medvedev”) was born on 14 SEP 1965 in Leningrad. He is married to Svetlana Medvedeva, and has one son, Ilya, who was born in 1995.

On 07 MAY 2008, Medvedev assumed the office of President of the Russian Federation while Putin became the Russian Prime Minister due to term limits. On 08 MAY 2012, Medvedev was appointed by Putin as the prime minister, while Putin ascended back to the presidency.

On 15 JAN 2020 Medvedev resigned from his role as Prime Minister—along with the rest of the government—to allow Putin to make sweeping constitutional changes. On 16 JAN 2020, Putin appointed Medvedev to the new office of deputy chairman of the Security Council.

Medvedev frequently, and openly, calls for the assassination of Western political figures.

Summary of Role(s): Responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine. Multitudinous propagandizer.

Organizational Membership: United Russia.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 14 MAR 2025, Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said Ukrainian troops remaining in the Kursk region of Russia will be ruthlessly destroyed if they continue to fight.

On 01 JAN 2025, Medvedev posted a social media message claiming that 2025 will be the year of "victory" for his country as the war against Ukraine that his ally Vladimir Putin started continues to rage. Medvedev shared the post on his X account with the message as a gif. In a separate video post on his Telegram channel, Medvedev also said that the outgoing year was one of "serious achievements" and referred to "those who are defending our homeland."

On 18 DEC 2024, Medvedev described the editors of the Times newspaper in Britain as "legitimate military targets" in response to the newspaper's coverage of the assassination of a Russian general. Medvedev's vitriolic comments followed a Times editorial in which the newspaper described the assassination of Lt Gen Igor Kirillov as "a legitimate act of defence" by Ukraine, which has claimed responsibility for the killing.

On 12 DEC 2024, General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee and President Xi Jinping met with Medvedev. Xi Jinping said that the two countries have blazed a new path featuring mutual respect, harmonious coexistence and win-win cooperation between major and neighboring countries, setting an example of a new type of international relations as well as relations between major neighboring countries. China is ready to work with Russia to strengthen the synergy of development strategies, tap the internal momentum of bilateral cooperation, and continuously bring benefits to the two countries and two peoples.

On 14 SEP 2024, Medvedev threatened to reduce Kyiv to a "giant melted spot" if Ukraine is allowed by its allies to use Western long-range missiles to strike targets deep inside Russia. The threat by Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of Russia's Security Council, came as the US and the UK deliberated giving Kyiv permission to use Western weapons to attack strategic targets farther into Russian territory.

On 03 SEP 2024, Medvedev threatened ICC judges amid calls to arrest the Russian president on an international warrant over alleged war crimes from the invasion of Ukraine. In response to the ICC arrest warrant, Medvedev said: "The European Union has expressed 'concern' to Mongolia over the visit of Russian President Vladimir Putin... If I were the judges and prosecutors of this unfinished "trial," I would be most afraid that one of the madmen will try to execute their illegal warrant. In this case, their life will cost no more than this s***** piece of paper."

On 17 JUL 2024, Medvedev claimed that Ukraine joining NATO would be viewed as a declaration of war against Moscow. He emphasized that only "prudence" on the alliance's part

could prevent catastrophic consequences for the planet, according to his interview published by a local weekly newspaper. He said, "From the very beginning, we have made it clear to NATO that Ukraine's accession is not just a direct threat to Russia's national interests. It is, in fact, a declaration of war, albeit with a delay."

On 23 JUN 2024, Medvedev warned that the United States will burn in an "earthly fire" following a missile attack on Sevastopol by Ukrainian troops. Amid the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, the Kremlin had placed blame on the U.S. for a Ukrainian attack on the Russian-annexed Crimean peninsula, claiming U.S.-supplied missiles were used. The Russian Defense Ministry said four of the U.S.-delivered Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) missiles were shot down by air defense systems, but fragments from the fifth rocket led to casualties on the ground. "Responsibility for the deliberate missile attack on the civilians of Sevastopol is borne above all by Washington, which supplied these weapons to Ukraine, and by the Kyiv regime, from whose territory this strike was carried out."

On 4 MAR 2024, Medvedev said the concept of Ukrainian independence "must disappear forever" and ruled out peace talks with the current Ukrainian leadership during the lecture he delivered on Russia's "geographic and strategic" borders at the state-sponsored Knowledge First forum, which invites international speakers to give lectures to young people.

On 04 MAR 2024, Medvedev provided chilling confirmation that Russia's attack on Ukraine is an old-fashioned imperial war with the end goal of extinguishing Ukrainian identity. Speaking at a festival in Sochi, Medvedev spelled out his rejection of Ukrainian statehood and elaborated on the imperial objectives underpinning Russia's ongoing invasion. "One of Ukraine's former leaders once said Ukraine is not Russia. That concept needs to disappear forever," he declared. "Ukraine is definitely Russia."

On 17 JAN 2024, in a mini-essay titled "Why Ukraine is dangerous for its residents," Medvedev argued that from now on, any independent state that lies on "historical Russian territories" will serve as a "pretext for renewed hostilities" for as long as it exists. "By no means am I only referring to the current state, the Banderite political regime. I'm talking about any version of Ukraine whatsoever," he stressed. Calling Ukraine a "cancerous growth," the former Russian president insisted that the war-ravaged country will always be illegitimate from a legal perspective, no matter who its leader is.

"Therefore, the risk of renewed clashes will persist indefinitely. Practically forever. Furthermore, there's a 100 percent chance of a new conflict, regardless of any papers about security that the West signs with the Kyiv puppet regime," said Medvedev. "Neither Ukraine's association with the E.U. nor even the accession of this artificial country into NATO can prevent it."

On 14 JUN 2023, Medvedev threatened communication cables on the oceans' floors could be targeted by Russia in retaliation for the Nord Stream pipeline.

On 30 MAY 2023, in response to a statement made by British Foreign Secretary James Cleverly in Estonia the day before, Medvedev threatened the UK was a "legitimate military target" of Russia. He falsely claimed the UK was "de facto leading an undeclared war against Russia" and thus "any of its public officials (either military, or civil, who facilitate the war) can be considered as a legitimate military target."

On 03 MAY 2023, after two drones were shot down near Vladimir Putin's Kremlin residence, Medvedev: without evidence that these were from the Ukrainian military, advocated for the assassination of Volodymyr Zelenskyy. He stated "[a]fter today's terrorist attack, there are no options left aside the physical elimination of Zelensky and his cabal."

On 02 MAY 2023, access to the English version of Medvedev's Twitter account was suspended after stating Poland should not exist as a nation "as long as no one but Russophobes is in power there" and falsely stating that Ukraine was "full of Polish mercenaries" who "must be ruthlessly destroyed."

On 09 APR 2023, Medvedev claimed that Ukraine will "disappear" as "no one needs it" citing "a financial and political hell" Western Europe has experienced defending it. He then gravely, but confidently, predicted "[s]uch a Ukraine is not needed by anyone on the planet. That is why it will not exist."

On 31 MAR 2023, in a long Twitter post, Medvedev threatened NATO peacekeepers and, along with implying a Third World War, stated in part: "[i]t is also obvious that such 'peacemakers' are our direct enemies. Wolves in sheep's clothing. They will be a legitimate target for our armed forces if they are deployed on the front line without Russia's consent, with weapons in their hands and directly threatening us. And then these 'peacekeepers' must be ruthlessly destroyed. They are soldiers of the enemy. They are combatants, not 'letter-writers'. And they will be killed in the course of hostilities. It remains to be seen whether Europe is ready for a long succession of coffins of its 'peacekeepers.'"

On 23 MAR 2023, Medvedev threatened in a Telegram video that any attempt to arrest Putin by the ICC would equate to "a declaration of war on the Russian Federation," and in hypothetically went Putin was arrested in Germany "in that case, all our assets - all our missiles et cetera - would fly to the Bundestag, to the Chancellor's office."

On 11 MAR 2023, Medvedev again falsely compared Ukraine to Nazi Germany on Saturday when he suggested Ukraine be renamed "Schweinish Bandera-Reich" ("Pig Bandera-Reich") in

response to a Ukrainian petition calling on the Ukrainian government to rename the entirety of the Russian Federation “Moscow.”

According to a report from MAR 2023 published by the Italian newspaper Il Foglio, Medvedev offered 15 million USD to the Wagner Group to murder Italian Defense Minister Guido Crosetto.

On 24 FEB 2023, Medvedev said the only way for Moscow to ensure a lasting peace with Ukraine was to push back the borders of hostile states as far as possible, even if that meant the frontiers of NATO member Poland.

On 22 FEB 2023, Medvedev said “After all, it is obvious to all reasonable forces that if the US wants Russian defeat, then we are on the verge of a world conflict,” he continued. “If the US wants to defeat Russia, then we have the right to defend ourselves with any weapon, including nuclear.”

On 21 DEC 2022, Medvedev traveled to Beijing to meet with Chinese President Xi Jinping at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse. There they discussed principally economic issues, but also international affairs including the crisis in Ukraine.

On 27 SEP 2022, Medvedev said Russia had the right to defend itself with nuclear weapons if the “very existence” of Russia was at risk, including any supposedly annexed territories in Ukraine.

On 07 SEP 2022, Ukraine sanctioned Medvedev.

On 27 JUL 2022, Medvedev shared a map on Telegram, described as predictions of “Western analysts,” which showed Ukraine, including its occupied territories, mostly absorbed by Russia, as well as Poland, Romania, and Hungary.

On 06 JUL 2022, Medvedev wrote on Telegram that it would be “crazy to create tribunals or courts for the so-called investigation of Russia’s actions”, claiming the idea of “punishing a country that has one of the largest nuclear potentials” may potentially pose “a threat to the existence of humanity.” Medvedev accused the US of creating “chaos and devastation around the world under the guise of ‘true democracy’”, concluding his message by saying “the US and its useless stooges should remember the words of the Bible: ‘Judge not, lest you be judged; so that one day the great day of His wrath will not come to their house, and who can stand?’”

On 06 APR 2022, the US sanctioned Medvedev.

On 02 MAR 2022, the EU sanctioned Medvedev.

XLVI. SERGEI/SERGEY BORISOVICH IVANOV

Title(s):

Special Representative of the President on Issues of Environmental Activities, Ecology and Transport

Role(s):

Responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Sergei Borisovich Ivanov (“Ivanov”) was born 31 JAN 1953 in Leningrad.

In NOV 2005, Ivanov was appointed to the post of Deputy Prime Minister in Mikhail Fradkov’s Second Cabinet, focusing on the manufacturing industry and export of arms. In FEB 2007, President Putin then promoted him to First Deputy Prime Minister with responsibility over defense industry, aerospace industry, nanotechnology, and transport. In JUN 2007, he was then appointed chairman of the Government Council for Nanotechnology. In DEC 2011, he was appointed Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration of Russia.

On 12 AUG 2016, Ivanov was relieved from his Chief of Staff position by Putin, and he was given the role of special envoy for transportation and the environment.

Summary of Role(s): Responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 23 JAN 2025, Ivanov made a statement comparing the SMO with WWII, "There is a struggle between light and darkness, spirituality and heartlessness, traditional and pseudo-liberal values, and in the future, truth and lies. And there is no doubt that, like 80 years ago, we will win." He further mentioned that European powers have made distorted ideas about the world their main ideological weapon. Such an ideological position, according to him, is doomed to failure. "Brainwashing of our own citizens, their fooling, based on a large-scale falsification of history and the creation of auras of heroes around traitors and murderers, has become the main ideological weapon in the European Union," he added.

On 23 JAN 2025, in the same interview to TASS, Ivanov said that he hopes for the opening of the tourist season on the Black Sea coast this year. However, according to the official, he cannot confirm this. Ivanov stated that no one can say for sure when the ecological disaster in Kuban will be eliminated. "I hope that it will be possible [to swim this summer], but I cannot confirm this. This is unknown. Perhaps, God forbid, but it will take years to completely eliminate the consequences," Ivanov explained.

On 09 AUG 2024, Putin discussed counterterrorism issues with permanent members of the Russian Security Council. "Today, the agenda of the operational meeting with permanent members of the Security Council includes a very important issue concerning individual aspects of the fight against terrorism," Putin said at the meeting, after which he handed the floor to the FSB Director for a report. The meeting was attended by State Duma Chairman Vyacheslav Volodin, Deputy Chairman of the Security Council Dmitry Medvedev, Secretary of the Security Council Shoigu, Defense Minister Belousov, FSB Director Bortnikov, Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service Naryshkin, Special Representative of the President for Environmental Protection, Ecology and Transport Ivanov, and Presidential Aide Patrushev.

On 30 SEP 2022, the US treasury again sanctioned Ivanov, pursuant to E.O. 14024.

On 25 FEB 2022, the US (again) and EU sanctioned Ivanov.

On 20 MAR 2014, the US sanctioned Ivanov in relation to Russia's annexation of Crimea.

Ivanov's son, Sergei Sergeevich Ivanov, was CEO of the Russian state-owned mining company Alrosa. Sergei Segeevich was sanctioned by the US along with his father on 25 FEB 2022.

Alrosa is the second-largest diamond extracting and exporting company in the world after De Beers. Diamonds have been a notable exception to European sanctions, with Belgium opposing such blockades to prevent Russia from replacing Antwerp as long-time supplier to wealthy Middle Eastern nations.

Sergei Sergeevich was due to run Alrosa until 2025, but in DEC 2022 it was announced he was

stepping down as CEO to join the private investment firm Volga Group, run by another longtime billionaire friend of Putin: Gennady Nikolayevich Timchenko.

XLVII. VYACHESLAV VIKTOROVICH VOLODIN

Title(s):

Chairman of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly

Role(s):

Responsible for overseeing the political integration of the annexed Ukrainian region of Crimea into the Russian Federation. Responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Vyacheslav Viktorovich Volodin (“Volodin”) was born 04 FEB 1964 in the Khvalynsky District.

In OCT 2010 he was appointed Deputy Prime Minister and in DEC 2011, became the First Deputy Chief of State of the Presidential Executive Office. In JAN 2017, he became a member of the Supreme Council of the United Russia Party and in OCT 2019, the 10th Chairman of the State Duma.

Summary of Role(s): Responsible for overseeing the political integration of the annexed Ukrainian region of Crimea into the Russian Federation. Responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine.

Organizational Membership: United Russia.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 14 AUG 2025, Volodin met with Kim Jong Un in Pyongyang as part of an official visit to North Korea, where he expressed gratitude to the North Korean government for its support of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

On 21 JUN 2025, Volodin posted on his telegram account a message reviewing the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, which had been held the day before. In the message, Volodin states that “Russians and Ukrainians are one people. In this sense, all of Ukraine is ours.” Volodin continues, stating “The situation along the entire front line is developing successfully. Our army is liberating more and more settlements from neo-Nazis. Wherever a Russian soldier sets foot, that is ours.”

On 07 MAR 2025, Volodin stated that Britain would have to return Moscow money that London had decided to “illegally gift” to Ukraine to fund Kyiv’s military. Ukraine received the first tranche of funds worth about \$1 billion secured by the proceeds of frozen Russian assets.

On 14 FEB 2025, Volodin called on the US Congress to provide lists of Russians who have received USAID funding, stating they would “hand these lists to the FSB.” Volodin said those who received funding from abroad “should publicly apologize and seek penance on Red Square.”

On 02 FEB 2025, Volodin traveled to India for a series of “important” discussions. Calling India a “strategic partner,” he stressed the need to expand engagement across all sectors. The visit occurred amid speculation about India potentially playing a mediation role in the Russia-Ukraine war.

On 12 DEC 2024, Volodin was sentenced in absentia to 15 years in prison by a Ukrainian court for encroaching on Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.

On 13 SEP 2024, Volodin, as Chairman of Russia’s State Duma, accused NATO of being a party to military action in Ukraine, suggesting it was already heavily involved in military decision-making. Volodin claimed that NATO personnel “determine which cities in our country will be attacked, coordinate military actions and give orders,” and that “NATO has become a participant in military actions in Ukraine.”

On 22 NOV 2023, Volodin met with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing. Volodin said that Russia and China are “not only strategic partners, but also strategic friends.” They discussed deepening cooperation through international platforms such as the SCO, BRICS, BRI and EAEU.

On 19 JUN 2023, Volodin falsely claimed that Russians who fled to Europe following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine were living in concentration camps. He stated, “In order to better understand the situation around those who left, it is enough to familiarize yourself with the statement of the Czech president, who invited Russian citizens living abroad to be sent to concentration camps.” Volodin was misrepresenting and exaggerating a statement by President Petr Pavel who stated,

“when there is an ongoing war, the security measures related to Russian nationals should be stricter than in normal times” and that though he was sympathetic to emigrating Russians, those “living in Western countries should be monitored much more than in the past because they are citizens of a nation that leads an aggressive war.”

On 14 JUN 2023, Volodin met with Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune in Moscow.

On 04 APR 2023, Volodin claimed on Telegram that “[t]he support of Washington and Brussels for the Kyiv authorities led to the creation of a terrorist state in the center of Europe.”

On 02 APR 2023, in the aftermath of the ICC issuing an arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin, Volodin encouraged legislatures to criminalize any Russians collaborating with the ICC or the calling of the ICC decisions to be enforced on Russian territory.

On 15 MAR 2023, the EU sanctioned Volodin.

On 13 JAN 2023, as Chairman of the State Duma Volodin suggested confiscating property of citizens who insult Russia while residing abroad. Volodin wrote that he has been observing recently how some Russian citizens, living abroad, “consider it possible to insult Russia, its residents, soldiers and officers, openly support villains, Nazis and murderers.”

On 21 SEP 2022, Putin announced a mobilization of military reservists and Volodin, as well as other top political officials, addressed the outrage within the country in the following days. Volodin said that she was aware of reports that some men, who were ineligible for the draft, had been called up to fight. In a message, Volodin said he “Appeals are coming in” and “Each case should be dealt with separately. If a mistake is made, it must be corrected.” He added “All levels of government must understand their responsibility.”

On 06 JUL 2022, Volodin discussed the US purchase of Alaska when he said, “When they attempt to appropriate our assets abroad, they should be aware that we also have something to claim back.”

On 25 FEB 2022, the US sanctioned Volodin.

On 09 SEP 2020, among other Russian senior officials, met with Li Zhanshu, who is the third in the PRC’s leadership as Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress. Li told Russian lawmakers: “On the Ukraine issue, for example, the US and NATO are expanding directly on Russia's doorstep, threatening Russia's national security and the lives of Russian citizens. Given the circumstances, Russia has taken necessary measures. China understands, and we are coordinating on various aspects.” Li also said at the meeting: “I believe

Russia was cornered. In this case, to protect the core interests of the country, Russia gave a resolute response.”

On 03 MAR 2020, the EU sanctioned Volodin.

On 17 AUG 2018, ahead of hearings on a controversial proposal to raise the retirement age, opposition leader Alexei Navalny accused Volodin in a video expose of hiding millions of dollars in assets in his mother’s name. Navalny's Anti-Corruption Foundation alleged that a spacious apartment valued at 3.4 million USD, or 230 million RUB in Moscow and ten companies held in the name of Volodin’s mother actually belong to the speaker.

XLVIII. DMITRY VIKTOROVICH KOCHNEV

Title(s):

Director of the Federal Protective Service

Role(s):

Official of the body responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Dmitry Viktorovich Kochnev (“Kochnev”) was born on 01 MAR 1964 in Moscow, Russian SFSR, USSR.

Kochnev was the head of the Russian Presidential Security Service from JUN 2015 to MAY 2016, and was acting head from JUN 2015 to DEC 2015. On 26 MAY 2016 Kochnev was appointed the Director of the Federal Protective Service. In early JUN 2021 he was promoted to the rank of army general.

Summary of Role(s): Official of the body responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine. The Federal Protective Service (FSO) is a federal government agency that is concerned with the tasks related to the protection of several high-ranking state officials, mandated by the relevant law, including the President of Russia, as well as certain federal properties. The FSO includes the Russian Presidential Security Service and also has about 20,000 troops and controls the nuclear briefcase that can be used in the event of a nuclear war.

Organizational Membership: Federal Protective Service of the Russian Federation.

Incidents and Events of Note: In MAY 2024, Kochnev was reappointed as Director of the Federal Guards Service (FSO) following Putin's governmental reshuffle after his inauguration for another presidential term. The official confirmation of his reappointment appeared in multiple news sources between 14-15 MAY 2024.

In APR 2024 Kochnev and the FSO were involved in acquiring assets of Russian businessmen who fled abroad, working with Umar Kremlev, the President of the International Amateur Boxing Association who has close ties to the FSO leadership.

On 26 JUN 2023, Kochnev was among the security delegation who met with Vladimir Putin who thanked them for their work in suppressing the Wagner Group rebellion on 23 and 24 JUN.

In FEB 2023, Kochnev oversaw the implementation of enhanced internal security measures at the FSO, including stricter vetting procedures and new IT systems designed to detect corruption and security breaches within the agency.

On 19 OCT 2022, Ukraine sanctioned Kochnev.

XLIX. ALEKSANDR/ALEXANDER VASILYEVICH BORTNIKOV

Title(s):

Director of the Federal Security Service

Role(s):

Official of the body responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Aleksandr Vasilievich Bortnikov (“Bortnikov”) was born on 15 NOV 1951 in Perm, Russia. He is a Russian intelligence officer who has served as the Director of the Federal Security Service (FSB) since 12 May 2008.

From 1975 to 2004, he worked in the secret police system in Leningrad/Saint Petersburg. In 2004, he became Deputy Director of the Federal Security Service, the Head of the Economic Security Service. In May 2008, Bortnikov was appointed Director of the FSB of Russia, chairman of the National Anti-Terrorism Committee, and a permanent member of the Security Council of Russia.

Aleksandr Bortnikov is also a member of the board of directors for Russia’s largest shipping company and hydrocarbon transporter, Sovkomflot.

Summary of Role(s): Official of the body responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine. The Federal Security Service is the Russian Federation's main security agency and is the main successor to the Soviet Union's KGB. As Director, Aleksandr Bortnikov oversees the entirety of the FSB and is a member of President Putin’s inner circle. Since the 2024 announcement of counterterrorism operations in the Kursk Oblast, Bortnikov, as Chairperson of the National Anti-Terrorism Committee, has been especially involved in and responsible for responses to Ukrainian

incursions in Russia's Kursk Oblast. The Russian State has described these defensive efforts as "counterterrorism" operations.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 9 AUG 2024, Bortnikov announced new counterterrorism operations in the Russian oblasts of Belgorod, Bryansk, and Kursk in response to the Ukrainian military operations in which sites in these regions were targeted. These counterterrorism operations expanded the ability of Russian authorities to monitor, regulate and suspend communication services and channels, as well as confiscate vehicles and enter private properties. Bortnikov is assumed to have taken a personal role, as chairperson of the Anti-Terrorism council, in accordance with the Federal Law No. 35-FZ of 6 MAR 2006 on Counteraction Against Terrorism.

On 26 MAR 2024, Bortnikov accused Ukraine of involvement in the 22 MAR 2024 terrorist attack on the Crocus City Hall public venue in Krasnogorsk, Moscow Oblast, during terrorists associated with ISIS-K, the Islamic State Khorasan Province, active in Central and South Asia, killed 144 people and injured an additional 551. Bortnikov was quoted saying, "We believe the action was prepared both by the radical Islamists themselves and, of course, facilitated by Western special services, and Ukraine's special services themselves have a direct connection to this."

On 21 FEB 2023, Bortnikov acknowledged Russia was notified of U.S. President Joe Biden's arrival in Ukraine earlier that week, which the White House kept secret from the general public. He stated that "[w]e did not give guarantees of his safety. Just said we took the note." He added that the FSB is still in contact with the U.S. on fighting terrorism, but at a diminished level since the invasion, stating: "No one wins from this (lack of cooperation). Everyone is interested in maintaining relations."

On 27 SEP 2022, Ukraine sanctioned Bortnikov.

On 25 MAR 2022, The Moscow Times noted that Bortnikov had disappeared from public view since around 11 MAR 2022, along with other senior officials including Sergey Shoigu, Igor Kostyukov and Viktor Zolotov. State TV programs in response subsequently broadcast a purported security council meeting on 24 MAR including brief appearances by many of the possibly-missing men, including Bortnikov, but it appeared to simply be an edited version of the security council meeting on 11 MAR.

On 20 MAR 2022, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) alleged that Bortnikov was a favorite to replace Vladimir Putin among a group of Russian elites plotting to assassinate Putin in a bid to

stabilize the economy and reestablish ties with the West following sanctions imposed on Russia for the 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

On 25 FEB 2022, the U.S. again sanctioned Bortnikov.

On 02 MAR 2021, the U.S. and Canada sanctioned Bortnikov.

On 14 MAR 2020, the E.U. again sanctioned Bortnikov.

In JAN 2018, the investigative website Russiangate.com was shut down just three hours after publishing a report Bortnikov secretly owns real estate outside of Saint Petersburg. This included a \$5.3 million mansion and land plot: which did not appear in Bortnikov's end-of-year tax declarations and was deleted from the state property registry in 2017.

In 2014, the E.U. and Canada sanctioned Bortnikov for Russia's military intervention in Ukraine.

L. SERGEI BORISOVICH KOROLEV/KOROLYOV

Title(s):

First Deputy Director of the Federal Security Service

Role(s):

Official of the body responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Sergei Borisovich Korolev (“Korolev”) was born on 25 JUL 1962, in Frunze, Kirghiz SSR, USSR.

In 2007 Korolev was appointed advisor to the Minister of Defense and oversaw the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Russian Federation. Between 2011 and 2012 Korolev headed the Internal Security Directorate of the FSB of Russia.

On 08 JUL 2016, Sergei Korolev was promoted to the head of the Economic Security Service of the FSB of Russia. In this position, his duties, among others, included providing Russian President Vladimir Putin with dossiers on members of the government. On 24 FEB 2021, by decree of the President of Russia, he was appointed First Deputy Director of the FSB of Russia. In early JUN 2021, Korolev was awarded the rank of General of the Army, and was also appointed to lead Russia’s delegation in the Shanghai Cooperative Organisation’s Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure.

Summary of Role(s): Official of the body responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine. The Federal Security Service is the Russian Federation's main security agency and is the main successor to the Soviet Union’s KGB. As First Deputy Director of the Federal Security Service, Korolev works directly for the agency's director, Aleksandr Bortnikov.

Organizational Membership: Supervisory Board of the National Research Center “Kurchatov Institute”. Supervisory Board of Rosatom.

Incidents and Events of Note: In MAY 2024, it was reported that Korolev had emerged as one of the primary beneficiaries of the Kremlin’s 2024 defense reshuffle, and was credited with carrying out both internal reforms to the Russian intelligence institutions and operations targeting Ukrainian officials. This included assassination schemes against Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Kyrylo Budanov, and Vasyl Malyuk. Two officers of Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) involved in the plots were linked to Korolev as having served with Korolev when he headed the 9th Department of the Operational Directorate of the 5th Service of the FSB.

On 19 OCT 2022, Ukraine sanctioned Korolev.

On 21 JUL 2022, the E.U. sanctioned Korolev.

LI. VLADIMIR GRIGORIEVICH KULISHOV

Title(s):

First Deputy Director of the Federal Security Service
Head of the Border Service of the Federal Security Service

Role(s):

FSB's Border Service under his command took part in systematic "filtration" operations and forced deportations of Ukrainians from the occupied territories of Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Vladimir Grigorievich Kulishov ("Kulishov") was born on 20 JUL 1957 in Russia's southern Rostov region.

Since 2000, Kulishov has been working in the central administration of the Federal Security Service in Moscow. In JUL 2003, he was appointed head of the Federal Security Service department for Saratov region. In 2004, he was appointed first deputy head of the Federal Security Service anti-terrorism directorate, and later he became head of the Federal Security Service department for the Chechen Republic. Since JUN 2008, Kulishov has been deputy director of the Federal Security Service and deputy head of administration of the National Anti-terrorism Committee.

In 2013, he received the post of First Deputy and head of the Border service.

Summary of Role(s): The functionaries of the FSB's Border Service under his command took part in systematic "filtration" operations and forced deportations of Ukrainians from the occupied territories of Ukraine. Russian border guards illegally subjected Ukrainian citizens to lengthy interrogations, searches, and detentions. The Federal Security Service is the Russian Federation's principal security agency and is the main successor to the Soviet Union's KGB. As First Deputy Director of the Federal Security Service, Kulishov works directly for the agency's director, Aleksandr Bortnikov.

Kulishov is connected with the former Secretary of the Security Council Patrushev, who was

released from his position in May 2024. According to The Insider, the breach of the Russian border in the Kursk region is an obvious failure of Kulishov and his border guards, who missed the concentration of Ukrainian troops at the border and fled into the forests or surrendered to the Ukrainian army en masse at the Sudzha, Tyotkino and Krupets crossing points.

General Kulishov was involved in a high-profile scam involving the land of the FSB kindergarten in the village of Kalchuga, not far from Putin's Novo-Ogaryovo residence. In the mid-2000s, the land in Kalchuga rose sharply in price; a hundred square meters was \$150,000. The children's institution was declared unsafe, the buildings were demolished, and the land was divided into several plots. The nominal land owners were FSB generals from the Patrushev clan. Thus, a plot worth \$2.4 million was registered in Kulishov's name, Bortnikov's plot was valued at \$2.5 million, the land of Deputy Director of the FSB Alexander Kupryazhkin was valued at \$2.4 million, etc. Then, through intermediaries, the plots were sold to the oligarch Igor Kesaev, who is also referred to as "Patrushev's wallet." FSB sources claim that the money allegedly went to a certain FSB fund aimed to help veterans of the special service and their families. However, no evidence of this was provided. Soon after the deal in Kalchuga was completed, the construction of Patrushev's mansion in Serebryany Bor began.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 29 MAY 2024, Kulishov accused NATO of gearing up for potential nuclear strikes on Russian soil. Speaking exclusively to state-run Ria Novosti on the occasion of Russia's "Border Guard Day," Kulishov outlined NATO's purportedly aggressive maneuvers near Russian borders. He alleged a surge in reconnaissance activities and intensified combat training by NATO troops, including drills that simulate nuclear strikes against Russia. "The situation requires taking appropriate steps to protect and secure our borders," Kulishov emphasized, underscoring Russia's perceived need for defensive measures in response. These accusations followed a directive by Putin, instructing the military to conduct exercises involving the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons. Moscow cited perceived threats from the West as justification for these maneuvers.

On 21 JUN 2023, information was leaked on social media that following attacks by armed groups in the Bryansk and Belgorod regions, Russia had decided to recreate its border troops. This was reported by Andrey Gurulev, a member of the State Duma Defense Committee. Russian President Vladimir Putin liquidated this special force in 2003, and its functions were transferred to the FSB. "The most significant event today is that a decision has been made to recreate the border troops. We talked about this, the military method of protecting the state border is extremely relevant. I don't know whether they heard us or not, but the decision has been made," the deputy wrote on his Telegram channel. The Defense Ministry did not confirm this information. Gurulev also did not specify whether the border service would be removed from the

FSB.

On 25 APR 2023, the Chinese and Russian governments entered into a maritime security cooperation agreement to share resources in international waters. Kulishov, who was instrumental in supporting this agreement, stated that this agreement will: “combat terrorism, illegal migration, fighting smuggling of drugs and weapons, as well as stopping illegal fishing.”

On 06 OCT 2022, the EU sanctioned Kulishov.

On 27 MAY 2022, Kulishov, in an interview with the Rossiyskaya Gazette Newspaper, asserted that “Nationalist and radical right-wing elements are trying to enter [Russia] under the guise of refugees.” He further recognized the “1.2 million Russian and Ukrainian citizens that have been authorized to enter the Russian Federation since mid-February.” Kulishov also mentioned the usage of strict control in identifying possible nationalists from the flow of refugees.

LII. NIKOLAI PLATONOVICH PATRUSHEV

Title(s):

Aide to the President of the Russian Federation

Former Secretary of the Security Council

Role(s):

Official of the body responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine. Multitudinous propagandizer.



Biographical Summary: Nikolai Platonovich Patrushev (“Patrushev”) was born on 11 JUL 1951 in Leningrad.

In 1994 Patrushev was appointed chief of the FSK Directorate of Internal Security, under Director Sergei Stepashin. After Stepashin’s resignation on 30 JUN 1995, Patrushev received the senior post of Deputy Chief of the FSB's Organisation and Inspection Department. In 1998 he was chief of the Control Directorate of the Presidential Staff from MAY-AUG, and from AUG-OCT he was Deputy Chief of the Presidential Staff. In OCT 1998 he was appointed Deputy Director of the FSB and chief of the Directorate for Economic Security. In APR 1999, he became FSB First Deputy Director—and on 09 AUG the same year a decree by President Boris Yeltsin promoted him to Director, replacing Vladimir Putin.

Patrushev was Secretary of the Security Council from 12 MAY 2008 until 14 MAY 2024, when he was replaced by then-outgoing former Minister of Defense Sergey Shoigu. This position is equivalent to the US national security adviser. After becoming Presidential Aide overseeing shipbuilding, an 11 JUN 2024 decree announced that he would remain a member of the Security Council.

Summary of Role(s): Official of the body responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 13 MAR 2025, Patrushev claimed that NATO is deliberately "escalating" tensions in the Baltic region, portraying the alliance as a threat to Russia's security. His comments came amid NATO's warnings that Russia may be ramping up hybrid operations in the region. Several undersea cables were damaged, leading the alliance to increase its presence in the Baltic Sea. Speaking to National Defense, a Russian military and political magazine, Patrushev alleged that NATO's naval forces are working to "block" Russia in the Baltic while ignoring diplomatic engagement with Moscow. Patrushev further accused the alliance, particularly the UK, of provoking instability in the region. "The forecast of the situation in the Baltic allows us to draw attention to the deliberate fomenting of regional tensions by the naval forces of European countries of the alliance," he said. Patrushev also claimed, without evidence, that NATO is conducting cyberattacks on Russian ships' navigation systems to create maritime emergencies, including accidents and infrastructure failures.

On 14 JAN 2025, in response to a question about possible territorial concessions during peace talks with then U.S. President-elect Donald Trump, Patrushev said in an interview with the pro-Kremlin tabloid Komsomolskaya Pravda that Ukraine may cease to exist as a sovereign state in 2025, "It can't be ruled out that Ukraine will cease to exist at all in the coming year." He claimed Kyiv collapsed "long before" Russia's 2022 invasion due to its alleged "violent enforcement of neo-Nazi ideology and ardent Russophobia."

On 17 MAY 2024, following Patrushev's dismissal from his role as Secretary to the Security Council, POLITICO published an article with the most notable statements of Patrushev. He is reported to be the person who persuaded Putin to start a full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Two months after Russia launched its invasion, in April 2022, Patrushev alleged in an interview with newspaper Rossiiskaya Gazeta that Ukrainian criminals were "trafficking young orphans taken from Ukraine for their subsequent illegal adoption in Europe." That wasn't all: the West had "revived the shadow market for the purchase of human organs from socially vulnerable segments of the Ukrainian population for clandestine transplants for European patients."

Months into Russia's invasion, in May 2022, Patrushev told the newspaper Argumenty i Fakti that the "Anglo-Saxons" had been guided by the 'golden billion' principle for "centuries." "Hiding behind words such as the fight for human rights, freedom and democracy, in reality they are implementing the doctrine of the 'golden billion,' which stipulates that only a limited number of people can thrive in this world," he said.

In 2015, a year after Moscow's annexation of Crimea, Patrushev expressed the conviction that the United States wanted to wipe Russia off the face of the earth. "You probably remember the declaration of former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright that neither the Far North nor

Siberia belongs to Russia,” he said in an interview.

Patrushev said that students were an instrument, lured to the West with grants and exchange programs. From the United States, “they return as agitators ready to carry out so-called democratic transformations and prepare the ground for the implementation of ‘color revolution’ scenarios,” Patrushev told a security meeting in the Armenian capital Yerevan.

Not Russia, but Poland is trying to invade Ukraine, Patrushev explained at a national security meeting in May 2022. “The so-called Western partners of the Kyiv regime are using the current situation for their own selfish interests and have big plans for Ukrainian lands,” he said.

On 14 MAY 2024, Putin demoted Nikolai Patrushev, a Cold War warrior who crafted the Kremlin's national security strategy, to a job overseeing the shipbuilding industry.

On 29 JUN 2023, Patrushev called his Indian counterpart: NSA Ajit Doval, Russian Security Council Secy Nikolai Patrushev, where the two discussed “[t]he current issues of Russian-Indian cooperation in the field of security and the prospects for deepening within the framework of bilateral and multilateral formats...in detail.”

On 29 MAR 2023, Patrushev met with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to discuss “issues of Russian-Indian bilateral cooperation and mutual interest” at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in India.

On 27 MAR 2023, Patrushev, in an interview with the state-run Rossiyskaya Gazeta newspaper, stated Russian military had the capability to destroy any nation on Earth, claiming: “[f]or some reason, American politicians who are held captive by their own propaganda remain confident that in the event of a direct conflict with Russia, the US is capable of launching a preventive missile strike, after which Russia will no longer be able to respond,” and “[t]his is short-sighted stupidity, and very dangerous...Russia is patient and does not intimidate anyone with its military advantage. But it has modern unique weapons capable of destroying any enemy, including the US, in case of a threat to its existence.”

On 22 FEB 2023, Patrushev met in Moscow with Wang Yi: a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee and director of the Office of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the CPC Central Committee.

On 15 NOV 2022, Patrushev said that Western-supplied arms and foreign mercenaries were priority targets for Russia’s forces fighting in Ukraine.

On 09 NOV 2022, Patrushev met with the Iranian president in Tehran following a meeting with Shamkhani, the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) of Iran.

On 25 FEB 2022, the US sanctioned Patrushev.

On 14 MAR 2020, the EU sanctioned Patrushev.

On 06 APR 2018, the US sanctioned Patrushev, pursuant to E.O. 13661.

LIII. RASHID GUMAROVICH NURGALIYEV/NURGALIEV

Title(s):

First Deputy Secretary of the Security Council

Role(s):

Official of the body responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Rashid Gumarovich Nurgaliyev (“Nurgaliyev”) was born in Zhetikara, Kazakh SSR, USSR on 08 OCT 1956 and is of Volga Tatar ethnicity.

In 2002 he became the first deputy minister of interior of Russia. Nurgaliyev became minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 2003. He was removed from office on 21 MAY 2012 and Vladimir Kolokoltsev replaced him in the post. Two days after his dismissal, on 23 MAY 2012, he was made Deputy Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation (SCRF). Nurgaliyev holds the rank of Army General.

In FEB 2023, by decree of President Vladimir Putin, Nurgaliyev was appointed First Deputy Secretary of the Russian Security Council, replacing Yuri Averyanov.

Summary of Role(s): Official of the body responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine. The Security Council of the Russian Federation (SCRF) is a constitutional body of the Russian president that works out the president’s decisions on national security affairs and matters of strategic interest. The SCRF acts as a forum for coordinating and integrating national security policy. Nurgaliev is a non-permanent member of the SCRF.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 27 OCT 2023, the Moscow-backed separatist government in Abkhazia signed a public-private partnership agreement with the recently established Russian

company Infrastructure Development to restore operations at the Babushera airport near the Abkhazian capital of Sukhumi. Rashid Nurgaliyev Jr., the son of the current deputy secretary of the Russian Security Council and former deputy minister of the interior, Rashid Nurgaliyev, owns Infrastructure Development. The elder Nurgaliyev is considered one of the most influential figures within Russian President Vladimir Putin's inner circle. The deal has heightened fears in Georgia that the Kremlin may be considering the full annexation of Abkhazia in the near future.

On 06 APR 2022, the US sanctioned Nurgaliyev.

On 12 SEP 2020, the EU again sanctioned Nurgaliyev.

On 25 JUL 2014, the EU sanctioned Nurgaliyev.

LIV. SERGEY YEVGENYEVICH NARYSHKIN

Title(s):

Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service

Role(s):

Official of the body responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Sergey Yevgenyevich Naryshkin (“Naryshkin”) is a Russian politician and businessman who has served as the director of the Foreign Intelligence Service since 2016. He was born 27 OCT 1954 in Saint Petersburg.

Since 13 SEP 2004, he has been a Minister, Chief of Staff of the Government of Russia. On 15 FEB 2007, President Vladimir Putin announced that Naryshkin had been appointed Deputy Prime Minister of Russia for external economic activity, focusing on collaboration with the Commonwealth of Independent States. In MAY 2008, Naryshkin was appointed chief of the Presidential Administration of Russia. In MAY 2009, President Dmitry Medvedev appointed him chairman of the Historical Truth Commission.

Naryshkin was elected to the State Duma, the lower house of the Russian parliament in DEC 2011. When the Duma began meeting for its new term on 21 DEC 2011, Naryshkin was elected as Chairman of the State Duma; he received 238 votes in favor of his candidacy, while 88 deputies opposed him. In JUN 2012, Naryshkin signed a resolution on setting up a culture council under the State Duma speaker. The council is “a standing advisory body” tasked with “the examination and drafting of initiatives on topical problems of legislative regulations in culture and associated industries, the development of recommendations on culture for the use in

lawmaking.” On 02 SEP 2013, Naryshkin stated that there are no political prisoners in today’s Russia.

Since the rise of tensions between the EU and Russia in 2014, Naryshkin was perceived as one of the main coordinators of contacts with European far-right and far-left parties supporting Russian foreign policy in Europe.

In SEP 2016, Naryshkin was appointed as chief of Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR). He is currently involved in the ceasefire negotiations.

Summary of Role(s): Official of the body responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine. Publicly supported the deployment of Russian forces in Ukraine. Publicly supported the Russia-Crimea reunification treaty and the related federal constitutional law.

Organizational Membership: United Russia. Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA).

Incidents and Events of Note: On 25 MAR 2025, the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine implicated Naryshkin in their accusation that Russian museum workers had stolen cultural artifacts from Crimea.

On 12 MAR 2025, Naryshkin held a phone call with the director of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, John Ratcliffe, the Interfax news agency reported on Wednesday. They discussed issues of cooperation between their respective intelligence agencies and crisis management. CIA Director John Ratcliffe called his Russian counterpart Sergey Naryshkin on Tuesday and "discussed the issues of interaction of both intelligence agencies in areas of common interest and the settlement of crisis situations," Russia’s state-run TASS news agency reported, citing a statement from the SVR’s press office. It added that both Ratcliffe and Naryshkin agreed "on maintaining regular contact between the SVR and CIA directors with the aim of facilitating international stability and security and reducing confrontation in relationships between Moscow and Washington."

On 14 FEB 2025, Bloomberg reported that Putin gathered a “heavyweight team” for peace talks. The team will reportedly include Yury Ushakov, Putin’s long time foreign policy adviser, Russian spy chief and Putin’s erstwhile KGB colleague Sergey Naryshkin, as well as Kirill Dmitriev, a close Kremlin associate and the head of RDIF, a Russian state-owned wealth fund.

On 27 NOV 2024, Naryshkin rejected any proposal to “freeze” the war in Ukraine, and argued that they would only accept a proposal that followed Putin’s peace plan. He also stated that Western nations were only calling for a freeze because Russia was “winning on all fronts.” He

claimed that discussions of a freeze were only because Western states recognized that “the strategic initiative on the battlefield belongs entirely to the Russian army.”

On 20 NOV 2024, Naryshkin warned the West against any direct military conflict with Russia, claiming that such actions risked “disastrous consequences.”

On 27 AUG 2024, Naryshkin claimed that Russia was attempting to prevent a “color revolution” in Georgia. He also notably called out supposed US involvement in Georgia, claiming they were preparing to delegitimize election results and incite a revolution.

On 28 MAR 2024, Naryshkin visited North Korea to deepen bilateral cooperation between Russia and North Korea. They also discussed broader regional security.

On 30 JUN 2023, Naryshkin again spoke with CIA Director William Burns. In a call that lasted about one hour, Burns made the call to assure the Kremlin that the US had nothing to do with the Wagner Group rebellion that week. However, according to Naryshkin claims “we considered and discussed what to do with Ukraine.” Though the CIA declined to comment on this, this would run counter to the US (and most Western nations) position to not speak or negotiate on Ukraine’s behalf (also referred to as: “nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine.”) When asked about Naryshkin’s alleged negotiations, the Ukrainian government rejected Naryshkin’s understanding of the conversation: questioning his authority saying “[t]oday, someone like Naryshkin has no leverage over how this war will end.”

On 24 MAY 2023, regarding US and UK policies towards Iran, Naryshkin said for the “Anglo-Saxons to take care of their own internal civil conflicts. Or better yet, go to...the devil” (or: “go to Hell.”)

On 14 NOV 2022, Naryshkin met with CIA Director William Burns and discussed the consequences of using nuclear weapons.

On 06 APR 2022, the US again sanctioned Naryshkin.

On 25 FEB 2022, the US sanctioned Naryshkin.

On 21 FEB 2022, days before Russia invaded Ukraine, Naryshkin received widespread attention in the global press for visibly trembling and “stutter[ing] uncomfortably” as Putin humiliated him publicly for “fumbling” his response to Putin’s questioning during a Security Council meeting concerning recognizing the Russian-backed separatist regions of Donetsk and Luhansk. Putin chided him, telling him at one point to “speak plainly Sergie.”

In JAN 2022, echoing a constant Russian theme, the SVR boss compared the government of Ukraine to the Nazis who invaded and occupied much of Russia from 1941 to 1945. Given that the Nazis are equated in Russian minds with absolute evil, Naryshkin's metaphor sounded like an alarming call to all Russians to defeat another looming fascist invasion.

In DEC 2021, Naryshkin dismissed reports of a possible invasion of Ukraine asserting that it was "malicious propaganda by the US State Department".

On 12 MAR 2020, the EU sanctioned Naryshkin.

As a result of the 2014 Crimean crisis, the US government blacklisted Naryshkin and other close friends of the Russian president, including Sergei Ivanov and Gennadi Timchenko. Nevertheless, he made an official visit to the US, along with other Russian top security chiefs, at the end of JAN 2018.

LV. ANTON EDUARDOVICH VAINO

Title(s):

Manager of the Presidential Administration

Role(s):

Official of the body responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine.

Provided support to or promoted a policy or action which destabilized Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Anton Eduardovich Vaino (“Vaino”) was born on 17 FEB 1972 in Tallinn.

Between APR 2008 and DEC 2011, Vaino served as a Deputy Chief of Staff of the Government. From DEC 2011 to MAY 2012, he was the Chief of Staff of the Government. Between MAY 2012 and AUG 2016, he served as a Deputy Head of the Presidential Executive Office. On 12 AUG 2016, he was appointed head of the Presidential Administration.

Summary of Role(s): As the Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office, Vaino plays an active role in Kremlin decision-making process by taking part in the Russian ‘Security Council’ and influencing the elaboration of decisions by the President in the field of Russia’s defense and national security. Vaino also attends meetings on socio-economic development of Crimea and Sevastopol.

Organizational Membership: United Russia.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 21 AUG 2024, it was rumored that Vaino was being

considered as the successor to Sergey Lavrov's position: Russian Foreign Minister.

On 5 JUN 2024, Vaino's son, Alexander, took part in a panel at Putin's flagship forum in St. Petersburg.

On 26 JUN 2023, Vaino was among the government officials thanked by Putin for their work in ending the Wagner Group rebellion. Vaino was seen as a key ally of Putin during negotiations which Putin refused to take part in. Though Vaino's specific role is not known, the independent Russian news outlet Meduza speculates it was a fairly large role. According to Meduza, once it became clear to Prigozhin that his actions lacked widespread support: Vaino, President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko, and Russian Ambassador to Belarus Boris Gryzlov were in direct communication with one another.

On 22 JUN 2023, Vaino met with Belarus Ambassador to Russia Dmitry Krutoi to discuss, in addition to cooperation in foreign and domestic policy issues, youth-related policy. According to a Belarus press release, "in particular, the parties touched upon the organization of an expanded meeting with the participation of the leaders of Russian and Belarusian youth associations, the youth wings of political parties and representatives of the Standing Committee of the Union State to discuss the state of work with young people and promising areas of joint activities. The patriotic cultural and educational project 'Memory Train', organized by the Council of the Republic of the National Assembly of the Republic of Belarus and the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, was especially noted."

The Memory Train is somewhat of a cultural exchange program on railways, which according to the Russian Federation Council is a "project will give young people from Russia and Belarus an opportunity to touch the history and feats of previous generations, as well as to establish direct youth contacts between the regions."

On 09 SEP 2022, Ukraine sanctioned Vaino.

On 06 APR 2022, the US sanctioned Vaino.

On 18 MAR 2022, New Zealand sanctioned Vaino.

On 15 MAR 2022, the UK, and for the second time Canada, sanctioned Vaino.

On 28 FEB 2022, Canada sanctioned Vaino.

On 25 FEB 2022, Australia and Switzerland sanctioned Vaino.

On 23 FEB 2022, the EU sanctioned Vaino.

On 23 SEP 2019, Vaino was found to own 1.6 billion rubles (approximately \$25 million USD) in

real estate, some of which was gifted to him via the state.

LVI. ALEKSANDR PETROVICH CHUPRIYAN

Title(s):

Former First Deputy Minister of Emergency Situations

Former Acting Minister of Emergency Situations

Role(s):

Official of the body responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Aleksandr Petrovich Chupriyan (“Chupriyan”) was born 23 MAR 1958 and is a Russian statesman, and political military commander, who is serving as the Acting Minister of Emergency Situations since 08 SEP 2021.

In 2003, he was the Head of the Main Directorate of the State Fire Service of the EMERCOM of Russia. Since 2005, he was the Head of the North-West Regional Center of the Ministry of the Russian Federation for Civil Defense, Emergencies and Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters. Between 2006 and 2018, Chupriyan was the Deputy Minister of the Russian Federation for Civil Defense, Emergencies and Elimination of the Consequences of Natural Disasters.

In JUN 2018, Chupriyan was appointed as the First Deputy Minister of Emergency Situations. In SEP 2021, Chupriyan was appointed as Acting Minister of Emergency Situations. On 25 MAY 2022, Aleksandr Vyacheslavovich Kurenkov was appointed Minister of Emergency Situations, replacing Chupriyan, who served as Acting Minister of Emergency Situations since SEP 2021.

Summary of Role(s): The Minister of Emergency Situations, is the head of the Russian Ministry

of Emergency Situations and is one of the five “presidential” ministers along with the ministers of defense, interior, foreign affairs, and justice. The Minister of Emergency Situations bears personal responsibility for performance assigned to the Ministry of emergency situations of Russia.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 30 MAR 2023, Chupriyan was dismissed by Vladimir Putin from his position as First Deputy Minister when Putin chose not to renew Chupriyan’s expiring five-year contract. No explanation was given as to why this decision was made, nor was a successor immediately named.

On 29 DEC 2022, Chupriyan was awarded a Qatari ambassador medal for support of international friendship between firefighters and rescuers.

On 25 MAY 2022, Aleksandr Vyacheslavovich Kurenkov was appointed Minister of Emergency Situations, replacing Chupriyan, who served as Acting Minister of Emergency Situations since SEP 2021.

On 18 MAY 2022, Australia sanctioned Chupriyan. On 21 APR 2022, the UK sanctioned Chupriyan.

On 14 MAR 2022, Canada sanctioned Chupriyan.

In early FEB 2022, Chupriyan visited the southern regions bordering Ukraine to prepare for “mass evacuations.”

LVII. MAXIM GENNADYEVICH RESHETNIKOV

Title(s):

Minister of Economic Development

Role(s):

Official of the body responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Maxim Gennadyevich Reshetnikov (“Reshetnikov”) was born 11 JUL 1979. s-From OCT 2009 to DEC 2010, he was appointed Director of the Department of Public Administration, Regional Development and Local-Self Government of the Apparatus of the Government of the Russian Federation. From DEC 2010 to APR 2012, he was First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Mayor and the Government of Moscow. Then from APR 2012-FEB 2017, he was Minister of the Government of Moscow, Head of the Department of Economic Policy, and City Development.

In FEB 2017, he was temporarily appointed, by President Putin, as acting Governor of Perm Krai, winning the election by SEP 2017. In DEC 2017 he joined the United Russia Party and in JAN 2020, he was appointed Minister of Economic Development of the Russian Federation in Mikhail Mishustin’s Cabinet.

Summary of Role(s): As Minister of Economic Development, Maxim Reshetnikov is responsible for infrastructure development programs in Crimea and Sevastopol, most notably under the federal target program “Social and Economic Development of the Republic of Crimea and Sebastopol until 2022” which has been extended until 2025. He has made public statements outlining the plans and priorities of the government of the Russian Federation concerning the economic development of Crimea and Sevastopol.

Organizational Membership: United Russia. Member of the Supervisory Council of the VTB Bank, a State-owned bank and associated with Dmitriy Grigorenko, member of the Supervisory Council of VTB Bank.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 15 MAR 2025, Reshetnikov oversaw discussions about implementing programs that would bolster the ‘Tourism and Hospitality’ initiative, which hopes to foster tourism and build the necessary infrastructure to facilitate such tourism.

On 4 MAR 2025, Reshetnikov discussed Russia’s plan to fill its labor shortage with migrant workers from other countries, such as Myanmar.

On 23 FEB 2025, Reshetnikov, on behalf of Russia, signed a memorandum with a Myanmar representative on economic cooperation plans. In particular it created the special economic zone in Dawei. The plans also include creating a port and an oil refinery.

On 20 FEB 2025, Reshetnikov led a Russian delegation to meet with the Chief Commissioner of the Ethiopian Investment Commission. The meeting focused on strengthening economic cooperation between the countries.

On 29 NOV 2024, Reshetnikov said that the Russian economy will need to adapt to the US sanctions that targeted the Russian banking sector. The statement followed Putin telling the public to not panic.

On 31 OCT 2024, Reshetnikov met with Tanzania to discuss new business opportunities.

On 26 OCT 2024, Reshetnikov met with Serbia’s prime minister to discuss strengthening of economic relationships and overall cooperation with Serbia.

On 1 OCT 2024, Reshetnikov met with Iran’s minister of finance to discuss strengthening economic ties between Russia and Iran. Their talks included discussing Russian investments in the oil industry, customs issues, economic issues, and common transportation. On 1 OCT 2024, it was also announced that tourism of Iran to Russia surged by 28 percent in the first half of the year.

On 26 JUN 2024, Reshetnikov attended the inaugural BRICS Tourism Forum and provided projections for tourism for Russia for the year.

On 16 JUN 2023, Reshetnikov spoke in St. Petersburg about increased expenditures of the Russian government. Not wanting to raise taxes, Reshetnikov is more in favor of budget cuts

amid Russia's \$42 billion USD deficit stating "will be discussing heavily...the budget rule. [...] We will...come back to it because we cannot go further with the parameters we agreed a year, a year-and-a-half ago."

On 13 JUN 2023, Reshetnikov stated Russia's E-Visa program would be scheduled to launch on 15 JUL 2023 once "technical issues" are resolved. Though originally planned to launch in 2021, the E-Visa is designed for citizens in over 50 "friendly" countries to apply for a Russian visa online. The visas are good for a 16 day stay during a 60-day window, which travel experts believe will be used by individual tourists, unable to see Russia as the travel industry heavily severed relations following the invasion of Ukraine, and due to the increased liabilities of a company taking tourists to a nation at war with a bordering country.

On 11 MAY 2023, Reshetnikov was in the UAE at the Annual Investment Meeting in Dubai. There: he stated working with Middle East and North African countries is "one of Russia's foreign economic policy priorities" and supported "develop[ing] joint projects," and "independent foreign policy." He also advocated creating independent banking and financial systems to avoid Western sanctions for Russia and these "reliable partners for Russia."

On 17 MAR 2023, at the MITT International Tourism Exhibition in Moscow, Reshetnikov announced construction of the second line of the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, development of new oil fields, and upgrades to railway services were all underway. He stated "Last year a record trade turnover level was reached. It soared 2.5-fold over the past three years thanks to the work of the intergovernmental commission, as well as the development of partnership contacts between businesses. This cooperation was largely fueled by the implementation of the temporary agreement on free-trade zones between the Eurasian (Economic) Union and Iran. We plan to sign a full-fledged agreement."

On 08 JUL 2022, Reshetnikov met with Iran's Central Bank Governor to discuss joint investments, removing legal barriers to mutual trade, and expanding banking and monetary cooperation.

On 09 JUN 2022, Ukraine sanctioned Reshetnikov. On 02 JUN 2022, the US sanctioned Reshetnikov. On 25 FEB 2022, the EU and Switzerland sanctioned Reshetnikov.

LVIII. IGOR SHCHEGOLEV

Title(s):

Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy to the Central Federal District

Role(s):

Official of the body responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Igor Shchegolev (“Shchegolev”) was born on 10 NOV 1965 in Vinnitsa, Ukraine. From 1988 to 1993, Shchegolev served as the Editor of the European Department at the TASS/ITAR-TASS news agency. Between 1993 and 1997, he served as an ITAR-TASS correspondent in Paris. Upon his return to Russia in 1997, he served as the Editor-in-Chief of the European Department of ITAR-TASS and deputy director of the ITAR-TASS news service.

In 1998, he left ITAR-TASS to work in government. Initially, he served as deputy head of the government corps of press officers, then briefly as the press secretary for Yevgeniy Primakov, but returned to lead the press officer corps. In 2000, he was appointed to the post of press secretary for then-acting President Vladimir Putin. At the end of 2001, he became the head of Presidential Protocol, which involved coordinating presidential trips overseas and within Russia. In 2004, his duties expanded to be head of the Kremlin Protocol. He remained in this role until 12 MAY 2008, when he was appointed Minister of Communications and Mass Media, as part of Putin’s second cabinet.

Summary of Role(s): The role of a Plenipotentiary Representative is to oversee the work of federal agencies in the region. This role is viewed as extensive and of considerable consequence. In this role, Shchegolev serves as a liaison between the federal subjects and the federal government. He is also primarily responsible for overseeing the compliance of the federal subjects with federal laws. The Central Federal District comprises the Central and Central Black

Earth economic regions and eighteen federal subjects (Oblasts). As of the 2010 Census, 38,427,539 Russians live in the Central Federal District.

Shchegolev serves as the chief advisor to President Vladimir Putin on matters concerning the World Wide Web and cyberspace in Russia. He is heavily involved in domestic censorship efforts.

Organizational Membership: While it cannot be confirmed, it is assumed that Shchegolev is a member of the United Russia political party, given his relationship and close proximity to the *de facto* leader of that party, Vladimir Putin.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 3 APR 2025, Shchegolev attended the first meeting of the State Council Commission for Supporting Combat Veterans of the “Special Military Operation” and their family members.

On 07 SEP 2022, Ukraine sanctioned Shchegolev.

On 06 APR 2022, the US again sanctioned Shchegolev.

On 25 FEB 2022, the EU, the US, and Australia sanctioned Shchegolev.

LIX. VLADIMIR VASILYEVICH USTINOV

Title(s):

Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy to the Southern Federal District

Role(s):

Official of the body responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Vladimir Vasilyevich Ustinov (“Ustinov”) was born on 25 FEB 1953 in Nikolayevsk-on-Amur, RSFSR, USSR. From 17 MAY 2000 to 02 JUN 2006, he served as the Prosecutor General of Russia. He also held the post of Minister of Justice until 2008.

Summary of Role(s): The role of a Plenipotentiary Representative is to oversee the work of federal agencies in the region. This role is viewed as extensive and of considerable consequence. In this role, Ustinov serves as a liaison between the federal subjects and the federal government. He is also primarily responsible for overseeing the compliance of the federal subjects with federal laws. The Southern Federal District shares borders with Ukraine, the Azov Sea, and the Black Sea, as well as Kazakhstan and the Caspian Sea. As of the 2010 Census, over 16.3 million Russians live in the Southern Federal District.

While serving as a plenipotentiary representative, Ustinov also serves as a non-permanent member of the Security Council of the Russian Federation.

Organizational Membership: While it cannot be confirmed, it is assumed that Ustinov is a member of the United Russia political party, given his close ties with Vladimir Putin.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 02 FEB 2023, Ustinov accompanied Vladimir Putin where they both laid flowers on the tomb of Soviet Marshal Vasily Chuikov in commemoration of the

80th anniversary of the Battle of Stalingrad. Ustinov made no comments, but Putin falsely stated “[u]nfortunately we see that the ideology of Nazism in its modern form and manifestation again directly threatens the security of our country.” Putin then hinted at nuclear warfare telling western nations, particularly Germany, that “We don't send our tanks to their borders, but we have the means to respond, and it won't end with the use of armored vehicles, everyone must understand that.”

On 07 SEP 2022 Ukraine sanctioned Ustinov.

On 06 APR 2022, the US sanctioned Ustinov again.

On 25 FEB 2022, the US Treasury announced that it had imposed additional sanctions on Ustinov, in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

On 06 APR 2018, Ustinov was sanctioned by the US, pursuant to E.O. 13661, for being an official of the Government of the Russian Federation.

LX. ALEKSANDR VLADIMIROVICH GUTSAN

Title(s):

Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy to the Northwestern Federal District

Role(s):

Official of the body responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Aleksandr Vladimirovich Gutsan (“Gutsan”) was born on 06 JUN 1960 in Siversky, RSFSR, USSR. From 20 JAN 2005 to 13 APR 2007, he served as the Deputy Director of the Federal Bailiff Service. From 13 APR 2007 to 07 NOV 2018, he served as the Deputy Prosecutor General of Russia. Since 07 NOV 2018, he has served as the Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of the Russian Federation in the Northwestern Federal District. Additionally, since 19 NOV 2018, he has served as a member of the Security Council.

Summary of Role(s): The role of a Plenipotentiary Representative is to oversee the work of federal agencies in the region. This role is viewed as extensive and of considerable consequence. In this role, Gutsan serves as a liaison between the federal subjects and the federal government. He is also primarily responsible for overseeing the compliance of the federal subjects with federal laws. The Northwestern Federal District comprises the Northern, Northwestern, and Kaliningrad economic regions and eleven federal subjects. As of the 2010 Census, 13,616,057 Russians live in the Northwestern Federal District.

While serving as a plenipotentiary representative, Gutsan also serves as a non-permanent member of the Security Council of the Russian Federation.

Holds Directorships in the Federal Bailiff Service (Deputy Director) and the Directorate of the Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian Federation in the North-West Federal District (Head).

Organizational Membership: While it cannot be confirmed, it is assumed that Gutsan is a

member of the United Russia political party, given his close ties with Vladimir Putin.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 20 JUL 2023, Gutsan toured the Floating LNG Platform construction center with Vladimir Putin and also attended a meeting that discussed the future of the construction center.

On 10 FEB 2023, Gutsan joined Vladimir Putin in an unannounced tour of a forest processing plant in the remote town of Oktyabrsky. The plant is owned by billionaire and Putin ally Vladimir Butorin.

On 07 SEP 2022 Ukraine sanctioned Gutsan. On 06 APR 2022, the US sanctioned Gutsan.

LXI. ANATOLY ANATOLYEVICH SERYSHEV

Title(s):

Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy to the Siberian Federal District

Role(s):

Official of the body responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Anatoly Anatolyevich Seryshev (“Seryshev”) was born on 19 JUL 1965 in Koblyakovo, Russian SFSR, USSR. From 2011 to 2016, Seryshev held the position of Head of the Directorate of the Federal Security Service in the Republic of Karelia. From 2016 to 2018, he served as deputy director of the Federal Customs Service. On 13 JUN 2018, Seryshev was appointed Assistant to the President of Russia which he served until becoming the Plenipotentiary Representative in 2021. Also in JUN 2018, Seryshev was appointed as a Board Member on the Presidential Anti-Corruption Council of the Russian Federation, where he still sits.

On 12 OCT 2021, he was appointed as the 6th Plenipotentiary Representative in the Siberian Federal District.

Summary of Role(s): The role of a Plenipotentiary Representative is to oversee the work of federal agencies in the region. This role is viewed as extensive and of considerable consequence. In this role, Seryshev serves as a liaison between the federal subjects and the federal government. He is also primarily responsible for overseeing the compliance of the federal subjects with federal laws. The Siberian Federal District comprises the West Siberian (part) and East Siberian economic regions and ten federal subjects. As of the 2010 Census, over 17.1 million Russians live in the Siberian Federal District.

While serving as a plenipotentiary representative, Seryshev also serves as a non-permanent

member of the Security Council of the Russian Federation.

Organizational Membership: While it cannot be confirmed, it is believed that Gutsan is a member of the United Russia political party, given his close ties with Vladimir Putin. Holds Directorships in the Office of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation for the Republic of Karelia (Head) and the Presidential Anti-Corruption Council of the Russian Federation).

Incidents and Events of Note: On 16 OCT 2024, Seryshev held a meeting concerning the Siberian regions' winter preparedness and also the state of critical civilian infrastructure in the region.

On 2 SEP 2024, Seryshev attended a meeting hosted by Putin that discussed the socioeconomic development of the Republic of Tuva.

On 07 SEP 2022, Ukraine sanctioned Seryshev.

On 06 APR 2022, the US sanctioned Seryshev.

LXII. NIKOLAY NIKOLAYEVICH TSUKANOV

Title(s):

Former Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy to the Ural Federal District
(26 JUN 2018 – 9 NOV 2020)

Role(s):

Official of the body responsible for aggression against Ukraine in Crimea.



Biographical Summary: Nikolay Nikolayevich Tsukanov (“Tsukanov”) was born on 22 MAR 1965 in Lipovo, Russian SFSR, USSR.

In 2005, Tsukanov was elected to the post of Mayor of Gusec. In 2009, he became the head of the Gusec municipal area. In MAR 2009, he became chairman of the Council of municipal formations of Kaliningrad Oblast. In 2010, he was elected secretary of the local political council of the United Russia party. On 28 SEP 2010, he became Governor of Kaliningrad Oblast. On 26 JUN 2018, Tsukanov replaced Igor Kholmanskikh as the presidential envoy to the Ural Federal District. On 09 NOV 2020, Vladimir Yakushev replaced Tsukanov as the presidential envoy to the Ural Federal District.

Tsukanov has been employed by Rostelecom, Russia’s largest digital services provider, serving as their Senior Vice President for digitalization of industry and forestry since 17 NOV 2020.

Summary of Role(s): The role of a Plenipotentiary Representative is to oversee the work of federal agencies in the region. This role is viewed as extensive and of considerable consequence. In this role, Tsukanov serves as a liaison between the federal subjects and the federal government. He is also primarily responsible for overseeing the compliance of the federal subjects with federal laws. The Ural Federal District comprises the Central (part) and West

Siberian economic regions and six federal subjects. As of the 2010 Census, 12,080,526 Russians live in the Ural Federal District.

While serving as a plenipotentiary representative, Ustinov also serves as a non-permanent member of the Security Council of the Russian Federation.

Organizational Membership: United Russia.

Incidents and Events of Note: In 2022, Tsukanov was included in HR6846: The *Corruption, Overthrowing Rule of Law, and Ruining Ukraine: Putin's Trifecta Act* or *CORRUPT Act* requiring “the President to report to Congress, within 30 days of this bill's enactment, a determination as to whether specified Russian persons meet the criteria to be subject to sanctions under laws that authorize sanctions relating to corruption or human rights violations.” The CORRUPT Act passed the House on 20 SEP 2022 and was sent to the Senate but no action was taken before the end of the 117th Congress.

LXIII. IGOR ANATOLYEVICH KOMAROV

Title(s):

Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy to the Volga Federal District

Role(s):

Official of the body responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Igor Anatolyevich Komarov (“Komarov”) was born on 25 May 1964 in Engels, Russia.

In MAR 2014, the government appointed Komarov the head of the United Rocket and Space Corporation. On 24 May 2018, Komarov was dismissed from office as the General Director of Roscosmos State Corporation. Since 07 SEP 2018 Komarov has been the Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy to the Volga Federal District. In NOV 2018, he became a Member of the Presidential Council for Strategic Development and National Projects.

Summary of Role(s): The role of a Plenipotentiary Representative is to oversee the work of federal agencies in the region. This role is viewed as extensive and of considerable consequence. Komarov serves as a liaison between the Russian Federation and its subjects in the Volga Federal District.

Organizational Membership: United Russia.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 26 MAR 2025, Komarov attended and delivered remarks to the Family Comes First federal district forum, which was opened by Maria Lvova-Belova, Presidential Commissioner for Children’s Rights and facing a warrant by the ICC. The Volga Federal District is one of the places where the Russian Government has been found to have illegally placed Ukrainian children.

On 7 MAR, 2024, UK authorities froze a five-floor red brick town house on Herberts Crescent in the Knightsbridge neighborhood of Kensington and Chelsea in London. This comes roughly a week after it was reported, on 28 FEB 2024, Komarov may have been evading UK sanctions and enjoying continued control of the property through a British Virgin Islands company, previously under his control, which, though transferred to a trust, had still maintained ownership of the property despite the 2022 sanctioning by the UK government.

On 21-22 FEB 2023, Komarov and Special Representative of the Chinese Government on Eurasian Affairs Li Hui helped lead the 8th China-Russia Yangtze and Volga Rivers Youth Forum. This was held principally, if not exclusively, online. Komarov stated “[i]n recent years, we have deepened economic, trade, and technological cooperation with our Chinese partners and established the Sino-Russian University Alliance of the Upper and Middle Reaches of the Yangtze River and the Federal District along Volga River,” and “[t]he forum is a good opportunity to exchange experiences and ideas and to understand the cultural traditions and development achievements of the two countries.”

On 07 SEP 2022, Ukraine sanctioned Komarov.

On 06 APR 2022, the U.S. sanctioned Komarov.

LXIV. YURY/YURIY YAKOVLEVICH CHAIKA/CHAYKA

Title(s):

Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy to the North Caucasian Federal District (2020 – PRES)
Prosecutor General of Russia (2006 – 2020)
Minister of Justice (1999 – 2006)

Role(s):

Official of the body responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Yury Yavoklevich Chaika (“Chaika”) was born 21 May 1951 in Nikolayevsk-on-Amur, Russian SFSR, USSR. Chaika is a Russian lawyer and politician, Presidential Envoy to the North Caucasian Federal District since 2020. Previously he served as Prosecutor General of Russia from 2006 to 2020 and Minister of Justice from 1999 to 2006.

His son is Arytom/Artem Chaika, who on 14 OCT 2022 was appointed by Head of the Chechen Republic Ramzan Kadyrov as his advisor for humanitarian, social, and economic matters. According to Kadyrov, Chaika will coordinate the work of public organizations “within a framework of humanitarian and socio-economic projects involving the Chechen Republic.” In MAR 2023, Chaika’s other son, Igor Chaika, was appointed as Deputy Head of Rossotrudnichestvo, the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States Affairs, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation.

Summary of Role(s): The role of a Plenipotentiary Representative is to oversee the work of federal agencies in the region. This role is viewed as extensive and of considerable consequence. Chaika serves as a liaison between the Russian Federation and its subjects in the North Caucasian Federal District.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 14 FEB 2025, the UK sanctioned Chaika's son, Artem Chaika. The UK government stated that "[Artem] Chaika is an involved person as he is associated with someone who is so involved, namely as the son of Yury Yakovlevich Chaika, who is or has been involved in obtaining a benefit from or supporting the Government of Russia or destabilising or undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty or independence of Ukraine by working for the Government of Russia as a member of the Security Council of the Russian Federation and by working for the Government of Russia as the Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy to the North Caucasus Federal District." Sanctions included an asset freeze, trust services sanctions, transport sanctions, a travel ban, and the Director Disqualification Sanction.

On 21 JUL 2022, the EU sanctioned Chaika.

On 06 APR 2022, the US sanctioned Chaika.

In APR 2022, Chaika gave state medals to service members who stood out during the alleged "special operation to de-nazify Ukraine."

On 17 MAR 2022, he defended Russia's war on Ukraine and claimed that Ukrainian authorities had carried out genocide in Ukraine during a meeting with refugees from the so-called Donetsk People's Republic.

On 21 JAN 2022, Ukraine sanctioned Chaika.

In MAR 2017, Chaika served a key role as the Prosecutor General in Russia's successful attempt to ban the practice of religion for Jehovah's Witnesses, which the Supreme Court of Russia upheld in APR 2017. Following this, Chaika headed the Russian state's prosecuting of Jehovah's Witnesses.

On 01 DEC 2015, Alexei Navalny's Anti-Corruption Foundation released the results of a lengthy investigation about Chaika and his family. Accompanied with a 43-minute documentary entitled Chaika, the investigation and documentary detail alleged corruption by Chaika and his family members for personal gain as well as allegations surrounding connections with organized crime and criminal enterprises. Chaika denies these allegations.

LXV. IGOR VIKTOROVICH KRASNOV

Title(s):

Prosecutor/Attorney General

Role(s):

Official of the body responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Igor Viktorovich Krasnov (“Krasnov”) was born on 24 DEC 1975 in Arkhangelsk, the administrative center of Arkhangelsk Oblast, Russia. On 30 APR 2016, Krasnov was appointed Deputy Chairman of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation by Alexander Bastrykin. On 20 JAN 2020, Russian President Vladimir Putin proposed that the Federation Council approve Krasnov as the Prosecutor General of Russia. On JAN 22, 2025, Vladimir Putin reappointed Krasnov as Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation.

Krasnov has the rank of Lieutenant General of Justice as well as the rank of Actual State Counselor of Justice, which is the highest-class rank in the prosecutor’s office. Krasnov is also a member of the Security Council of Russia.

Summary of Role(s): The Prosecutor General of Russia heads the system of official prosecution in known courts and heads the Office of the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation. The Prosecutor General is the most powerful component of the Russian judicial system.

The Office of the Prosecutor General of Russia prosecutes in court on behalf of the State and represents the interests of a citizen or of the State in court in cases determined by law. The Office of the Prosecutor General of Russia also supervises the observance of laws by bodies that conduct detective and search activity, inquiry, and pretrial investigation. Furthermore, the Office of the Prosecutor General supervises the observance of laws in the execution of judicial decisions

in criminal cases and is also entrusted in the application of other measures of coercion related to the restraint of personal liberty of citizens.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 19 MAR 2025, it was reported by Krasnov that Russia had transferred 2.4 trillion roubles (\$28.7 billion) worth of property to the state. Krasnov also addressed an oil spill that occurred in the Black Sea on 15 DEC 2024, stating that an investigation was planned by the Emergency Situations Ministry and its regional bodies.

On 15 NOV 2024, Krasnov visited Baku, Azerbaijan. He participated in a meeting of law enforcement representatives from the COP-29 participating countries.

On 5 OCT 2024, Krasnov led a delegation for Armenian Prosecutor General Anna Vardapetyan. The delegation participated in the 34th meeting of the Coordinating Council of the Prosecutors General of the Member States of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Krasnov and Vardapetyan signed a cooperation program for 2025-2026, agreeing to enhance collaboration in the scientific and education domain.

On 4 SEP 2024, Krasnov attended a working meeting with Amnat Jedcharoenruk, Attorney General of Thailand, at the Eastern Economic Forum held in Vladivostok on Russia's eastern coast. Krasnov stated the need for coordinated effort between the Russian and Thai governments efforts to combat transborder crime, and announced that a draft program on prosecutorial cooperation was presented to Jedcharoenruk's office. This push for an extradition deal comes as thousands of Russians were reported to have arrived in Thailand in avoidance of Russian conscription campaigns for its war on Ukraine.

On 22 JUL 2024, Krasnov arrived in Pyongyang, North Korea, for an official visit with his counterpart Kim Chol Won, the Central Prosecutor of the DPRK. This was the first official visit by a Russian Prosecutor General to North Korea since the Cooperation Agreement was signed in December of 2010.¹⁴³² Krasnov and Kim signed a cooperation agreement that was an expanded version of the 2010 agreement, as well as a program of cooperation for 2024-2026 between the Prosecutor General's Office of Russia and the Central Prosecutor's Office of North Korea. Krasnov's office indicated that cooperation as part of the agreement will include countering crimes in information and communication technologies, countering corruption and other official crimes, and environmental crimes. The agreement also provided for the potential expansion of

¹⁴³² Burc Eruygur, *Russia's prosecutor general arrives in North Korea for 1st-ever official trip*, Andalou Agency (Jul. 22, 2024), <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/russia-s-prosecutor-general-arrives-in-north-korea-for-1st-ever-official-trip/3282022>.

cooperation to the countering of crimes in other areas.

On 17 JUN 2024, Krasnov met with his counterpart from Egypt, Public Prosecutor Counselor Mohamed Shawqi, and signed a Memorandum of Understanding to cooperate on combatting crimes of terrorism, extremism, money laundering, human trafficking, illegal migration, organ trafficking, environmental crimes, and cybercrimes.

On 26 MAR 2024, Krasnov announced during a collegium meeting of the Prosecutor General's Office that Russian courts had transferred strategic enterprises and assets worth 1 trillion roubles, or around 11 billion USD, to state ownership in 2023. According to Krasnov, these assets "had been taken out of the ownership of the Russian Federation by illegal, including corrupt, means... Moreover, some of their funds were even being directed to finance terrorist activities on the part of Ukraine."¹⁴³³

On 13 JUL 2023, Krasnov was in Beijing to meet with Chen Wenqing of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee and head of the Commission for Political and Legal Affairs of the CPC Central Committee to discuss Chinese-Russian relations. Principally, the two were focused on making developments in law enforcement and judicial cooperation between the two nations. This also included stating, without evidence, that "NATO countries made significant efforts to destabilize international law enforcement cooperation and undermine the institutions of international criminal investigation, extradition and mutual legal assistance."

On 23 JUN 2023, it is believed that Kamran informed Vladimir Putin about the creation of a criminal case for Yevgeny Prigozhin of the Wagner Group surrounding the armed mutiny of the Wagner Group that began the same day and concluded on 24 JUN 2023.

On 15 JUN 2023, Kamran hosted a trilateral meeting with his Azerbaijani and Armenian counterparts. They mainly discussed coordination between the countries regarding police powers, soldier safety, and civilian protection from areas heavily affected by landmines.

On 14 JUN 2023, Kamran hosted his Vietnamese counterpart: Prosecutor General of the Supreme People's Procuracy Le Minh Tri in Moscow. There, the two signed a cooperation agreement, which according to Vietnam+/VietnamPlus is "to create a foundation for the further development of partnership between the two procuracy sectors in a practical and effective manner."

¹⁴³³ *Russian state claimed \$11 bln in domestic assets in 2023, prosecutor says*, Reuters (Mar. 26, 2024), <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-state-claimed-11-bln-domestic-assets-2023-prosecutor-says-2024-03-26/>.

On 16 MAR 2023, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation granted a motion by Krasnov to recognize the Freedom of Russia Legion as a terrorist organization. The Freedom of Russia Legion is a pro-Ukrainian volunteer legion, consisting of defecting Russians and Belarusians: both from the armed forces and civilians. Though already illegal in Russia (in JAN 2023, 22-year-old Kirill Belousov of the Saratov region, was sentenced to 5 years of hard labor for trying to join the Freedom of Russia Legion), it is now punishable with up to 20 years imprisonment.

On 31 JAN 2023, a video was released of Krasnov telling Putin about failures in mobilization during the Russian invasion. These included 9,000 troops who were improperly mobilized due to their health having to be returned home, soldiers who were not paid, and some lacking basic equipment like bulletproof vests. The video was quickly retweeted by Ukrainian officials.

On 07 SEP 2022, Ukraine sanctioned Krasnov.

On 08 AUG 2022, Krasnov announced the removal of 138,000 websites which he explained were sources of “fake news” which included information about the Kremlin and the invasion of Ukraine.

On 02 MAR 2021, the EU and US sanctioned Krasnov for the sentencing of the Russian opposition leader, Alexey Navalny.

LXVI. DENIS VALENTINOVICH MANTUROV

Title(s):

Deputy Prime Minister for Defense and Space Industry
Minister for Trade and Industry of the Russian Federation

Role(s):

Official of the body responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Denis Valentinovich Manturov (“Manturov”) was born 23 FEB 1969 in Murmansk, Russia.

In 2007 Manturov started as Deputy Minister of Industry and Energy of the Russian Federation. In 2008, Manturov assumed the role of Deputy Minister of Industry and Trade of Russia. Since 2011, Manturov has also been a professor for Management Systems of Economic objects at the Moscow Aviation Institute. In 2012, Manturov was appointed as acting Minister of Industry and Trade in FEB and was re- approved in JUL. On 30 JUL 2015, he was named to the board of directors of the United Aircraft Corporation, and still currently holds that position.

In JUL 2022, Mansurov replaced Yury Borisov as Deputy Prime Minister of Russia for Defense and Space Industry. In this position he is responsible for creating state policy in the areas of industry, national defense, defense procurement, law enforcement, military-technical cooperation with foreign countries, mobilization preparation and management of the state material reserve.

Summary of Role(s): Official of the body responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine.

Organizational Membership: Board Member of United Aircraft Corporation of Russia.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 17 MAR 2025, Manturov stated that Russia plans to develop a joint partnership with Qatar, which they expect to cover a wide range of industries. He also stated that the two countries have significant potential for cooperation in digital technologies and information security solutions.

On 11 MAR 2025, Manturov met with Deputy Prime Minister of Uzbekistan Jamshid Khodjaev to discuss trade and economic relations.

On 12 NOV 2024, Manturov was the co-chair, along with India's Minister of External Affairs Dr. Dr. Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, of the 25th Session of the Intergovernmental Russian-Indian Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific, Technical, and Cultural Cooperation in New Delhi.

On 11 NOV 2024, Manturov attended a session of the Russian-Indian Business Forum in Mumbai, where connections between entrepreneurs and businesses from both countries were discussed.

On 28 OCT 2024, Manturov met with Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko to discuss joint-projects, focusing on import substitutions.

On 09 JUN 2023, Manturov nearly avoided being killed after he visited the town of Henichesk in the occupied region of Kherson. Manturov was there to inspect trade facilities and meet with the new governor, Vladimir Slado, who had just been installed by the Russian government. Just minutes after leaving, the area was hit by British Storm Shadow missiles launched by the Ukrainian military.

On 16 MAR 2023, Manturov stated Russia may confiscate Japanese assets at a Toyota manufacturing plant in Saint Petersburg and then transfer them to the Russian state entity NAMI in response to sanctions by the Japanese government. Vehicle production at the plant has been suspended since MAR 2022.

On 26 JAN 2023, the US sanctioned Manturov.

On 12 JAN 2023, an irate Putin harshly reprimanded Manturov at a meeting for delays in ordering military aircrafts. Putin stated at separate times, "[w]hat are you fooling around for?

When will the contracts be signed?”, along with “[t]hese 700 aircraft, including helicopters...you need to sort this out with the defense ministry...several enterprises still haven't received any orders”, and “[n]o, do it within a month. Don't you understand the situation we're in? It needs to be done in a month, no later.”

In JUL 2022, Manturov replaced Yury Borisov as Deputy Prime Minister.

On 09 JUN 2022, Ukraine sanctioned Manturov.

LXVII. ALEKSANDR/ALEKSANDER VYACHESLAVOVICH KURENKOV

Title(s):

Minister of Emergency Situations (25 MAY 2022 – PRES)

Role(s):

Official of the body responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine.

Member of the so-called ‘People’s Council’ of the so-called ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’.



Kurenkov worked as a Federal Protective Service officer on the protective detail of then-Russian Prime Minister Viktor Zubkov between 2007 and 2008, with Zubkov later becoming Putin’s first deputy chairman.

Kurenkov, according to Ministry of Emergency Situations sources, became a “Putin adjutant” in 2015.

On 25 MAY 2022, Kurenkov was appointed Minister of Emergency Situations, replacing Aleksandr Chupriyan.

Summary of Role(s): Official of the body responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine. Member of the so-called ‘People’s Council’ of the so-called ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 12 JAN 2025, following an oil spill caused by two oil tankers (Volgoneft-212 and Volgoneft-239) hit by a storm in DEC 2024 in the Kerch Strait, the Kremlin formed an interagency emergency task force, including Kurenkov that was sent to the Krasnodar

region to handle the ongoing spill.

On 14 NOV 2024, Kurenkov visited Cuba to continue the Emergency Situations Ministry's collaboration with Cuba's firefighters.

On 03 OCT 2024, Kurenkov said that the Emergency Situations Ministry had sent 33 tons of humanitarian aid to Lebanon amid Israeli airstrikes near Beirut.

On 15 AUG 2024, the Emergency Situations Ministry declared a federal emergency in response to Ukraine's incursion into the Belgorod region. Kurenkov is quoted as saying during the announcement that "The situation in the region remains complex and tense. As a result of terrorist attacks by Ukrainian armed groups in the Belgorod region, residential houses and infrastructure facilities have been damaged, there are dead and injured citizens,"

On 09 AUG 2024, the Emergency Situations Ministry declared a federal emergency in response to Ukraine's incursion into the Kursk region. The Russian government classifies a federal emergency as a man-made or natural disaster resulting in more than 500 casualties or damages exceeding 1.2 billion RUB (\$13.6 million USD).

On 07 APR 2024, Kurenkov visited the Orenburg Oblast city of Orsk to supervise rescue operations in response to flooding caused by a dam on the Ural River breaking.

On 21 JUN 2023, Kurenkov confirmed that 41 had died and 121 hospitalized after the 06 JUN 2023 breach of the Kakhovka Dam in Kherson Oblast, Ukraine. Kurenkov also added that over 8,000 people were displaced. As of 14 JUL 2023, at least 58 people were killed, with as many as 31 others unaccounted for. The cause of the breach is still unknown, but most experts in the intelligence community suspect the Russian military was the cause.

On 24 FEB 2023, the US, New Zealand, and Australia sanctioned Kurenkov.

On 06 FEB 2023, following the destructive 7.7 magnitude earthquake in Turkey, Kurenkov said they had 100 search and rescue personnel on standby ready to be sent by two Il-76 planes to Turkey as "Russia is always ready to help a friendly state whose citizens find themselves in a difficult situation."

On 19 OCT 2022, Ukraine sanctioned Kurenkov alongside other Russian officials because of their involvement in Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

On 25 MAY 2022, Kurenkov was appointed Minister of Emergency Situations, replacing

Aleksandr Chupriyan.

On 08 APR 2022, the EU sanctioned Kurenkov for having supported and implemented actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilized Ukraine.

LXVIII. MIKHAIL YEVGENYEVICH/EVGENIEVICH MIZINTSEV

Title(s):

Former Deputy Commander of the Wagner Group

Former Deputy Minister of Defense

Former Head of the National Defense Control Center at the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces

Role(s):

Former official of the body responsible for the ongoing war in Ukraine. Mizintsev led the siege of the Ukrainian Sea of Azov port of Mariupol and is known as the “Butcher of Mariupol.”



Biographical Summary: Mikhail Yevgenyevich Mizintsev (“Mizintsev”) was born 10 SEP 1962 in Averinskaya.

Mizintsev orchestrated bombing campaigns during the Russian military intervention in the Syrian civil war, including at the Battle of Aleppo. He was accused of arranging a brutal bombing campaign that annihilated Aleppo.

During Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Mizintsev commanded soldiers during the Siege of Mariupol, where he became known as the “butcher of Mariupol.”

On 24 SEP 2022, Mizintsev was appointed Deputy Minister of Defense, replacing Dmitry Bulgakov. Mizintsev holds the rank of colonel general. Mizintsev was previously head of the National Defense Control Center of Russia. Mizintsev himself was replaced on 30 APR 2023, by Alexey Kuzmenkov. On 04 MAY 2023, Mizintsev became the Deputy Commander of the

Wagner Group, serving under Yevgeny Prigozhin.

On 13 JUL 2023, Mizintsev was confirmed to have been detained by Russian security services. Mizintsev has not been seen or heard from since.

Summary of Role(s): Official of the body responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine. Mizintsev, now Deputy Minister of Defense, was previously head of the National Defense Control Center of Russia. Mizintsev led the siege of the Ukrainian Sea of Azov port of Mariupol and is known as the “butcher of Mariupol.”

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 15 SEP 2023, France sanctioned Mizintsev.

On 13 JUL 2023, both the Wall Street Journal and Moscow Times confirmed that Mizintsev was one of at least 13 senior military officers who were detained by Russian security services following the failed Wagner Group mutiny.

On 04 MAY 2023, Mizintsev became the Deputy Commander of the Wagner Group, serving under Yevgeny Prigozhin.

On 30 APR 2023, Mizintsev was replaced as Deputy Minister of Defense for logistics by Alexey Kuzmenkov.

On 24 SEP 2022, Mizintsev was appointed Deputy Minister of Defense, replacing Dmitry Bulgakov.

On 19 OCT 2022, Ukraine sanctioned Mizintsev.

On 03 JUN 2022, the EU sanctioned Mizintsev.

LXIX. AZATBEK ASANBEKOVICH OMURBEKOV

Title(s):

Former Commander of the 64th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade

Role(s):

Official of the body responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine. Omurbekov led the 64th Brigade in the siege of the Battle of Bucha and is known as the “Butcher of Bucha.”



Biographical Summary: Azatbek Asanbekovich Omurbekov (“Omurbekov”) was born on 17 SEP 1983 in Jaynak, Kashka-Suu, Aksy District, Jalal-Abad Region, Kyrgyz SSR, USSR.

Omurbekov was previously in Ukraine when he led troops in the Crimean Peninsula in 2014. Omurbekov was ordered by Aleksandr Chaiko to deploy to Belarus in JAN 2022 in preparation for the invasion the following month.

In the first weeks of Russia’s invasion, Omurbekov led an offensive on Bucha and Borodyanka. He was nicknamed “the butcher of Bucha” after his troops detained, looted, sexually assaulted, raped, tortured, mutilated, and murdered Ukrainian civilians during the Battle of Bucha from 27 FEB to 31 MAR 2022.

War crimes under Omurbekov’s direction are too multitudinous to be captured here. However, many soldiers including Daniil Frolkin have confessed to killing civilians at Omurbekov and Lt. Colonel Andrey Prokurat’s direct orders. (Frolkin himself received a suspended sentence by a Russian court for murdering civilians.) Additionally, soldier Nikita Chibrin detailed the disregard for civilians. This included the order to kill any civilian with a cell phone and said his former 64th

Brigade would “run away, then I found out they were rapists. They raped a mother and her daughter. The alleged rapists were beaten by the commanders. However, these soldiers were never fully punished for their crimes. They were never jailed. They were just fired.” Furthermore, Ukrainian reporter Evgeny Spirin described how “[s]ome of the killed children had their arms tied up. Children.... They were tying up children. There were shot dogs. Killed women. Girls younger than ten with their vaginas torn apart...”

In APR 2022, Omurbekov was promoted from Lieutenant Colonel to Colonel. Likely as a reward for his massacres in Bucha. In MAY 2022, Omurbekov was replaced as the 64th Brigade's commander by Acting Commander Lt. Colonel Vasiliy Shcherbakov. Omurbekov was redeployed to the Battle of Donbas.

Omurbekov does not appear to have played a major, active role in Russian military operations following the Bucha massacres.

Summary of Role(s): Official of the body responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine. Omurbekov led the 64th Brigade in the siege of the Battle of Bucha and is known as the “Butcher of Bucha.”

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 20 NOV 2023, the US sanctioned Omurbekov for his role in Bucha as commanding officer of the 64th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade where he “killed, beat, dismembered, burned, and conducted mock executions of civilians,” according to the State Department. Guard Corporal Daniil Frolkiv was also sanctioned for his extrajudicial killings of Ukrainian civilians in Andriivka, Donetsk Oblast, where Omurbekov as well was in command. US sanctions on Omurbekov and Frolkiv include visa bans that extend to their immediate families.

On 19 OCT 2022, Ukraine sanctioned Omurbekov.

On 28 JUN 2022, the US sanctioned Omurbekov along with the entire 64th Brigade for having “killed numerous civilians, detained civilians, beat detained civilians, conducted mock executions of civilians, dismembered civilians including removing parts of their scalps and removing their limbs, burned civilians, and seized and damaged civilian homes and property” across Bucha.

On 03 JUN 2022, the EU sanctioned Omurbekov citing his “direct responsibility in killings, rapes and torture in Bucha.”

In MAY 2022, Omurbekov was replaced by Acting Commander Lt. Colonel Vasiliy

Shcherbakov as the commander of the 64th Brigade. According to the Institute for the Study of War: the 64th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade has likely been, or if not already: will be, destroyed. They say this is “part of an intentional Kremlin effort to conceal war crimes it committed in Kyiv Oblast.”

In MAR 2022, Omurbekov was a key figure in the Bucha massacre. Due to the vastness and extent of the numerous tragedies of the Bucha massacre: please see “MAR 2022 Invasion of Bucha” under the Most Egregious Crimes Index for a thorough and detailed investigation of related war crimes in Bucha.

LXX. ALEKSANDR VLADIMIROVICH DVORNIKOV

Title(s):

Former Commander in Chief of the Southern Military District

Former Commander of Russian forces in Ukraine

Role(s):

Former top official responsible for all Russian forces in Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Aleksandr Vladimirovich Dvornikov (“Dvornikov”) was born on the 22 AUG 1961 in Ussuriysk, Primorskiy Krai, RSFSR, USSR.

In SEP 2015, Dvornikov became the first commander of the Russian Armed Forces in Syria during the Russian military intervention in Syria. Dvornikov is known as the “Butcher of Syria.”

In JUL 2016, Dvornikov became the Southern Military District’s acting commander and was confirmed to the position on 20 SEP 2016. The Southern Military District is one of the five military districts in Russia. It is the smallest military district in Russia by geographic size. The Southern Military District allegedly includes Ukraine’s Crimea and Sevastopol.

On 23 JUN 2020, Dvornikov was promoted to the rank of army general.

In APR 2022, Dvornikov was appointed the Commander of Russian forces in Ukraine. This came just one month after he allegedly ordered the shelling of the Mykolaiv Regional State Administration. He was replaced in JUN 2022 by Gennady Zhidko. He was also replaced as Commander of the Southern District by Colonel General Sergei Kuzovlev on 23 JAN 2023.

Summary of Role(s): Former top official responsible for all Russian forces in Ukraine. Responsible for the actions of the Black Sea Fleet and other military forces of the Russian Federation against Ukraine on 25 NOV 2018 which prevented Ukrainian vessels from accessing their coastal territory on the Sea of Azov.

Organizational Membership: DOSAAF of Russia.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 12 FEB 2025 The Security Service of Ukraine publicly announced and notified Dvornikov that he had been charged with ordering the shelling of the Mykolaiv Regional State Administration in MAR 2022.

On 30 JAN 2024 Dvornikov was elected Chairman of the DOSAAF of Russia (Volunteer Society for the Assistance to the Army, Aviation, and Navy) an organization sanctioned in 2024 by Canada. This organization is associated with the Ministry of Emergency Situations and assists with military readiness as well as natural disasters.

On 23 JAN 2023, Dvornikov was replaced as the Commander of the Southern District by Colonel General Sergei Kuzovlev.

On 19 OCT 2022, Ukraine sanctioned Dvornikov.

On 12 MAR 2022, the EU sanctioned Dvornikov.

In MAR 2019, the EU sanctioned Dvorkikov due to his role in the Kerch Strait incident.

LXXI. VIKTOR NIKOLAYEVICH SOKOLOV

Title(s):

Former Commander in Chief of the Black Sea Fleet

Role(s):

Commanded the entirety of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Navy—the fleet positioned in the Black Sea within the territorial waters of Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Viktor Nikolayevich Sokolov (“Sokolov”) was born 04 APR 1962. Iilla.

In mid-2016 Sokolov was assigned to command a detachment of the Northern Fleet, based around the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov and the battlecruiser Pyotr Velikiy, for operations off the coast of Syria during the Russian intervention there.

Sokolov served as deputy commander of the Northern Fleet for almost seven years, before being appointed head of the N. G. Kuznetsov Naval Academy on 17 JAN 2020.

On 17 AUG 2022, Sokolov was appointed Russian Black Sea Fleet commander, replacing Igor Osipov.

Summary of Role(s): Commands the entirety of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Navy—the fleet positioned in the Black Sea within the territorial waters of Ukraine.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 05 MAR 2024, the International Criminal Court issued a warrant for Sokolov's arrest for the war crime of directing attacks at civilian objects (article 8(2)(b)(ii) of the Rome Statute) and the war crime of causing excessive incidental harm to civilians or damage to civilian objects (article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute), and the crime against humanity of inhumane acts under article 7(1)(k) of the Rome Statute.

On 15 FEB 2024, Russian media reported that Sokolov had been replaced as Commander of the Black Sea Fleet. Under Sokolov, a significant portion of the Black Sea Fleet had been destroyed by Ukraine, including the large landing ship Tsezar Kunikov on 14 FEB. On 2 APR 2024, Sergei Pinchuk was appointed as Commander of the Russian Black Sea Fleet.

On 22 SEP 2023, Ukraine claimed that Sokolov, and many other officers, were killed at a meeting at the Black Sea Fleet headquarters in Sevastopol, Crimea. Ukraine fired Storm Shadows cruise missiles during what was referred to as Operation Crab Trap. He was later shown to be alive on 27 SEP 2023 in a ceremony honoring the 810th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade.

In JUN 2023, Sokolov acknowledged that as Russian military bases on the Crimean Peninsula have come under attack on a regular basis, especially by naval drones in the Black Sea Fleet stationed in Sevastopol, the Russian military has had to tighten defenses there. This also comes at a time where, according to British intelligence, Russia has ramped up its usage of trained dolphins and other marine animals to help protect at-risk areas like Sevastopol.

On 25 MAY 2023, the Press Services of the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) announced that the SSU had evidence to prove since at least 10 AUG 2022 Sokolov had personally given orders approving regular combat launches of 3M14 Caliber cruise missiles into Ukraine. These missiles have been principally targeted at Ukrainian energy facilities, but geographically occurred all across Ukraine. As a result, at least four civilians were killed and another forty were injured according to the SSU.

Sokolov was informed by investigators that as a result of the shelling, he was suspected of violating several articles of the Criminal Code of Ukraine. This includes Art. 28 (pt. 2) with Art. 438 (pt. 1) and Part 2 of Art. 28 (pt. 2) with Art. 438 (pt. 2) (violation of the laws and customs of war, committed by a group of persons according to a prior conspiracy). It also includes Art. 110 (pt. 3) (encroachment on the territorial integrity and inviolability of Ukraine). Finally, it also includes Art. 28 (pt. 2) with Art. 437 (pt. 2) (planning, preparation, unleashing and waging of an aggressive war, committed by a group of persons based on a prior conspiracy).

If charged and convicted, Sokolov potentially faces life imprisonment for these violations of

domestic Ukrainian law.

On 17 AUG 2022, Sokolov was appointed Russian Black Sea Fleet commander, replacing Igor Osipov.

LXXII. ALEKSANDR ALEKSEYEVICH MOISEYEV/MOISEEV

Title(s):

Acting Commander in Chief of the Navy
Commander in Chief of the Northern Military District/Northern Fleet Joint Strategic Command

Role(s):

Top official responsible for one of the five military districts in Russia.



Biographical Summary: Aleksandr Alekseyevich Moiseyev (“Moiseyev”) was born 16 APR 1962 in the settlement of Borskoe in the Gvardeysky District of Kaliningrad Oblast, USSR. CIn JUN 2011, Moiseyev was appointed Deputy Commander of the Northern Fleet’s submarine forces, later becoming their commander. On 20 FEB 2013, he was promoted to rear admiral, and served as a deputy to the Council of Deputies of Alexandrovsk, Murmansk Oblast. On 5 APR 2016, he was appointed Chief of Staff of the Russian Federation.

On 14 MAY 2018 he took command of the Black Sea Fleet and oversaw a period of expansion within the fleet. He has also courted controversy with regards to relations with Ukraine following the Russian military intervention in Ukraine from 2014 onwards, and the Kerch Strait incident in NOV 2018.

On 2 MAY 2019, Moiseyev was appointed commander of the Northern Fleet, and was promoted to the rank of admiral on 10 DEC 2020.

In MAY 2019, he was appointed commander of the Northern Military District/Northern Fleet Joint Strategic Command (“Northern Military District”). The Northern Military District is the third largest military-administered district by geographic size.

On 19 MAR 2024, Moiseyev was appointed Acting Commander in Chief of Naval operations.

Summary of Role(s): Top official responsible for one of the five military districts in Russia.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 13 DEC 2024, Moiseyev spoke at the Arctic Forum Conference in St. Petersburg, Russia, highlighting upgrades to the Russian naval nuclear forces.

On 25 APR 2024, Moiseyev met with senior Chinese military officials during a Western Pacific Naval Symposium. Media were told Chinese naval leaders had a “deep exchange of views” with Moiseyev.

Moiseyev was most likely responsible for the close incident between two Russian and two NATO aircrafts in international airspace above the Russian Arctic and Norwegian maritime borders during a command and staff exercise on 15 MAR 2023.

On 01 JUN 2022, Moiseyev announced the Admiral Golovko frigate would become the first of the Russian fleet to be armed full-time with Zircon hypersonic cruise missiles by the end of the year. The Zircon travels at nine times faster than the speed of sound and can hit a target from at least 1,000 miles away.

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On 16 FEB 2019, Moiseyev was one of seven Russian personnel that were notified by the Security Service of Ukraine that they were suspected of engaging in aggressive war or aggressive military actions.

LXXIII. ALEKSANDR CHAIKO

Title(s):

Former Commander in Chief of the Eastern Military District

Role(s):

Former top official responsible for one of the five military districts in Russia.



Biographical Summary: Aleksandr Yuryevich Chaiko (“Chaiko”) was born on 27 JUL 1971 in Golitsyno, Moscow Oblast, USSR.

From SEP 2019 to NOV 2020 and from FEB 2021 to JUN 2021, he was the Commander of the Group of Forces of the Armed Forces of Russia in Syria. On 11 JUN 2021, Chaiko was promoted Colonel General.

On 12 NOV 2021, Chaiko became the Commander of the Eastern Military District. The Eastern Military District is one of the five military districts in Russia and the second largest military district in Russia by geographic size.

Chaiko earned a global reputation as a brutal leader in Syria in 2019 and 2020. Human Rights Watch states that he may be responsible for widespread attacks against hospitals, schools, and populated areas in the Idlib Governorate. The attacks killed 1,600 civilians and displaced 1.4 million people. He is also believed to have ordered the arrest and deportation of war correspondents critical of him, notably Oleg Blokin, in Syria.

During the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, troops under Chaiko's command tortured and executed hundreds of Ukrainian civilians during the Kyiv offensive. Chaiko commanded the assault on Kyiv from the Ukrainian village of Zdvyzhivka from 20-31 MAR 2022.

On 01 DEC 2024, Chaiko was again installed as Russia's manager of military operations in Syria.

Summary of Role(s): Top official responsible for one of the five military districts in Russia. Top official responsible for Russian military operations in Syria.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: In NOV 2022, Chaiko, who was reassigned to Syria following his dismissal in OCT 2022, met with Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) commander-in-chief Mazloum Aldi. He has so far failed to convince the SDF and Kurdish forces to withdraw from the Syrian border.

As of OCT 2022, Chaiko is no longer leading the Eastern Military District after major Russian losses in northeast Ukraine in SEP 2022 and Ukraine's recapture of Lyman, in the Donetsk region. He was replaced by Rustam Muradov, who was dismissed himself on 06 APR 2023.

On 29 JUN 2022, the UK sanctioned Chaiko.

On 21 JUN 2018, Ukraine sanctioned Chaiko.

LXXIV. RUSTAM USMANOVICH MURADOV

Title(s):

First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of Russian Ground Forces
Former Commander in Chief of the Eastern Military District

Role(s):

Advises and assists the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Ground Forces in military decisions and tactics in Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: From 2015 to 2017, he served as the First Deputy Chief and Chief of Staff of the 41st Russian Combined Arms Army. In 2016, he was the representative of Russia at the Joint Russian- Ukrainian Center for Control and Coordination of Ceasefire and Stabilization of the Line of Delimitation of the Parties (JCCC) in Donbas. On 05 MAR 2016, in Donbas, In 2017, he was appointed as a military adviser in Syria. Muradov was awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation in the same year. Then, he served as the Commander of the 2nd Guards Red Banner Army of the Central Military District until Andrey Kolotovkin replaced him in 2018. Since then, he's the Deputy Commander of the Southern Military District. He was promoted to lieutenant general on 20 FEB 2020 by the decree of the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin. On 11 NOV 2020, he was appointed the commander of the Russian peacekeeping forces in Nagorno-Karabakh, after a peace agreement ending the war over the region. He was replaced by Major General Mikhail Kosobokov on 09 SEP 2021.

On 07 OCT 2022, General Muradov was appointed Commander of Eastern Military District. The Eastern Military District is one of the five military districts in Russia and the second largest military district in Russia by geographic size.

In late MAR 2023, Muradov was fired from his position of Commander of the Eastern Military District.

On 29 OCT 2024, Muradov was promoted to First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of Russian Ground Forces.

Summary of Role(s): Top official responsible for Russian Ground Forces in military decisions and tactics in Ukraine.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 29 NOV 2024, General Muradov was appointed to the position of First Deputy Commander of the Ground Forces, within the Ministry of Defence, according to Magomed Kurbanov, head of the Republic of Dagestan's Tabasar district, despite his poor record of heavy losses as a general.¹⁴³⁴

It was reported that on 20 APR 2023 by Russian military blogger Voyerkor Kotenko Z that Vladimir Putin signed a decree formally dismissing General Rustam Muradov and forcing Zhuravlyov into retirement, following a series of military campaign failures.

On 27 MAR 2023, Muradov was fired from his role as Commander of the Eastern Military District after a failed battle for Vuhledar that saw dozens of armored vehicles lost as well as incidents of Russian tanks running over their own troops. He left the position about one week later.

On 07 NOV 2022, a scathing letter by Marines of Russia's 155th Naval Infantry Brigade to regional governor Oleg Kozhemyako blamed their generals including Muradov for 'playing down the number of losses for fear of being held responsible.' They claimed "[y]et again we were thrown into an incomprehensible attack by Generals Muradov and Akhmedov, so that Muradov could get bonuses from [chief of the general staff Valery] Gerasimov, and his promised Hero of Russia" medal. The Marines also asked "[h]ow long will mediocrities like Muradov and Akhmedov plan military operations for the sake of their reports, and for receiving awards at the cost of so many lives?" claiming the generals "don't care about anything but themselves, they call [soldiers] cannon fodder." They lastly requested Kozhemyako to "get in touch with the supreme [commander Putin] so that a commission is sent to investigate what happened."

On 19 OCT 2022, Ukraine sanctioned Muradov.

On 28 FEB 2022, the EU sanctioned Muradov.

¹⁴³⁴ Top Russian General Dismissed for Heavy Ukraine Losses Appointed to Senior Army Post – Regional Official, Moscow Times. (Nov. 29, 2024) <https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2024/11/29/top-russian-general-dismissed-for-heavy-ukraine-losses-appointed-to-senior-army-post-regional-official-a87166>.

LXXV. ALEKSANDER LINKOV

Title(s):

Acting Commander in Chief of the Central Military District
(NOV 2022 – PRES)

Role(s):

Top official responsible for one of the five military districts in Russia.



Biographical Summary: There is not much information about Aleksandr Valerievich Linkov (“Linkov”) online. However, he previously chaired the organizational and mobilization department of the Central Military District. Linkov holds the rank of major general.

On 03 NOV 2022, Linkov was appointed Acting Commander of Russia’s Central Military District. The Central Military District is one of the five military districts in Russia and is the largest military district in Russia by geographic size and population at 54.9 million people.

Summary of Role(s): Top official responsible for one of the five military districts in Russia.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 03 NOV 2022, Alexander Linkov was appointed Acting Commander of Russia’s Central Military District.

LXXVI. ALEXANDER ALEXANDROVICH ZHURAVLYOV

Title(s):

Former Commander in Chief of the Western Military District

Role(s):

Former top official responsible for one of the five military districts in Russia.



Biographical Summary: Alexander Alexandrovich Zhuravlyov (“Zhuravlyov”) was born on 05 DEC 1965 in Golyshmanovo, Tyumen Oblast, RSFSR, USSR.

In JUL 2016, Zhuravlyov was appointed as the commander of the Russian military forces in Syria, replacing Aleksandr Dvornikov. He held this post until DEC 2016, when he was replaced by Andrey Kartapolov.

On 22 NOV 2017, Zhuravlyov was appointed commander of the Eastern Military District, replacing Sergey Surovikin, who transferred to command the Russian Aerospace Forces. In JAN 2018, he once again took command of the contingent of Russian military forces stationed in Syria, having taken over from Sergey Surovikin.

In NOV 2018, Zhuravlyov was appointed commander of the Western Military District.

As commander of the Western Military District, Zhuravlyov was responsible for the Russian troops that invaded northern Ukraine during the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, before Aleksandr Dvornikov was appointed overall commander of Russian forces in Ukraine on 09 APR 2022.

Summary of Role(s): Former top official responsible for one of the five military districts in Russia. As commander of the Western Military District, Zhuravlyov was responsible for the Russian troops that invaded northern Ukraine during the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, before Aleksandr Dvornikov was appointed overall commander of Russian forces in Ukraine on 09 APR 2022.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: It was reported that on 20 APR 2023 by Russian military blogger Vovnenko Z that Vladimir Putin signed a decree formally dismissing General Rustam Muradov and forcing Zhuravlyov into retirement, following a series of military campaign failures.

On 19 OCT 2022, Ukraine sanctioned Zhuravlyov.

In SEP 2022, Roman Berdnikov was appointed Commander in Chief of the Western Military District, according to Russian State Media replacing Zhuravlyov. However, from JUN to SEP 2022 Andrei Sychevoi held this position until he was allegedly captured by Ukrainian forces.

On 13 MAY 2022, CNN reported that newly collected evidence identified Zhuravlyov ordering the use of 17 cluster bombs, cluster munition fired from the 300mm Smerch multiple rocket launcher, by the 79th Rocket Artillery Brigade against civilian targets in Kharkiv on 27–28 FEB 2022.

LXXVII. ANDREI/ANDREY IYANOVICH SYCHEVOI

Title(s):

Former Commander in Chief of the Western Military District

Role(s):

Former top official responsible for one of the five military districts in Russia.



Biographical Summary: Andrei Sychevoi (“Sychevoi”) was born 16 MAY 1969 in Troitskaya, Krymsky District, Krasnodar Krai, Russian SFSR, USSR. Sychevoi holds the rank of Lieutenant General.

Sychevoi allegedly held the position of Commander in Chief of the Western Military District from JUN to SEP 2022 replacing Alexander Zhuravlyov. In SEP 2022, Roman Berdnikov was appointed as Commander in Chief..

In early SEP 2022, Sychevoi appears to have been captured by Ukrainian forces in Kharkiv. As of 22 SEP 2022, it remains unclear if Sychevol was in fact captured, and if so: whether he is still alive and still being held.

Summary of Role(s): Former top official responsible for one of the five military districts in Russia. The Western Military District is one of the five military districts in Russia and is the second smallest military district in Russia by geographic size. The Western Military District is headquartered in the General Staff Building in Saint Petersburg.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 19 OCT 2022, Ukraine sanctioned Sychevoi.

In SEP 2022, Roman Berdnikov was appointed Commander in Chief of the Western Military District, according to Russian State Media replacing Alexander Zhuravlyov.

In early SEP 2022, Sychevoi appears to have been captured by Ukrainian forces in Kharkiv. This is due to the similar appearance between the man seen captured and Sychevoi. However, this has not been confirmed.

On 28 FEB 2022, the EU sanctioned Sychevoi.

LXXVIII. ROMAN BORISOVICH BERDNIKOV

Title(s):

Former Commander in Chief of the Western Military District

Role(s):

Top official formerly responsible for one of the five military districts in Russia.



Biographical Summary: Roman Borisovich Berdnikov (“Berdnikov”) was born on 31 AUG 1974 in the town of Kamen-na-Obi, Altai Territory.

He was promoted to the rank of lieutenant general on 10 DEC 2020. In OCT 2021, he was appointed Commander of the Group of Forces of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in the Syrian Arab Republic.

In SEP 2022, Berdnikov was appointed Commander in Chief of the Western Military District, according to Russian State Media replacing Alexander Zhuravlyov.

In DEC 2022, Berdnikov was replaced with Yevgeny Nikiforov. He does not appear to have been heard from since.

Summary of Role(s): Former top official responsible for one of the five military districts in Russia.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: By DEC 2022, Berdnikov, as well as Sergey Kuzylev, who is believed to have also held the position of Commander in Chief of the Western Military District,

lost their position to Yevgeny Nikiforov.

On 05 JUN 2022, while engaging in combat in the Donbas region in Ukraine, rumors of Berdnikov being killed in action circulated. These rumors were obviously incorrect given Berdnikov's promotion and later removal from his position as Commander in Chief of the Western Military District. However, the Kremlin confirmed the death of Major- General Roman Kutuzov the same day. There is speculation the Kremlin confirmed the death of Kutuzov to cover up the possible death of Berdnikov: a far more famous figure in Russia. In all reality, it's much more likely that observers mixed up the two men given that they each have the same first name.

LXXIX. VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVICH YAKUSHEV

Title(s):

Acting Speaker of the Russian Federation
First Deputy Chairman of the Federation Council
Senator from Tyumen Oblast
Former Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy to the Ural Federal District

Role(s):

Official body responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Vladimir Vladimirovich Yakushev (“Yakushev”) was born on 14 JUN 1968 in Neftekamsk.

In 2001, Yakushev started his political career as vice governor of Tyumen Oblast. From 2005 to 2018, he was Governor of Tyumen Oblast. Yakushev was Minister of Construction, Housing and Utilities from 18 MAY 2018 to 09 NOV 2020. He left the position on 25 SEP 2024, and was replaced by Artem Zhoga on 02 OCT 2024.

On 09 NOV 2020, Yakushev was appointed Presidential Plenipotentiary Representative to the Ural Federal District, replacing Nikolay Tsukanov.

On 15 JUN 2024, Yakushev was appointed Acting Secretary of the General Council of United Russia by Dmitry Medvedev, replacing Andrei Turchak.

On 30 SEP 2024, Yakushev was dismissed from the Security Council by President Putin.

Summary of Role(s): Official body responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine. The role of a Plenipotentiary Representative is to oversee the work of federal agencies in the region. This role is viewed as extensive and of considerable consequence. In this role, Yakushev served as a liaison between the federal subjects and the federal government. He was also primarily responsible for overseeing the compliance of the federal subjects with federal laws. The Ural Federal District comprises the Central (part) and West Siberian economic regions and six federal subjects. As of the 2010 Census, over 12 million Russians live in the Ural Federal District. Since his appointment as First Deputy Chairman, Yakushev serves as a key ally of Putin in the day-to-day operations of the Federation Council. Since his appointment as Secretary of the General Council, Yakushev has served as a key manager in expanding the influence and power of United Russia.

Organizational Membership: United Russia.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 26 FEB 2025, Yakushev met with Ri Hi-yong, a North Korean politician and Chairman of the WPK North Hamgyong Provincial Committee, in Moscow. Yakushev emphasised his appreciation of the recent assistance of North Korea to Russia regarding their invasion of Ukraine. Korean state news reported the two signed “a protocol for ‘expanding cooperation in various sectors’ and to ‘deepen the development,’ between the two nations. This effort to strengthen their partnership came just weeks after North Korea delivered 200 long-range artillery pieces to Russia.

On 04 OCT 2024, Yakushev met with his successor as Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy to the Ural Federal District: Artem Zhoga.

On 30 SEP 2024, Yakushev was dismissed from the Security Council by Putin as part of a larger shake-up.

On 15 JUN 2024, Dmitry Medvedev appointed Yakushev Acting Secretary of the General Council of United Russia. One source reported that this was largely “circumstantial”, stating that if Yanushev’s predecessor Andrey Turchak “hadn’t fallen out of favor and been sent to Altai, there wouldn’t have been a need to find a new head of [United Russia’s] General Council. And if the choice hadn’t fallen on Yakushev, the envoy position wouldn’t have opened up.”

On 16 FEB 2024, Yakushev joined President Putin in a tour of factories in Uralvagonzavod that manufactures vehicles for the Russian military, such as the T-90M Proryv tank.

On 16 JUN 2023, Yakushev met in Moscow with Iranian Minister of Roads and Urban

Development Mehrdad Bazrpash to discuss Russia's interest in importing cement and other building and raw materials from Iran.

On 07 SEP 2022, Ukraine sanctioned Yakushev. On 06 APR 2022, the US sanctioned Yakushev.

On 09 NOV 2020, Yakushev was appointed Presidential Plenipotentiary Representative to the Ural Federal District.

LXXX. MARIA ALEKSEEVNA LVOVA-BELOVA

Title(s):

Presidential Commissioner for Children's Rights

Role(s):

Serves as the ombudsman for children under the care of the Russian state. Multitudinous propagandizer for children's affairs.



Biographical Summary: Maria Lvova-Belova (“Lvova-Belova”) was born on 25 OCT 1984 in Penza, Russian SFSR, USSR.

From 2003 to 2024, Lvova-Belova was married to Pavel Kogelmanz: who was ordained a priest at Mitrofanov Church in Penza on 17 AUG 2019. They have at least 23 children: 5 biological, 5 adopted, and 13 disabled children who she said, “are in my custody as well, but they do not live with me.” One of her 5 adopted children, a 15-year-old boy from Mariupol, is likely a victim of the invasion, and was adopted by Lvova-Belova in FEB 2023. In 2024, she and Kogelmanz divorced and she married billionaire Konstantin Malofeev. In 2008, she co-founded the Blagovest Penza Regional Public Organisation for Social Adaptation.

She joined United Russia in 2019, and on 24 NOV 2019 was elected to the Presidium of the General Council of the United Russia as co-chair of the working group to support civil society. She is a close ally of former President and Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev.

In SEP 2020, she was appointed to the Senate by Penza Oblast Governor Ivan Belozertsev and was reappointed following Penza's snap election on 17-19 SEP 2021. Lvova-Belova resigned a month later after President Vladimir Putin appointed her as the Federal Commissioner for

Children's Rights after Anna Kuznetsova resigned.

In this role, Lvova-Belova has openly advocated for stripping the Ukrainian identities of children and teaching them to love Russia instead. Lvova-Belova said the large-scale adoptions are to help “preserve [children’s] right to live under a peaceful sky.” However, she highlighted the clear role nationalism has played in these adoptions stating that children sang the Ukrainian national anthem before adoption but have “transformed into a love of Russia.”

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Lvova-Belova has effectively been supervising the forcible deportation of Ukrainian children into the Russian state adoption system. According to the United Nations, at least 16,221 children have been forcibly transferred by Russia across state lines as of 16 MAR 2023. As of JAN 2025, the Ukrainian National Information Bureau has reported that at least 19,546 children have been forcibly deported into Russia. Ukrainian officials believe the actual number to be in the hundreds of thousands.

On 17 MAR 2023, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for Lvova-Belova, as well as President Vladimir Putin, for forcibly taking Ukrainian children across state lines during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Based on Lvova-Belova’s own estimates, over 700,000 Ukrainian children had been transferred to Russia by JUL 2023.

The ICC claims that Lvova-Belova is “is allegedly responsible for the war crime of unlawful deportation of population (children) and that of unlawful transfer of population (children) from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation (under articles 8(2)(a)(vii) and 8(2)(b)(viii) of the Rome Statute).” They added that “[t]here are reasonable grounds to believe that Ms. Lvova-Belova bears individual criminal responsibility for the aforementioned crimes, for having committed the acts directly, jointly with others and/or through others (article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute).”

Lvova-Belova has propagandized the conflict on the world stage in too multitudinous a way to capture here. However, to give a basic understanding of what generally occurs: Ukrainian children are forcibly transferred (usually by the Russian military) often regardless of whether or not they are orphans or if they’re in any immediate danger. They are then quickly funneled through the Russian state adoption process and given new homes. They frequently have their names changed in favor of Russian ones and are issued Russian documentation including Russian passports. Russian families take part in these adoptions for multiple reasons: on a wide spectrum ranging from genuine compassion to financial benefits from the state. These coexist alongside standard considerations like infertility that makes adoption an ideal option, especially as Russia is experiencing a declining birth rate. But regardless of the reason, both the adoptive families and the children are fed disinformation by Lvova-Belova and the state. For the families: this includes indoctrination that the children are being “saved” from a Nazified Ukrainian state. For the children: this includes emotional scarring including ideas that their parents did not love

them while attending “re-education” schools to indoctrinate them with the Russian language, culture, and identity.

Summary of Role(s): Serves as the ombudsman for children under the care of the Russian state. Multitudinous propagandizer for children’s affairs. Principally, Lvova-Belova ensures the Russian state works to strip Ukrainian children of their cultural identity and senses of heritage. Lvova-Belova also serves to spread disinformation that minimizes the actions the Russian government has taken against Ukrainian children’s interests as well as minimizing the tremendous gravity of these actions.

Organizational Membership: United Russia.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 11 DEC 2024, Lvova-Belova spoke with Andrey Chibis, Governor of Murmansk Oblast, at a forum in Murmansk on prevention of social orphanhood. Lvova-Belova stated on social media that those at the forum were focused on “[t]he ways we can support families that are experiencing hardship” with Chibis stating “[t]he main thing is not to neglect children, their future and families, when difficult circumstances appear.” He has been accused by the EU Council of being “involved in the illegal transportation of Ukrainian children to Russia and their adoption by Russian families,” and his actions “violate the rights of Ukrainian children and infringe Ukrainian law and administrative order.”

On 03 DEC 2024, an investigation by Yale University’s Humanitarian Research Lab reviewed how President Vladimir Putin and unspecified “senior Kremlin officials” directly financed and facilitated the transport of at least 314 Ukrainian children in Russian-occupied regions who were filtered through Russian foster care and adoption agencies since 2022. The report identified that at least 67 of the 314 children had been naturalized as Russian citizens, but the number was suspected to be much higher. Russian foster parents and adoptive parents can file for Russian citizenship on behalf of their Ukrainian child, which helps erase their Ukrainian identity. It is not clear if Lvova-Belova was directly involved in these transfers. International law scholar and law professor Oona Hathaway reported the findings could support a broader genocide case under the ICC's Rome Statute.

In SEP 2024, Qatari mediators negotiated the release of nine Ukraine children: eight boys and one girl aged twelve to seventeen. Lvova-Belova was seen with Qatari Ambassador to Russia Sheikh Ahmed bin Nasser Al-Thani greeting the children. Qatari officials later reported that Ukraine released four Russian children, which was promptly rejected by Ukrainian officials. Dmytro Lubinets, ombudsman and Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights stated “Ukraine has not kidnapped and does not hold Russian children on its territory, nor does it prevent their return to Russia if they are on our territory.”

On 08 SEP 2024, it was announced Lvova-Belova had married billionaire Konstantin Malofeev. Malofeev, a media tycoon and “self-professed monarchist” who runs the pro-Putin, Christian Orthodox channel Tsargrad TV. Konstantin, like Lvova-Belova, both advocate for “traditional values.” Malofeev’s prior wife divorced him in 2023 after Malofeev stated on television he would “give a thrashing” to his daughter if she ever divorced. Multiple pop singers performed at their wedding at a villa in Rotunda. Lvova-Belova and Malofeev were reported to have been in an affair since at least 25 JUL 2024. Lvova-Belova was still married to Kogelmanz at the time.

On 19 FEB 2024, eleven Ukrainian children, between the ages of two and sixteen, were returned from Russia following Qatari mediation. According to the Moscow Times, the children “were hosted at the Qatari embassy in Moscow ahead of a long journey through Belarus, which should see them cross into northwestern Ukraine.” Lvova-Belova boasted that “[a]s a result of this work, the number of children reunited with their families in Ukraine with our participation will grow to 59.” As of JAN 2025, the Ukrainian National Information Bureau has reported that at least 19,546 children have been forcibly deported into Russia.

In OCT 2023, as part of the documentary “Ukraine’s Stolen Children”, when asked about allegations of mistreatment and Russian re-education camps. Lvova-Belova laughed then stated they were “checking the facts.”

On 16 OCT 2023, after four Ukrainian children, between the ages of two and seventeen, were returned from Russia following Qatari mediation, Lvova-Belova falsely stated the Russian government only had seventeen requests from Ukrainian families to return children, and that Russian authorities were “working on this.”

On 09 AUG 2023, it was reported that Alexei Petrov, a 27-year-old advisor in Lvova-Belova’s office, was associated with online white supremacist and neo-Nazi movements as a teenager. It was not until JUL 2023 when, after being questioned by Reuters, he deleted previously posted videos and unsubscribed from two far-right online groups. According to Reuters, when Petrov was sixteen to nineteen years old, he made at least three social media posts containing content from “a far-right organization that originated in Russia and promotes white racial supremacy, as well as three images and slogans associated with neo-Nazism.” Petrov’s Skype handle likewise incorporates the name of the white supremacist organization, and his Instagram handle contained a coded Adolf Hitler reference widely used in far-right circles. Petrov denied these claims, alleging groups he has belonged to either changed their names or affiliations. This all comes after Lvova-Belova has repeatedly claimed the Ukrainian government were “fascists” who have facilitated “the virus of “Nazism.”

On 31 JUL 2023, Lvova-Belova claimed that 700,000 Ukrainian children have been brought to Russia since Russia’s full-scale invasion began in FEB 2022. These 700,000 were part of 4.8

million Ukrainians being “accepted” into Russia. Lvova-Belova claimed most of these 700,000 children arrived with their relatives, but did include about 1,500 children who lived in orphanages or Ukrainian institutions.

On 19 MAY 2023, UN Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict Virginia Gamba held a controversial meeting with Lvova-Belova in Moscow. Though this was done in Gamba’s official capacity, it was not well-received by human rights groups and the US government. The Ukrainian Ambassador to the UN said of Gamba’s meeting that “it was her [own] intention” but did not know the details of it.

Farhan Haq, the Deputy Spokesman for the UN, defended the meeting between Gamba and Lvova-Belova, stating “[r]egarding Ms. Lvova-Belova, I would only add the point that [she] has the responsibility within the Russian Federation for important areas of Ms. Gamba’s mandate. It is important for Ms. Gamba to be able to meet with relevant officials in order to further her work regarding the protection of children.”

For her own part, Lvova-Belova praised the meeting. She stated that “[t]he conversation turned out to be constructive and sincere – without politics. After all, we are united by a sense of personal responsibility for the life and safety of children.” Lvova-Belova added that the two also “discussed various forms of further cooperation with the UN and other international organizations” to protect children.

On 11 MAY 2023, Lvova-Belova spoke at the St. Petersburg International Legal Forum, where she mocked Ukrainian parents trying to retrieve their children from the Russian state. She said the children were taken to be “re-educated” from “powerful propaganda” in Ukraine. She then blamed their parents, arguing that “[w]hen they say, ‘return our children,’ where should we return them? To abusers? To those who didn’t take care of them? [...] The kind of propaganda that was used in Ukraine will not pass so easily.” She then also claimed that accusations of Ukrainian children suffering in Russia is propaganda from the Ukrainian government and their parents, stating “[t]hey search for the children through social networks and ask them to make videos about how hard it is for them to live in Russia.”

According to Newsweek, as of 09 MAY 2023, Lvova-Belova has overseen the abduction of 19,393 Ukrainian children to Russia. Only 364 are known to have been reunited with their families. The number of Ukrainian children abducted is likely much higher, with Ukrainian authorities believing it to be “a few hundred thousand.”

On 05 APR 2023, Lvova-Belova, via video, spoke at a UN Security Council meeting about evacuating children from conflict zones. This prompted members from the US, UK, Albania, and Malta to walk out.

On 04 APR 2023, Lvova-Belova publicly rejected the ICC's arrest warrant and their claims. Along with a plethora of disinformation, she stated “[a]s far as the ICC's accusations are concerned, we don't understand what we are accused of. Give us the facts and we will look into it. So far, it all looks like a farce without specifics and is incomprehensible.”

On 22 MAR 2023, when asked about her arrest warrant being issued by the ICC, Lvova-Belova defended her actions stating “[h]ow is one supposed to react to news which is based on myths, fakes, and stories which people thought up themselves? What were we supposed to do? Leave the children under bombing?” without acknowledging that the Russians were illegally bombing Ukrainian families.

On 17 MAR 2023, Lvova-Belova was declared an international fugitive with the ICC issuing a warrant for her arrest for the unlawful deportation and transfer of children.

In FEB 2023, Vladimir Putin praised Lvova-Belova for her “humanitarian effort” to “protect Russian citizens.”

On 19 OCT 2022, Ukraine sanctioned Lvova-Belova.

On 27 SEP 2022, Lvova-Belova spoke about a group of 30 children Russia “evacuated” from Mariupol, she said “[a]t first, they said bad things about the [Russian] president. They said all sorts of awful things, sang the Ukrainian national anthem, said 'Glory to Ukraine! Then some time passed. These children were placed in foster families in the Moscow region. One of the boys was placed in my family, and I saw with my own eyes how this integration takes place. [...] Now, none of them want to go back. They say, ‘we're very happy here in Russia.’ Maybe there was some negativity at the beginning, but their transformation has resulted in a love for Russia.”

On 15 SEP 2022, the US sanctioned Lvova-Belova.

In Autumn 2022, after visiting the annexed regions of Ukraine, Lvova-Belova stated she planned in 2023 to open “centers for adolescents” to “give them special attention”, and to deploy teams to reach out to “street children” in the occupied territories.

Sometime between FEB 2022 and AUG 2022, Lvova-Belova adopted a then-sixteen-year-old Ukrainian boy named Filip from Mariupol. Filip, in interviews, states that his biological mother died from cancer in 2017. Lvova-Belova proudly tells audiences about the change in Filip's personality stating in AUG 2022 “[m]y adopted son runs after my young children and says, ‘I will eat the Muscovite.’ And this manifests itself in everything,” she said. “He tells them how he used to go out with a flag to demonstrate in support of Ukraine, how he used to celebrate various

Ukrainian holidays. And he is proud of it!” She also admits “[h]e really is a foreigner” who “didn't watch the same films and cartoons that our children in Russia watched. He didn't listen to the same music. He learned history differently.” before chillingly concluding that “[h]is mind works differently.”

On 21 JUL 2022, the EU sanctioned Lvova-Belova.



C. Statute of the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine

Statute of the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine

Upon Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February of 2022, scholars and world leaders recognized and began to publicly declare that Russia had committed various international crimes including the crime of aggression. Very soon after, people, organizations, leaders, and academics began to call for Russia and its leaders to be held accountable for its crimes in Ukraine.

The Council of Europe took the first step to establish a tribunal for the crime of aggression in Ukraine in May 2023, when it set up a Register of Damage Caused by the Aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. On May 13, 2025 the Ukrainian government formally requested the establishment of a special tribunal to investigate and prosecute Russia's aggressive acts in Ukraine. This was to be done by agreement between the Council of Europe and Ukraine. On May 14, 2025, the Council of Europe endorsed this tribunal's creation at the annual meeting of the Council of Europe foreign ministers.

The Statute of the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine was finalized on June 24, 2025. An agreement establishing the Special Tribunal was signed by Ukraine's President, Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Alain Berset, the Secretary General of the Council of Europe and can be found below and at this web address: <https://search.coe.int/cm?i=0900001680b678ca>. This is the first international tribunal established while the conflict that is the subject of the tribunal is ongoing.

The Tribunal will focus on the political and military leaders who have had a hand in the crime of aggression in Ukraine. This includes planning, preparation, ordering, and facilitating. The Special Tribunal is complementary to the ICC and while the ICC has the jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide in Ukraine, there are jurisdictional limits to its ability to prosecute crimes of aggression in Ukraine. The Special Tribunal will eliminate this gap.

1532nd meeting, 18 and 24 June 2025

2 Current political questions

2.3 Consequences of the aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine

Statute of the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine

Having been established by the Agreement concluded on 25 June 2025 between the Council of Europe and Ukraine, the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine (hereinafter “Special Tribunal”) shall function in accordance with the provisions of this Statute.

CHAPTER I – JURISDICTION AND APPLICABLE LAW

Article 1 – Jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal

The Special Tribunal shall have the power to investigate, prosecute and try persons who bear the greatest responsibility for the crime of aggression against Ukraine. Such jurisdiction is based on the territorial jurisdiction of Ukraine.

Article 2 – Definition of the crime of aggression

(1) For the purpose of this Statute, “crime of aggression” means the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations.

(2) For the purpose of paragraph 1 of this article, “act of aggression” means the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.

(3) For the purpose of determining whether an act of aggression, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations, the Special Tribunal shall take into account United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974 and all relevant United Nations General Assembly resolutions with respect to Ukraine, including those recited in the preamble of the Agreement between the Council of Europe and Ukraine on the Establishment of the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine (hereinafter “Agreement”).

(4) For the purpose of this Statute, in the context of the aggression against Ukraine, an act of aggression which is determined by its character, gravity and scale to constitute a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations, shall also be deemed to constitute a war of aggression.

Article 3 – Applicable law

The Special Tribunal shall apply:

- (a) in the first place, this Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence adopted in accordance with Article 15 of this Statute;
- (b) in the second place, applicable treaties, customary international law and general principles of law when necessary to ensure compliance with accepted standards of international criminal law;
- (c) failing that, provisions of the substantive criminal law of Ukraine relating to the prosecution and punishment of the crime of aggression.

Article 4 – Individual criminal responsibility and irrelevance of official capacity

(1) A person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State who planned, instigated, ordered or committed, or attempted to commit, a crime referred to in Article 2 of this Statute shall be individually responsible for the crime. This shall be without prejudice to the responsibility of States under international law.

(2) For the purpose of this Statute, the official position of any accused person at the time of the alleged commission of a crime, whether as head of State or government, a member of a government or parliament, an elected representative or a government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment.

(3) An amnesty granted to any person falling within the jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal with respect to the crime referred to in Article 2 of this Statute shall not be a bar to prosecution.

Article 5 – Non-prejudice clause

Nothing in this Statute shall be interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in any way existing or developing rules of international law for purposes other than this Statute.

CHAPTER II – ORGANISATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE SPECIAL TRIBUNAL

Article 6 – Organisation of the Special Tribunal

The Special Tribunal shall consist of:

- (a) the Chambers;
- (b) the Office of the Prosecutor; and
- (c) the Registry.

Article 7 – The judges and composition of the Chambers

(1) The Chambers shall be composed of different formations as follows:

- (a) one judge as a Pre-Trial Judge;
- (b) three judges in the Trial Chamber; and
- (c) five judges in the Appeals Chamber.

(2) The President of the Special Tribunal may assign alternate judges to each formation, as appropriate. The principles and procedures governing the application of this paragraph shall be those provided for in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.

(3) Each judge shall serve only in the chamber to which he or she has been assigned.

(4) The President of the Special Tribunal shall be elected for a term of three years renewable once by an absolute majority of the judges on the roster sitting in plenary session. The Vice-President of the Special Tribunal shall be elected by an absolute majority of the judges on the roster sitting in plenary session. In the absence or incapacity of the President of the Special Tribunal, the Vice-President shall assume the duties of the President of the Special Tribunal until the President of the Special Tribunal has resumed his or her duties or has been replaced.

(5) The President of the Special Tribunal shall be the presiding judge of the Appeals Chamber. The Trial Chambers, respectively, shall elect a presiding judge who shall conduct the proceedings in the chamber to which he or she was elected.

Article 8 – Qualification and election of judges for the Chambers

(1) The judges of the Special Tribunal shall be persons of high moral character, impartiality and integrity who possess the qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment to the highest judicial offices. They shall be independent in the performance of their functions and shall not seek or act on instructions from any government or any other source. No two judges may be nationals of the same State. For the purpose of membership of the Special Tribunal, a person who could be regarded as a national of more than one State shall be deemed to be a national of the State in which that person ordinarily exercises civil and political rights. In electing the judges, due account shall be taken of the experience of the candidates in criminal law, in particular their criminal trial experience and international law, as well as ensuring a geographical and gender balance, and representation across legal systems.

(2) Members and associate members of the Management Committee of the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine (hereinafter “Management Committee”) as established by the Enlarged Partial Agreement of the Council of Europe on the Management Committee of

the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine (hereinafter “Enlarged Partial Agreement”) may propose candidates for the roster of judges. The nominated candidate does not need to be a national of a State that is a member or associate member of the Management Committee. The roster of judges shall include 15 judges for staggered mandates to ensure the efficient and effective functioning of the Special Tribunal.

(3) An independent advisory panel shall recommend to the Management Committee the most suitable candidates for the roster of judges. This advisory panel, whose members shall be appointed by the Management Committee, shall consist of seven eminent members of the highest national courts, former judges of international criminal courts and tribunals and other lawyers of high moral character with substantial experience in international law, including international criminal law. In its composition, the advisory panel shall strive to achieve a geographical and gender balance.

(4) In accordance with the Enlarged Partial Agreement and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the Management Committee will elect the judges by secret ballot by an absolute majority for a nine-year period to the roster. In relation to the judges elected at the first election, however, the terms of five judges shall expire at the end of three years and the terms of five more judges shall expire at the end of six years. The judges whose terms are to expire at the end of the above-mentioned initial periods of three and six years shall be chosen by lot to be drawn by the Secretary General of the Council of Europe (hereinafter “Secretary General”) immediately after the first election has been completed. The judges shall not be eligible for re-election to the roster.

(5) The judges shall not receive remuneration or other benefits for being on the roster. The judges on the roster shall endeavour not to undertake any activity which could compromise the ability of the President of the Special Tribunal to assign them to exercise functions as a judge in the Special Tribunal.

(6) The President of the Special Tribunal shall assign judges from the roster to the formations of the Special Tribunal or for any other matter as foreseen by this Statute or the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. The trial chamber formation shall be composed predominantly of judges with criminal trial experience. When assigned to hear a pre-trial, trial or appeal phase of a case, the judge shall be assigned for a term of three years or until the completion of the phase of the proceedings to which he or she is assigned. The term can be prolonged for the duration required to complete the matter or the phase of the proceedings to which he or she is assigned. The judges shall only be present at the seat of the Special Tribunal as necessary at the request of the President of the Special Tribunal to exercise functions requiring their presence. In so far as possible, and as decided by the President of the Special Tribunal, the functions may be exercised remotely.

(7) The Pre-Trial Judge who has confirmed the indictment shall not be part of the Trial or Appeals Chamber assigned to the case.

(8) The President of the Special Tribunal may, upon the request of a judge, excuse that judge from the exercise of a function under this Statute in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.

(9) A judge shall not participate in any case in which his or her impartiality might reasonably be doubted on any ground. A judge shall be disqualified from a case in accordance with this paragraph if, *inter alia*, that judge has previously been involved in any capacity in that case before the Special Tribunal or in a related criminal case at the national level involving the person being investigated or prosecuted. A judge shall also be disqualified on such other grounds as may be provided for in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. A judge shall not be disqualified solely on the basis of his or her nationality. The Prosecutor or the person being investigated or prosecuted may request the disqualification of a judge under this paragraph. Any question as to the disqualification of a judge shall be decided by an absolute majority of the judges on the roster sitting in plenary session. The challenged judge shall be entitled to present his or her comments on the matter but shall not take part in the decision.

(10) In the event of a vacancy on the roster of judges, an election shall be held in accordance with this article to fill the vacancy. A judge elected to fill a vacancy shall serve for the remainder of the predecessor's term and, if that period is two years or less, shall be eligible for re-election for a full term.

Article 9 – The Office of the Prosecutor

(1) The Office of the Prosecutor shall be an independent organ of the Special Tribunal. The Prosecutor of the Special Tribunal (hereinafter “Prosecutor”) and the permanent staff of the office shall not seek or act on instructions from any government or from any other authority. They shall not engage in any other occupation of a professional nature. The Prosecutor shall be responsible for conducting independent and impartial investigations and prosecutions.

(2) The Prosecutor shall be assisted by at least one Deputy Prosecutor and by such staff as may be required to perform the functions assigned to him or her effectively and efficiently.

Article 10 – Qualification and election of the Prosecutor

(1) The Prosecutor shall be of high moral character and possess the highest level of professional competence and have extensive experience in the conduct of investigations and prosecutions of criminal cases.

(2) All States that are members or associate members of the Management Committee may propose candidates for the position of the Prosecutor. Nominations for the position of the Prosecutor should preferably be made with the support of multiple States. The nominated candidate does not need to be a national of a State that is a member or associate member of the Management Committee.

(3) The advisory panel shall recommend to the Management Committee the most suitable candidates.

(4) The Prosecutor shall be elected by secret ballot by an absolute majority of the members of the Management Committee. The term of the Prosecutor shall be seven years. He or she shall not be eligible for re-election. Deputy Prosecutors are elected in the same way as the Prosecutor, from a list of candidates provided by the Prosecutor, for a term of seven years without a possibility of re-election.

(5) The Prosecutor and Deputy Prosecutors shall not participate in any matter in which their impartiality might reasonably be doubted. The Prosecutor and Deputy Prosecutors shall not be disqualified solely on the basis of their nationality.

(6) Any question as to the disqualification of the Prosecutor and Deputy Prosecutors shall be decided by the Appeals Chamber. The person being investigated or prosecuted may at any time request the disqualification of the Prosecutor and Deputy Prosecutors on the grounds set out in this article; and the Prosecutor and Deputy Prosecutors, as appropriate, shall be entitled to present their comments on the matter.

Article 11 – The Registry

(1) The Registry shall be responsible for the administration and servicing of the Special Tribunal.

(2) The Registry shall consist of the Registrar of the Special Tribunal (hereinafter “Registrar”) and such other staff as may be required.

(3) The Registrar shall establish, within the Registry:

(a) a Victims and Witnesses Unit, which shall provide, as appropriate and in consultation with the Chambers and the Office of the Prosecutor or Defence Unit respectively, protective measures and security arrangements, counselling and other appropriate assistance for witnesses and others who are at risk on account of testimony given by such witnesses, and shall organise the representation of victims before the Special Tribunal;

(b) a Detention Unit, which shall manage the conditions of detention of suspects and accused persons; and

(c) an independent Defence Unit, which shall protect the rights of the defence, draw up a defence counsel list, provide support and assistance to the defence counsel and to the persons entitled to legal assistance, including, where appropriate, legal research, collection of evidence and advice, and appearing before the Special Tribunal in respect of specific issues.

(4) Without prejudice to the authority of the Prosecutor under this Statute to receive, obtain and

provide information and to establish channels of communication for this purpose, the Registrar shall serve as the channel of communication of the Special Tribunal.

(5) The Registrar may co-ordinate with national authorities to take custody of accused persons.

(6) The Registrar shall be responsible for the internal security of the Special Tribunal, in consultation with the President of the Special Tribunal and the Prosecutor, as well as the host State.

Article 12 – Qualification and appointment of the Registrar

(1) The Registrar shall be of high moral character and possess the highest level of professional competence and have extensive experience in the administration of international criminal justice.

(2) Upon election by the judges on the roster sitting in plenary session, the Registrar shall be appointed by the Secretary General for a four-year term. He or she shall be eligible for re appointment.

Article 13 – Staff of the Special Tribunal

(1) Subject to Article 9, paragraph 2, and Article 11, paragraph 2, of this Statute, the Secretary General shall appoint, upon the recommendation of the President of the Special Tribunal, the Prosecutor and the Registrar respectively, such qualified staff to the Special Tribunal as may be required. In the case of the Office of the Prosecutor, this shall include the appointment of investigators. In the case of the Defence Unit, this may include one or more lawyers for the defence counsel.

(2) When making recommendations for appointment to the Secretary General, the President of the Special Tribunal, the Prosecutor and the Registrar shall have regard to the highest standards of efficiency, competency and integrity, and the following criteria:

- (a) equitable representation across geographical regions and legal systems;
- (b) a fair gender representation; and
- (c) legal expertise on specific issues, as appropriate.

(3) In accordance with the applicable regulations and rules of the Council of Europe, members or associate members of the Management Committee may place seconded officials at the disposal of the Special Tribunal to assist with the work of the Registry, the Office of the Prosecutor and the Defence Unit.

(4) Subject to the provision of Article 51 of this Statute, the Staff Rules and Regulations of the Council of Europe apply to the staff of the Special Tribunal appointed by the Secretary General and seconded officials, as appropriate.

Article 14 – Languages of the Special Tribunal

(1) The working language of the Special Tribunal shall be English. The Rules of Procedure and Evidence shall determine in what circumstances and under which conditions other languages may be used, taking into account the two official languages of the Council of Europe.

(2) The application of paragraph 1 of this article shall not in any way limit the rights of the suspect or the accused under Articles 19 and 20 of this Statute.

Article 15 – Rules of Procedure and Evidence

(1) As soon as possible following their placement on the roster, the judges of the Special Tribunal sitting in plenary shall adopt, by a two-thirds majority, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the conduct of the pre-trial, trial and appeal phase of the proceedings, the admission of evidence, the representation of victims in the proceedings, the protection of witnesses, safeguards for the protection of personal information, international co-operation and legal assistance, and other appropriate matters. The Rules of Procedure and Evidence shall reflect the highest standards of international criminal procedure, with a view to ensuring a fair and expeditious trial. The Rules of Procedure and Evidence shall enter into force upon conclusion of the next meeting of the Management Committee, unless the Committee objects.

(2) Amendments to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence may be proposed by:

- (a) any member or associate member of the Management Committee;
- (b) the judges of the Special Tribunal, sitting in plenary, acting by an absolute majority;
- (c) the Prosecutor; or
- (d) the Registrar.

(3) Such amendments shall be adopted and enter into force in accordance with the procedure foreseen in paragraph 1 of this article.

(4) The Rules of Procedure and Evidence, amendments thereto and any provisional rules shall be consistent with this Statute. Amendments to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence as well as provisional rules shall not be applied retroactively to the detriment of the person who is being investigated or prosecuted, or who has been convicted.

(5) In the event of conflict between this Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the Statute shall prevail.

CHAPTER III – INVESTIGATION, PROSECUTION, PRE-TRIAL, TRIAL AND APPEAL PROCEEDINGS *Section 1 - General principles*

Article 16 – Right to a fair trial

(1) Everyone shall be equal before the Special Tribunal.

(2) Everyone shall be entitled to a public hearing, having regard to the provisions of this Statute, and to a fair trial conducted independently and impartially and within a reasonable time.

Article 17 – *Ne bis in idem*

(1) Except as provided for in this Statute, no person shall be tried before the Special Tribunal with respect to conduct which formed the basis of crimes for which the person has already been convicted or acquitted by the Special Tribunal.

(2) No person who has been tried by a national court shall be tried by the Special Tribunal with respect to the same conduct referred to in Article 2 of this Statute unless the proceedings in the other court:

(a) were for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal; or

(b) were otherwise not conducted independently or impartially in accordance with due process guarantees recognised by international law and were conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, was inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice.

(3) In the event that the circumstances set forth in paragraph 2 of this article are satisfied, the Special Tribunal, in sentencing a convicted person, shall take into account the extent to which any penalty imposed by a national court on the same person for the same conduct has already been served.

(4) No person who has been tried by the Special Tribunal shall be tried by a national court of Ukraine with respect to the same conduct referred to in Article 2 of this Statute.

Article 18 – Presumption of innocence

(1) Everyone shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty before the Special Tribunal in accordance with the applicable law.

(2) The burden of proof for establishing the guilt of the accused is on the Prosecutor of the Special Tribunal.

(3) In order to convict the accused, the Chambers must be convinced of the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

Article 19 – Rights of persons during an investigation

(1) In respect of an investigation under this Statute, a person:

(a) shall not be compelled to incriminate himself or herself, or to admit guilt;

(b) shall not be subjected to any form of coercion, duress or threat, to torture or to any other form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;

(c) shall, if questioned in a language other than a language the person competently understands and speaks, have, free of any cost, the assistance of a competent interpreter and such translations as are necessary to meet the requirements of fairness; and

(d) shall not be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention and shall not be deprived of his or her liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedures as established in this Statute.

(2) Where there are grounds to believe that a person has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal and that person is about to be questioned by the Prosecutor, or by national authorities pursuant to a request for judicial assistance, that person shall also have the following rights of which he or she shall be informed prior to being questioned:

(a) to be informed that there are grounds to believe that he or she has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal;

(b) to remain silent, without such silence being a consideration in the determination of guilt or innocence;

(c) to have legal counsel of the person's choosing or, if the person does not have legal counsel, to have legal counsel assigned to him or her by the Defence Unit, in any case where the interests of justice so require, and without payment by the person in any such case if the person does not have sufficient means to pay for it; and

(d) to consult legal counsel prior to being questioned and to be questioned in the presence of legal counsel unless the person has voluntarily waived his or her right to legal counsel after being informed of these rights.

Article 20 – Rights of the accused

(1) In the determination of any charge, the accused shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing, conducted impartially, and to the following minimum rights, in full equality:

(a) to be informed promptly and in detail of the nature, cause and content of the charge and his or her rights according to this Statute, in a language which the accused competently understands and speaks in order to allow for those rights to be exercised effectively;

(b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defence and to communicate freely, in confidence, with legal counsel of the accused's choosing;

(c) to be tried without undue delay;

(d) to be present at the trial, notwithstanding Article 28 of this Statute, to conduct the defence in person or through legal counsel of the accused's choosing, and to be informed, if the accused does not have legal counsel, of this right unless removed by the Trial Chamber for continually disrupting proceedings in accordance with Article 26, paragraph 7.b, or Article 38, paragraph 2, of this Statute;

(e) to have legal counsel assigned by the Special Tribunal in any case where the interests of justice so require, and without payment if the accused lacks sufficient means to pay for it;

(f) to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him or her and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his or her behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him or her. The accused shall also be entitled to raise defences and to present other evidence admissible under this Statute;

(g) to have, free of any cost, the assistance of a competent interpreter and such translations as are necessary to meet the requirements of fairness, if any of the proceedings or documents presented to the Special Tribunal are not in a language which the accused competently understands and speaks;

(h) not to be compelled to testify or to admit guilt and to remain silent, without such silence being a consideration in the determination of guilt or innocence;

(i) to make an unsworn oral or written statement in his or her defence; and

(j) not to have imposed on him or her any reversal of the burden of proof or any onus of rebuttal.

(2) Subject to any other specific provisions on disclosure in this Statute, the Prosecutor shall, as soon as practicable, disclose to the defence evidence in the Prosecutor's possession or control which he or she believes shows or tends to show the innocence of the accused, or to mitigate the guilt of the accused, or which may affect the credibility of prosecution evidence. In case of doubt as to the application of this paragraph, the Special Tribunal shall decide.

Article 21 – Protection of witnesses

(1) The Special Tribunal shall take appropriate measures to protect the safety, physical and psychological well-being, dignity and privacy of witnesses. In so doing, the Special Tribunal shall have regard to all relevant factors, including age, gender and health, and the nature of the crime. These measures shall not be prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial.

(2) As an exception to the principle of public hearings, the Chambers of the Special Tribunal may, to protect witnesses or an accused, conduct any part of the proceedings in closed session or

allow the presentation of evidence by electronic or other special means.

(3) Other measures for the protection of witnesses shall be defined in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. The Special Tribunal shall take appropriate measures to ensure that safe relocation of witnesses takes place outside the host State.

(4) The Victims and Witnesses Unit may advise the Prosecutor and the Chambers on appropriate protective measures, security arrangements, counselling and assistance.

Article 22 – Representation of victims in the proceedings

Where groups of victims are identified by the Special Tribunal as specially affected by conduct which formed the basis of the crime as specified in the indictment, the Special Tribunal shall allow them to be collectively represented by legal counsel while ensuring the observance of the rights of the accused, a fair and impartial trial and an efficient conduct of the proceedings.

Section 2 - Investigation, prosecution and pre-trial procedure

Article 23 – Investigation and preparation of indictment

(1) The Prosecutor General of Ukraine refers to the Prosecutor of the Special Tribunal criminal proceedings, information or evidence related to a crime within the jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal requesting the Prosecutor of the Special Tribunal to investigate whether one or more specific persons should be charged with such a crime irrespective of the procedural status of the person concerned in Ukrainian proceedings.

(2) On the basis of such a referral, the Prosecutor of the Special Tribunal shall assess the information received or obtained from any source and decide whether there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation regarding a crime within the jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal. The Prosecutor may, at any time, reconsider a decision whether to proceed with an investigation based on new facts or information. If the Prosecutor decides not to proceed with an investigation, he or she shall draw up a reasoned archiving order and notify Ukraine thereof.

(3) Upon conducting investigations in accordance with Article 24 of this Statute and a determination that there is sufficient evidence to provide reasonable grounds for believing that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal has been or is being committed, the Prosecutor shall prepare an indictment containing a concise statement of the facts and the crime with which the accused is charged under this Statute. The Prosecutor shall forward the indictment to the President of the Special Tribunal for confirmation by a Pre-Trial Judge, together with supporting material.

(4) Functional immunity shall not apply before the Special Tribunal.

(5) Where the indictment concerns a head of State, head of government or minister of foreign affairs, the Pre-Trial Judge shall not confirm the indictment and shall order the proceedings be suspended until that person no longer holds that office or an appropriate waiver has been presented to the Special Tribunal. During the suspension, the Pre-Trial Judge shall not otherwise act upon the indictment.

Article 24 – Duties and powers of the Prosecutor with respect to investigations

(1) The Prosecutor shall:

(a) in order to establish the truth, extend the investigation to cover all facts and evidence relevant to an assessment of whether there is criminal responsibility under this Statute, and, in doing so, investigate incriminating and exonerating circumstances equally;

(b) take appropriate measures to ensure the effective investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal and in doing so, respect the interests and personal circumstances of victims and witnesses, including age, gender and health, and take into account the nature of the crime; and

(c) fully respect the rights of persons arising under this Statute.

(2) The Prosecutor may conduct investigations on the territory of a State in accordance with the provisions of Chapter IV of this Statute on international co-operation and mutual legal assistance.

(3) The Prosecutor may:

(a) collect and examine evidence;

(b) request the presence of persons being investigated and witnesses and question them, either in person or by video link;

(c) seek the co-operation of any State or international body, organisation or arrangement in accordance with its respective competence or mandate;

(d) enter into such arrangements or agreements, not inconsistent with this Statute, as may be necessary to facilitate the co-operation of a State or international, intergovernmental or non governmental organisation;

(e) agree not to disclose, at any stage of the proceedings, documents or information that the Prosecutor obtains on the condition of confidentiality and solely for the purpose of generating new evidence, unless the provider of the information consents;

(f) take necessary measures, or request that necessary measures be taken, to ensure the confidentiality of information, the protection of any person or the preservation of evidence;

(g) share relevant information and evidence on potential other criminal offences under national law to the appropriate State authorities where doing so is consistent with applicable law and the interests of justice; and

(h) make public a formal document containing the charges and material facts.

(4) In the conduct of an investigation concerning persons holding office as head of State, head of government or minister of foreign affairs, during their term in office or while an appropriate waiver has not been presented to the Special Tribunal, the measures in paragraph 3 of this article may be taken only insofar as they do not amount to measures of constraint.

Article 25 – Review of the indictment, arrest warrant and pre-trial proceedings

(1) Upon receipt of an indictment for review from the Prosecutor, the President of the Special Tribunal shall designate one judge from the roster to review the indictment as the Pre-Trial Judge.

(2) The Pre-Trial Judge shall review the indictment, which shall contain the charges against the accused. If satisfied that there is sufficient evidence to provide reasonable grounds for believing that a person has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal, the Pre-Trial Judge shall confirm the indictment or, where the indictment is against a head of State, head of government or minister of foreign affairs, suspend the proceedings in accordance with Article 23, paragraph 5, of this Statute. If the Pre-Trial Judge is not satisfied, the indictment or charges therein shall be dismissed.

(3) Upon confirmation of the indictment, the Pre-Trial Judge may, at the request of the Prosecutor, issue orders and warrants for the arrest, detention, surrender or transfer of persons to the Special Tribunal.

(4) Upon the surrender of the person to the Special Tribunal, or the person's appearance before the Special Tribunal voluntarily or pursuant to a summons, the Pre-Trial Judge shall satisfy him- or herself that the person has been duly informed of the crimes which he or she is alleged to have committed, and of his or her rights under this Statute, including the right to apply for interim release pending trial. The case shall thereafter be assigned by the President of the Special Tribunal to a Trial Chamber, from which the Pre-Trial Judge shall be excluded from serving.

Section 3 – Trial

Article 26 – Functions and powers of the Trial Chamber

(1) The Trial Chamber shall ensure that a trial is fair and expeditious and is conducted with full respect for the rights of the accused and due regard for the protection of witnesses.

(2) Upon assignment of a case for trial in accordance with Article 25, paragraph 4, of this Statute, the Trial Chamber shall:

- (a) confer with the parties and adopt such procedures as are necessary to facilitate the fair and expeditious conduct of the proceedings;
 - (b) determine the language or languages to be used at the trial; and
 - (c) subject to any other relevant provisions of this Statute, and in particular Article 24, paragraph 3.e, of this Statute, provide for the disclosure of documents or information not previously disclosed, sufficiently in advance of the commencement of the trial to enable adequate preparation for trial.
- (3) The Trial Chamber shall also be responsible for ruling on any preliminary motions, including challenges to the indictment and jurisdiction, and to make any necessary orders or decisions to ensure the case is prepared properly and expeditiously for trial.
- (4) The Trial Chamber may, if necessary for its effective and fair functioning, refer preliminary issues to the Pre-Trial Judge.
- (5) Upon notice to the parties, the Trial Chamber may, as appropriate, join or sever charges against more than one accused.
- (6) In performing its functions prior to trial or during the course of a trial, the Trial Chamber may, as necessary:
 - (a) require the attendance and testimony of witnesses and production of documents and other evidence by obtaining, if necessary, the assistance of States as provided in this Statute and any relevant co-operation agreements or arrangements;
 - (b) provide for the protection of confidential information;
 - (c) order the production of evidence in addition to that already collected prior to the trial or presented during the trial by the parties;
 - (d) provide for the protection of the accused and of witnesses; and
 - (e) rule on any other relevant matters.
- (7) The Trial Chamber shall have, *inter alia*, the power, on application of a party or on its own
 - (a) rule on the admissibility or relevance of evidence; and
 - (b) take all necessary steps to maintain order in the course of a hearing, including ordering the removal, detention or similar restriction against a non-compliant person.
- (8) The Trial Chamber shall ensure that a complete record of the trial, which accurately reflects the proceedings, is made and that it is maintained and preserved by the Registrar.

Article 27 – Commencement and conduct of trial proceedings

- (1) The Trial Chamber shall read the indictment to the accused, satisfy itself that the rights of the accused are respected and confirm that the accused understands the nature of the charges. It shall afford him or her the opportunity to make an admission of guilt in accordance with Article 29 of this Statute or to plead not guilty.
- (2) Unless otherwise decided by the Trial Chamber in the interests of justice, the examination of witnesses shall commence with questions posed by the presiding judge, followed by questions posed by other members of the Trial Chamber, the Prosecutor and the defence counsel.
- (3) At the trial, the presiding judge may give directions for the conduct of proceedings, including to ensure that they are conducted in a fair and impartial manner. Subject to any directions of the presiding judge, the parties may submit evidence in accordance with the provisions of this Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
- (4) The hearings shall be public unless the Trial Chamber decides to hold the proceedings in camera in accordance with this Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.

Article 28 – Proceedings in the absence of the accused

(1) Where, upon confirmation of the indictment under Article 25, paragraph 2, of this Statute, the accused does not appear before the Special Tribunal, the Special Tribunal may conduct proceedings in his or her absence:

- (a) when he or she has waived his or her right to be present in an unequivocal manner; or
- (b) if all reasonable steps have been taken to secure his or her appearance before the Special Tribunal and to inform the person of the charges and the consequences of his or her non-appearance before the Special Tribunal; and the interests of justice so require.

(2) When hearings are conducted in the absence of the accused, the Special Tribunal shall ensure that:

(a) the accused has been duly notified or served with, or otherwise been given notice through publication in the media or communication to his or her State of residence or nationality of:

- (i) the indictment;
 - (ii) the date, time and place of the hearing; and
 - (iii) the consequences of his or her non-appearance before the Special Tribunal;
- and

(b) the accused has designated a defence counsel of his or her own choosing, to be remunerated either by the accused or, if the accused is proved to be indigent, by the Special Tribunal; whenever the accused refuses or fails to appoint a defence counsel,

such counsel is to be assigned by the Defence Unit with a view to ensuring full representation of the interests and rights of the accused.

(3) In case of a conviction in the absence of the accused, the convicted person shall have the right to a retrial in his or her presence before the Special Tribunal or a successor mechanism, unless he or she:

- (a) has waived in writing his or her right to a retrial; or
- (b) accepts the judgment.

Article 29 – Proceedings on an admission of guilt

(1) Where the accused makes an admission of guilt, the Trial Chamber shall determine whether:

- (a) the accused understands the nature and consequences of the admission of guilt;
- (b) the admission is voluntarily made by the accused after sufficient consultation with his or her defence counsel; and
- (c) the admission of guilt is supported by the facts of the case that are contained in:
 - (i) the charges brought by the Prosecutor and admitted by the accused;
 - (ii) any materials presented by the Prosecutor which supplement the charges and which the accused accepts; and
 - (iii) any other evidence, such as the testimony of witnesses, presented by the Prosecutor or the accused.

(2) Where the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the matters referred to in paragraph 1 of this article are established, it shall consider the admission of guilt, together with any additional evidence presented, as establishing all the essential facts that are required to prove the crime to which the admission of guilt relates, and it may convict the accused of that crime.

(3) Where the Trial Chamber is not satisfied that the matters referred to in paragraph 1 of this article are established, it shall consider the admission of guilt as not having been made, in which case it shall order that the trial be continued under the ordinary trial procedures provided by this Statute and may remit the case to another Trial Chamber.

(4) Where the Trial Chamber is of the opinion that a more complete presentation of the facts of the case is required in the interests of justice, in particular the interests of the victims, the Trial Chamber may:

- (a) request the Prosecutor to present additional evidence, including the testimony of witnesses; or

(b) order that the trial be continued under the ordinary trial procedures provided by this Statute, in which case it shall consider the admission of guilt as not having been made and may remit the case to another Trial Chamber.

(5) Any discussions between the Prosecutor and the defence counsel regarding modification of the charges, the admission of guilt or the penalty to be imposed shall not be binding on the Special Tribunal.

Article 30 – Evidence

(1) Before testifying, each witness shall, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, give an undertaking as to the truthfulness of the evidence to be given by that witness.

(2) The testimony of a witness at trial shall be given in person. For purposes set forth in Article 21 of this Statute or in order to ensure efficiency and cost saving, the Special Tribunal may also permit the giving of viva voce (oral) or recorded testimony of a witness by means of video or audio technology, as well as the introduction of documents or written transcripts, subject to this Statute and in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. These measures shall not be prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused.

(3) The parties may submit evidence relevant to the case. The Special Tribunal shall have the authority to request the submission of all evidence that it considers necessary for the determination of the truth.

(4) The Special Tribunal may rule on the relevance or admissibility of any evidence, taking into account, *inter alia*, the probative value of the evidence and any prejudice that such evidence may cause to a fair trial or to a fair evaluation of the testimony of a witness, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.

(5) The Special Tribunal shall respect and observe privileges on confidentiality and non-disclosure as provided for in this Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.

(6) The Special Tribunal shall not require proof of facts of common knowledge but may take judicial notice of them.

(7) Evidence obtained by means of a violation of this Statute or internationally recognised human rights shall not be admissible if:

(a) the violation casts substantial doubt on the reliability of the evidence; or

(b) the admission of the evidence would be antithetical to and would seriously damage the integrity of the proceedings.

(8) The Special Tribunal shall ensure the protection of personal information as provided for in

the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.

Article 31 – Special rules on evidence collected prior to the establishment of the Special Tribunal or held by States or other entities

(1) Evidence collected prior to the establishment of the Special Tribunal by the competent authorities of Ukraine or any other national authorities, including those of States participating in the International Centre for the Prosecution of the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine (ICPA) in accordance with its mandate as set out in the agreement to establish the Joint Investigation Team, may be received by the Prosecutor in accordance with Chapter IV.

(2) Where the competent authorities of States other than Ukraine hold relevant information or evidence with regard to cases subject to the consideration of the Special Tribunal, the Special Tribunal may seek the co-operation of these States and request the transmission of the relevant information and evidence in accordance with Chapter IV.

(3) Where international organisations or entities hold relevant information, documents or evidence with regard to cases subject to the consideration of the Special Tribunal, the Special Tribunal may seek the co-operation of these international organisations or entities and request the transmission of the relevant information, documents and evidence in accordance with Chapter IV. This paragraph shall also apply to the transmission of evidence from Eurojust, in particular in relation to information and evidence stored in the Core International Crimes Evidence Database in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2018/1727 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 November 2018 on the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust), and replacing and repealing Council Decision 2002/187/JHA.

(4) When deciding on the relevance or admissibility of evidence collected by a State or any other entity, the Chambers shall decide pursuant to this Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. The weight to be given to any such evidence shall be determined by the Chambers.

Article 32 – Offences against the administration of justice

(1) The Special Tribunal shall have jurisdiction over the following offences against its administration of justice, when committed intentionally, by whatever means, including electronic means:

(a) giving false testimony when under an obligation to tell the truth;

(b) presenting evidence that the party knows is false or forged;

(c) corruptly influencing a witness, obstructing or interfering with the attendance or testimony of a witness, retaliating against a witness for giving testimony or destroying, tampering with or interfering with the collection of evidence;

(d) impeding, intimidating or corruptly influencing an official of the Special Tribunal for

the purpose of forcing or persuading the official not to perform, or to perform improperly, his or her duties;

(e) retaliating against an official of the Special Tribunal on account of duties performed by that or another official;

(f) soliciting or accepting a bribe as an official of the Special Tribunal in connection with his or her official duties;

(g) seriously obstructing the proceedings of the Special Tribunal.

(2) The principles and procedures governing the Special Tribunal's exercise of jurisdiction over offences under this article shall be those provided for in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. The conditions for providing international co-operation to the Special Tribunal with respect to its proceedings under this article shall be governed by the domestic laws of the requested State.

Article 33 – Protection of national security information

(1) Any organ of the Special Tribunal shall notify a State when it seeks to disclose information or documents of that State which that State has classified as pertaining to its national security interests.

(2) If a State learns that information or documents provided by the State are being, or are likely to be, disclosed at any stage of the proceedings, and it is of the opinion that disclosure would prejudice its national security interests, that State shall have the right to intervene in order to prevent disclosure of the information.

(3) If, in the opinion of a State, disclosure of information would prejudice its national security interests, all reasonable steps will be taken by the State, acting in conjunction with the Prosecutor, the defence counsel or the Chambers, as the case may be, to seek to resolve the matter by co-operative means.

(4) The above is without prejudice to the right of a State to refuse the execution of a request for disclosure of national security information if it considers that the execution of the request is likely to prejudice its sovereignty, security, *ordre public* or other essential interests.

(5) The principles and procedures governing the application of this article shall be those provided for in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.

Article 34 – Third party information or documents

(1) The Special Tribunal may request a State to provide a document or information in its custody, possession or control, which was disclosed to that State in confidence by another State or intergovernmental or international organisation.

(2) If the requested State informs the Special Tribunal that the originator of the document or information does not consent to disclosure to the Special Tribunal, the Special Tribunal shall endeavour to resolve the issue of disclosure with the originator directly, as appropriate.

(3) The principles and procedures governing the application of this article shall be those provided for in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.

Article 35 – Requirements for decisions

(1) All the judges of the Trial Chamber shall be present at each stage of the trial and throughout their deliberations. The President of the Special Tribunal may designate one or more alternate judges to be present at each stage of the trial and to replace a member of the Trial Chamber if that member is unable to continue attending.

(2) The Trial Chamber's decision shall be based on its evaluation of the evidence and the entire proceedings. The decision shall not exceed the facts and circumstances described in the charges and any amendments to the charges. The Trial Chamber may base its decision only on evidence submitted and discussed before it at the trial.

(3) The judges shall attempt to achieve unanimity in their decision, failing which the decision shall be taken by a majority of the judges.

(4) The deliberations of the Trial Chamber shall remain secret.

(5) The decision shall be in writing and shall contain a full and reasoned statement of the Trial Chamber's findings on the evidence and conclusions. The Trial Chamber shall issue one decision. When there is a lack of unanimity, the Trial Chamber's decision shall contain the views of the majority and the minority. The decision or a summary thereof shall be delivered in open court.

(6) The written decision under this article shall be delivered within ten months from the date the closing statements end, unless special circumstances justify a delivery within fifteen months.

Section 4 – Penalties

Article 36 – Penalties for the crime of aggression

(1) The Trial Chamber may impose the following penalties for the crime of aggression:

(a) imprisonment for a specified number of years, which may not exceed a maximum of thirty years; or

(b) a term of life imprisonment when justified by the extreme gravity of the crime and the individual circumstances of the convicted person.

(2) In addition to imprisonment, the Trial Chamber may order:

- (a) a fine under the criteria provided for in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence;
- (b) the confiscation of instrumentalities, proceeds, property and assets derived directly or indirectly from the crime of aggression, without prejudice to the rights of bona fide third parties.

Article 37 – Transfer of funds collected through fines or confiscation measures

The Special Tribunal shall order funds collected through fines or confiscation measures to be transferred to an international mechanism, giving priority to a compensation mechanism established in accordance with United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/ES-11/5 of 14 November 2022 for reparation for damage, loss or injury, and arising from the internationally wrongful acts of the Russian Federation in or against Ukraine.

Article 38 – Penalties for offences against the administration of justice and sanctions against misconduct

- (1) In the event of conviction for an offence against the administration of justice in accordance with Article 32 of this Statute, the Special Tribunal may impose a term of imprisonment not exceeding five years, a fine in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence or both.
- (2) The Special Tribunal may sanction persons present before it who commit misconduct, including disruption of its proceedings or deliberate refusal to comply with its directions, by administrative measures other than imprisonment, such as temporary or permanent removal from the courtroom, a fine or other similar measures provided for in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
- (3) The procedures governing the imposition of the measures set forth in paragraph 2 of this article shall be those provided for in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.

Article 39 – Determination of the sentence

- (1) In imposing the sentence, the Trial Chamber shall, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, take into account such factors as the gravity of the crime or offence and the individual circumstances of the convicted person, including any mitigating or aggravating factors as well as international human rights law.
- (2) In determining the terms of imprisonment for the crime of aggression provided for in this Statute, the Trial Chamber shall, as appropriate, have recourse to international practice regarding prison sentences.
- (3) In imposing a sentence of imprisonment, the Trial Chamber shall deduct the time, if any, previously spent in detention.

Section 5 - Appeal

Article 40 – Appeal against decision of acquittal or conviction, or against a sentence

(1) A decision of acquittal or conviction may be appealed in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence by the Prosecutor or the convicted person on any of the following grounds:

- (a) procedural error;
- (b) error of fact;
- (c) error of law; or
- (d) any other ground that affects the fairness or reliability of the proceedings or decision.

(2) A sentence may be appealed, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, by the Prosecutor or the convicted person on the ground of disproportion between the crime and the sentence.

Article 41 – Appeal against other decisions

(1) The Prosecutor or a person indicted or convicted by the Special Tribunal may appeal any of the following decisions, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence:

- (a) a decision with respect to jurisdiction;
- (b) a decision granting or denying release of the person being investigated or prosecuted;
- (c) a decision that involves an issue that would significantly affect the fair and expeditious conduct of the proceedings or the outcome of the trial, and for which, in the opinion of the Pre-Trial Judge or Trial Chamber, an immediate resolution by the Appeals Chamber may materially advance the proceedings; or
- (d) other decisions referred to as being subject to appeal in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.

(2) An appeal under paragraph 1 of this article shall not of itself have suspensive effect unless the Appeals Chamber so orders upon request and in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.

Article 42 – Proceedings on appeal

(1) The Appeals Chamber shall have all the powers of the Trial Chamber.

(2) If the Appeals Chamber finds that the proceedings appealed against were unfair in a way that affected the reliability of the decision or sentence, or that the decision or sentence appealed against was materially affected by error of fact or law or procedural error, it may:

- (a) reverse or amend the decision or sentence; or
- (b) order a new trial before another trial chamber.

For these purposes, the Appeals Chamber may remand a factual issue to the original Trial Chamber for it to determine the issue and to report back accordingly, or it may itself call evidence to determine the issue. When the decision or sentence has been appealed only by the person convicted, or the Prosecutor on that person's behalf, it cannot be amended to his or her detriment.

(3) The Appeals Chamber may change a sentence imposed by the Trial Chamber if it considers that the sentence is disproportionate to the crime.

(4) The judgment of the Appeals Chamber shall be taken by a majority of the judges and shall be delivered in open court. The judgment shall state the reasons on which it is based. When there is a lack of unanimity, it shall contain the views of the majority and the minority, but a judge may deliver a separate or dissenting opinion on a question of law.

(5) The Appeals Chamber may deliver its judgment in the absence of the person acquitted or convicted.

Article 43 – Revision of conviction or sentences

(1) The convicted person or, after death, spouses, children, parents or one person alive at the time of that person's death who has been given express written instructions from that person to bring such a claim, or the Prosecutor on the person's behalf, may apply to the Appeals Chamber to revise the final judgment of conviction or sentence on the grounds that:

(a) new evidence has been discovered that:

(i) was not available at the time of trial, and such unavailability was not wholly or partially attributable to the party making the application; and

(ii) is sufficiently important that, had it been proved at trial, it would have been likely to have resulted in a different verdict;

(b) it has been newly discovered that decisive evidence, taken into account at trial and upon which the conviction depends, was false, forged or falsified; or

(c) one or more of the judges who participated in conviction or confirmation of the charges has committed, in that case, an act of serious misconduct or serious breach of duty of sufficient gravity to justify the removal of that judge or those judges from office.

(2) The Appeals Chamber shall reject the application if it considers it to be unfounded. If it determines that the application is meritorious, it may, as appropriate:

(a) reconvene the original Trial Chamber;

(b) constitute a new Trial Chamber; or

(c) retain jurisdiction over the matter;

with a view to, after hearing the parties in the manner set forth in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, arriving at a determination on whether the judgment should be revised.

Article 44 – Compensation to an arrested person

(1) Anyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention on behalf of the Special Tribunal shall have an enforceable right to compensation.

(2) The principles and procedures governing the application of this article shall be those provided for in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.

Article 45 – Release of detained persons

Persons detained in the Special Tribunal's detention facilities in the host State shall not be released in the host State. Instead, they shall be transported to and released in their State of nationality, in the State where they were originally detained, or if they do not have rights of residency in the latter, in a State where they are ordinarily or lawfully resident, or in another State that agrees to accept them.

CHAPTER IV – INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION AND MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE

Article 46 – Co-operation with the International Criminal Court

(1) The Special Tribunal shall co-operate with the International Criminal Court on all matters of mutual concern. The Special Tribunal may conclude agreements or practical arrangements with the International Criminal Court with a view to ensuring the effective exercise of their respective jurisdictions.

(2) Nothing in this Statute shall negate the existing obligations of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to co-operate fully with the International Criminal Court in its investigation and prosecution of crimes within its jurisdiction. Whenever a person subject to an arrest warrant by the International Criminal Court is detained in the detention facilities of the International Criminal Court, the Special Tribunal shall give priority to the proceedings before the International Criminal Court.

Article 47 – Co-operation with the United Nations, international organisations and other relevant international bodies

(1) The Special Tribunal may request the United Nations to provide information or documents, including in accordance with any existing agreements and arrangements between the Council of Europe and the United Nations. The Special Tribunal may ask any other international organisation or other relevant international bodies to provide information or documents.

(2) The Special Tribunal may also request other forms of co-operation and assistance which may be agreed upon with the United Nations, Eurojust or any other relevant organisation or body and which are in accordance with its competence or mandate.

(3) The Special Tribunal may enter into arrangements or agreements with these international organisations or bodies for the purposes defined in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article.

Article 48 – Co-operation and mutual legal assistance

(1) The competent Ukrainian judicial authorities shall, in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement and this Statute, co-operate fully with all organs of the Special Tribunal. They shall facilitate access of the Prosecutor and the defence counsel to sites, persons and relevant documents required for the investigation. The competent Ukrainian judicial authorities shall in accordance with the Agreement and this Statute, comply without undue delay with any request for assistance by any organ of the Special Tribunal including, but not limited to:

- (a) arrest, surrender, transfer or detention of persons;
- (b) execution of requests for mutual legal assistance for the purpose of procuring evidence or transmitting articles to be produced in evidence, records or documents;
- (c) service of documents.

(2) In addition, the Special Tribunal may make requests under any bilateral or multilateral mutual legal assistance agreement entered into by Ukraine or request Ukraine to do so on its behalf, as permitted by the national legislation of the requested State, such as the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (ETS No. 30), its additional protocol (ETS No. 99), its second additional protocol (ETS No. 182) and the Ljubljana–The Hague Convention on International Cooperation in the Investigation and Prosecution of the Crime of Genocide, Crimes against Humanity, War Crimes and other International Crimes.

(3) The Special Tribunal may request the assistance and co-operation from members and associate members of the Management Committee as is necessary for the investigation and prosecution of persons for the crime of aggression against Ukraine.

(4) The Special Tribunal may enter into co-operation agreements or arrangements with members and associate members of the Management Committee for the crime of aggression against Ukraine. Such co-operation agreements or arrangements may, as necessary and appropriate, cover matters such as:

- (a) arrest, surrender, transfer or detention of persons;
- (b) the identification and whereabouts of persons or the location of items;
- (c) the taking of evidence, including testimony under oath, and the production of evidence, including expert opinions and reports necessary to the Special Tribunal;

- (d) the questioning of suspected or accused persons;
- (e) the service of documents, including judicial documents;
- (f) facilitating the voluntary appearance of persons as witnesses or experts before the Special Tribunal;
- (g) the temporary transfer of persons in custody for testimony or other purposes;
- (h) the examination of places or sites, including the exhumation and examination of grave sites;
- (i) the execution of searches and seizures;
- (j) the provision of records and documents, including official records and documents;
- (k) the protection of witnesses and the preservation of evidence;
- (l) the identification, tracing and freezing or seizure of proceeds, property and assets and instrumentalities of crimes for the purpose of eventual forfeiture, without prejudice to the rights of bona fide third parties;
- (m) the implementation of witness protection programmes, including, but not limited to, the provision of assistance in the relocation and safeguarding of witnesses, and ensuring their physical, psychological and emotional well-being; and
- (n) any other type of assistance which is not prohibited by the law of the requested State, with a view to facilitating the investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal.

(5) The Special Tribunal may invite any third State to provide assistance under this chapter on the basis of an agreement or arrangement with such State, an ad hoc arrangement, or any other appropriate basis. Such agreements and arrangements may cover, as necessary and appropriate, the matters enumerated in paragraph 4 of this article.

(6) The Special Tribunal may, upon request, co-operate with and provide assistance to members and associate members of the Management Committee conducting an investigation into or a trial in respect of conduct which constitutes a crime within the jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal, or which constitutes a serious crime under the national law of the requesting State.

CHAPTER V – ENFORCEMENT

Article 49 – Enforcement of sentences

(1) A sentence of imprisonment shall be served in a State that has concluded an agreement to this effect with the Special Tribunal.

(2) If several States have concluded such agreements, the President of the Special Tribunal shall designate the responsible State in any given case, by taking into account the need to ensure fair burden-sharing and after consultation with all States concerned regarding whether they are willing and able to execute the full sentence in compliance with the ruling of the Special Tribunal.

(3) If no State has concluded such an agreement the sentence may be served in Ukraine. Under no circumstances can any prison sentence be enforced in the host State.

Article 50 – Reduction of sentence

(1) The State of enforcement shall not release the person before expiry of the sentence pronounced by the Special Tribunal.

(2) The Special Tribunal shall have the right to decide any reduction of sentence or modification of the modalities for serving the sentence and shall rule on the matter after having heard the person.

(3) The procedures governing the imposition of the measures set forth in paragraph 2 of this article shall be those provided for in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.

CHAPTER VI – FINAL CLAUSES

Article 51 – Rules and regulations of the Council of Europe

The administrative and financial rules and regulations of the Council of Europe are applicable to the Special Tribunal. The Committee of Ministers, upon a proposal by the Management Committee, may approve derogations from applicable Council of Europe rules and regulations if doing so is required for the efficient exercise of the Special Tribunal's functions.

Article 52 – Annual report and audit

(1) The President of the Special Tribunal shall prepare an annual activity report of the Special Tribunal for approval by the Management Committee. This public report shall specify, in particular, the pending and concluded investigations, prosecutions and decisions.

(2) The Registrar of the Special Tribunal shall assist the Secretary General in preparing the annual budget of expenditure of the Special Tribunal, for approval by the Management Committee.

(3) The Secretary General shall draw up the annual accounts of the Special Tribunal in accordance with the Financial Regulations of the Council of Europe (hereinafter “Financial Regulations”). The records, books and accounts of the Special Tribunal, including its annual financial statements, shall be audited annually by an independent auditor, as provided for in the Financial Regulations.

Article 53 – Efficiency and cost-effectiveness

(1) A phased-in approach shall be adopted for the establishment of the Special Tribunal. This includes the following:

(a) in a first phase, the Special Tribunal shall be set up without exercising jurisdiction. During this phase:

- (i) key administrative and support personnel of the Special Tribunal, such as the Registrar and the necessary core staff, shall take up their duties, as appropriate; and
- (ii) judges are appointed to the roster to elect the President of the Special Tribunal and to adopt the Rules of Procedure and Evidence;

(b) in a second phase, upon entry into force of the host State agreement, the Special Tribunal shall proceed with establishing its full judicial structure. The judges, the Prosecutor and the Deputy Prosecutors will take office on a date to be determined in accordance with this Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. Until such a date is set, judges may be convened on an ad hoc basis to address organisational matters and, as necessary, to perform their duties.

(2) As soon as the full judicial structure of the Special Tribunal has been established, the President of the Special Tribunal shall notify the Parties to the Agreement that the Special Tribunal has been constituted in accordance with this Statute. As from this moment, the Special Tribunal shall commence exercising its jurisdiction.

(3) The Special Tribunal shall undertake decisions aimed at ensuring its operations and proceedings achieve efficiency and cost-effectiveness. This includes the following:

(a) the Special Tribunal shall make all arrangements for mutual legal assistance and co-operation as may be necessary for the effective and efficient performance of the functions of the Special Tribunal regarding the reception and use of results of investigations carried out by the judicial authorities of other States into the crimes which are the subject matter of this Statute; and

(b) the Office of the Prosecutor and Registry shall make appropriate arrangements to ensure that there is a co-ordinated transition from investigations and evidence gathering by regional and international mechanisms.

Article 54 – Dissolution of the Special Tribunal upon fulfilment of its mandate and establishment of a residual mechanism

(1) When the President of the Special Tribunal confirms that:

(a) all investigations, pre-trial proceedings, trials and appeals commenced before the

Special Tribunal have been completed and all possible appeal rights in such proceedings have lapsed, excluding any proceedings suspended in accordance with Article 23, paragraph 5, of this Statute; and

(b) in circumstances where a fugitive remains at large, the Prosecutor and the Registrar have taken all reasonable steps to ascertain the fugitive's whereabouts and secure his or her arrest and the proceedings foreseen by Article 28, paragraphs 1 and 2, of this Statute are finished;

the President of the Special Tribunal shall inform the Management Committee of the fulfilment of the mandate of the Special Tribunal, upon which the Management Committee may recommend to the Parties, in accordance with Article 13, paragraph 3, of the Enlarged Partial Agreement, to dissolve the Special Tribunal and to establish a residual mechanism.

(2) Within a reasonable period of time after the recommendation referred to in paragraph 1 of this article and taking into account the transition plan adopted by the Management Committee in accordance with Article 13, paragraph 4, of the Enlarged Partial Agreement, the Parties shall establish a residual mechanism vested with the necessary personnel and financial resources to carry out any remaining prosecutorial functions, remaining judicial functions, including retrials in accordance with Article 28, paragraph 3, of this Statute, as well as to deal with any matters pertaining to:

- (a) the protection of witnesses;
- (b) the supervision of the enforcement of sentences; and
- (c) the processing of requests for early, interim and final release.

(3) The decision by the Parties to dissolve the Special Tribunal shall be effective one hundred and eighty days after the commencement of the functions of the residual mechanism. During this transition period, the Special Tribunal shall co-operate with the Parties to the Agreement and the Management Committee to ensure an orderly winding-down of operations and liquidation of obligations under all related agreements.
